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CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance: 
Empirical Evidence from Listed Banks of Bangladesh 
 
Abstract  
Agency problem occurs due to separation of management and shareholders and 
management compensation and corporate governance have received massive attention in 
academic research to mitigate the agency problem.  Corporate governance acts as a 
mechanism to align the interest of management with shareholders. Management 
compensation and good corporate governance reduce the agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).Corporate governance (including compensation based on performance and 
proper monitoring) and compensation disclosure are the two key instruments to resolve 
agency conflict (Clarkson et al., 2011). Management compensation and corporate governance 
ensure better monitoring, transparency and accountability and meet the company’s objective 
or shareholders demand of value maximization and interest of other stakeholders. Thus, 
management compensation and corporate governance are emerging issues in academic 
research nowadays. 
To date, most of the prior empirical research examined the CEO compensation and 
corporate governance using firms of different countries like US, UK, Australia, Canada, 
Japan, China, and Malaysia etc.  But the research on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance have not been examined yet in the developing country especially in Bangladesh 
in compare to other developed and developing countries. Thus, there is a scarcity of research 
in the field of CEO compensation and corporate governance using data from Bangladeshi 
firms especially in the banking sector.  In Bangladesh, banking sector is growing very fast 
and it is considered as the promising sector due to its contribution to a significant percentage 
in national GDP.  It is well known that banking sector is well structured, comply the rules 
regulation properly and disclosure is higher in compare to other companies in Bangladesh. 
But till now, there is dearth of research study on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance which especially focuses on the determinants of CEO compensation, quality of 
CEO compensation disclosure, the major determinants of CEO compensation disclosure, 
quality of corporate governance and the significant indicators of corporate governance quality 
in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Moreover, there is no database or index to assess the 
quality of CEO compensation disclosure and quality of corporate governance in the listed 
banks. Thus, there is a gap of research especially in the pay and governance literature of 
Bangladesh. This gap of research inspires me to do my research on CEO compensation and 
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corporate governance in listed banks of Bangladesh and filling up the gap is my research 
motivation of this research study. 
This research study tries to address the following research questions in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013:  First, what are the major 
determinants of CEO compensation?  Second, what is the quality of CEO compensation 
disclosure?What are the significant determinants of CEO compensation disclosure? Third, 
what is the quality of corporate governance? What are the significant determinants of 
corporate governance quality?  The first two research questions are related with CEO 
compensation and the third research question deals with corporate governance. The details of 
the research questions, findings, recommendation or suggestions and the implication of the 
researches are described below:  
Firstly, I examine the determinants of CEO compensation in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. To do so, I try to find out whether there is a 
positive relationship between pay and performance. Shareholders are widely dispersed and 
less informed about the business activities which may increase firm wealth and can’t monitor 
the each activity of managers and investment opportunities. But effective corporate 
governance mechanisms monitor the activities of managers and mitigate the agency cost born 
by the shareholders. Thus, I also evaluate the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms through board composition and ownership structures in setting CEO pay.  
Executive compensation research finds that firm size is a significant determinant in CEO 
compensation. I try to find out whether this is also applicable in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh. In short, determinants of CEO compensation are examined through firm 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms (including board composition and ownership 
structures), firm characteristic and external monitoring parameters.This study focuses on to 
find out the relationship between pay and firm performance; evaluates the effectiveness of 
board composition through size of board of directors, the role of independent directors and 
presence of female directors in setting CEO pay; impact of ownership structures through 
institutional investors, foreign investors and director ownership on CEO pay; and effect of 
firm size and firm’s leverage on CEO pay.  
This research finds a positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. 
This result indicates that improvement in firm performance also increase the CEO pay. Board 
size is negatively related to CEO pay which implies large board is effective and restricts the 
CEO pay. This study also finds that independent directors, female directors, institutional 
investors, and directors’ cannot play their monitoring role in setting CEO compensation. CEO 
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pay is higher due to weak corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical result shows that 
firm size is a significant determinant in CEO pay and leverage is negatively associated with 
CEO pay which implies that CEO pay is monitored by the debt holders.  
This study provides some suggestions to improve the pay literature in Bangladesh and 
reduce the agency problem between shareholders and executives. First, only few banks 
disclose the breakdown information of total CEO compensation. This makes difficult to do 
rigorous research by considering all the components of CEO information. The regulatory 
authority should more concentrate on disclosure of executives’ information with breakdown 
in details and performance bonus or incentives should be clearly specified. Second, large 
board is effective in monitoring CEO pay but role of independent directors are not effective 
enough to control the CEO pay. Generally, the banks disclose the information in corporate 
governance checklist that they complies the minimum requirement of independent directors. 
But whether the independent directors are playing their role as independent is a matter of 
question. This study also finds that institutions are not playing their monitoring role in 
limiting the activities of executives and CEO pay. CEO pay is high due to weak corporate 
governance mechanisms in listed banks. Thus, the regulatory authority such as Bangladesh 
Bank and Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) should more emphasize 
on efficient corporate governance mechanisms which will reduce the agency cost of the 
shareholders. Third, in listed banks, board formulates two committees which are executive 
committee and audit committee. Board decides the compensation package of executives and 
collects the approval from Bangladesh Bank. Separate compensation committee is available 
in the firms of developed countries. But in listed banks, there is no separate compensation 
committee. Thus, Bangladesh Bank should introduce separate compensation committee to 
design effective compensation package for the executives. Fourth, this study finds that stock 
option and grants are widely used in US and UK but there are no use of equity based 
incentives like stock option and grant in listed banks of Bangladesh. The regulatory authority 
such as Bangladesh Bank and Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) 
should introduce the option and grant as incentive for the executives. This stock and grant 
will also help to reduce the agency problem between the managers and shareholders.  
This empirical research contributes to the pay literature in many ways: First, there is 
dearth of research studies relating to determinants of CEO compensation in banks of 
Bangladesh. Thus, this study will provide a remedy for the paucity of compensation research 
and will add value to the CEO pay literature in Bangladesh. Second, this paper investigates 
the relationship among CEO pay, firm performance, corporate governance parameters (such 
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as board composition and ownership structure) and external monitoring and multivariate 
analysis has been done considering all the variables. Hence, this multivariate analysis will 
help to understand which factors contribute significantly in determination of CEO pay.  
Third, this study will help to understand the mechanisms of corporate governance systems in 
banks and how it works and to what extent it is effective in determination of CEO pay.  
Finally, the findings of this study will enrich the corporate governance mechanisms and pay 
performance relationship will contribute to work as a better alignment of management and 
shareholders by reducing agency problem in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
Secondly, I examine disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its determinants in 
the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. The specific research 
questions are (1) to examine the disclosure practices of CEO compensation of the listed banks 
by preparing a self structured CEO compensation disclosure index and (2) to examine which 
factors contribute significantly in disclosure practices of CEO compensation. I prepare a self 
structured CEO compensation disclosure index considering compensation policy and process, 
perquisites, bonus and retirement benefit and so on to measure the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation.  I consider firm performance, corporate governance mechanisms including 
board composition and ownership pattern, leverage, firm size, CEO compensation and audit 
quality variables to examine the effect on disclosure of CEO compensation. I want to find out 
the effect of internal firm performance ROA and external firm performance Tobin’s Q on 
CEO compensation disclosure index. To ensure transparency and accountability to the 
stakeholders, I want to examine to what extent corporate governance variables are effective in 
disclosing CEO compensation information. I consider board composition (board size, 
percentage of independent directors and presence of female directors in the board) and 
ownership pattern (institutional investors, ownership hold by directors and foreign investors) 
as the mechanisms of corporate governance.  Moreover, I want to test whether debt holders 
have any bargaining power about disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  Previous studies 
stated that firm size is a significant explanatory variable in disclosing compensation 
information. I want to examine whether firm size is also a significant explanatory variable in 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Empirical 
research also finds that disclosure is more when compensation is less and vice versa. I try to 
find out whether there is any effect of CEO compensation on disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation. Finally, I want to examine whether audit quality has any significant effect on 
CEO compensation disclosure.  
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This study finds that overall CEO compensation disclosure measured by the index is 
very poor but increased over the years as expected. The empirical result shows that firm 
performance (ROA), CEO compensation, director ownership, foreign investors and audit 
quality are the significant explanatory factors for CEO compensation disclosure index. CEO 
compensation disclosure is more transparent when firm performance is high. When firm 
performance is good, they also try to present themselves that they are more accountable to the 
shareholders and attract new investors by disclosing CEO compensation information in more 
details.  This research study shows that disclosure quality of CEO compensation is high when 
CEO receives more compensation. Directors monitoring role is effective in ensuring higher 
disclosure of CEO compensation. Foreign investors are more concerned about their 
investment and they are habituated about the comprehensive disclosure of CEO 
compensation like their home countries and expect same disclosure in listed banks of 
Bangladesh and monitor accordingly. Moreover, this study reveals that disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation is comparatively high when firm is audited by the affiliated audit firms of 
BIG 4. BIG 4 audit firm ensures higher disclosure and transparency to retain their reputation 
in the global market.  But this study also reports that firm size has no significant association 
with CEO compensation disclosure and board size, independent directors, female directors, 
and institutional investors have no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation which means that corporate governance is very weak and inefficient. Creditors 
also don’t have any bargaining power to increase the quality of disclosure of CEO 
compensation.  
This study provides some suggestions to develop the transparency of CEO 
compensation disclosure and thereby, reduce the agency cost and information asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers in the listed banks of Bangladesh. First, Clarkson et al. 
(2006) stated that compulsory disclosure requirements increases high quality disclosures and 
less chance of interpretative judgment. Thus, the regulatory authority should establish a 
comprehensive disclosure guideline including the minimum (mandatory) and voluntary 
disclosure requirement for all the companies. Second, there is no separate compensation 
committee for directors, management and employees in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Thus, 
a separate compensation committee should be established to ensure the transparency and 
accountability of the compensation and disclosure issues. Third, it is also observed that there 
is no change or improvement of disclosure pattern of CEO compensation from 2006 to 2013. 
This implies that the disclosure of CEO compensation in 2013 is same as like in 2006.  Thus, 
the regulatory authority and internal compensation committee should more emphasize on 
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disclosure in details about compensation policy and process, pay performance relation, 
separate disclosure, segregated compensation, variable and fixed elements, compensation of 
peer groups, criteria for setting up salaries, component of perquisites, bonus and other 
benefits, retirement benefits, share based payments etc. and monitor the disclosure practices 
regularly to ensure transparency and accountability to the stakeholders. Finally, the 
regulatory authority should more focus on corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
governance mechanisms should be modernized based on the global market demand and board 
size, female directors, independent directors and institutional investors monitoring role 
should be effective to raise the disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  
This empirical research will contribute to the disclosure literature in many ways: First, 
there is dearth of research studies related to disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh. Thus, this study will contribute to the paucity of CEO 
compensation disclosure research and will add value to the disclosure literature of 
Bangladesh. Second, this study evaluates the self structured CEO compensation disclosure 
index and  the relationship of CEO compensation disclosure index with firm performance, 
corporate governance variables including board composition and ownership pattern, firm 
characteristics, CEO compensation and audit quality using descriptive statistics, correlation 
matrix and multivariate analysis. This analysis and findings will help to understand disclosure 
practices of CEO compensation in the absence of detailed accounting standard and major 
determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Third, the findings of the study will help to regulators, practitioners, researchers and others to 
understand the mechanisms of corporate governance and to what extent the corporate 
governance is effective in disclosing CEO compensation disclosure index and how firms 
should modernize the corporate governance mechanisms to enrich the comprehensive 
disclosure of CEO compensation similar to developed countries disclosure. Finally, this 
finding of the research will help to materialize the transparency and accountability about 
CEO compensation disclosure to the stakeholders and reduce the information asymmetry and 
agency cost by resolving the burning question of public whether CEO receives excess amount 
or not.  
Thirdly, I examine measurement and determinants of corporate governance quality 
considering the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. The specific 
research questions are: (1) what is the quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh? (2) What are the determinants of quality of corporate governance in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh?  To resolve the first research question, I develop an index of corporate 
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governance quality considering ownership information, shareholder rights, financial 
transparency, board, management structure and process, external auditing information, risk 
management information, tax management information, and corporate responsibility, 
compliance and stakeholder information. The overall quality of corporate governance 
provides the information to what extent banks are applying or practicing corporate 
governance attributes. Moreover, corporate governance quality indicates that whether the 
firm is a better governed firm or poor governed firms.  The second research question deals 
with the determinants of quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
Board characteristics such as board size and proportion of independent director, ownership 
structure such as institutional ownership, director ownership and foreign investors, external 
monitoring such as leverage and firm characteristics such as firm size and firm age are 
considered to find out the determinants of corporate governance quality. The determinants of 
corporate governance quality help to asses which factors are important in corporate 
governance quality and which factors are inactive or not playing the significant role in 
improving corporate governance quality.  
To measure the corporate governance quality, a self structured governance index is 
developed including total 285 attributes and divided into eight sub categories using the 
corporate governance guidelines, regulatory requirement of Bangladesh Bank, listing 
requirement, disclosure practices and previous empirical governance literature. The empirical 
study shows that overall corporate governance quality measured by the index is only 52.37% 
which indicates poor quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh 
although it said that banking sector is well organized, highly developed and regulated by 
various laws all over the world. The empirical result finds that quality is higher in shareholder 
rights and external auditing information but quality is lower in board, management structure 
and process; financial transparency; risk management information; and tax management 
information among the sub categories of governance quality. The empirical analysis also 
presents that overall corporate governance quality is drastically increased in 2012 because of 
significant improvement in board, management structure and process and financial 
transparency and information in the annual report. Newly corporate governance guidelines 
2012 include some new issues which have ultimate effect on quality of board, management 
structure and process and financial transparency and information in the annual report. This 
study also observed that governance quality is very low in voluntary attributes and even some 
mandatory attributes are violated by the most of the banks.  This study also investigates the 
determinants of corporate governance quality in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Board 
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characteristics (board size and board independence), ownership structure (institutional 
ownership, director ownership and foreign investors), external monitoring (firm leverage) and 
firm characteristics (firm size and firm age) are considered to measure the determinants of 
corporate governance quality.This study finds that firm size, small board, independent 
director, director shareholdings and newly firms are the significant explanatory variables in 
determining the corporate governance quality but institutional shareholders, foreign investors 
and creditors have no significant monitoring role or power to improve the quality of corporate 
governance.  
This study provides some suggestions based on empirical results to improve the 
governance literature in the listed banks of Bangladesh. First, stakeholders may have more 
demand of voluntary governance information but most of the banks show a poor quality of 
corporate governance in voluntary attributes.  The regulatory authority and banks should 
more focus on voluntary attributes of corporate governance and can  impose as mandatory 
requirement, if necessary, in the corporate governance guidelines.  Second, it is common that 
firms follow the mandatory attributes of corporate governance. But it is evident that listed 
banks are violating even some mandatory attributes of corporate governance. Thus, banks and 
regulatory authority should be more cautious and follow the mandatory attributes and the 
regulatory authority may impose high penalty in violation of mandatory attributes. Third, the 
empirical evidence finds that corporate governance quality is low in terms of board, 
management structure and process; financial transparency; risk management; and tax 
management information. Thus, the banks and regulatory authority should more emphasize 
on overall as well as individual attributes of subcategories of corporate governance and 
impose as mandatory requirement, if necessary, in the corporate governance guidelines.  
Fourth, bank follows the corporate governance guidelines and report “comply or explain” or 
“comply” basis according to corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 respectively. 
Most of the banks disclose the governance related issue in the compliance checklist table by 
giving yes or no type information. But most of the banks do not provide any discussion or 
explanation or notes in details about the governance issue in the governance report or 
director’s report or any part of the annual report. Thus, banks should provide more details 
information voluntarily or the regulatory authority should impose mandatory restriction to 
disclose the governance information with details explanation or discussion.  Fifth, the 
empirical result finds that institutional investors, foreign investors and creditors have no 
bargaining power to improve the quality of corporate governance. They should develop and 
increase their monitoring capacity and bargaining power to increase the corporate governance 
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quality by holding a significant ownership. Sixth, there is no information of tax management 
or compliance, risk management and reporting in the corporate governance guidelines. The 
regulatory authority should include tax management and compliance, risk management and 
reporting information in the governance guidelines to improve the quality of governance. 
Finally, this study finds that some of the mandatory attributes (such as having independent 
directors and minimum number of independent directors) are violated by most of the banks 
but there is no information about the penalty or punishment in the annual report. Moreover, 
there is no information of penalty or punishment in the corporate governance guidelines. 
Thus, the regulatory authority should closely monitor the compliance of governance attributes 
and impose a huge penalty in case of violation of attributes and include a separate segment of 
punishment or penalty in the corporate governance guidelines.  
This empirical research study contributes to the corporate governance literature in 
many ways: First, thereis dearth of research studies relating to corporate governance quality 
and its determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Thus, this study will provide a remedy 
for the paucity of governance research and will add value to the governance literature of 
Bangladesh. Second, this study develops a unique self structured corporate governance index 
as a proxy of corporate governance quality for the banking sector of Bangladesh. Third, this 
study investigates the quality of corporate governance through item wise, category wise, and 
overall analysis over the time period in the banking sector of Bangladesh.  The different types 
of analysis will show that to what extent banks are practicing corporate governance attributes 
and whether they are better governed or worst governed firm. Fourth, this study investigates 
the determinants of corporate governance quality through board characteristics, ownership 
structure, external monitoring and firm characteristics using multiple regression analysis. 
Thus, the regression analysis will help to understand which factors are contributing 
significantly and which factors are inactive or not playing the significant role in improving 
corporate governance quality.  Finally, the findings of this study will help to the regulator and 
policy maker to understand and identify the actual scenario and weakness of corporate 
governance practices. Thus, the regulator may emphasize on weak point of corporate 
governance issues and include some new issues as a mandatory requirement in the corporate 
governance guidelines which will improve the quality of corporate governance in the banking 
sector of Bangladesh.  
The overall research findings, recommendations or suggestions will help to 
understand the practical scenario and provide the guidelines for further improvement in the 
area of CEO compensation and corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
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Moreover, the regulatory authority, policy makers, researchers, practitioners, banks and 
others should more emphasize on the research findings and recommendations of CEO 
compensation and corporate governance and should take necessary action for further 
development or improvement and ensure proper transparency and accountability to the 
stakeholders.  
The following are some issues for future research: First, future research on 
determinants of CEO compensation and disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its 
determinants can be examined considering other determinants like stock return, political 
effect, stakeholder pressure, and legal framework etc. Second, future research can be carried 
out considering qualitative method (such as interview, or questionnaire survey) to find out the 
major determinants of CEO compensation and disclosure quality of CEO compensation. 
Third, researcher may continue future research considering total compensation as well as 
performance incentives based on availability of data in recent periods. Fourth, future research 
on determinants of compensation and disclosure quality of compensation can be done 
considering management and executives other than CEO. Fifth, researcher can apply the 
qualitative approach such as interview and questionnaire survey to measure the quality of 
corporate governance in future.  Sixth, researcher can do further research considering the 
macroeconomic and financial market condition of Bangladesh and the effect of these 
indicators on CEO compensation and corporate governance.  Finally, researcher can also 
examine CEO compensation and corporate governance considering manufacturing firms and 
make a comparative analysis between banking and financial institution and manufacturing 
firms or listed banks of Bangladesh with other listed banks of South Asia.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Outline of the Study 
 
1.1 Background of Research 
Agency problem occurs due to separation of management and shareholders and 
management compensation and corporate governance have received massive attention in 
academic research to mitigate the agency problem.  Corporate governance acts as a 
mechanism to align the interest of management with shareholders. Management 
compensation and good corporate governance reduce the agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance (including compensation based on performance and 
proper monitoring) and compensation disclosure are the two key instruments to resolve 
agency conflict (Clarkson et al., 2011). Management compensation and corporate governance 
ensure better monitoring, transparency and accountability and meet the company‟s objective 
or shareholders demand of value maximization and interest of other stakeholders. Thus, 
management compensation and corporate governance are emerging issues in academic 
research nowadays. 
Managerial compensation plays a pivotal role in motivating, rewarding, and 
disciplining managers to follow and maximize specific firm objectives or shareholders‟ 
wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and Firth et al., 1999). According to agency theory, 
executive compensation should be based on firm performance and as a result earlier empirical 
research mainly focused on the relationship between pay and performance. But the empirical 
evidence is mixed. Most of the prior empirical research examined the relationship between 
pay and performance and effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on executive 
compensation using firm of different countries like US (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon 
and Leach, 1994; Core et al., 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Conyon, 2006), UK  
(Conyon et al.,1995; Conyon and Peck,1998; Ozkan, 2007), Germany (Conyon and 
Schwalbach, 2000; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006),  Australia (Clarkson et al., 2011), Canada 
(Zhou,1999), Japan (Kato, 1997; Basu et al., 2007; Sakawa et al., 2012),  China (Fung et al., 
2001; Firth et al., 2006; Luo and Jackson, 2012), Hongkong (Firth et al., 1999; Cheng and 
Firth, 2006) etc.  But the relationship between top management pay and performance; 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms through board composition and ownership 
structures on executive pay have not been examined yet in developing country like Bangladesh 
especially in the banking sector. 
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Disclosure quality of management compensation plays an influential role to 
stakeholders, researchers, regulators and policymakers to ensure transparency and 
accountability. Shareholders raise the burning question that management receives excessive 
amount from their wealth and therefore, management compensation itself promotes the 
question of agency conflict without adequate disclosure of management compensation.  In 
addition, information asymmetry is boosted up when there is lack of timely and quality 
disclosure of management compensation (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen et al., 2004). Agency 
conflict and information asymmetry enhances the demand of disclosure of management 
compensation to the public and quality disclosure of management compensation limits the 
agency conflict and information asymmetry. Empirical studies documented public disclosure 
of CEO compensation is a norm over the years in developed countries especially in US 
(Andjelkovic et al., 2002), UK (Conyon and Murphy, 2000), Canada (Zhou, 2000) and 
Australia (Merherbi et al., 2006) but most of the countries till do not disclose compensation 
information in public. Similarly, there is dearth of empirical research on how CEO 
compensation disclose in the financial report, compensation policy and process, elements of 
compensation, types of incentives, retirement and long term benefits and relationship of CEO 
compensation disclosure with firm performance, corporate governance, firm characteristics 
and other variables in Bangladesh especially in the banking sector.  
Corporate governance is an emerging issue in academic research and various 
corporate scandals like Enron and Andersen in US and Marconi in UK increases the demand 
of effective corporate governance (Khanchel, 2007). Shareholders, investors, and advisors are 
interested to know the practices and compliance of corporate governance other than financial 
position and performance. There is no uniform policy to define corporate governance quality 
as the code of governance, rules and regulation, and best practices vary based on the firm, 
industry, country and time period. Empirical research on corporate governance quality and its 
determinants are mainly based on US (Khanchel, 2007; Silveira et al., 2009; Turrent and 
Ariza, 2016), UK (Barucci and Falini, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Lazarides and Drimpetas, 
2011), Canada (Gordon et al., 2012), Africa (Waweru, 2014a,b), Korea (Black et al., 2006b) 
and Malaysia (Ariff et al., 2007) and Bangladesh (Biswas, 2012). Most of the researchers 
developed the self structured corporate governance index to assess the quality of corporate 
governance where as only few researchers used the corporate governance index provided by 
rating agencies. In Bangladesh, no rating agency provides the corporate governance index 
and even no database is available to measure the quality of corporate governance. It is said 
that banking sector is highly organized and developed and regulated by various laws. 
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Moreover, corporate governance guideline 2006 is revised in 2012 which includes some 
additional requirement for better governance.  But there is dearth of empirical research study 
of corporate governance quality and its determinants in the banking sector of Bangladesh.  
Therefore, it is evident that most of the empirical research on CEO compensation and 
corporate governance are examined in the developed and other developing countries. But 
there is dearth of research study on CEO compensation and corporate governance in 
Bangladesh especially in the banking sector.  Thus, this research study deals with the CEO 
compensation and corporate governance of the listed banks of Bangladesh.   
 
1.2 Research Question 
The major focus of this thesis is  the CEO compensation and corporate governance of 
the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013 and this research study tries 
to address the following the specific research questions: First, what are the major 
determinants of CEO compensation?  Second, what is the quality of CEO compensation 
disclosure? What are the significant determinants of CEO compensation disclosure? Third, 
what is the quality of corporate governance? What are the significant determinants of 
corporate governance quality?  The first two research questions are related with CEO 
compensation which are explained and resolved in the chapter two and three and the third 
research question deals with corporate governance which is presented and discussed in the 
chapter four.  The details of the research questions are explained below:  
In the chapter 2, I examine the determinants of CEO compensation in the listed banks 
of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. To do so, I try to find out whether there is a 
positive relationship between pay and performance.  Shareholders are widely dispersed and 
less informed about the business activities which may increase firm wealth and can‟t monitor 
the each activity of managers and investment opportunities. But effective corporate 
governance mechanisms monitor the activities of managers and mitigate the agency cost born 
by the shareholders. Thus, I also evaluate the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms through board composition and ownership structures in setting CEO pay.  
Executive compensation research finds that firm size is a significant determinant in CEO 
compensation. I try to find out whether this is also applicable in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh. In summary, determinants of CEO compensation are examined through firm 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms (including board composition and ownership 
structures), firm characteristic and external monitoring parameters.  This study focuses on to 
find out the relationship between pay and firm performance; evaluates the effectiveness of 
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board composition through size of board of directors, the role of independent directors and 
presence of female directors in setting CEO pay; impact of ownership structures through 
institutional investors, foreign investors and director ownership on CEO pay; and effect of 
firm size and firm‟s leverage on CEO pay.  
In the chapter 3, I examine disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its 
determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. The 
specific research questions are (1) to examine the disclosure practices of CEO compensation 
of the listed banks by preparing a self structured CEO compensation disclosure index and (2) 
to examine which factors contribute significantly in disclosure practices of CEO 
compensation. I prepare a self structured CEO compensation disclosure index considering 
compensation policy and process, perquisites, bonus, retirement benefit and so on to measure 
the disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  I consider firm performance, corporate 
governance mechanisms including board composition and ownership pattern, leverage, firm 
size, CEO compensation and audit quality variables to examine the effect on disclosure of 
CEO compensation. I want to find out the effect of internal firm performance ROA and 
external firm performance Tobin‟s Q on CEO compensation disclosure index. To ensure 
transparency and accountability to the stakeholders, I want to examine to what extent 
corporate governance variables are effective in disclosing CEO compensation information. I 
consider board composition (board size, percentage of independent directors and presence of 
female directors in the board) and ownership pattern (institutional investors, ownership hold 
by directors and foreign investors) as the mechanisms of corporate governance.  Moreover, I 
want to test whether debt holders have any bargaining power about disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation.  Previous studies stated that firm size is a significant explanatory variable in 
disclosing compensation information. I want to examine whether firm size is also a 
significant explanatory variable in disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh. Empirical research also finds that disclosure is more when 
compensation is less and vice versa. I try to find out whether there is any effect of CEO 
compensation on disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Finally, I want to examine 
whether audit quality has any significant effect on CEO compensation disclosure.  
In the chapter four, I examine measurement and determinants of corporate governance 
quality considering the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. The 
specific research questions are: (1) what is the quality of corporate governance in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh? (2) What are the determinants of quality of corporate governance in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh?  To resolve the first research question, I develop an index of 
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corporate governance quality considering ownership information, shareholder rights, 
financial transparency, board, management structure and process, external auditing 
information, risk management information, tax management information, and corporate 
responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information. The overall quality of corporate 
governance provides the information to what extent banks are applying or practicing 
corporate governance attributes. Moreover, corporate governance quality indicates that 
whether the firm is a better governed firm or poor governed firms.  The second research 
question deals with the determinants of quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh. Board characteristics such as board size and proportion of independent director, 
ownership structure such as institutional ownership, director ownership and foreign investors, 
external monitoring such as leverage and firm characteristics such as firm size and firm age 
are considered to find out the determinants of corporate governance quality. The determinants 
of corporate governance quality help to asses which factors are important in corporate 
governance quality and which factors are inactive or not playing the significant role in 
improving corporate governance quality.  
 
1.3 Motivation of Research 
To date, most of the prior empirical research examined the CEO compensation and 
corporate governance using firms of different countries like US, UK, Australia, Canada, 
Japan, China, and Malaysia etc. But research on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance has not been examined yet in the developing country especially in Bangladesh in 
compare to other developed and developing countries. Thus, there is a scarcity of research in 
the field of CEO compensation and corporate governance using data from Bangladeshi firms 
especially in the banking sector.  In Bangladesh, banking sector is growing very fast and it is 
considered as the promising sector due to its contribution to a significant percentage in 
national GDP.  It is well known that banking sector is well structured, comply the rules 
regulation properly and disclosure is higher in compare to other companies in Bangladesh. 
But till now, there is dearth of research study on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance which especially focuses on the determinants of CEO compensation, quality of 
CEO compensation disclosure, the major determinants of CEO compensation disclosure, 
quality of corporate governance and the significant indicators of corporate governance quality 
in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Moreover, there is no database or index to assess the 
quality of CEO compensation disclosure and quality of corporate governance in the listed 
banks.  Thus, there is a gap of research especially in the pay and governance literature of 
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Bangladesh. This gap of research inspires me to do my research on CEO compensation and 
corporate governance in listed banks of Bangladesh and filling up the gap is my research 
motivation of this research study.  
 
1.4 Theory and Research Methodology 
1.4.1 Theory  
A theory is defined as a set of interconnected concepts, explanations, and propositions 
that describe or forecast observable fact in focusing the association of the variables. 
Theoretical framework explains, analyze and improve the management compensation and 
corporate governance research. Management compensation and corporate governance are 
considered extensively for theoretical and empirical analysis by the academic researchers in 
last few decades (Murphy, 1999; Lee, 2013). Most of the empirical literature mainly used the 
agency theory due to its principal agent relationship. The most popular theory for CEO 
compensation and corporate governance is also the agency theory.  
Agency theory is formally developed and explained with implications by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Ross (1973) and Fama and Jensen (1983) after the influential improvement 
of agency theory by the Berle and Means (1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) presented the 
theory of the firm which is known as agency theory.  Agency relationship arises when 
managers, as an agent, work on behalf of the shareholders, known as principals, interest. 
Agency relationship is a contract when one party (the principal) engage another party (the 
agent) to perform some service on behalf of the principal‟s interest and delegate decision 
making power from the principal to agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jongsureypart, 2006; 
Al Najjar, 2010; Kruapong, 2011).  Agency conflict arises due to separation of managers and 
shareholders and interest of owners and managers are different by nature. Jongsureypart 
(2006) study stated that agency problem arises due to divorce of ownership and control.  
Agency theory focused on conflict of interest between shareholders and managers because of 
separate ownership and control (Jongsureypart, 2006; Al Najjar, 2010; Lee, 2013; Turrent 
and Ariza, 2016); behavior of shareholders and managers varies about risk and mangers 
choice affect the welfare of the shareholders after delegation of power or control from the 
shareholders to the managers (Jensen, 1986). Shareholders always seek to maximize the value 
of the firm where as managers always seek to maximize their personal benefits.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) study also stated that both the principal and agent will maximize the utility 
and therefore, agent will not work for the best interest of the principal.   
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Agency theory is based on some human assumptions such as rational behavior, self 
maximization behavior, opportunistic attitude, and risk averse and organization assumptions 
such as goal congruence and information asymmetry between principals and agents 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry, 2002; Lee, 2013).  According to agency theory assumption, 
managers always work for self maximization rather than shareholder wealth maximization 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Al Najjar, 2010; Kruapong, 2011) 
because managers are self interested, risk averse and less effort taker (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Davis et al., 1997); and they have more information than the 
shareholders (Adams, 1994) and have different interest or goals (Lee, 2013). Lee (2013) 
study stated that information asymmetry raises the question of principal‟s ability to supervise 
the agent effectively. Adams (1994) study also stated that agents are generally risk averse 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) which create the problem of information asymmetry.  Managers personal 
benefit maximization may affect the right decision making (Short, 2000) and managers also 
involve themselves for ethical behavior and philanthropic activities which may also affect the 
interest of shareholders (Hendry, 2002).  Sapienza et al. (2000) study stated that information 
asymmetry and goal conflict between the shareholders and managers create the agency 
relationship worse.  Agency theory marked that higher ownership concentration leads to 
conflict of interest between the minority and majority shareholders and interest of minority 
shareholders are dominated by the majority shareholders due to absence of strong legal 
structure (Turrent and Ariza, 2016).  Agency relationship faces two major problems such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardlt, 1989; Walker, 1989). The moral hazard 
problem originate due to principal‟s inability to directly monitor the effort of the agent to 
achieve the goal where as  adverse selection problem originate due to principal‟s inability to 
identify the talent or capabilities of the agent during recruitment or tenure (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency cost generate from agency conflict due to separation of ownership from the 
management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) study explained the agency cost such as 
monitoring cost, cost of bonding, and residual loss. The fundamental part of agency theory is 
to reduce the agency problem by aligning the interest of managers with the shareholders.  
Shareholders also have to face the challenge of optimal alignment with the manager at 
minimal cost (Lee, 2013).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) study stated that management compensation and good 
corporate governance reduce the agency problem. Clarkson et al. (2011) study mentioned that 
corporate governance (including compensation based on performance and proper monitoring) 
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and compensation disclosure are the two key instruments to resolve agency conflict. Thus, 
agency theory is the most appropriate theory for CEO compensation and corporate 
governance and the hypothesis are developed for determinants of CEO compensation, 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its determinants and quality of corporate 
governance on the basis of agency theory and prior empirical literature.  
 
1.4.2 Research Methodology  
This empirical research study mainly deals with three questions. The first research 
question tries to find out the determinants of CEO compensation in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh. A total of 236 firm years are considered as sample from the thirty listed banks of 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) during the period of 2006 to 2013. The major sources of data 
of this empirical analysis are the annual report of banks that are available at specific bank 
websites and website of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). All the information is collected from 
directors‟ report, corporate governance report, profit and loss account, balance sheet, and 
notes or any other part of the annual report where it is available. The potential determinants 
are firm performance measures (ROA and Tobin‟s Q); corporate governance mechanisms 
through board composition (board size, independent directors and female directors) and 
ownership structures (institutional ownership, foreign investors and directors‟ ownership); 
firm characteristic (firm size) and external monitoring (debt to total equity). The hypotheses 
are developed on the basis of agency theory and prior empirical research. A pooled cross 
sectional method has been applied to test the hypothesis. The determinants of CEO 
compensation are examined and presented as the main analysis on the basis of CEO pay at 
level models and CEO pay at lagged models. The determinants of CEO compensation are 
reexamined considering the time adjustment, serial correlation, interaction effect, fixed effect, 
and random effect as an additional analysis. The additional analyses are made to cross check 
with the result and findings of the main part.  
The second research question deals with the disclosure quality of CEO compensation 
and its determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh. A total of 236 firm years are 
considered as sample from the thirty listed banks of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) during the 
period of 2006 to 2013. The major sources of data of this empirical analysis are the annual 
report of banks that are available at specific bank websites and website of Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE). All the information is collected from different parts of the annual report 
such as directors‟ report, management discussion and analysis, corporate governance report, 
profit and loss account, balance sheet and notes. A self structured CEO compensation 
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disclosure index is developed on the basis of disclosure guideline and requirements which 
considers the compensation policy and process, perquisites, bonus, retirement benefit and so 
on to measure the quality of CEO compensation disclosure. If the particular information 
related to CEO compensation is disclosed then scores one otherwise zero. The maximum 
score is twenty four if disclosed all information and the minimum score is zero if disclosed 
nothing. Disclosure ranges between zero and one and higher score means higher disclosure.  
The individual score is converted into percentage form to make it clear that to what 
percentage banks are disclosing compensation information in details.  CEO compensation 
disclosure index includes total twenty four attributes from the annual report. The element of 
CEO compensation disclosure index are separate disclosure for CEO compensation, 
compensation process, pay performance relationship, comparative CEO information, 
segregated CEO compensation, relative importance on fixed and variable components of 
CEO compensation, criteria of setting up the salaries for CEO compensation, components of 
perquisites ( perquisites includes house rent, house maintenance, entertainment, utility, 
allowances, special allowances, leave fare assistance, dearness allowance, medical allowance, 
security allowance and others), bonus and other benefits (bonus includes festival bonus, 
performance or incentive bonus), retirement benefits (provident fund and others) and equity 
or share based payments. Firm performance (ROA and Tobin‟s Q), corporate governance 
mechanisms through board characteristics (board size, independent directors and female 
directors) and ownership structures (institutional investors, director ownership, and foreign 
investors) firm characteristics (firm size), external monitoring (debt to total equity), CEO 
compensation and audit quality variables are used as the determinants of the quality of CEO 
compensation disclosure. The hypotheses are developed based on the agency theory and prior 
empirical research. To test the hypothesis, a pooled cross sectional method has been applied 
on disclosure quality of CEO compensation. The disclosure quality of CEO compensation is 
reexamined considering the time dummy, serial correlation, TOBIT regression, fixed effect,  
and random effect as an additional analysis.  The additional analysis has been conducted to 
check the result and findings with the main analysis. 
The third research question deals with the measurement and determinants analysis of 
corporate governance quality. A total of 234 firm years are considered as sample from the 
thirty listed banks of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) during the period of 2006 to 2013. The 
major sources of data of this empirical analysis are the annual report of banks that are 
available at specific bank websites and website of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). All the 
information is collected from different parts of the annual report such as directors‟ report, 
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chairman report, CEO report, management discussion and analysis, corporate governance 
report, risk management report, report of the audit committee, executive committee and risk 
management committee, profit and loss account, balance sheet and notes and any other part 
of the annual report where it is available. To measure the quality of corporate governance, a 
self structured corporate governance index is prepared and divided into eight categories such 
as quality of ownership information; quality of shareholder rights information; quality of 
financial transparency and information in the annual report information; quality of board, 
management structure and process information; quality of external auditing information; 
quality of risk management information; quality of tax management information; and quality 
of corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information considering corporate 
governance guidelines, regulatory requirement of Bangladesh Bank, listing requirement, 
disclosure practices and previous empirical governance literature. The answer of all the 
attributes is collected from the annual report.  If the answer of the attributes is yes (complied 
or disclosed) then score one and all attribute is equally weighted. If the answer of the 
attributes is no then score zero by considering three issues in the annual report such as the 
attribute is not available in the firm or the attribute is available but not material to disclose or 
attribute is available and it is material but the firm chose not to disclose the attribute. This 
study method considers un-weighted method and all attributes of governance are scored 
equally to avoid judgment error. Corporate governance quality is measured by adding the 
score of all attributes of each bank and then total score of each bank is divided by total 
number of attributes and converted into percentage form. Thus, corporate governance quality 
is expressed in percentage form. In this study, board characteristics (such as board size and 
board independence), ownership structures (such as institutional ownership, director 
ownership, and foreign investors), external monitoring (such as firm leverage) and firm 
characteristics (such as firm size and firm age) are considered as the determinants of 
corporate governance quality. The hypotheses are developed based on the agency theory, 
previous empirical literature and applicability in listed banks of Bangladesh. To test the 
hypothesis, a pooled cross sectional method has been applied on the disclosure quality of 
corporate governance. The determinants of quality of corporate governance are examined and 
presented as the main analysis on the basis of corporate governance quality at firm level and 
at lagged models. The disclosure quality of corporate governance is reexamined considering 
the time dummy, serial correlation with firm level model and lagged models, fixed effect and 
random effect as an additional analysis.  The additional analyses are conducted to cross check 
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with the result and findings of the main part of corporate governance quality at firm level 
models and at lagged models.  
 
1.5 Outline of remaining chapters 
This thesis deals with the CEO compensation and corporate governance of the listed 
banks of Bangladesh. The thesis mainly composed of five chapters. The first chapter presents 
the introduction and outline of the study. The second chapter presents the determinants of 
CEO compensation of the listed banks of Bangladesh.  In this chapter, section 2.1 presents 
the introduction; section 2.2 discusses prior research studies; Section 2.3 shows setting CEO 
compensation in banks of Bangladesh; section 2.4 presents the theoretical framework; section 
2.5 explains the selection process of sample; section 2.6 describes the research design 
procedures including hypothesis development, models and variables; section 2.7 describes 
analysis of the results. This section explains the disclosure pattern of CEO compensation in 
annual reports, descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and multivariate analysis; section 2.8 
describes additional analysis considering the time adjustment, serial correlation, interaction 
effect, fixed effect, random effect, and changing the measurement of leverage and section 2.9 
presents conclusion by giving summary of the findings and recommendations. 
The third chapter describes the disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its 
determinants of the listed banks of Bangladesh.  In this chapter, section 3.1 describes the 
introduction; section 3.2 presents the prior research; section 3.3 shows disclosure requirement 
in Asia; section 3.4 presents the theoretical framework; section 3.5 explains selection process 
of sample; section 3.6 describe the research design including hypothesis development, 
regression models and variables; section 3.7 explains the analysis of the results. This section 
includes CEO compensation disclosure index, descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and 
multivariate analysis; section 3.8 discuss the additional analysis considering  time dummy, 
serial correlation effect, alternative method named as TOBIT analysis, fixed effect, random 
effect, changing the  measurement of leverage and modified CEO compensation disclosure 
index. Finally this paper ends with the section 3.9 which presents the conclusion and 
recommendation about the disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh.  
The fourth chapter deals with measurement and determinants analysis of corporate 
governance quality. In this chapter, section 4.1 presents the introduction;  section 4.2  review 
the related  literature  on corporate governance quality and its determinants; section 4.3 
presents the settings applicable for banks which includes legal framework, institutional 
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framework, and corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012; section 4.4  shows 
theoretical framework of corporate governance; section 4.5 presents the sample selection; 
section 4.6 explain the research design including research model, development of hypothesis 
and variables;  section 4.7 describe the analysis of corporate governance quality through 
overall, category wise and item wise analysis over the time period;  section 4.8 discuss the 
analysis of corporate governance quality and its determinants using descriptive analysis, 
correlation matrix and multiple regression analysis;  section 4. 9 explain the additional 
analysis of corporate governance quality and its measurement and section 4.10 presents the 
overall conclusion including recommendations.  
The final chapter deals with conclusion. In the chapter 5, section 5.1 discusses the 
overview of the thesis which mainly describes the research questions and findings; section 
5.2 explains the implications of the research; section 5.3 shows the limitation of research; and 
section 5.4 describes the area of future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Determinants of CEO Compensation 
2.1 Introduction   
Agency problem occurs due to separation of management and shareholders and 
management compensation has received massive attention in academic research to mitigate 
the agency problem.  Corporate governance acts as a mechanism to align the interest of 
management with shareholders.  Management compensation and good governance reduce the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Clarkson et al. (2011) study also mentioned 
that corporate governance (including compensation based on performance and proper 
monitoring) and compensation disclosure are the two key instruments to resolve agency 
conflict.  Agency costs are reduced if managerial compensation is linked to performance 
through payments such as bonuses (Tosi and Mejia, 1989). Managerial compensation plays a 
pivotal role in motivating, rewarding, and disciplining managers to follow and maximize 
specific firm objectives or shareholders‟ wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and Firth et al., 
1999). 
According to agency theory, executive compensation should be based on firm 
performance and as a result earlier empirical research mainly focused on the relationship 
between pay and performance. But the empirical evidence is mixed.  Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) examined sensitivity of executive pay with the increase of shareholder value and find 
that executive receive only $3.25 in every $1000 increase in shareholder value but it is not 
sufficient enough as incentives for managers. Muphy (1999) and Hall and Liebman (1998) 
stated that pay performance sensitivity has increased over time and dominated by stock 
option and stock holdings.  
To date, most of the prior empirical research examined the relationship between pay 
and performance and effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on executive 
compensation using firm of different countries like  US, UK, Germany, Australia, Canada, 
Japan,  China, Malaysia, Hong Kong etc.  Empirical studies with author reference in different 
countries are presented in Table 2-1.  
But the relationship between top management pay and performance; effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms through board composition and ownership structures on 
executive pay has not been examined yet in developing country like Bangladesh. As a result, 
there is a dearth of research using data from Bangladeshi firms. This gap of research inspires 
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me to do my research on CEO pay related to Bangladesh and filling up the gap is my research 
motivation of this study.  
 
Table 2- 1 
List of Executive Compensation Research Papers in Different Region over the World 
Country Research Studies 
US Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Leach, 1994; Core et al., 1999; 
Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Conyon, 2006. 
UK Gregg et al. 1993; Conyon et al.,1995; Conyon and Peck,1998; Ozkan ,2007. 
Australia Izan et al.,1998; Clarkson et al., 2011. 
Canada Zhou, 1999. 
Germany Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006. 
Chaina Fung et al., 2001; Firth et al., 2006; Luo and Jackson, 2012; Lam et al., 2013.  
Japan Kato, 1997; Basu et al., 2007; Sakawa et al., 2012. 
Hongkong Firth et al., 1999; Cheng and Firth, 2006. 
Malaysia Dogan and Smyth, 2002. 
India Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Ghosh, 2003; Parthasarathy et al., 2006. 
 
Banking sector in Bangladesh is growing very fast and it is considered as the 
promising sector due to its contribution to a significant percentage in national GDP.  Banking 
sector is well structured, comply the rules regulation properly and disclosure is higher in 
compare to other companies in Bangladesh. Moreover, CEO information is disclosed 
separately in the financial statements of the banks.  But there is dearth of research study on 
how CEO compensation is determined in listed banks of Bangladesh.   
The research question of this study is to find out the main determinants of CEO 
compensation in listed banks of Bangladesh. To do so, I try to find out whether there is a 
positive relationship between pay and performance.  Shareholders are widely dispersed and 
less informed about the business activities which may increase firm wealth and can‟t monitor 
the each activity of managers and investment opportunities. But effective corporate 
governance mechanisms monitor the activities of managers and mitigate the agency cost born 
by the shareholders. Thus, I evaluate the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms through board composition and ownership structures in setting CEO pay.  
Executive compensation research finds that firm size is a significant determinant in CEO 
compensation. I try to find out whether this is also applicable in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh. These are the main empirical research questions that I seek to address in this 
study.  
This paper contributes to the pay literature in many ways: First, there is dearth of 
research studies relating to determinants of CEO compensation in banks of Bangladesh. Thus, 
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this study will provide a remedy for the paucity of compensation research and will add value 
to the CEO pay literature in Bangladesh. Second, this paper investigates the relationship 
among CEO pay, firm performance, corporate governance parameters (such as board 
composition and ownership structure) and external monitoring and multivariate analysis has 
been done considering all the variables. Hence, this multivariate analysis will help to 
understand which factors contribute significantly in determination of CEO pay.  Third, this 
study will help to understand the mechanisms of corporate governance systems in banks and 
how it works and to what extent it is effective in determination of CEO pay.  Finally, the 
findings of this study will enrich the corporate governance mechanisms and pay performance 
relationship will contribute to work as a better alignment of management and shareholders by 
reducing agency problem in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
The empirical results of this study find that CEO pay is positively associated with 
firm performance. This result indicates that improvement in firm performance also increase 
the CEO pay. Board size is negatively related to CEO pay which implies large board is 
effective and restricts the CEO pay.  Presence of female directors have the positive 
relationship with CEO pay because female directors are appointed by controlling 
shareholders and controlling shareholders decide everything to maximize their self interest 
and female directors have no voice in CEO compensation. This study also finds that 
institutional investors, independent directors and directors‟ can‟t play their monitoring role in 
setting CEO pay. The result indicates that corporate governance is very weak which 
ultimately lead to higher CEO pay.  The empirical result shows that firm size is a significant 
explanatory variable in setting CEO pay. Leverage is negatively associated with CEO pay 
and it indicates that CEO pay is monitored by the debt holders. The results recommend that 
the banks should disclose executive information in more details particularly CEO information 
including performance incentives. Moreover, the regulators or govt. should more emphasize 
on efficient corporate governance mechanisms which will reduce the agency cost of the 
shareholders.  
This research study is structured in the following ways: section 2.2 discusses prior 
research studies; section 2.3 shows setting CEO compensation in banks of Bangladesh; 
section 2.4 presents the theoretical framework; section 2.5 explains the selection process of 
sample; section 2.6 describes the research design procedures including hypothesis 
development, models and variables; section 2.7 describes analysis of the results. This section 
explains the disclosure pattern of CEO compensation in annual reports, descriptive statistics, 
correlation matrix and multivariate analysis; section 2.8 describes additional analysis 
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considering the time adjustment, serial correlation, interaction effect, fixed effect, random 
effect and changing the measurement of leverage and section 2.9 presents conclusion 
including summary of the findings and recommendations. 
 
2.2 Prior Research  
To align the interest of managers and owners, executive compensation plays a pivotal 
role and thereby reduces the agency conflict between the two parties. Executive pay should 
be based on firm performance according to principal agent theory and prior studies finds that 
CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with firm performance (Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Firth et 
al., 1999; Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Cheng and Firth, 2006; Kato and Kubo, 2006; Ozkan, 
2007; Jeppson et al., 2009).  In empirical studies, several proxy like stock return, return on 
assets (ROA), Tobin‟s Q, return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), pretax profit and 
growth are used to measure or compute the firm performance. But other studies find no 
relationship or weak relationship of management compensation with firm performance 
(Conyon et al., 1995; Zhou 1999; Fernandes, 2008; Luo and Jackson, 2012).  
Pay performance relationship varies based on data, models, firms, industry, time and 
country specifications. Some empirical research findings of pay performance relationship are 
described in the Table 2-2.  
 
Table 2-2 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Firm 
Performance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Performance 
Measure 
Findings 
Coughla
n and 
Schmidt 
(1985) 
249 corporations 
and  597 
observations 
considered from 
surveys appearing in 
Forbes magazine 
1977 to 
1980 
 management 
compensation; 
 
 sales growth rates 
 stock price 
performance  
 Sales growth rates and 
stock price are 
positively related to 
compensation. 
Murphy 
(1985) 
 Sample is 72 firms, 
461 executives, and 
4,500 executive-
years from  Fortune 
500. 
1964 to 
1981 
 Each executive‟s 
compensation 
includes salary, 
bonus, salary plus 
bonus, deferred 
compensation, ex-
ante value of stock 
options, and total 
compensation. 
 Stock Return 
 Sales growth 
 Executive compensation 
is strongly positively 
related to corporate 
performance. 
Jensen US data on 2213 1974 to  Change in salary plus  Change in  Positive relationship 
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Table 2-2 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Firm 
Performance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Performance 
Measure 
Findings 
and 
Murphy 
(1990) 
CEOs 1986 bonus 
 Change in total pay 
(salary plus bonus, 
value of restricted 
stock,  saving and 
thrift , plans, and 
other  benefits) plus 
change in value  of 
stock options 
shareholder wealth with CEO pays but very 
small pay performance 
sensitivity. 
Conyon 
and 
Leech 
(I994) 
294 UK companies  I983 to 
1986 
 Change in salary plus 
bonus of highest paid 
director 
 Change in 
shareholder wealth 
 Positive relationship 
with directors pay. 
Conyon 
(1995) 
Sample of 789 listed 
companies in UK 
1980 to 
1993 
 Basic pay of the 
highest paid directors 
(salary plus bonus) 
 Stock market 
performance 
 No relationship between 
stock market return and 
directors pay.  
Conyon 
and 
Peck 
(1998) 
UK Financial Times 
top 100 companies 
by market value 
(referred to as FT-
SE 100 companies) 
1991 to 
1994 
 Compensation of 
highest paid directors 
 Total shareholder 
return 
 Shareholder return is 
positive and significant.  
Core et 
al. 
(1999) 
495 observations for 
205 publicly traded 
US firms  
1982 to 
1984 
 Total compensation 
of CEO  
 Cash compensation of 
CEO 
 Salary of CEO 
 ROA ( ratio of 
earnings before 
interest and taxes 
to total assets for 
the prior year.) 
 Stock Return(% 
stock market 
return for the prior 
year) 
 Positive but no 
significant association. 
 Positive and significant 
association. 
Firth et 
al. 
(1999) 
351 listed companies 
in Hongkong 
1994 to 
1995 
 Pay of the highest 
paid director(CEO) 
 Average executive 
directors pay 
 Average bonus per 
executive director 
 Average bonus pay 
per executive director 
divided by average 
executive director‟s 
pay 
 
 ROSE (Net Profit 
divided by 
Average 
stockholder‟s 
equity) 
 Stock Return 
 
 Significant positive 
association. 
 Little or no statistical 
relationship. 
Ramasw
amy et 
al. 
(2000) 
 Top 150 
manufacturing firms 
in India 
1992 to 
1993 
 Total compensation 
of CEO.  
 ROA   CEO compensation is 
positively related to 
performance. 
Fung et 
al. 
(2001) 
549 listed 
nonfinancial  
companies and 1647 
firm year 
observations in 
chaina 
1998 to 
2000 
 Executive 
compensation 
(highest paid 
executive considered 
as the CEO) 
 ROA 
(Profit/assets) 
 Stock Return 
(Annual return on 
stock) 
 Positive and significant 
association 
 Positive and significant 
association 
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Table 2-2 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Firm 
Performance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Performance 
Measure 
Findings 
Cheng 
and 
Firth 
(2006) 
3024 firm year 
observations  
considering 336 
firms in Hongkong 
1994 to 
2002 
 CEO pay (highest 
paid director treated 
as CEO) 
 Average executive 
director pay 
 Five highest paid 
employees (Top5) 
 Average bonus pay 
per executive director 
 Bonus as a percentage 
of total pay 
 ROE  
 Stock Return 
 
 Positive and significant 
association except top 5. 
 Positive but no 
significant association. 
Firth et 
al. 
(2006) 
549 companies and 
1647 firm year 
observations in 
listed firms of China 
1998 to 
2000 
 Total pay of the CEO  Return on sales 
(operating income 
divided by sales) 
 Stock Return 
 Positive but no 
significant association. 
 Positive but no 
significant association. 
 
Kato 
and 
Kubo 
(2006) 
51 japanese firms 
including 18 listed 
and 33 unlisted 
firms 
1986 to 
1985 
  Cash compensation 
of CEO 
 ROA  
 Pretax profit 
 Growth of sales 
 Positive and significant 
association. 
 Negative and significant 
association. 
 Positive and statistically 
significant association. 
Parthasa
rathy et 
al. 
(2006) 
409 companies of 
BSE 500 index in 
India 
2004   Total Compensation 
of CEO. 
 ROA 
 Incremental ROA 
 NPM (Net Profit 
Margin) 
 Incremental NPM 
 TRS (Total return 
to shareholders) 
 Positive but no 
significant association. 
 Negative and no 
significant association. 
 Positive but no 
significant association. 
 Negative and no 
significant association. 
 Negative and no 
significant association. 
 
Basu et 
al. 
(2007) 
Total of 1083 
executive year 
observations for 174  
firms and 300 
executives in Japan 
1992 to 
1996 
 Top executive pay  ROA (Net 
income/total 
assetst-1 ) 
 RET (annual stock 
return is computed 
by (stock pricet + 
dividend per 
share)/ (stock 
pricet-1)-1, 
adjusted for stock 
splits and stock 
dividends.  
 Positive but not 
significant association. 
 Negative and not 
significant association. 
 
Ozkan 
(2007) 
414 UK firms of 
both financial and 
non financial 
2003 to 
2004 
 Compensation of 
CEO including cash, 
equity and total 
compensation.  
 Stock Return 
 Tobin‟s Q 
 Positive but no 
significant association.  
 Positive and significant 
association. 
Fernand
es 
(2008) 
51 companies  listed 
in Euronext Lisbon, 
Portuguese Stock 
Market 
2002 to 
2004 
 Total board pay 
 Executive board 
member pay  
 Non executive board 
 Stock Return  Board compensation is 
not significantly related 
to firm performance.  
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Table 2-2 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Firm 
Performance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Performance 
Measure 
Findings 
member pay 
Jeppson 
et al. 
(2009) 
200 companies in 
the database 
complied by Equilar 
2006 to 
2007 
 Total CEO 
compensation 
includes base salary, 
cash bonuses, perks, 
stock awards and 
option awards. 
 Company Revenue 
 Change in net 
income 
 Change in Total 
shareholder return 
 Firm performance 
measured by company 
revenue is only 
significant factor in 
determining base salary, 
cash bonuses, perks, 
and the value of stock 
awards. 
Luo and 
Jackson 
(2012) 
12,184 observations 
including 142 
financial firms listed 
in Shanghai and 
Shenzen stock 
exchanges, Chaina  
2001 to 
2009 
 Average 
compensation of three 
highest paid 
executives and  
 total compensation of 
management team 
 ROA  (Ratio of 
Earnings before 
interest and taxes 
to total assets) 
 Stock Return 
 Positive but no 
significant association 
 No significant 
association. 
 
 
Bushman and Smith (2001) stated that both accounting profitability measures and cash 
compensation are less used in pay performance sensitivity of top management.  Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) study reported that incentives are not sufficient enough for executives as pay 
performance sensitivity is very small. Hall and Leibman (1998) study stated that pay 
performance sensitivity is double for stock option and stock holdings where as pay 
performance sensitivity is very small for cash compensation.   Bushman et al. (1998) study 
also observed that stock return is more emphasized in determining cash compensation rather 
than earnings.  Total sensitivity of executive wealth changes to shareholder wealth and this 
change is dominated by stock and stock option holdings (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Kaplan 
(1994) reported that total compensation is associated with both accounting earnings and stock 
returns. Murphy (1999) find that companies used both financial and non financial measures in 
bonus plans for executives and most of the company uses a single measurement like revenue, 
net income, pretax income or operating profit. Jeppson et al. (2009) stated that firm 
performance is measured by total company revenue which is a significant factor in determining 
base salary, cash bonuses, perks and the value of stock awards.  Elasticity of annual cash 
compensation is 0.2 to 0.3 with respect to sales and this range is fixed over firms, industries, 
countries and time (Rosen, 1992). It is evident from the previous research findings that 
accounting profitability measures are used as firm performance measure and cash 
compensation are extensively used in management compensation but later stock return as 
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firm performance measure and stock option as management remuneration are mostly used in 
many firms.  
Corporate governance plays a pivotal role in management compensation 
(Parthasarathy et al., 2006). Luo and Jackson (2012) stated that executive compensation and 
corporate governance are associated with each other. Agency problem can be reduced by both 
management compensation and corporate governance mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  Kim and Nofsinger (2007) study stipulated the need of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms in the firm because agency conflict may not resolve using only management 
compensation incentives. Core et al. (1999) study documented that CEO receives high 
compensation when firm‟s corporate governance is weak. The executive compensation is 
positively related with firm performance but negatively related with corporate governance 
mechanisms (Lazarides et al. 2008). Some empirical research findings between CEO pay and 
corporate governance mechanisms are discussed in the Table 2-3.  
 
Table 2-3 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Corporate Governance 
Measure 
Findings 
Boyd 
(1994) 
193 firms in 12 
industry groups 
1980  Total cash 
compensation 
including base 
salary, bonus and 
long term or 
deferred income.  
 Level of board control 
consists of CEO 
duality; ratio of 
insiders on the board; 
institutional 
ownership; outside 
directors in the board 
and level of director 
compensation 
 CEO compensation is 
inversely related to the 
levels of board control.  
Mehran 
(1995) 
153 
manufacturing 
firms  
1979-
1980 
 Percentage of total 
compensation that 
is equity based 
 
 Percentage of equity 
held by managers 
 Percentage of equity 
held by outside block 
holders 
 Percentage of outside 
directors  
 Negative relationship 
between percentage of 
executives‟ equity based 
compensation and 
percentage of equity 
holdings.  
 Outside block holders use 
less equity based 
compensation.  
 Outsiders on the board 
make greater use of 
equity based 
compensation.  
Conyon 
(1997) 
213 large UK 
companies 
1988 
and 
1993 
 Top director 
compensation  
 Compensation 
committees 
 Separation of CEO and 
chairman 
 Companies adopt 
compensation 
committees have lower 
director compensation.  
  Company having 
separate CEO and 
chairman play no role in 
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Table 2-3 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Corporate Governance 
Measure 
Findings 
director compensation.  
Cosh 
and 
Hughes 
(1997) 
UK electrical 
engineering 
industry 
1989 to 
1994 
 Executive pay  Presence of 
institutional 
shareholders. 
 Presence of non 
executive directors. 
 Presence or absence of 
institutions or non 
executive directors has 
no influence on 
executive pay.  
Conyon 
and 
Peck 
(1998) 
UK Financial 
Times top 100 
companies by 
market value 
(referred to as 
FT-SE 100 
companies) 
1991 to 
1994 
 Compensation of 
highest paid 
directors 
 Proportion of outside 
directors  
 Existence of 
compensation 
committee  
 Proportion of outsiders 
on compensation 
committee 
 CEO duality 
 Board monitoring 
measured in terms of 
proportion of outside 
directors on the board, 
presence of compensation 
committee and proportion 
of outside directors on it, 
and CEO duality had 
only a limited effect on 
directors pay.   
Core et 
al. 
(1999) 
495 observations 
for 205 publicly 
traded US firms  
1982 to 
1984 
 Total 
compensation of 
CEO  
 Cash 
compensation of 
CEO 
 Salary of CEO 
 Board Structure  (CEO 
is board chair; Board 
Size; inside directors; 
outside directors 
appointed by CEO; 
gray outside directors; 
interlocked outside 
directors; outside 
directors over age 69; 
busy outside directors) 
 Ownership Structure 
(CEO percentage stock 
ownership; non CEO 
insider owns 5%;  % of  
stock ownership per 
outside director; 
outside block holder 
owns 5%) 
 CEO duality, board size, 
gray outside directors, 
interlocked outside 
directors, outside 
directors appointed by 
the CEO, outside 
directors over age 69, 
busy outside directors, 
have the positive and 
significant relationship 
with CEO pay.  
 Total compensation has a 
significant negative 
association with the 
percentage of inside 
directors.  
 All ownership variables 
are negatively and 
statistically significant.   
Firth et 
al. 
(1999) 
351 listed 
companies in 
Hongkong 
1994 to 
1995 
 Pay of the highest 
paid 
director(CEO) 
 Average executive 
directors pay 
 Average bonus per 
executive director 
 Average bonus 
pay per executive 
director divided by 
average executive 
director‟s pay 
 
 Director Ownership 
 Family ownership 
 Proportion of non 
executive directors 
 Institutional 
Shareholding  
 
 Director ownership is 
negatively related to pay 
and the result is 
statistically significant.  
 Family ownership is 
negatively and 
statistically significant to 
pay.   
 Non executive director is 
positively associated with 
pay but statistically 
significant for director 
pay and bonus pay. 
 Institutional shareholders 
are associated with lower 
pay and the result is 
significant. 
Ramasw  Top 150 1992 to  Total  CEO duality  CEO duality and 
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Table 2-3 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Corporate Governance 
Measure 
Findings 
amy et 
al. 
(2000) 
manufacturing 
firms in India 
1993 compensation of 
CEO considering 
natural logarithm 
form 
 Proportion of insider 
directors 
proportion of insider 
directors had no 
significant association 
with CEO compensation 
in family-owned firms 
but did play a key role in 
non-family organizations. 
Fung et 
al. 
(2001) 
549 listed 
nonfinancial  
companies and 
1647 firm year 
observations in 
chaina 
1998 to 
2000 
 Executive 
compensation 
(highest paid 
executive 
considered as the 
CEO) 
 Foreign ownership 
 Govt. control firms 
 Proportion of non 
executive directors 
 Size of BOD 
 
 Foreign ownership is 
positively and 
significantly associated 
with CEO pay.  
  CEO pay is negatively 
and statistically 
associated with govt 
ownership. 
 Non executive directors 
are negatively associated 
but not significant.  
 Board size is negatively 
and statistically 
associated with CEO pay.   
Hartzell 
and 
Starks 
(2003) 
1,914 firms 
included on the 
Standard & 
Poor's 
ExecuComp 
database 
1992 to 
1997 
 Level of pay 
(salary) and total 
director 
compensation 
which includes  
salary, bonus, 
long-term 
incentive plan 
payouts, stock and 
option grants, and 
others  for up to 
five top executives 
in each firm 
 Institutional equity 
holders 
 Institutional ownership is 
negatively related to level 
of compensation i. e. 
institutional investors 
play their monitoring 
role.  
Cheng 
and 
Firth 
(2006) 
3024 firm year 
observation 
considering 336 
firms in 
Hongkong 
1994 to 
2002 
 CEO pay (highest 
paid director 
treated as CEO) 
 Average executive 
director pay 
 Five highest paid 
employees (Top5) 
 Average bonus 
pay per executive 
director 
 Bonus as a 
percentage of total 
pay 
 Percentage of stock 
ownership of directors 
(excluding 
independent and 
nonexecutive 
directors) 
 Percentage of  stock 
ownership by outside 
investors that exceed 
5% of the outstanding 
shares (Block 
ownership) 
 Proportion of 
independent non 
executive directors 
 Percentage of stock 
ownership of 
independent non 
executive directors  
 Pay is negatively related 
to director shareholdings. 
 Pay is negatively related 
to block holder 
shareholdings.  
 Positive coefficient but 
no significant 
relationship of proportion 
of independent non 
executive directors with 
pay. 
 Positive coefficient but 
no significant 
relationship of percentage 
of stock ownership of 
independent non 
executive directors with 
pay. 
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Table 2-3 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Corporate Governance 
Measure 
Findings 
Parthasa
rathy et 
al. 
(2006) 
409 companies of 
BSE 500 index in 
India 
2004  Total 
compensation of 
CEO 
 Separation of power 
between Chairman and 
CEO 
 Presence of owner-
managers on the board  
 Proportion of 
Independent directors 
 Proportion of 
institutional 
shareholdings 
 Positive but no 
significant relationship  
 Positive and statistically 
significant relationship 
 Negative and not 
significant relationship 
 Positive and statistically 
significant relationship.  
Basu et 
al. 
(2007) 
Total of 1083 
executive year 
observations for 
174  firms and 
300 executives in 
Japan 
1992 to 
1996 
 Top executive pay  Board Size (Number of 
directors on the board)  
 Outside directors on 
the board (1 if at least 
one director otherwise 
0). 
 Percentage of shares 
owned by all directors 
 Keiretsu group (1 if 
firm belongs to one of 
the eight corporate 
groups otherwise 0.) 
 Main bank (1 if  a 
firms largest lender is 
also the largest 
shareholders among 
banks) 
 
 Pay is positively related 
to board size but not 
significant.  
 Presence of outside 
directors is negatively 
and statistically 
significant with pay. 
 Pay is positively and 
statistically significant 
with director ownership.  
 Top executive 
compensation is, on 
average, lower for 
keiretsu firms than non 
for non keiretsu firms and 
pay is negatively related 
with keiretsu group but 
not significant. 
 Pay is positively related 
to main bank but not 
significant.  
Ozkan 
(2007) 
414 UK firms of 
both financial 
and non financial 
2003 to 
2004 
 Compensation of 
CEO including 
cash, equity and 
total 
compensation.  
 Board Size 
 Non executive  
director ownership 
 Institutional ownership 
 Block holder 
ownership 
 Director ownership 
 Board size is positively 
and statistically 
significant with CEO 
pay.  
 Non executive directors 
pay their CEOs higher 
compensation.  
 Institutional and block 
holder ownership have a 
significant and negative 
impact on CEO 
compensation.  
 CEO compensation is 
lower when director 
ownership is higher. 
Fernand
es 
(2008) 
51 companies  
listed in Euronext 
Lisbon, 
Portuguese Stock 
Market 
2002 to 
2004 
 Total board pay 
 Executive board 
member pay  
 Non executive 
board member pay 
 Non executive 
directors  
 Compensation is higher 
when companies have 
more nonexecutive 
directors i.e. monitoring 
is weak. 
Croci et 
al. 
754 listed firms 
with 3731 firm 
2001 to 
2008 
 CEO 
compensation 
 Total institutional 
ownership including 
domestic and foreign 
 Institutional ownership is 
associated with higher 
levels of CEO cash and 
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Table 2-3 
Summary of Studies on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Compensation 
Measure 
Corporate Governance 
Measure 
Findings 
(2012) year observations 
from 14 countries 
in Continental 
Europe 
including total, 
cash, equity and 
equity ratio.  
(equity ratio 
means ratio of 
equity based 
compensation to 
total 
compensation) 
ownership 
 Board Size 
 Proportion of 
independent non 
executive directors 
 Board busyness 
 CEO age 
total compensation. 
 Relationship between 
board Size and CEO 
compensation is positive 
and significant.  
 A positive and significant 
relation between 
proportion of 
independent directors and 
CEO compensation level. 
Independent directors 
push for a higher equity 
ratio which indicates 
positive relationship. 
 Busy boards offer a 
higher level of CEO total 
and cash compensation 
and have a higher 
fraction of equity based 
compensation. 
 CEO age is negative and 
significant in total 
compensation and equity 
ratio. 
Luo and 
Jackson 
(2012) 
12,184 
observations 
including 142 
financial firms 
listed in 
Shanghai and 
Shenzen stock 
exchanges, 
Chaina  
2001 to 
2009 
 Average 
compensation of 
three highest paid 
executives and  
 total compensation 
of management 
team 
 Ownership 
concentration indicated 
by single, five and ten 
largest shareholders 
 State ownership 
 Compensation 
committee 
 Ownership concentration 
is negatively associated 
with compensation. 
 State ownership is also 
negatively associated 
with executive 
compensation.  
 Compensation committee 
has the positive 
association with 
compensation.  
Sakawa 
et al. 
(2012) 
312 executive 
data from 200 
listed firms of 
stock exchange 
in Japan in 
nonfinancial 
firms 
2010  Incentive of 
executive 
compensation in 
three modes: 
Total, short term 
and long term 
incentives.  
 Foreign ownership 
 Internal control 
mechanism  of Firms 
with committee 
systems (compensation 
committee) 
 Firms with higher degree 
of foreign ownership 
have effective incentive 
compensation. 
 Firms with committees 
only facilitate short term 
incentive package.   
 
 
Boards play a crucial role in determination of management compensation (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998). Board provides a governance safeguard in 
managerial employment contract (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Core et al. (1999) study 
shows that small board restricts executive pay. They also added that large board is associated 
with less effective monitoring.   Andjelkovic et al. (2000) stated that large board is not 
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effective in setting executive pay. They explained that critical evaluation, effective decision 
and implementation of new policy are comparatively difficult for companies having large 
board. On the other hand, Fung et al. (2001) study finds that large board is effective and CEO 
compensation is restricted by large board in Chaina.  
Cheng and Firth (2006) stated that the effectiveness of the board depends on the non 
executive directors. Higher numbers of independent directors assure effective monitoring and 
restrict managerial power to act against shareholders (Parthasarathy et al., 2006). But other 
studies find very small effect of board of directors (including executive and non executive 
directors) with CEO pay (Finkelstein et al., 1989; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Conyon et al., 
1998; Boyd, 1994). Non executive directors do not restrain top management pay and may 
actually increase the pay because outside directors are indebted to the management which implies 
lack of independence ( Cheng and Firth , 2006).  Croci et al. (2012), Ezammel and Watson 
(2002), Lorsch and MacIver (1989) also find that independent directors increase the higher pay of 
top management.  
Recently, gender diversity becomes a new research theme in ensuring effective 
corporate governance mechanisms around the world.  Gender diversity in the boardroom 
increases public debate (Carter et al., 2003).  In US, the average percentage of female 
directors increased by 9.6% in 20 years. (Farrell and Hersch, 2005) and this result implies 
that female directors create value to the firm. Pathan and Faff (2013) find that average 
percentage of female director increase 5.2% in 1997 to 11.96% in 2011 in US but female 
representative in the board remains significantly lower than nonbanking firms. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) study observed that attendance of female directors in board meeting are 
higher.  Carter et al. (2003) study finds that firm performance is positively associated with 
presence of female directors.  Liang et al. (2013) stated that gender diversity increases firm 
performance with weaker governance but decreases shareholder value with strong 
governance.  
Executive pay is also affected by ownership concentration. When block holder ownership 
is high they try to monitor the operations of firm and create pressure to discipline executive pay 
due to their large investment in the firm but if the ownership structures are widely dispersed, 
individual shareholders can‟t create any pressure on management. CEO compensation is low 
when ownership concentration is high (Core et al., 1999; Cyert et al., 1997). Conyon and Leech 
(1994) found no evidence that the ownership structure had a significant impact on changes in pay.  
Allen (1981) and Lambert et al. (1993) find that managerial compensation is lower when insider 
ownership is high. Ozkan (2007) study finds a negative association between CEO compensation 
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and director ownership. He stated that if managers having stock ownership, then they might have 
less demand of equity incentive compensation. Basu et al. (2007) study find top executive pay is 
positively and statistically significant with director ownership.  Sakawa et al. (2012) find that 
firms with a higher degree of foreign ownership have the effective incentive compensation 
packages.  
Georgen and Renneboog (2001) and Stapledon (1996) study examined to what extent 
institutions are effective in monitoring and disciplining in UK firms  and find that institutions 
are passive investors and institutional monitoring is not an important governance mechanism. 
Ozkan (2007) study document that institutional investors owned around  80%  of UK equity in 
2004 and find that institutional investors and block holder shareholder are  negatively associated 
with level of total CEO and cash compensation . This result implies that they are active and apply 
their monitoring role in restricting the compensation.  Firth et al. (1999) and Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) studies also find a negative relationship between CEO pay and institutional investors. But 
some studies find a positive relationship between CEO pay and institutional investors (Croci et 
al., 2012; Fernandes et al., 2012; Parthasarathy et al., 2006).  
Management compensation also acts as a instrument to resolve the agency conflict 
between owners and debt holders. John et al. (2010) study report that bank CEO‟s pay 
performance sensitivity is declining in line with the leverage. Houston and James (1995) 
conducted the study in banking industry and find that CEO receives low cash compensation 
when there is a high leverage ratio.  Fung et al. (2001) study report that CEO pay is 
negatively associated with leverage. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) also observed that during 
financial trouble, CEO pay performance sensitivity is low. Director compensation is 
negatively associated with leverage (Bryan et al., 2000).  
Firm size is the most important factor in management compensation and included as 
explanatory variable for compensation studies (Murphy,  1998; Ramaswamy et al., 2000; 
Parthasarathy et al., 2006; Lazarides et al., 2008). Most of the empirical studies find that firm 
size is positively and significantly associated with executive compensation (Conyon, 1997; Core 
et al.,  1999; Fung et al.,  2001;  Ghosh, 2003). Larger firms pay their executive comparatively 
high compensation due to their large size in terms of sales or profit.  Kato and Rockel (1992) 
also find the positive relationship between firm size and level of Japanese management 
compensation. Most of the countries have the positive relationship between pay and size 
(Firth et al., 1996, 1999) and in some cases size is the only significant variable.   
Firm discloses the executive information mandatorily to follow the rules and regulation 
and in some cases disclose voluntarily to inform the shareholders and other interested users.  
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Coulton et al. (2001) find that more information of executive compensation disclosed by the large 
firms and disclosure is more transparent when CEO pay is less but disclosure is relatively less 
when CEO pay is high. Nagar et al. (1999) stated that the form of compensation and in particular 
the relative proportion of equity based compensation influences managers disclosure practices. 
Stakeholders create pressure in setting management pay, only when they have the evidence of 
compensation information. Andjelkovic et al. (2002) stated board faces less pressure due to 
absence of disclosure of executive pay information. Kamery (2004) finds that disclosure of 
executive compensation information changes the determinants of pay.  
The above literature review indicates that empirical studies of management compensation 
and its determinants are examined in most of the developed and developing countries other than 
Bangladesh. But there is dearth of research literature related to management compensation in 
Bangladesh. It is difficult to say whether management compensation and its determinants are 
same or not in the developing country like Bangladesh.  Thus, this is the gap of research in pay 
literature particularly in Bangladesh. This research study will fill up the gap by examining the 
behavior of CEO compensation, components of compensation, performance incentives, and 
major determinants of CEO compensation.   
 
2.3 Setting CEO Compensation in Banks of Bangladesh 
Executive compensation information is not disclosed properly in many countries and 
even pay setting process is also not clear or transparent. Board of the director decides the 
CEO pay without the approval of shareholders. Most of the firms form a compensat ion 
committee comprised of nonexecutive directors or outsiders to determine the executive pay 
(Firth et al., 1999). Main et al. (1995) stated that compensation committee may not play the 
independent role due to reciprocal relationship with the executive directors. Firth et al. (1999) 
stated that executive compensation is also determined by comparing the size and industry of 
the similar group. Firth et al. (1999) also find that in UK, firms are adopting cadbury 
committee‟s recommendation on corporate governance and setting the top level 
compensation.  Pay setting process is determined by the boards, or compensation committee 
or corporate governance guidelines or peer group review. This pay setting process also varies 
from industry to industry and country to country.  
In Bangladesh, CEO pay setting process in listed banks is different from other 
countries. There is no separate compensation committee for the executive compensation. The 
board of directors of the bank appoints the competent Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with 
the approval of Bangladesh Bank. Bank companies require approval of Bangladesh Bank in 
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respect of appointment, dismissal, release or removal of Bank CEO in accordance with Bank 
Companies Act 1991 (15(4)). Board of directors should appoint an honest, efficient, 
experienced and suitable CEO to obtain confidence of the depositors, strengthen the financial 
base and ultimately ensure better good governance. 
After submission of required documents, Bangladesh Bank reviews the resume, terms 
and conditions, and compensation facilities during the tenure of the CEO and finally approve 
for final appointment1. Bangladesh Bank gives the instruction for CEO compensation and all 
the listed banks have to ensure the following instructions2:  
1. Bank financial condition, area of operation, business volume, earning capacity of 
the bank, CEO‟s qualification, age, experience and peer banks compensation 
should be considered in fixing the salary and allowances of the CEO.  
2. Total monthly salary should be determined and total salary should be comprised of 
direct salary covering basic pay, house rent, festival allowance, other allowances 
and other facilities like provident fund, leave fare facilities, utility expenses should 
be specified in Taka.  
3. Terms of salary allowances and other facilities that specified in the terms and 
conditions of appointment can‟t be changed during the tenure but in case of 
renewal, salary can be newly fixed considering the job performance of the CEO.  
4. CEO should not entitle any other direct and indirect facilities (e.g. dividend, 
commission, club expenses etc.) other than salary allowances and other facilities 
that are mentioned in (2).  
5. CEO has to pay the tax and bank will not pay the income tax of the CEO and CEO 
is not allowed to provide service above age of 65.  
 
But banks do not disclose the pay setting process clearly and total executives 
information is disclosed in the financial statements in total. Only few banks disclose the total 
executive   information in details with incentive information. In Bangladesh, there are no uses 
of stock options like other countries. CEO can‟t hold any shares as per bank regulation and 
no opportunity to earn dividend income and capital gain. CEO receives basic salary, house 
rent,  house maintenance, medical allowance, provident fund, bonus and other facilities and 
components of CEO compensation varies bank to bank and performance of CEO.  
                                                             
1  Source: BRPD (Banking Regulation and Policy Department) circular letter no- 3, dated February 1, 2006.  
 
2 Source : Bangladesh Bank 
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2.4 Theoretical Framework 
A theory is defined as a set of interconnected concepts, explanations, and propositions 
that describe or forecast observable fact in focusing the association of the variables. 
Theoretical framework explains, analyze and improve the management compensation 
research. Management compensation research is considered extensively for theoretical and 
empirical analysis by the academic researchers in last few decades (Murphy, 1999; Lee, 
2013). Most of the empirical literature mainly used the agency theory due to its principal 
agent relationship. The most popular theory for CEO compensation is the agency theory. 
 Management compensation has received massive attention in academic research to 
mitigate the agency problem which occurs due to separation of management and 
shareholders.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) study stated that agency problem is reduced by 
aligning the interest of managers and shareholders through management compensation. 
Management compensation should be linked to firm performance in order to stimulate the 
CEO to maximize shareholders‟ wealth. This pay performance relationship is the basic 
principle of principal agent theory (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Baker, 1992; Kaplan, 1994).  
Agency costs are reduced if managerial compensation is linked to performance through 
payments such as bonuses (Tosi and Mejia, 1989). Managerial compensation plays a pivotal 
role in motivating, rewarding, and disciplining managers to follow and maximize specific 
firm objectives or shareholders‟ wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Firth et al., 1999). 
Moreover, corporate governance plays a pivotal role in management compensation 
(Parthasarathy et al., 2006). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) study provided that executives try to 
maximize their self interest from the shareholder resources. But effective corporate 
governance protects the shareholders wealth. Luo and Jackson (2012) stated that executive 
compensation and corporate governance are associated with each other. Agency problem can 
be reduced by both management compensation and corporate governance mechanisms 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Boards also play a crucial role in determination of management 
compensation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998). Board provides a 
governance safeguard in managerial employment contract (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
Board effectiveness depends on the presence of nonexecutive directors in the board (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Core et al., 1999). Higher numbers of independent directors 
assure effective monitoring and restrict managerial power to act against shareholders 
(Parthasarathy et al., 2006). Executive pay is also affected by ownership concentration. 
Management compensation also acts as an instrument to resolve the agency conflict between 
owners and debt holders. Thus, management compensation and corporate governance 
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mechanisms through board characteristics and ownership structures protect the interest of the 
shareholders and reduce the agency problem.  
 In summary, agency theory requires in reducing the agency problem: compensation 
should be based on firm performance; board characteristics and ownership structures act as an 
instrument of corporate governance to restrict the CEO pay and protect the interest of 
shareholders; chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should be different 
individuals (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; McColgan, 2001; 
Biswas, 2012); separate audit committee; presence of higher number of independent directors 
in the board and audit committee (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; 
McColgan, 2001; Biswas, 2012).  
 
2.5 Selection Process of Sample  
In Bangladesh, banking companies started its banking activities after independence in 
1971.  At the initial stage, three forms of banks were operated and they were known as 
nationalized commercial banks (six banks), state owned specialized banks (two banks) and 
foreign banks (three banks). Banks are currently operating are classified as scheduled bank 
and nonscheduled bank in Bangladesh. Scheduled banks have to follow the Bank Company 
Act, 1991 (amended in 2003) and non scheduled banks were established for special and 
definite purpose. The number of scheduled and non scheduled banks is fifty six and four 
respectively. Scheduled banks are further classified into state owned commercial banks 
(SCBs), specialized banks, private commercial banks (PCBs) and foreign commercial banks 
(FCBs)3 . Only thirty private commercial banks shares are traded in stock exchange and  
listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). In this study, only the listed commercial banks of 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) are considered because only listed banks have to comply Bank 
Company Act 1991 (amended in 2003), Company Act, 1994, regulation from the central bank 
known as Bangladesh Bank (BB) guidelines, corporate governance guidelines and disclosure 
policy issued by the regulatory body named as Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC).  
Total 236 firm years are considered as sample from the thirty listed banks of Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) during the period of 2006 to 2013.  Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC), the regulatory authority, introduced corporate governance 
guideline in 2006 and corporate governance guideline (amendment) in 2012 to ensure proper 
                                                             
3  Source : Bangladesh Bank 
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monitoring and governance by the firms. All the banks have to prepare the corporate 
governance compliance checklist since 2006. Only few banks disclose the corporate 
governance information in details voluntarily.  The sample of the listed banks is given in the 
Table 2-4.  
 
Table 2-4 
Listed Banks of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
No. Name of the Bank 
1 ARAB BANGLADESH BANK 
2 AL-ARAFAH ISLAMI BANK  
3 BANK ASIA 
4 BRAC BANK 
5 CITY BANK 
6 DHAKA BANK  
7 DUTCH-BANGLA BANK 
8 EASTERN BANK 
9 EXIM BANK 
10 FIRST SECURITY ISLAMI BANK 
11 ICB ISLAMIC BANK  
12 IFIC BANK 
13 ISLAMI BANK BANGLADESH 
14 JAMUNA BANK 
15 MERCANTILE BANK  
16 MUTUAL TRUST BANK  
17 NATIONAL BANK  
18 NCC  BANK  
19 ONE BANK  
20 PREMIER BANK 
21 PRIME BANK 
22 PUBALI BANK 
23 RUPALI BANK 
24 SHAHJALAL ISLAMI BANK 
25 SOCIAL ISLAMI BANK  
26 SOUTHEAST BANK  
27 STANDARD BANK  
28 TRUST BANK 
29 UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 
30 UTTARA BANK  
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2.6 Research Design 
2.6.1 Hypotheses Development 
Determinants of CEO compensation are examined on the basis of prior empirical 
research and managerial theories of the firm. In this study, level of CEO compensation is 
used and the only one dependent variable is the total CEO remuneration. The potential 
determinants of CEO pay that I examine are performance measures (ROA and Tobin‟s Q); 
corporate governance mechanisms through board composition (board size, independent 
directors and female directors) and ownership structures (institutional ownership, foreign 
investors and directors‟ ownership); firm characteristic (firm size) and external monitoring 
(debt to total equity). The hypotheses are developed based on the prior empirical research and 
described below:  
 
Firm Performance 
Executive compensation should be linked to firm performance in order to stimulate 
the CEO to maximize shareholders‟ wealth. This pay performance relationship is the basic 
principle of principal agent theory (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Baker, 1992; Kaplan, 1994).  
There is a positive relationship between executive compensation and firm performance 
(Coughlin and Schmidt, 1985; Murphy 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Ramswamy et al., 2000) but other studies find that there is no relationship or weak 
relationship between firm performance and executive compensation (Conyon et al., 1995; 
Zhou, 1999; Fernandes, 2008; Luo and Jackson, 2012).  
Empirical research mainly used ROA (return on assets), ROE (return on equity), 
Tobin‟s Q, stock return, net interest margin, sales revenue, pretax profit, growth etc for 
performance measure and pay performance sensitivity. Empirical evidence finds mixed result 
by using the same performance measures in different parts of the world. The reason is 
explained by Luo and Jackson (2012) and they stated that pay performance relationship 
varies based on different data, institutions and model specifications.  Kato and Long (2006) 
find that there is little relevant study about executive compensation and CEO equity 
incentives in emerging economies.  Moreover, there is dearth of research study how CEO pay 
is determined in the listed banks of Bangladesh in compare to the developed countries. To 
align the interest of managers with the interest of owners, agency theory says that manager‟s 
compensation work as a function of firm performance (Kaplan, 1994; Murphy, 1985, 1999).  
Thus, I develop my first hypothesis in this way:   
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Hypothesis 1:      Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between firm performance   
and CEO pay.  
 
Hypothesis 1(a):  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between ROA (return on 
assets) and CEO pay. 
 
Hypothesis 1(b):  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
CEO pay. 
 
In this study, two types of firm performance measures named as internal 
performance and external performance are used. Internal performance is measured by 
Return on Assets (ROA) and external performance is measured by Tobin‟s Q. CEO always 
try to maximize the profitability and mainly use ROA because it is more reliant and under 
control of managers. But the problems are ROA reflect only short term performance at the 
expense of long term prospects and ROA can be manipulated via changing accounting 
method or falsification of accounting numbers by the managers. The second performance 
measure, Tobin‟s Q, represents growth and market value of the firms. Ozkan (2007) find 
that Tobin‟s Q is positively and significantly associated with CEO pay which implies that 
higher growth opportunities pay higher compensation to CEO.  Tobin‟s Q considers the 
market price of shares which is difficult to manipulate and reflect the business operations 
and long term profitability. The disadvantages are share price of Tobin‟s Q is unstable and 
outside control of managers. But it is more common to use return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin‟s Q as performance measures in compensation literature.  
 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Shareholders are widely dispersed and can‟t control the activities of managers and 
less informed about the investment opportunities that may increase shareholders wealth. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) study provided that executives try to maximize their self interest 
from the shareholder resources. But effective corporate governance protects the shareholders 
wealth. Corporate governance ensures how the firm will be directed and monitored. 
Corporate governance effectively monitor and control the activities of self serving behavior 
of managers and their investment activities which are not possible to identify and evaluate by 
the general shareholders. Thus, firms have developed governance and reporting mechanism 
to mitigate the agency cost borne by shareholders.  Agency problems are greater due to weak 
corporate governance mechanisms which ultimately lead to higher CEO compensation in US 
firms (Core et al., 1999). Basu et al. (2007), using 174 large Japanese firms, also find that top 
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executive pay is higher in firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms. Ozkan (2007) 
stated that corporate governance mechanisms such as board composition and ownership 
structures have the influence on compensation policy and reduce the agency conflicts 
between executives and shareholders. Therefore, effective corporate governance mechanisms 
(including board composition and ownership structures) are important for controlling managerial 
compensation. 
 
Board Composition 
Board Size 
Board of director is the apex body to formulate policies, strategy and monitoring activities 
of a company. Empirical studies stated that a company‟s board is the primary internal corporate 
governance mechanism responsible for setting management compensation, design and 
implementation of incentive system and monitoring senior management (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1988, 1996; Lorsch, 1989; Jensen, 1993; Tosi, and Mejia, 1997). The board of 
directors has the power to control the activities of CEO and restrict CEO compensation. Jensen 
(1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) study find that small boards are more effective than large 
boards. Firm value and performance is a decreasing function of board size (Yermack , 1996).  
Studies related to US find that large board size is not effective in monitoring the CEO‟s 
compensation but Fung et al. (2001) stated that firms with a large number of directors tend to 
restrain CEO compensation.  Large board increased the monitoring capability and having more 
business expertise in the board reduces the decision making power of CEO (Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Guest, 2008).  
In Bangladesh, the size of board member should not be less than 5 and not more than 20 
according to corporate governance guideline 2006 and corporate governance guideline 
(amendment) 2012.  The empirical evidence shows that small board is effective where as some 
other papers report that large board is effective in restricting the CEO pay. This indicates that 
empirical evidence is mixed and thus I develop the hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the size of the board 
of directors and CEO pay.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the size of the 
board of directors and CEO pay.  
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In this study, I consider the natural logarithm of number of directors in the board to find 
out the relationship of board members with CEO pay.   
 
Independent Directors 
Board effectiveness depends on the presence of nonexecutive directors in the board 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Core et al., 1999). It is assumed that non executive 
independent directors are effective and independent and work on behalf of the shareholders 
interest.  Weisbach (1988) provides evidence that the greater the number of outside directors 
on the board, the stronger the corporate governance of the firm. Consistent with Weisbach 
(1988), the effectiveness of the independent non executive directors depends on their 
proportional representation on the board (Conyon and Peck, 1998).  Independent directors have 
added incentive to closely monitor the managers when they own relatively high stockholdings 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Parthsarathy et al. (2006) stated that presence of the higher number of 
independent directors in the board ensures proper monitoring of the firm and limits managerial 
power to act against the interest of the shareholders. Corporate governance literature indicates 
that there is a negative relationship between proportions of nonexecutive directors and top 
management pay but empirical evidence is mixed (Boyd, 1994; Kren and Kerr, 1997). Some 
studies find a significant positive relationship of proportion of nonexecutive director with the 
CEO pay (Croci et al., 2012; Firth et al., 1999; Lambert et al., 1993; Ezammel and Watson, 
2002; Cheng and Firth, 2006).  The reason for positive relationship can be explained in several 
ways: first, performance of the executive is outstanding, so nonexecutive directors increase 
their compensation.  Second, nonexecutive directors are not effective due to indebted to the 
management which implies that they are not independent (Cheng and Firth, 2006). Third, non-
executive directors increase CEO pay and use it as a comparison benchmark when they 
renegotiate their own compensation at the firms or during their working period (Fung et al., 
2001). 
In listed banks of Bangladesh, there must be at least one tenth of independent director in 
the board (minimum one) according to corporate governance guideline 2006. But corporate 
governance guideline 2012 revised it and changes made for independent directors from one tenth 
to one fifth of the board. This change implies that the regulatory authority emphasizes more on 
the presence of independent directors in the board to play the monitoring role on behalf of the 
shareholders. Parthasarathy et al. (2006) stated that presence of independent directors serves 
as internal monitoring mechanism to restrict the action of managers and uphold the interest of 
shareholders. The number of board size is minimum five and maximum twenty where as 
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number of independent director ranges from one tenth to one fifth. It is difficult to play the 
effective monitoring role by small number of independent directors. Moreover, independent 
directors receive only meeting fee which is not sufficient enough to play their supervisory 
role. Thus, I assume that role of independent directors will not be effective enough to restrict 
the CEO pay and develop my next hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between independent 
directors and CEO pay. 
 
In this study, I try to find out the relationship between percentage of independent 
directors and CEO pay and percentage of independent director is computed by the number of 
independent directors divided by number of total directors with the CEO pay.  
 
Female Directors 
Earlier empirical research rarely focused on the presence of female directors in the 
board.  Nowadays, gender diversity or proportion of female directors in the board also plays a 
crucial role in effective governance of banks. Female directors‟ representation on boards is 
increasing over the year in banks which indicate female directors create value of the firm. 
Robinson and Dechant (1997) stated that female directors are hard workers and having good 
communication skills with problem solving and decision making capacity in the entire board. 
Eagly and Carli (2003) find that females reach to directorship position and demonstrate that 
they are highly proficient, diligent, and sincere about responsibilities and take best 
preparation before board meeting and improve board effectiveness. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) examined the role of female directors and find that female directors are regular in 
board meeting and try to join in monitoring committees. Smith et al. (2006) represent the 
importance of presence of female directors in the board and find that female directors are 
efficient in decision making due to their better understanding capability of the market and 
their presence in the board increase the image of the firm that ultimately contribute in firm 
performance. They also find that presence of female members in the board also increase other 
board members understanding of the business environment. Carter et al. (2003) finds a 
positive relation between percentage of female directors and firm performance.  This implies 
that firm performance is good when there is a presence of female directors in the board. If the 
firm performance is good then CEO will expect positive return from the banks.  
In Bangladesh, females‟ involvement is increasing in the corporate sector and they 
demonstrate their capability by participating in the board of directors. The number of female 
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directors in the banking sector is also increasing over the years because they have the 
capacity to effectively manage the business. On the other hand, it is also argued that most 
female directors are appointed by the controlling shareholders and in this situation, generally 
female directors work on behalf of the interest of the controlling shareholders and they have 
no voice or remain silent in the board. Thus, I assume that a positive relationship between 
female directors and CEO pay and develop my hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the female directors 
and CEO pay.  
 
In this study, I consider the percentage of female directors in the board to find out the 
effect of gender diversity. Percentage of female directors is computed by the number of 
female directors in the board divided by the number of total directors in the board.  
 
Ownership Structures 
Ownership structures have the influence on executive compensation. Family 
ownership, block holder share ownership, top ten or top five percentage share ownership,  
institutional ownership, directors ownership are mainly used as proxy for ownership 
structures in empirical research. But in this study, three categories of ownership structures 
such as institutional ownership, foreign investors and director ownership are examined on 
CEO compensation in listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 
Institutional Shareholdings 
Institutional investors are normally banks and financial institutions and hold a large 
percentage of ownership of the firms and monitor the activities of the management. 
Individual investors can‟t create pressure on management due to their less investment as well 
as dispersed ownership structure. But institution plays a significant role as a large block 
holders and control the discretionary decision making power of management and executive 
compensation. Parthasarathy et al. (2006) study stated that institution plays an active role in 
the shareholder meetings of the company, voice their opinion and ensure that managers need 
to win their support on matters that require shareholder approval. They also said that 
institution can play a monitoring role like independent directors by restricting compensation 
of CEO and other executives if it is unfavorable for the shareholders. Firth et al. (1999) and 
Ozkan (2007) find that institutional shareholders are associated with lower CEO pay which 
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means that higher level of institutional share holders restrain CEOs from awarding himself 
very high compensation.  
The empirical evidence is mixed. There is a positive relationship between pay and 
institutional shareholding which implies that monitoring role of institutional shareholders is 
either weak or absent (Parthasarathy et al., 2006).  Fernandes et al. (2012) observed a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and CEO pay both in US and around the world 
and explained that institutional investor‟s push for a higher fraction of equity based 
incentives.  Croci et al. (2012) stated that institutional ownership is associated with high 
levels of CEO cash and total compensation in continental Europe, especially in family firms. 
They also added that institutional investors encourage firms to provide performance based 
compensation to their CEOs.    
In this study, only listed banks are considered and institutional owners of these banks 
are peer groups i.e. other banks and financial institution in the same industry.  It is assumed 
that institutional owners may not play their monitoring role effectively in restricting the CEO 
pay in the same industry. Moreover, institution may motivate to provide performance based 
compensation to the CEO. Thus develop my hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the shareholdings of   
institutional shareholders and CEO pay. 
 
Directors Shareholdings 
Directors are the top executive body in a firm. Directors also hold the shares of the 
firm and they are treated as the inside owners. Directors are more active and concern about 
business activities when they have share ownership in the firm.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
stated that director shareholdings stimulate to reach best firm performance. When directors 
have the ownership, they can earn through cash and stock earnings.  Directors can earn 
dividend and capital gain from the shares. Therefore, they have less demand of cash 
compensation to align the interests of executives and shareholders.  Ozkan (2007) study finds 
that CEO receives low compensation when director ownership is high. Firth et al. (1999) find 
that there is a negative relationship between director shareholdings and director‟s pay.  Since 
director earns rewards based on stock price performance so they receive low cash 
compensation and no controversy over excessive pay exists. There is also empirical evidence 
of positive relationship between director shareholdings and directors pay.  Basu et al. (2007) 
study find positive and statistically significant relation between top executive pay and director 
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ownership which implies that top executive earned higher income when board owns a higher 
percentage of shares.  Moreover, director holds the executive positions and decide their own 
compensation which give raise the excessive compensation.  
In listed banks of Bangladesh, directors have the scope to earn both dividend and 
capital gain from the shares but CEO can‟t hold any shares as per bank regulation. Thus, 
there is no scope to earn dividend and capital gain from share price. CEO only receives the 
cash compensation rather than stock earnings. The empirical evidence of the relationship 
between director ownership and CEO compensation is mixed. Thus, I want to examine the 
relationship between directors‟ ownership and CEO pay in the listed banks of Bangladesh 
and thus develop the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the proportional 
shareholdings of directors and CEO pay. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between the proportional 
shareholdings of directors and CEO pay. 
 
In this study, percentage of shares held by all directors in the board is considered. The 
percentage of ownership of director is computed by number of shares hold by all directors 
divided by total number of shares outstanding.  
 
Foreign Ownership 
Foreign investors are more concerned about their investment and they demand high 
quality and better qualified executive in managing the business and expect a good return from 
their investment. This demand leads to a positive relationship between CEO pay and the 
presence of foreign investors. If the performances of the executives are outstanding, foreign 
investor want to pay a good amount in response of their performance. Sakawa et al. (2012) 
study stated that the role of foreign ownership is expected to facilitate greater incentives for 
top executives because stock option adoption is likely to be greater in firms with more foreign 
ownership. They also find that regarding long-term incentives, foreign shareholders are 
expected to facilitate stock based incentive compensation. Uchida (2006) examined the 
relation between stock option adoption and foreign shareholding and described a positive 
relation between the stock option compensation and foreign shareholding. Fung et al. (2001) 
stated that CEO pay is higher because foreign shareholders demand to hire the best possible 
professional managers.  
In Bangladesh, foreign investors‟ investment in the banking sector is increasing day 
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by day. But there is no scope of using stock option or stock based incentive schemes for the 
CEO. As the foreign investors are concerned about their investment, they demand highly 
talented candidate as CEO and have the interest to pay high compensation. Thus, I develop 
my next hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 7: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the presence of 
foreign ownership and CEO pay.  
 
Percentage of foreign ownership is computed by the number of shares hold by the 
foreign investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding.  
 
External Monitoring 
Leverage 
Firm value can be increased by controlling the agency cost related to debt and equity 
which are borne by the owners of the firm. Fung et al. (2001) study finds that executive 
compensation and capital structure are used to reduce the agency cost of equity and debt. Debt 
holders are more active and play their monitoring role when management activities are against 
of their interest. There is comparatively less research to find out the relationship between 
executive compensation and leverage ratio.  Leverage is used as proxy of external monitoring in 
compensation related empirical research.  Previous studies used different ways to compute the 
leverage ratio such as debt to equity ratio, debt to total assets, long term debt divided by total 
assets, long term debt divided by total equity etc.  Previous research find that there is a negative 
relationship between leverage and pay performance sensitivity of the CEOs in banking 
industry (Houston and James, 1995; John et al., 2010).  John and Qian (2003) find that CEO 
has low pay performance sensitivity in the banking industry in compare to manufacturing firms 
and this difference due to debt ratios between two firms.  John and John (1993) observed that 
debt holders control the firms and decision making power of management when there is 
existence of external debt. Firms with high leverage try to avoid stock options (Kato et al., 
2005). Fung et al. (2001) document that CEO receives low compensation when firms have 
high debt ratios and this indicates that debt holders create pressure on the board and CEO. 
In listed banks of Bangladesh, there is no use of stock options for CEO compensation.  
Debt holders have the monitoring capacity to restrict the CEO pay when CEO‟s performance 
and activities are against the interest of the debt holders. Thus, I assume a negative 
relationship between debt holders and CEO pay and develop my next hypothesis as:  
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Hypothesis 8: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between leverage and CEO 
pay.  
 
In this study, leverage is used as proxy of external monitoring and leverage is 
measured by debt to equity ratio. Debt to equity ratio is computed by book value of total debt 
divided by book value of total equity.  
 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size 
In compensation studies, firm size plays a significant role in determination of 
executives‟ compensation. Earlier research used total assets, natural logarithm of total assets, 
market capitalization, natural logarithm of market capitalization, sales turnover, interest 
revenue, capital employed etc. as proxy of firm size. There is a positive relationship between 
firm size and executive compensation (Conyon, 1997; Core et al.,  1999; Fung et al.,  2001; 
Ghosh, 2003; Parthasarathy et al., 2006; Lazarides et al., 2008). Firth et al. (1996 and 1999) 
stated that pay size relationship is observed all around the world where research has been 
conducted. Larger firms pay higher compensation to the CEO (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; 
Ozkan, 2007).  
It is common that large firms will pay high compensation to the executives because of 
huge amount of sales (interest revenue) or profit in large firms. In listed banks of Bangladesh, 
I also assume this positive relationship between firm size and CEO pay following the prior 
studies (Conyon, 1997; Core et al.,  1999; Fung et al.,  2001) and thus develop my 
hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 9: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
pay.  
 
In this study, natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy of firm size.  
 
2.6.2 Models 
In this study, it is observed that the sample size is not equal in each year, and the sample 
size ranges twenty six to thirty during the study period, and number of observations is 
comparatively less in total. Thus, to get the larger sample size and greater variation which 
reduces the standard error, this study applies the pooled cross sectional method to test the 
hypothesis. The CEO pay model is developed following the methodology used by the Luo 
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and Jackson (2012) and Kato et al. (2007) studies. This model determines the proportionate 
effect of independent variables on dependent variable named as CEO pay rather than Taka 
value effect.  
 
LNTCEOP =   β0 + β1Performance + β2 Board Composition + β3Ownership   Structures 
+ β4 External monitoring+ β5 Firm Characteristic + ɛ 
 
where LNTCEO represents the natural logarithm of total CEO compensation. Total 
CEO pay is rightly skewed and transformed into natural logarithm of total CEO pay to adjust 
the normality of total pay. Previous empirical studies of other countries related to 
Compensation also considered the logarithm form of compensation.  Firm performance is 
divided by internal and external performance following Core et al. (1999). Internal 
performance is explained by ROA and external performance is represented by Tobin‟s Q 
which considers the market value of shares and growth of the firm. 
 
The models are further restructured on the basis of above equation: 
 
  LNTCEOP = β0 + β1 ROA + β2 LNBSIZE + β3 ID + β4 FEDIR + β5 INT+ β6 OWNDIR 
+β7FINVTR+β8DEBT2TE+β9LNASSET+ɛ ………………………….(1) 
 
LNTCEOP = β0 + β1 TOBIN‟S Q + β2 LNBSIZE + β3 ID + β4 FEDIR + β5 INT+ β6 
OWNDIR+β7FINVTR+β8DEBT2TE+β9LNASSET+ ɛ………….…..(2) 
 
LNTCEOP = β0 + β1 ROA +β2 TOBIN‟S Q + β3 LNBSIZE + β4 ID + β5 FEDIR + β6 
INT+β7OWNDIR+β8FINVTR+β9DEBT2TE+β10LNASSET+ ɛ……..(3) 
 
Where 
LNTCEOP = Natural Logarithm of Total CEO pay.  
ROA = Return on Assets. ROA is calculated by net profit before tax divided by 
average total assets. In this study, only banks are considered as sample and 
main source of income of banks are interest income. Thus, interest is not 
deducted from net profit before tax.  
Tobin‟s Q = Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total assets minus book value of 
total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets.  
LNBSIZE = Natural Logarithm of number of board size.  
ID = Percentage of independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of 
independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors.  
FEDIR = Percentage of female directors in a board. It is measured by number of 
female directors in a board divided by total number of directors. 
INT = Percentage of ownership held by institution. It is computed by number of 
shares owned by institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding.    
OWNDIR = Percentage of shares ownership held by all directors in a board. It is 
computed by number of shares owned by all directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.   
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FINVTR = Percentage of ownership held by foreign Investors. It is computed by 
number of shares owned by foreign investors divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. 
DEBT2TE = Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity.  
LNASSET = Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy 
of firm size.  
 
Definition of variables and their expected relationship with CEO pay are given in the 
Table 2-5.  
Table 2-5 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variables Variables Explanation  Predicted 
Relationship 
Compensation    
CEO Compensation LNTCEOP Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Pay  
    
Performance 
 
   
Return on Assets ROA  Net Profit Before Tax/ Average Total 
Assets 
Positive 
Tobin‟s Q Tobin‟s Q Book value of total assets minus book 
value of total Equity plus market value 
of total equity divided by book value of 
total assets 
Positive 
 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanism 
   
 
Board Structure 
Information 
 
   
Board Size LNBSIZE Natural Logarithm of Board Size Positive 
Negative 
Independent Directors ID  %  of Independent directors in a board Positive 
Female Directors FEDIR % of Female directors in a board Positive 
    
Ownership Information 
 
   
Institutional Ownership INT % of ownership held by Institution Positive 
Director‟s Ownership OWNDIR % of Ownership held by all directors in 
a board 
Positive 
Negative 
Foreign Investors FINVTR % of Ownership held by Foreign 
Investors 
Positive 
    
External Monitoring    
Debt Ratio DEBT2TE Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity 
Negative 
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Table 2-5 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variables Variables Explanation  Predicted 
Relationship 
    
Firm Characteristic    
Firm Size LNASSET Natural logarithm of book value of 
total assets 
Positive 
 
2.6.3 Variables 
Only listed banks that are traded on Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) are considered for 
empirical analysis.  The major sources of this empirical analysis are annual report of banks 
that are available at specific bank websites and website of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). The 
financial time period of all listed banks start from 1st January and end at December 31. CEO 
compensation data and other variables cover the time period from 2006 to 2013. The sample 
is considered from 2006 because Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), 
regulatory authority, introduced corporate governance guideline in 2006 and corporate 
governance guideline (amendment) in 2012 and all banks have to prepare the corporate 
governance compliance checklist since 2006. Only few banks disclose corporate governance 
information in details voluntarily.  
In this study, the variables include the information of listed banks total CEO pay, 
performance measures such as ROA and Tobin‟s Q, corporate governance mechanisms 
through board composition such as board size, percentage of independent directors, presence 
of female directors in the board and ownership structures like percentage of ownership by 
institution, foreign investors and director ownership and external monitoring information 
such as leverage and firm characteristic such as firm size.  
The most important part of this study is to find out the CEO compensation level and 
structure for the CEO of each bank. There are no use of stock option and grants in any banks. 
CEO can‟t hold shares as per bank regulation. Thus, all banks mainly provide cash 
compensation.  All banks disclose their total CEO compensation in profit and loss account as 
separate line item and details of total CEO compensation in the notes. But only few banks 
disclose their detail breakdown in the notes such as basic salary, house rent, house 
maintenance, provident fund, medical facilities etc. As details of CEO compensation of all 
banks are not available in the profit and loss account and notes, hence, only total CEO 
compensation is considered for this study. This total CEO compensation information is 
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collected from each banks profit and loss account statement and total CEO compensation is 
expressed in Taka value. Total CEO pay is normally large amount and it is increased over the 
years and normally rightly skewed. Thus, total CEO compensation is transformed into natural 
logarithm form to adjust for normality of total pay.  
Firm performance can be measured by internal and external performance. Internal 
performance is measured by return on assets (ROA) and External performance is measured 
by Tobin‟s Q.  ROA is computed by net profit before tax divided by average total assets. Net 
profit and total asset information is collected from consolidated profit and loss account and 
consolidated balance sheet of the annual report. Tobin‟s Q is calculated by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets. Book value of total asset and equity information is collected from 
consolidated balance sheet of each bank‟s annual report. Market value of total equity is 
calculated by multiplying the number of outstanding shares with the market price of share of 
each bank. Market price of share is obtained by considering the closing market price at 31st 
December in each year for each bank. Closing market price information is collected from 
annual report of each bank and cross match with the market price information from Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE). Information about outstanding shares is also collected from notes of 
each bank‟s the financial statement and again cross match with DSE monthly review 
published by Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE).  
Corporate governance has the significant influence in CEO determination and 
governance mechanisms that are used in this study are board composition and ownership 
structures. Board composition variables are board size, independent directors and female 
directors. Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) introduced corporate 
governance guideline 2006 and later revised the corporate governance guideline through 
amendment in 2012.  All the banks have to prepare a corporate governance compliance 
checklist since 2006 and corporate governance report from 2012 with detail explanation of 
how they manage and follow the guidelines and at the end of corporate governance report 
disclose a checklist of following all the required conditions.  The corporate governance 
variables data are collected from the corporate governance compliance checklist and 
corporate governance report that is the part of annual reports. The corporate governance 
report discloses the details information about board structure and function of board, profile of 
the board members, number of independent directors, female directors in the board etc 
according to corporate governance guideline 2006 and corporate governance guideline 
(amendment) 2012.  Board size, independent directors and presence of female directors‟ 
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information are obtained from both corporate governance report and board of directors‟ 
profile in the annual report. Percentage of independent director is computed by the number of 
independent directors divided by number of total directors in the board. Percentage of female 
directors is also computed in the same procedure that is number of female directors in the 
board divided by total number of directors in the board. 
Ownership structure of the listed banks is considered to know the impact of various 
owners on CEO compensation. Ownership variables such as institutional ownership, foreign 
investor ownership and director ownership are used in this study. Institutional ownership and 
foreign investor ownership information are obtained from the shareholding pattern 
information in the corporate governance report and in the notes of equity section of the 
annual report. Both institutional information and foreign investor ownership information are 
again cross checked with the published information of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
monthly review report. Any missing data are adjusted with the closet year value.  Director 
ownership information required to disclose in the corporate governance report. But some 
companies disclose in the notes of the financial statement instead of corporate governance 
report. Thus, percentage of director ownership is collected either from the corporate 
governance report or in the notes where it is available.  
External monitoring variable such as leverage also has the impact on CEO 
compensation. Leverage is computed by the book value of total debt divided by book value of 
total equity. Both book value of total debt and book value of total equity information are 
collected from the consolidated balance sheet of the annual report.  
Firm size is a major factor in determination of CEO pay. In this study, total asset is 
used as the proxy of firm size. Book value of total asset is collected from the consolidated 
balance sheet of the annual report. Total asset is normally large amount and transformed into 
natural logarithm of total assets following other empirical studies related to executive 
compensation.  
 
2.7 Analysis of the Results 
2.7.1 Disclosure Pattern of CEO Compensation 
All the listed banks of Bangladesh have to disclose CEO compensation information as 
separate line item in the profit and loss account and details information in the notes or 
director report or corporate governance report. The required CEO compensation is total 
compensation including basic salary, house rent, house maintenance, medical allowance, 
festival bonus, incentive bonus, provident fund etc. In practice, all listed banks disclose the 
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CEO compensation information as separate line item in the profit and loss account. But most 
of the banks do not disclose the total CEO remuneration in details breakdown. Only few 
banks disclose the total CEO remuneration with breakdown information in details and 
disclose the bonus information as festival bonus and incentive bonus. Bangladesh is a Muslim 
country and there are two big religious festivals and CEO receives bonus in these festivals. 
Some banks disclose only bonus in the breakdown of CEO information but it is difficult to 
identify whether it is festival bonus or incentive bonus.  Incentive bonus information is not 
disclosed separately and the reason might be incentive bonus is adjusted with basic salary or 
total salary. Since details CEO remuneration information are not available in all listed banks 
thus only total cash compensation of the CEO is measured as the executive compensation 
following  the prior studies (Parthasarathy et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2006; Leone et al., 2006). 
Moreover, total cash compensation is considered because total CEO compensation reflects 
the past and current performance and this is consistent with prior studies (Gaver and Gaver, 
1998; Comprix and Mueller, 2006).  Compensation figures of the CEO are expressed as 
Bangladeshi Taka.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 - Trend of Total CEO Pay from 2006 to 2013 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the trend of total CEO pay from 2006 to 2013.  The mean of 
total CEO salary increased remarkably over the year and it is highest in 2013 and lowest in 
2006 as expected. The total CEO remuneration is rightly skewed. Total CEO compensation is 
transformed into natural logarithm form to adjust for normality of total pay. 
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2.7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2-6 represents descriptive statistics of each variable for the sample of 236 firms 
during the period of 2006 to 2013. Total CEO pay is expressed in thousands in descriptive 
statistics.  The mean CEO pay is TK. 7,788,196, ranging from a maximum of Tk. 21,606,090 
and minimum of Tk. 361,080 with a standard deviation of Tk. 3,534,794. The median CEO 
pay is Tk. 7,836,187. The average of total CEO pay in listed banks in Bangladesh is only Tk. 
7,788,196 which is much lower in compare to the other developed countries4. But in compare 
to per capita GDP in Bangladesh, CEO compensation in banking sector is significantly higher 
than average salary in Bangladesh5 . Reaz and Arun (2006) also point out that executive in 
banks are the highest paid executives among any Bangladeshi companies. CEO‟s in the 
banking industry received the highest compensation in compare to other industries all over 
the world and this finding is consistent following the Fernandes (2008).  
 
Table 2-6 
Descriptive Summary Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
CEO Pay (in 
thousands) 236 7788.196 361.08 5280 7836.187 10340.65 21606.09 3534.794 
ROA  (%) 236 2.477707 -20.52043 1.98769 2.917638 3.605306 7.782377 2.717383 
Tobin‟s Q 236 1.135735 0.9243132 1.028214 1.068794 1.146552 5.779525 0.3422262 
BSIZE 232 13.89655 5 11.5 14 15.5 27 4.255639 
ID (%) 232 7.19215 0 0 6.66667 10.55556 50 8.35619 
FEDIR (%) 232 11.47504 0 0 9.09091 16.66667 92.30769 11.87215 
INT (%) 236 14.26262 0 5.6 13.46 20.425 64.82 11.15091 
OWNDIR (%) 236 19.76421 0 8.35 19.23 29.135 57.15 13.64586 
FINVTR (%) 236 2.110751 0 0 0 0.24 37.42 6.29819 
DEBT2TE 236 12.14761 -16.72824 9.488538 11.34883 13.82555 230.9772 15.21685 
Total Asset (in 
million) 
236 
97588.41 14302.84 48328.74 81481.92 129086.2 549979.1 71731.33 
 
 
Performance is measured by two ways: Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin‟s Q. 
Performance measured by ROA and the mean of ROA is 2.48% and a range from -20.52% to 
                                                             
4 Fung et al. (2001) study reveals that the average cash compensation is USD 614,000 in US ( Core et al., 
1999); average pay is GBP 291,000 excluding option and other deferred compensation in UK  ( Conyon , 
1997); average compensation for executives is $281,000 in Canada (Zhou,1999); average CEO pay in 
Hongkong is HK$ 4 million (Firth et al.,1999). (Exchange rate on December 31, 2013 between: USD and TK. is 
77.68; GBP and Tk. is 128.6694; Hongkong and Tk. is 10.0177). 
 
5 According to source of World Bank, GDP per capita income in Bangladesh is 957.82 USD (in 2013) or 
equivalent to TK. 74,403.46. (Exchange rate between USD and TK. is 77.68 on December 31, 2013).  
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7.78% and standard deviation is 2.72.  The mean of Tobin‟s Q, performance measurement of 
firm value or growth, averages is 1.14 and ranges from 0.92 to 5.78. The Tobin‟s Q in listed 
banks of Bangladesh is higher than US banks but lower than UK firms6.  
The mean (median) board size is 13.90 (14) and ranges from minimum 5 to maximum 
27 with a standard deviation 4.25. The average board size in US banks is 13 (Pathan and Faff 
, 2013); 9 for  UK companies (Veprauskaite and Adams, 2013); 13.80 in China (Liang et al., 
2013) and 29.99 in Japan (Basu et al., 2007).  Thus, average board size is similar to US and 
China. On average, the percentage of independent directors is 7.19% and a range from 
minimum 0% to maximum 50% with a standard deviation 8.36%. The minimum percentage 
of independent directors in the board is one tenth that is minimum one (corporate governance 
guideline 2006) and one fifth (corporate governance guidelines (amendment) 2012). But 
descriptive statistics represent that minimum percentage of independent director is 0% which 
implies that some banks don‟t complying the minimum number of independent directors 
according to corporate governance guideline 2006 and corporate governance guideline 
(amendment) 2012 and even some banks mentioned in the checklist as recruitment of  
independent directors is in process. The percentage of independent director is 70.91% in US 
banks (Pathan and Faff, 2013); 23% in China (Liang et al., 2013); 24% in Thailand (Pathan et 
al., 2007), 50.61% in India (Parthasarathy et al., 2006). Thus, the percentage of independent 
director in listed banks of Bangladesh is very low in compare to other countries. The mean 
percentage of female directors in the board in listed banks of Bangladesh is 11.48% which is 
almost similar in China 11% (Liang et al., 2013) but in US banks, the percentage of female 
directors is only 7.94% (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
The mean percentage of institutional shareholding is 14.26% and maximum is 64.82% 
where as standard deviation is 11.15%. Institutional ownership in listed banks of Bangladesh 
is only 14.26% where as institutional ownership is 31.4% in Uk (Ozkan, 2007); 16% in 
Hongkong  (Firth et al., 1999); and 17.84% in India (Parthasarathy et al., 2006) which implies 
that institutional ownership is too low in compare to other countries. The proportional 
shareholding of directors mean is 19.76% and maximum is 57.15% with the standard 
deviation is 13.65. The average director shareholding in UK is 4.19% (Ozkan, 2007) and in 
Hongkong is 44% (Firth et al., 1999) which indicates that average director shareholdings in 
Bangladesh is higher than UK but lower than Hongkong companies.  The mean percentage of 
                                                             
6 Pathan and Faff (2013) find Tobin’s Q is 1.07 in US banks where as Ozkan (2007) and Veprauskaite and 
Adams (2013) study find Tobin’s Q is 1.64 and 1.56 in UK firms respectively. 
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foreign investors is only 2.11% with a maximum of 37.42 % in Bangladesh where as average 
foreign share ownership is 16 % in Chaina (Fung et al., 2001) and 24% in Japan (Sakawa et  
al., 2012). It is difficult for the few foreign investors to play the monitoring role in restricting 
the CEO pay in listed banks.  
The mean of leverage ratio is 12.15% and with a standard deviation of 15.26. Total 
asset average mean is 97588.4 million and ranges from 14302.84 to 549979.1 million with a 
standard deviation of 71731.33 million.  
 
2.7.3 Correlation Matrix 
Pearson correlation matrix between each variable is reported in Table 2-7. CEO 
compensation is positively associated with ROA (0.1777) and Tobin‟s Q (0.0091) indicating 
that the higher the performance of banks, the higher the CEO compensation in listed banks of 
Bangladesh.  
 
Table 2-7 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  
CEO Pay 
(Natural 
Log ) 
ROA         
(%) 
Tobin‟s        
Q 
BSIZE 
(Natural 
Log ) 
ID        
(%) 
FEDIR       
(%) 
INT        
(%) 
OWNDIR 
(%) 
FINVTR  
(%) DEBT2TE  
TOTAL 
ASSET     
((Natural 
Log ) 
CEO Pay 
(Natural Log ) 1 
  
 
       ROA (%) 0.1777 1 
 
 
       Tobin‟s Q 0.0091 -0.1307 1  
       BSIZE 
(Natural log) 
0.0428 0.4269 -0.1458 1 
       ID (%) 0.3137 -0.0672 -0.0701 -0.2857 1 
      FEDIR (%) 0.1772 0.0122 -0.1169 -0.0642 0.0345 1 
     INT (%) 0.1771 -0.0202 -0.0284 0.0899 0.0291 0.0613 1 
    OWNDIR (%) 0.2051 -0.1318 -0.0024 0.3663 -0.1200 -0.1949 -0.0250 1 
   FINVTR (%) -0.0092 -0.1554 0.0435 -0.1426 0.0465 -0.0644 -0.1874 -0.0833 1 
  DEBT2TE -0.2082 0.0843 -0.0568 -0.0602 -0.0559 0.0274 -0.1151 -0.1367 0.0276 1 
 TOTALASSET 
(Natural log) 
0.2778 0.2276 -0.1771 0.2776 0.3950 0.0193 0.0363 -0.0227 0.1514 0.0106 
1 
 
 
Board size (0.0428) has a positive relationship with CEO pay. Independent directors 
(0.3137) have the positive relationship with CEO pay which implies that independent 
directors are not effective enough to monitor the CEO pay. Female directors have the positive 
correlation (0.1772) with the CEO pay and it indicates that female directors monitoring role 
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is not effective to restrict CEO pay because they are appointed by the controlling 
shareholders and as a result, they have no voice in the board.  
This study also examine the data set to check the multicollinearity issue in Table 2-8 
and finds that variance inflation factor (VIF) for all variables are less than 2.5 and average 
VIF is 1.44 which implies that there is no high correlation with other variables that may 
create multi co linearity problem and thus this data set avoid the multi co linearity problem. 
   
Table 2-8 
Checking of Multicollinearity 
 VIF 1/VIF 
ROA (%) 1.60 0.625572 
Tobin‟s Q 1.07 0.935597 
LNBSIZE 2.45 0.408933 
ID (%) 1.56 0.639542 
FEDIR (%) 1.06 0.940072 
INT (%) 1.08 0.928263 
OWNDIR (%) 1.59 0.629602 
FINVTR (%) 1.23 0.815896 
DEBT2TE  1.05 0.953878 
LNASSET 1.73 0.579687 
Mean VIF 1.44  
 
2.7.4 Multivariate Analysis 
2.7.4.1 Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models 
In this study, determinants of CEO pay at level models are examined on the basis of 
firm performance, corporate governance (board composition and ownership structures), 
external monitoring and firm characteristic. Table 2-9 represents the regression models 
(Equation 1, 2, and 3) of determinants of CEO pay at level models. In regression analysis, 
total CEO remuneration is transformed into natural logarithm form because CEO pay is 
highly right skewed. Another advantage of using natural logarithm of total CEO 
compensation as dependent variable is that regression coefficients measure the proportionate 
effects of a variable on compensation, rather than Taka value effect.  Standard errors and t 
statistics are adjusted to avoid the problem of heteroskedasticity.  But it is not reported in the 
table for the brevity. The level of relationship between dependent variable and independent 
variables are indicated by coefficient and probability in the parenthesis shows whether 
hypothesis are accepted or rejected.  
Performance measures are examined separately as well as jointly on total CEO 
remuneration. Return on assets (ROA) in equation (1), Tobin‟s Q in equation (2) and both 
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ROA and Tobin‟s Q are presented in equation (3) while considering all other factors are 
constant. The regression results from equation 1 represent a good fit for the model of CEO 
pay and explain 34.40% variability of CEO compensation.   
 
Table 2-9 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  11.86402 11.26618 11.28576 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.0984424  0.1000842 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  0.1722982 0.1968491 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.4898989 -0.0079231 -0.4663235 
  (0.003) (0.961) (0.005) 
ID (%) (+) 0.01817765 0.02132985 0.01869196 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.01241966 0.01250845 0.01307439 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0105272 0.0100245 0.0106131 
  (0.012) (0.025) (0.011) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0198539 0.0122892 0.019856 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0011338 0.0061239 0.0007718 
  (0.841) (0.392) (0.891) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0078828 -0.0072397 -0.0076373 
  (0.033) (0.118) (0.049) 
LNASSET (+) 0.1652856 0.1464764 0.176245 
  (0.032) (0.092) (0.021) 
R2  0.3440 0.2811 0.3536 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total assets; 
LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and 
t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
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In equation 1, total CEO pay is positively related with ROA after controlling other 
factors and it is significant at 1% level. The empirical result therefore supports hypothesis 
1(a) which is there is a positive relationship between CEO pay and ROA and the result is 
consistent with prior studies (Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Fung et al., 2001; 
Kato and Kubo, 2006; Basu et al., 2007).  The result indicates that listed banks of Bangladesh 
determined their CEO pay on the basis of ROA. CEO receives high compensation when ROA 
is high.  
The second hypothesis 2a assumes that there is a positive relationship between board 
size and CEO pay where as the hypothesis 2b assumes that there is a negative relationship 
between board size and CEO pay. The empirical result shows that board size is negatively 
related to CEO pay and significant at 1% level.  The empirical result is consistent with the 
predicted hypothesis 2b and rejects the hypothesis 2a. The result is consistent with the prior 
studies (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Fung et al., 2001; Guest, 2008) but opposite of the result in 
US (Core et al., 1999). The negative relationship implies that large board has the greater 
monitoring capacity and business expertise which reduce the decision making power of the 
CEO. Moreover, CEO faces difficulties to convince or satisfy more directors in the board and 
failure to get reward for high compensation.    
The third hypothesis is there is a positive relationship between CEO pay and 
independent directors.  I got a strongly positive relationship between independent directors 
and CEO pay and the result is consistent with prior studies (Croci et al., 2012; Cheng and 
Firth, 2006; Ezammel and Watson, 2002; Firth et al., 1999; Lambert et al., 1993). This 
finding can be explained in several ways. First, independent directors are not effective 
enough to monitor the CEO pay which indicates corporate governance is weak. Second, CEO 
pay is high because independent directors are satisfied enough for the performance of CEO. 
Third, independent directors are appointed by the board and the board tries to appoint their 
selected person as independent directors and the independent directors play their role on 
behalf of the board. Fourth, independent directors increase the CEO pay and use it as a 
comparison benchmark to reappoint themselves in the following years. Fifth, independent 
directors receive only meeting fee and the amount of meeting fee is only Taka five thousand 
per meeting. This amount is not sufficient enough to take the responsibilities and monitor the 
activities of the firm. Finally, according to corporate governance guideline 2006, there must 
be one tenth (1/10) independent director in the board (e.g. minimum is one) and corporate 
governance guideline (amendment) 2012 revised it and new guideline requires the one fifth 
(1/5) independent directors in the board. But some banks disclosed in the compliance of 
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corporate governance checklist, they will appoint the independent director soon or it is 
already in process. Thus, the numbers of independent directors are not sufficient enough to 
play their monitoring role in the board.  
Previous studies observed that female directors are hard worker, sincere, efficient and 
increase firm performance by creating more value to the firm. It is also argued that 
controlling shareholders appoint the female directors and control them in a way to maximize 
their (controlling shareholders) self interest. Thus, develop the hypothesis as there is a 
positive relationship between presence of female directors and CEO pay. In this study, I 
found a positive relationship between female directors in the board and CEO pay and the 
result is significant at 1% level.  This can be explained in several ways: First, the result 
implies that CEO is more active and performs better when board is directed and controlled by 
female directors. Second, female directors have affordability to pay high compensation i.e. 
banks having female directors have much money and have the ability to pay high 
compensation. Third, female directors are effective enough in the board and their presence 
increase the firm performance which ultimately increase the higher CEO pay. This finding 
also support the previous studies arguments that female directors (1) increase the image of the 
firm and have better understanding capability of the market (Smith et al., 2006); (2) have the 
problem solving and decision making capacity (Robinson and Dechant, 1997) and (3) 
increase board effectiveness (Eagly and Carli, 2003). Finally, female directors are appointed 
by the board and the board is mainly controlled by the controlling shareholders i.e. sponsor 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders also appoint their nominated person as CEO and 
maximize their self interest. Thus, controlling shareholders decide everything according to 
their own way and female directors have no voice in the board about CEO compensation 
issue.  
Institutional investors may not play their monitoring role effectively in the same 
industry and thus develop the hypothesis as there is a positive relationship between CEO pay 
and institutional ownership.  I got a positive relationship and the result is significant at 5% 
level. This result supports the hypothesis 5 and consistent with the prior studies 
(Parthasarathy et al., 2006; Croci et al., 2012; Fernandes et al., 2012).  This result implies that 
monitoring role of institutional shareholder is either absent or weak to restrain the CEO pay 
in listed banks. This result can be explained in several ways: First, institutional investors 
motivate firms to provide performance based compensation package to the CEO. Second, the 
mean percentage of institutional ownership in listed banks is only 14.26% which is not large 
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enough in compare to other countries to play their monitoring role7. Third, only listed banks 
are considered in this study, so other banks and financial institution don‟t play their 
monitoring role to restrict the CEO pay within the same peer group or industry. Finally, 
institutional investors are passive investors and institutional monitoring is not an important 
governance mechanism in banks to restrict CEO pay.  
Hypothesis 6a assumes that there is a positive relationship between CEO pay and 
director shareholdings where as hypothesis 6b assumes that there is a negative relationship 
between CEO pay and director shareholdings. The empirical result reports the significant 
positive relationship and supports the hypothesis 6a and rejects the hypothesis 6b.  The 
empirical result shows a positive relationship between director shareholdings and CEO pay 
and it is significant at 1% level. This result is consistent with the study of Basu et al. (2007). 
Director holds shares of the banks and they earn the dividend income and capital 
appreciation. But according to Bangladesh Bank rules, CEO can‟t hold any shares of the bank 
which indicates CEO can‟t earn any dividend income or any capital appreciation from the 
shares. Directors try to compensate the CEO by paying high cash compensation including 
basic salary, bonus, house rent, and house maintenance facilities. Moreover, most of the 
directors are the sponsor shareholders and sponsor shareholders control the board in a way to 
increase their personal wealth8.  Reaz and Arun (2006) stated that sponsors shareholder 
control everything such as appointment or firing of CEO and salary determination. Thus, 
sponsor shareholders try to appoint their nominated person as CEO who will look at their 
interests and pay high to serve their own objectives.  
CEO pay is higher because foreign shareholders more emphasize on recruiting highly 
qualified CEO and thus, develop the hypothesis 7 as there is a positive relationship between 
CEO pay and foreign investors. Foreign investors monitor properly and pay high if the 
performance of the CEO is good. The empirical result reveals a positive relationship between 
foreign investors‟ ownership and CEO pay but the result is not significant. The positive 
relationship indicates that foreign investors pay a good amount in response of the CEO‟s 
performance. But the mean percentage of foreign investors is only 2.11% in Bangladesh 
                                                             
7 Institutional ownership is 31.4% in UK (Ozkan, 2007); 16% in Hongkong (Firth et al., 1999); and 17.84% in   
India (Parthasarathy et al., 2006).  
 
8 Sponsor shareholders are the controlling shareholders and they are mainly the company insiders. Sponsor 
shareholders are also known as promoters. Promoters are the persons who are involve in preparation of 
prospectus of the company (Company act 1994, (145)). Sponsor shareholders or promoters organize the 
company for themselves or on behalf of others and they are involved in issuing prospectus. 
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where as foreign share ownership is 16% in China (Fung et al., 2001) and 24% in Japan 
(Sakawa et al., 2012). This few foreign investors can‟t play their monitoring role properly in 
CEO pay in compare to other countries. But the empirical result shows a positive relationship 
as expected. 
External monitoring can also play a crucial role in CEO pay. External debt holders 
can exert extra pressure on board to reduce the CEO compensation and thus develop the 
hypothesis as there is a negative relationship between external monitoring and CEO 
compensation. The coefficient is negative and significant at 5% level and this result support 
hypothesis 8. The depositors are the major debt holders of the bank.  The implication of this 
result is that when firm has high debt, debt holders perform their monitoring role by creating 
more pressure on board and restricting the CEO pay and  this result is consistent with prior 
studies  (Fung et al.,2001; Houston and James, 1995; John  et al., 2010). 
Previous compensation literature finds that firm size is a significant determinant for 
executive compensation. The empirical result shows that firm size (represented by natural 
logarithm of total assets) is positively and significantly associated with CEO pay as expected. 
The result supports the hypothesis 9 and consistent with prior studies (Conyon, 1997; Core et 
al.,  1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Fung et al.,  2001; Ghosh, 2003; Parthasarathy et al., 
2006; Lazarides et al., 2008). Firth et al. (1996 and 1999) stated that pay size relationship is 
observed all around the world where research has been conducted and this is also applicable 
in listed banks of Bangladesh.  
In equation 2, run the regression using another performance measure named as 
Tobin‟s Q considering all other factors are constant. Tobin‟s Q represents the market value of 
the firm or growth of the firm. The model explains about 28.11% of the variability of the 
CEO pay in Equation 2. The hypothesis 1(b) assumes that there is a positive relationship 
between Tobin‟s Q and CEO pay. The empirical result indicates a positive relationship and it 
is significant at 1 % level and this result supports hypothesis 1(b) and consistent with the 
Ozkan (2007) study in UK. The result implies that increase of the firm value or growth also 
increases the CEO compensation. The demand of highly professional and talented CEO is 
increased due to increase of firm value or growth.  
Most of the results in equation 2 are almost similar to those reported in equation 1. 
For example- positive and statistically significant coefficients are observed for independent 
directors, female directors, institutional ownership, director ownership, and firm size (total 
assets). The empirical result reports a positive relationship between foreign investors‟ 
ownership and CEO pay but it is not significant which is similar to equation 1. The reason is 
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the mean percentage of foreign investors is only 2.11% which is not significant enough to 
play the monitoring role in compare to other countries. In equation 2, the major differences 
are board size and debt to equity. In equation 1, the result reported that board size is 
negatively related to CEO pay and it is significant at 1% level. In equation 2, I got the 
negative relationship with the CEO pay and the direction is similar with equation 1 which 
implies that large board is effective in restricting CEO pay but it is not significant.  Another 
difference is the debt to equity ratio. There is a negative relationship with the CEO pay as like 
equation 1, because debt holders create more pressure on management and restrict the CEO 
pay but the result is not significant in equation 2.  
In equation 3, I have considered both performance measure ROA and Tobin‟s Q in 
the same equation and run the regression. The model explains about 35.36% of the variability 
in CEO pay. ROA is positively and statistically associated with CEO pay and significant at 
1% level.  Another performance measure Tobin‟s Q which represents the growth of the firm 
is also associated with CEO pay and statistically significant at 1% level. This implies that 
firm considers both performance measures in setting CEO compensation. In equation 3, 
independent directors, female directors, institutional investors, directors‟ ownership and firm 
size are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay and the result is similar with 
equation 1 and 2.  Foreign share ownership is positively related with CEO pay but it does not 
achieve statistical significance and this result is also similar with equation 1 and 2. The result 
of board size and debt to equity ratio in equation 3 are similar to equation 1 but varies with 
the equation 2.  Board size is negatively associated with CEO pay in all equations and it is 
statistically significant at 1% level in equation 1 and 3.  This result implies that large board is 
effective in restricting CEO pay and it is difficult for the CEO to increase the compensation 
by convincing many directors in the board.  There exists negative relationship between CEO 
pay and debt to equity ratio in all the equations but the result is statistically significant in 
equation 1 and 3.  This result indicates that debt holders have the capacity to exert pressure 
on management activities and restrict the CEO pay if management activities are against the 
interest of shareholders.  
 
2.7.4.2 Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models 
Determinants of CEO pay are also examined using the lag model in Table 2-10. Lag 
model is considered because CEO pay might be based on previous year‟s facts and figures. 
Moreover, it requires minimum three months to publish the annual report. As a result, 
previous year‟s firm performance, board characteristics, ownership structures and firm 
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characteristics might be significant factors for CEO pay. CEO pay is related to lagged 
variables such as ROA, Tobin‟s Q, LNBSIZE, ID, FEDIR, INT, OWNDIR, FINVTR, 
DEBT2TE and LNASSET and denoted as ROA(-1), Tobin‟s Q(-1), LNBSIZE(-1), ID(-1), 
FEDIR(-1), INT(-1), OWNDIR(-1), FINVTR(-1), DEBT2TE(-1) and LNASSET(-1).    
 
Table 2-10 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  12.89093 12.25081 12.38806 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (-1) (%) (+) 0.1028269  0.1049082 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) (+)  0.1912672 0.2189509 
   (0.001) (0.002) 
LNBSIZE (-1) (+) / (-) -0.4438799 0.0896344 -0.4225281 
  (0.004) (0.568) (0.005) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.01642275 0.02229148 0.016758 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
FEDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.01241046 0.01252239 0.0132995 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INT (-1) (%) (+) 0.0109003 0.0105454 0.0111124 
  (0.013) (0.026) (0.011) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) / (-) 0.0198697 0.0118014 0.0199876 
  (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0010074 0.0062225 0.0008009 
  (0.872) (0.415) (0.896) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (-) -0.0081728 -0.0073972 -0.0079261 
  (0.029) (0.122) (0.044) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 0.1239319 0.1010067 0.1307362 
  (0.119) (0.270) (0.095) 
R2  0.3238 0.2493 0.3377 
Observations  202 202 202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA(-1) (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets of previous year; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR(-1)- Percentage of 
Female directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by the number of female directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board; INT(-1)- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution of previous year; 
OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board of previous year. It is computed 
by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage 
of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity of previous year; LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of 
previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t 
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statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is 
presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical result using the lagged models is almost same as like CEO pay at level 
models. CEO pay is positively and statistically significant to firm performance (ROA and 
Tobin‟s Q), percentage of independent directors, percentage of female directors, institutional 
investors, and director ownership and negatively related to board size and debt to total equity. 
CEO pay is positively related to foreign investors but not significant like CEO pay at level 
models. The only difference between CEO pay at level models and CEO pay at lagged 
models is the firm size. CEO pay is positively and statistically associated with firm size in 
CEO pay at level models, where as in lagged model, CEO pay is positively associated in 
three equations as expected but statistically significant in equation 3 only. This result implies 
that previous year‟s firm size is also a significant factor for CEO pay.  
The overall results conclude that previous years firm performance, board 
characteristics, ownership structures and firm characteristics have significant influence on 
CEO pay and this is evident using the lagged model in Table 2-10.  
 
2.8 Additional Analysis 
2.8.1 Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering Time Dummy  
Table 2-11 represents the regression results of the determinants of CEO pay at level 
models considering time dummy.  The result shows that time is a significant factor from 2008 
to 2013 in explaining the determinants of CEO pay.  
There is no change of result in Table 2-11 in compare to Table 2-9 in terms of ROA, 
board size, female directors, and institutional ownership after considering the time effect 
which implies that the result of these variables are consistent with or without time 
adjustment.  Performance measured by ROA, female directors and institutional ownership are 
positively and statistically associated with CEO pay where as board size is negatively and 
statistically significant with CEO pay in equation 1 and 3.  
But the result of some other variables directional sign or significance level become 
changed which implies that time has significant effect on these variables.  Tobin‟s Q is 
positive in all equations as expected and the result indicates that CEO pay is positively 
related to Tobin‟s Q but statistically significant in equation 3 only. The empirical result 
shows a positive relationship between independent directors and CEO pay in all equations as 
before and this implies that independent directors are not effective in monitoring the CEO 
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pay. But the result is statistically significant in equation 2 which reveal that independent 
directors are affected by time factors.   
 
Table 2-11 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models  Considering 
Time Dummy  
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  21.09465 18.92545 20.47212 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.1197706  0.1231036 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  0.091157 0.1675653 
   (0.231) (0.003) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.3903911 0.1339432 -0.3791303 
  (0.010) (0.426) (0.012) 
ID (%) (+) 0.00600300 0.0139838 0.00572910 
  (0.289) (0.063) (0.308) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.01525801 0.01453051 0.01575941 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0089502 0.0083193 0.0091475 
  (0.029) (0.060) (0.025) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0122586 0.0054725 0.0123154 
  (0.014) (0.240) (0.013) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0127626 0.016159 0.0122979 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0052209 -0.004779 -0.0052208 
  (0.182) (0.342) (0.195) 
LNASSET (+) -0.2339463 -0.1858036 -0.2176079 
  (0.009) (0.086) (0.016) 
Year Dummy     
             2007  0.1877547 0.1557556 0.1695097 
  (0.148) (0.256) (0.192) 
             2008  0.3566903 0.3232475 0.343093 
  (0.016) 0.025 (0.021) 
             2009  0.54816 0.4702736 0.5290885 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
             2010  0.696605 0.66331 0.6201842 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2011  0.9944976 0.8531098 0.9696709 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2012  1.062317 0.8528993 1.050409 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2013  1.195172 0.9108525 1.186437 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
R2  0.4519 0.3578 0.4579 
Observations  232 232 232 
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This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total assets; 
LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and 
t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
Director ownership is positively associated with CEO pay in all equations as before 
and this indicates that directors appoint their nominated person as CEO who will look 
directors interest and directors pay high compensation. But the result is statistically 
significant in equation 1 and 2.  Foreign investor ownership is also positively associated with 
CEO pay as before and this time the result is significant in all equations after controlling time 
effect. This result explains that foreign investors are highly concerned about their investment 
and demand high quality talented CEO and pay high compensation. Debt to total equity i.e. 
leverage is negatively associated with CEO pay in all equation as before and the result point 
out that debt holders create pressure on CEO pay if CEO‟s activities are against the interest of 
the debt holders but the result is not statistically significant after considering the time 
dummy.  The interesting finding is that firm size is negatively related to CEO pay and 
statistically significant. The reason is CEO pay might be affected by change of political 
government in 2007-08 and stock market turmoil in 2010-11.  
 
2.8.2 Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering Time Dummy  
Table 2-12 represents the regression result of determinants of CEO pay at lagged 
models considering time dummy. CEO pay is related to lagged variables such as ROA, 
Tobin‟s Q, LNBSIZE, ID, FEDIR, INT, OWNDIR, FINVTR, DEBT2TE and LNASSET  
after controlling time dummy and denoted as ROA(-1), Tobin‟s Q(-1), LNBSIZE(-1), ID(-1), 
FEDIR(-1), INT(-1), OWNDIR(-1), FINVTR(-1), DEBT2TE(-1) and LNASSET(-1). The 
empirical result shows that time has a significant effect on CEO pay from 2008 to 2013.  
The result of determinants of CEO pay is almost same between CEO pay at level 
models after controlling the time dummy (Table 2-11) and CEO pay at lagged models after  
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Table 2-12 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering 
Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  21.7884 19.78558 21.14297 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (-1) (%) (+) 0.1173671  0.1210267 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) (+)  0.1155824 0.1869313 
   (0.057) (0.008) 
LNBSIZE (-1) (+) / (-) -0.3400923 0.2158543 -0.3306842 
  (0.013) (0.193) (0.015) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.006287751 0.01555378 0.005950149 
  (0.349) (0.074) (0.371) 
FEDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0151658 0.01451112 0.01584667 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INT (-1) (%) (+) 0.0089451 0.0086745 0.0092295 
  (0.036) (0.065) (0.031) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) / (-) 0.0125687 0.0051986 0.0127976 
  (0.015) (0.264) (0.013) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.01174 0.0155313 0.0112997 
  (0.066) (0.051) (0.073) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (-) -0.0054919 -0.0049449 -0.005499 
  (0.173) (0.341) (0.185) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) -0.262287 -0.2256345 -0.2459471 
  (0.004) (0.052) (0.007) 
Year Dummy     
             2008  0.2765158 0.2453228 0.2567288 
  (0.041) (0.086) (0.057) 
             2009  0.3591566 0.3249367 0.3445476 
  (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) 
             2010  0.6246855 0.5475389 0.6043866 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2011  0.7065279 0.6662885 0.622819 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2012  0.9641104 0.8267997 0.9385024 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
             2013  1.061337 0.8584186 1.049464 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
R2  0.4252 0.3233 0.4340 
Observations  202 202 202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA(-1) (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets of previous year; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
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by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR(-1)- Percentage of 
Female directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by the number of female directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board; INT(-1)- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution of previous year; 
OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board of previous year. It is computed 
by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage 
of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity of previous year; LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of 
previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.    The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but 
t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability 
is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
considering the time dummy (Table 2-12) in terms of ROA, board size, independent director, 
female director, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, leverage and 
firm size. The only difference is the performance measure named as Tobin‟s Q.  Tobin‟s Q is 
positively and statistically associated with CEO pay in both equations 2 and 3 in Table 2-12 
which implies that CEO pay depends on firm performance.  
The result of determinants of CEO pay in terms of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, board size, 
female directors, and institutional ownership are similar in comparing the CEO pay at level 
models (Table 2-9) and CEO pay at lagged models after controlling time dummy (Table 2-
12). This result shows that CEO pay is positively and statistically associated with firm 
performance (including both ROA and Tobin‟s Q), female directors and institutional 
ownership and negatively and statistically associated with board size. But the differences 
between these two models in Table 2-9 and Table 2-12 are percentage of independent 
directors, director ownership, foreign investors, debt to total equity and firm size due to time 
effect. Independent directors are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay in 
equation 2 only which indicates that they are not effective in restricting the CEO pay. CEO 
pay is positively and significantly associated with director ownership in equation 1 and 3 and 
this implies that controlling shareholders monitor everything in their own way and nominated 
their selected person as CEO and pay high to serve the controlling shareholders objectives. 
CEO pay is positively and statistically associated with foreign investors after controlling time 
and this result means that foreign investors are highly concerned about their investment and 
demand talented person as CEO and pay high for their qualification, experience and 
performance. Leverage has no impact on CEO pay after controlling time dummy which 
implies debt holders can‟t create pressure on management when time is controlled. Firm size 
is negatively and statistically associated with CEO pay. The relationship between firm size 
and CEO pay might be affected by two factors which are change of political government in 
2007-08 and stock market turmoil in 2010-11.  
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2.8.3 Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering Serial Correlation 
Table 2-13 represents the regression results of determinants of CEO pay at level 
models considering serial correlation.  Firm performance and corporate governance variables 
are generally consistent over the years and variable of one year might affect the following 
years and as a result, the problem of serial correlation may arise. Thus, the results of the 
regression are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to avoid the 
problem of serial correlation.  
 
Table 2-13 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering 
Serial Correlation 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  11.86402 11.26618 11.28576 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.0984424  0.1000842 
  (0.106)  (0.093) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  0.1722982 0.1968491 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.4898989 -0.0079231 -0.4663235 
  (0.015) (0.979) (0.018) 
ID (%) (+) 0.01817765 0.02132985 0.01869196 
  (0.053) (0.105) (0.047) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.01241966 0.01250845 0.01307439 
  (0.040) (0.046) (0.031) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0105272 0.0100245 0.0106131 
  (0.257) (0.341) (0.247) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0198539 0.0122892 0.019856 
  (0.095) (0.165) (0.089) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0011338 0.0061239 0.0007718 
  (0.928) (0.731) (0.950) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0078828 -0.0072397 -0.0076373 
  (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) 
LNASSET (+) 0.1652856 0.1464764 0.176245 
  (0.344) (0.488) (0.306) 
R2  0.3440 0.2811 0.3536 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total assets; 
LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
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OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and 
t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error clustered at the firm level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
There is no change of result between CEO pay at level models (Table 2-9) and CEO 
pay at level models considering serial correlation (Table 2-13) in terms of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, 
board size, independent directors, female directors, director ownership, institutional investors, 
foreign investors and debt to total equity.  Performance variables such as ROA and Tobin‟s Q 
both are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay. It is evident that CEO pay 
depends on firm performance and this result also supports the hypothesis 1. Large board is 
effective in restricting the CEO pay due to presence of various business expertises‟ in the 
board. Independent directors and female directors are positively associated with CEO pay and 
this result indicates that corporate governance is weak in the listed banks of Bangladesh 
which ultimately increase the high CEO pay. Director ownership is also positively associated 
with CEO pay because directors are the mainly controlling shareholders and controlling 
shareholders appoint their nominated person as CEO to maximize their own objectives and 
pay high compensation to CEO to act on behalf of the controlling shareholders. Institutional 
investors and foreign investors have the positive association with CEO pay as expected but 
the results are not significant which implies that they have no monitoring role in restricting 
the CEO pay. Debt holders are active in restricting the CEO pay if any action or activities of 
CEO is against the interest of the debt holders.  
The major difference is firm size between CEO pay at level models (Table 2-9) and 
CEO pay at level models considering serial correlation (Table 2-13). Firm size is positively 
associated with CEO pay as expected but the result is not significant when CEO pay is 
clustered at firm level. The reason might be change of political government in 2007-08 and 
stock market turmoil in 2010-11.  
 
2.8.4 Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering Serial Correlation 
Determinants of CEO pay at lagged models considering serial correlation is presented 
in the Table 2-14.  CEO pay might be affected by the lagged variables such as ROA, Tobin‟s 
Q, LNBSIZE, ID, FEDIR, INT, OWNDIR, FINVTR, DEBT2TE and LNASSET and denoted 
as ROA(-1), Tobin‟s Q(-1), LNBSIZE(-1), ID(-1), FEDIR(-1), INT(-1), OWNDIR(-1), 
FINVTR(-1), DEBT2TE(-1) and LNASSET(-1). The results of the regression are adjusted 
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with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to avoid the problem of serial 
correlation.  
 
Table 2-14 
       Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models 
Considering Serial Correlation 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  12.89093 12.25081 12.38806 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
ROA (-1) (%) (+) 0.1028269  0.1049082 
  (0.084)  (0.071) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) (+)  0.1912672 0.2189509 
   (0.003) (0.005) 
LNBSIZE (-1) (+) / (-) -0.4438799 0.0896344 -0.4225281 
  (0.025) (0.774) (0.025) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.01642275 0.02229148 0.016758 
  (0.061) (0.111) (0.054) 
FEDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.01241046 0.01252239 0.0132995 
  (0.044) (0.053) (0.034) 
INT (-1) (%) (+) 0.0109003 0.0105454 0.0111124 
  (0.243) (0.321) (0.227) 
OWNDIR (-1)(%) (+) / (-) 0.0198697 0.0118014 0.0199876 
  (0.090) (0.167) (0.079) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0010074 0.0062225 0.0008009 
  (0.937) (0.732) (0.949) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (-) -0.0081728 -0.0073972 -0.0079261 
  (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 0.1239319 0.1010067 0.1307362 
  (0.465) (0.626) (0.432) 
R2  0.3238 0.2493 0.3377 
Observations  202 202 202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA(-1) (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets of previous year; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR(-1)- Percentage of 
Female directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by the number of female directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board; INT(-1)- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution of previous year; 
OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board of previous year. It is computed 
by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage 
of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity of previous year; LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of 
previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t 
statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at the firm 
level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
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The results of the regression between CEO pay at lagged models considering serial 
correlation (Table 2-14) and CEO pay at level models considering serial correlation (Table 2-
13) are exactly the same in terms of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent directors, 
female directors, director ownership, institutional investors, foreign investors, debt to total 
equity and firm size. The empirical result shows that CEO pay is positively and significantly 
associated with ROA and Tobin‟s Q and this result indicates firm performance determines the 
CEO pay. Board size and debt to total equity are negatively and statistically associated with 
CEO pay which means large board and debt holders can play effective role by restricting 
CEO pay. Independent directors and female directors, directors ownership are also positively 
associated with CEO pay which implies that they are not effective in controlling CEO pay. 
Moreover, foreign investors, institutional investors and firm size also have no significant 
association with CEO pay and this result is consistent with the CEO pay level model 
clustered at firm level.  
There is no change of result between CEO pay at lagged models considering the serial 
correlation (Table 2-14) and CEO pay at level models (Table 2-9) in terms of ROA, Tobin‟s 
Q, board size, independent directors, female directors, director ownership, institutional 
investors,  foreign investors and debt to total equity.  The major difference is firm size which 
has the positive association with the CEO pay as expected but the result is not significant.  
 
2.8.5    Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering Time Dummy and Serial 
Correlation  
Table 2-15 represents the regression result of determinants of CEO pay at level 
models considering time dummy and serial correlation. The standard errors and t statistics are 
adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and only coefficient and 
probability are reported in the regression result after considering the time dummy. The result 
shows that time has a significant impact on CEO pay. 
Firm performance is a significant determinant of CEO pay and CEO pay depends on 
ROA and Tobin‟s Q. Board size is negatively associated with CEO pay and this result 
indicates that large board is effective in restring the CEO pay in listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Female directors are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay which implies that 
CEO receives high compensation in the presence of female directors in the board. Female 
directors have no voice in the board or they are inactive about CEO compensation issue 
because female directors are also appointed by the controlling shareholders and they act on 
behalf of the controlling shareholders‟ interest. CEO pay is negatively associated with  
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Table 2-15 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models 
Considering Time Dummy and Serial Correlation  
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  21.09465 18.92545 20.47212 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.1197706  0.1231036 
  (0.021)  (0.016) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  0.091157 0.1675653 
   (0.278) (0.005) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.3903911 0.1339432 -0.3791303 
  (0.024) (0.648) (0.028) 
ID (%) (+) 0.006003001 0.01398384 0.005729108 
  (0.514) (0.365) (0.528) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.01525801 0.01453051 0.01575941 
  (0.014) (0.022) (0.011) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0089502 0.0083193 0.0091475 
  (0.338) (0.440) (0.323) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0122586 0.0054725 0.0123154 
  (0.261) (0.567) (0.250) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0127626 0.016159 0.0122979 
  (0.252) (0.328) (0.264) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0052209 -0.0047779 -0.0052208 
  (0.002) (0.028) (0.001) 
LNASSET (+) -0.2339463 -0.1858036 -0.2176079 
  (0.131) (0.351) (0.151) 
Year  Dummy     
             2007  0.1877547 0.1557556 0.1695097 
  (0.089) (0.074) (0.127) 
             2008  0.3566903 0.3232475 0.343093 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
             2009  0.54816 0.4702736 0.5290885 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
             2010  0.696605 0.66331 0.6201842 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2011  0.9944976 0.8531098 0.9696709 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2012  1.062317 0.8528993 1.050409 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2013  1.195172 0.9108525 1.186437 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
R2  0.4519 0.3578 0.4579 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total assets; 
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LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and 
t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
leverage and the result is significant. This result means that CEO pay is controlled by the debt 
holders and debt holders create pressure on management if the activities are against the 
interest of the shareholders. CEO pay is not significantly associated with independent 
directors, institutional ownership, director ownership, foreign investor and firm size after 
controlling time dummy and this result interpret that time has a significant impact on these 
variable and corporate governance is very weak in listed banks of Bangladesh in restricting 
the CEO pay which ultimately causes the higher CEO pay.  
 
2.8.6 Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering Time Dummy and Serial 
Correlation  
CEO pay at lagged models is also observed considering the time dummy and serial 
correlation and the results of the regression are presented in the Table 2-16. CEO pay might 
be related to lagged variables such as ROA, Tobin‟s Q, LNBSIZE, ID, FEDIR, INT, 
OWNDIR, FINVTR, DEBT2TE and LNASSET and denoted as ROA(-1), Tobin‟s Q(-1), 
LNBSIZE(-1), ID(-1), FEDIR(-1), INT(-1), OWNDIR(-1), FINVTR(-1), DEBT2TE(-1) and 
LNASSET(-1). The results of the regression considered the time dummy and adjusted with 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to avoid the problem of serial correlation. 
There is no difference between the CEO pay at level models and CEO pay at lagged 
models after controlling time dummy and serial correlation. The regression result presents 
that lagged firm performance (including ROA and Tobin‟s Q) affect the CEO pay. Board size 
and leverage are negatively associated with CEO pay which means large board and debt 
holders are effective in restricting the CEO pay. CEO pay is positively and significantly 
associated with female directors and this result indicates that they are not effective in 
controlling the CEO pay. Firm size is not a significant factor in CEO pay after adjustment of 
time. The empirical result also doesn‟t find any significant association of CEO pay at lagged 
models with independent directors, institutional investors, director ownership and foreign 
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investors when time is controlled. This result implies that corporate governance is not 
effective in the listed banks of Bangladesh and therefore, increase the agency cost of the 
shareholders.  
 
Table 2-16  
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering 
Time Dummy and Serial Correlation  
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  21.7884 19.78558 21.14297 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (-1) (%) (+) 0.1173671  0.1210267 
  (0.022)  (0.016) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) (+)  0.1155824 0.1869313 
   (0.057) (0.010) 
LNBSIZE (-1) (+) / (-) -0.3400923 0.2158543 -0.3306842 
  (0.045) (0.494) (0.045) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.006287751 0.01555378 0.005950149 
  (0.497) (0.318) (0.514) 
FEDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0151658 0.01451112 0.01584667 
  (0.016) (0.029) (0.013) 
INT (-1) (%) (+) 0.0089451 0.0086745 0.0092295 
  (0.339) (0.424) (0.319) 
OWNDIR (-1) 
(%) 
(+) / (-) 0.0125687 0.0051986 0.0127976 
  (0.242) (0.549) (0.223) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.01174 0.0155313 0.0112997 
  (0.320) (0.377) (0.331) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (-) -0.0054919 -0.0049449 -0.005499 
  (0.001) (0.019) (0.000) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) -0.262287 -0.2256345 -0.2459471 
  (0.109) (0.289) (0.121) 
Year Dummy     
             2008  0.2765158 0.2453228 0.2567288 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) 
             2009  0.3591566 0.3249367 0.3445476 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
             2010  0.6246855 0.5475389 0.6043866 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2011  0.7065279 0.6662885 0.622819 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2012  0.9641104 0.8267997 0.9385024 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             2013  1.061337 0.8584186 1.049464 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2  0.4252 0.3233 0.4340 
Observations  202 202 202 
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This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA(-1) (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets of previous year; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR(-1)- Percentage of 
Female directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by the number of female directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board; INT(-1)- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution of previous year; 
OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board of previous year. It is computed 
by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage 
of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity of previous year; LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of 
previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.   The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t 
statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at the firm 
level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis. 
 
2.8.7 Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering Interaction Effect  
Table 2-17 represents the regression result of determinants of CEO pay at level 
models considering the interaction effect of firm performance with corporate governance. 
This analysis considers the interaction of firm performance and corporate governance and 
examined to what extent CEO pay is influenced by the interaction form of firm performance 
and corporate governance.  
 
Table 2-17 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering 
Interaction Effect 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  9.556825 15.28536 14.23743 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.3383575  0.2883751 
  (0.003)  (0.126) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -3.489928 -4.406951 
   (0.318) (0.231) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) 0.016332 -1.644819 -1.926684 
  (0.941) (0.222) (0.148) 
ID (%) (+) 0.0136393 0.02039377 -0.01061341 
  (0.039) (0.367) (0.807) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.0165962 0.04736024 0.06620848 
  (0.075) (0.155) (0.081) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0122738 -0.0203621 0.015947 
  (0.043) (0.385) (0.582) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0225143 0.0082952 0.0086944 
  (0.000) (0.750) (0.797) 
FINVTR (%) (+) -0.0090525 -0.069882 -0.0648928 
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Table 2-17 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering 
Interaction Effect 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
  (0.652) (0.131) (0.133) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0064098 -0.0067629 -0.0055887 
  (0.091) (0.147) (0.160) 
LNASSET (+) 0.2016585 0.1605552 0.2213916 
  (0.011) (0.076) (0.006) 
ROA* LNBSIZE  -0.0538591  -0.0227728 
  (0.276)  (0.796) 
ROA* ID  0.003052161  0.002874925 
  (0.242)  (0.386) 
ROA* FEDIR  -0.001779131  -0.002963516 
  (0.565)  (0.274) 
ROA* INT  -0.0021201  -0.0019273 
  (0.145)  (0.252) 
ROA* OWNDIR  -0.0041762  -0.0051386 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROA* FINVTR  0.002906  0.0023529 
  (0.603)  (0.714) 
Tobin‟s Q *LNBSIZE   1.341477 1.611746 
   (0.270) (0.195) 
Tobin‟s Q * ID   -0.000296348 0.02100872 
   (0.988) (0.566) 
Tobin‟s Q * FEDIR   -0.03199475 -0.04317193 
   (0.296) (0.202) 
Tobin‟s Q * INT   0.0282732 -0.0036016 
   (0.211) (0.898) 
Tobin‟s Q * OWNDIR   0.0073539 0.0168577 
   (0.758) (0.588) 
Tobin‟s Q * FINVTR   0.0651476 0.0497514 
   (0.111) (0.201) 
R2  0.4246 0.3001 0.4474 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total assets; 
LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size; ROA* LNBSIZE- 
interaction of ROA and LNBSIZE;  ROA* ID- interaction of ROA and ID; ROA* FEDIR- interaction of ROA 
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and FEDIR; ROA* INT- interaction of ROA and INT; ROA* OWNDIR- interaction of ROA and OWNDIR; 
ROA* FINVTR- interaction of ROA and FINVTR; Tobin’s Q *LNBSIZE- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and 
LNBSIZE; Tobin’s Q * ID- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and ID; Tobin’s Q * FEDIR- interaction of Tobin‟s Q 
and FEDIR; Tobin’s Q * INT- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and INT; Tobin’s Q * OWNDIR- interaction of 
Tobin‟s Q and OWNDIR; Tobin’s Q * FINVTR- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and FINVTR; The standard errors 
and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical result reveals that CEO pay is positively and significantly associated 
with ROA, independent director, institutional ownership and director ownership and 
negatively and statistically associated with leverage in equation 1. This result implies that 
CEO pay depends on firm performance; independent director and institutional investors can‟t 
play their monitoring role effectively in restricting CEO compensation. Directors appoint 
their nominated person as CEO and CEO works on behalf of the directors‟ interest and 
receive high compensation. In addition, debt holders create pressure on management to 
control the CEO pay. The empirical result shows that CEO pay is positively and statistically 
associated with percentage of female directors in equation 1 and 3. This result indicates that 
female directors are not active and remain silent in board meeting about compensation issue. 
CEO pay is positively and statistically associated with firm size in all equations. This means 
that firm size is a significant determinant in CEO compensation and it is evident all over the 
world where research has been conducted about compensation. There is no significant 
interaction effect of firm performance and corporate governance variables on CEO pay 
except ROA and director ownership interaction. CEO pay is negatively and statistically 
associated with the interaction effect of ROA and director ownership. This result implies that 
interaction effect of ROA and director ownership is not significant explanatory factor for 
determination of CEO pay. In other words, it can be said that interaction effect of ROA and 
director ownership are less emphasized (or less used) in determination of CEO pay in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 
2.8.8 Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering Interaction Effect 
Determinants of CEO pay at lagged models are examined using the interaction effect 
of firm performance and corporate governance and the results of the regression are presented 
in the Table 2-18.  
The empirical result shows that CEO pay is positively and significantly associated 
with ROA. This result says that firm performance is a major determinant of CEO pay. CEO 
pay is positively and significantly associated with independent director, female director, 
 74  
 
institutional ownership and director ownership in equation 1. This result implies that 
independent director, female director, institutional owners and director can‟t monitor 
effectively in restricting CEO pay and as a result, corporate governance is very weak in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh. CEO pay is negatively associated with leverage in equation 1 and 
foreign investor in equation 2 and 3. This means that both debt holders and foreign investor 
monitor effectively to restrict the CEO compensation. Firm size is also positively and 
significantly associated with CEO pay in equation 1 and 3. This result is evident all over the 
world and it is common that CEO pay will increase with the increase of firm size. The 
empirical research finds that CEO pay at lagged models is positively and significantly 
associated with the interaction effect of Tobin‟s Q and foreign investors. This implies that 
foreign investors coupled with Tobin‟s Q have the influential power to increase the CEO pay. 
This study also finds that CEO pay is negatively and statistically associated with the 
interaction of ROA and female director in equation 3; ROA and institutional ownership in 
equation 1 and 3; and ROA and director ownership in equation 1 and 3. This result indicates 
that these interaction forms have less weight in CEO pay because these interaction forms are 
not significant determinant for CEO pay in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 
Table 2-18 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering  
Interaction Effect 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  10.08097 15.66613 14.45801 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA (-1) (%) (+) 0.3620227  0.3269863 
  (0.001)  (0.052) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) (+)  -3.134808 -4.359471 
   (0.442) (0.289) 
LNBSIZE (-1) (+) / (-) 0.1021555 -1.460545 -1.820089 
  (0.639) (0.364) (0.242) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.01212082 0.04568468 -0.007018979 
  (0.066) (0.054) (0.892) 
FEDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.02484834 0.04098891 0.07342359 
  (0.027) (0.375) (0.157) 
INT (-1) (%) (+) 0.0143602 -0.013984 0.0246867 
  (0.026) (0.577) (0.357) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) / (-) 0.0224151 0.0067515 -0.000967 
  (0.000) (0.808) (0.977) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) -0.0014947 -0.0931486 -0.0833607 
  (0.939) (0.017) (0.041) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (-) -0.0067452 -0.007044 -0.0059154 
  (0.079) (0.152) (0.143) 
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Table 2-18 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering  
Interaction Effect 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 0.1726747 0.1242533 0.2030303 
  (0.031) (0.180) (0.011) 
ROA(-1) * LNBSIZE(-1)  -0.0444764  -0.0225493 
  (0.364)  (0.769) 
ROA(-1)* ID(-1)  0.0030234  0.003690993 
  (0.165)  (0.321) 
ROA(-1)* FEDIR(-1)  -0.0048618  -0.005751883 
  (0.171)  (0.052) 
ROA(-1)* INT(-1)  -0.0027982  -0.0025584 
  (0.046)  (0.095) 
ROA(-1)* OWNDIR(-1)  -0.0046214  -0.0052439 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROA(-1)* FINVTR(-1)  0.0003656  -0.0020344 
  (0.942)  (0.738) 
Tobin‟s Q (1)*LNBSIZE(-
1) 
  1.273095 1.593851 
   (0.377) (0.254) 
Tobin‟s Q(-1) * ID(-1)   -0.02337686 0.01364353 
   (0.210) (0.740) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1)* FEDIR(-1)   -0.02606225 -0.04246136 
   (0.537) (0.362) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1)* INT(-1)   0.0224677 -0.0095365 
   (0.350) (0.709) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) * 
OWNDIR(1) 
  0.0076929 0.0247962 
   (0.765) (0.417) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1)*  
FINVTR(-1) 
  0.0839868 0.0755668 
   (0.017) (0.027) 
R2  0.4325 0.2734 0.4627 
Observations  202 202 202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA(-1) (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets of previous year; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR(-1)- Percentage of 
Female directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by the number of female directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board; INT(-1)- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution of previous year; 
OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board of previous year. It is computed 
by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage 
of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity of previous year; LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of 
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previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  ROA(-1) * LNBSIZE(-1) - interaction of ROA and 
LNBSIZE of previous year;  ROA(-1) * ID(-1) - interaction of ROA and ID of previous year; ROA(-1) * 
FEDIR(-1) - interaction of ROA and FEDIR of previous year; ROA(-1) * INT(-1) - interaction of ROA and 
INT of previous year ; ROA(-1) * OWNDIR(-1) - interaction of ROA and OWNDIR of previous year; ROA(-
1) * FINVTR(-1) - interaction of ROA and FINVTR of previous year; Tobin’s Q(-1)  *LNBSIZE(-1) - 
interaction of Tobin‟s Q and LNBSIZE of previous year ; Tobin’s Q (-1) * ID(-1) - interaction of Tobin‟s Q 
and ID of previous year ; Tobin’s Q (-1) * FEDIR(-1) - interaction of Tobin‟s Q and FEDIR of previous year; 
Tobin’s Q (-1) * INT(-1) - interaction of Tobin‟s Q and INT of previous year; Tobin’s Q(-1)  * OWNDIR(-1) 
- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and OWNDIR of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)  * FINVTR(-1) - interaction of 
Tobin‟s Q and FINVTR of previous year; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are 
calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented in 
the parenthesis.  
 
2.8.9   Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Considering Interaction Effect and 
Time Dummy 
Table 2-19 represents the regression result of the CEO pay at level models 
considering the time dummy and interaction effect of firm performance and corporate 
governance variables. The empirical result shows that CEO pay is influenced when time is 
controlled.  
 
Table 2-19 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models 
Considering Interaction Effect and Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  19.21294 25.14772 24.10603 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.2211074  0.1075698 
  (0.082)  (0.549) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -3.725924 -4.097688 
   (0.328) (0.286) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.0526908 -1.801191 -2.044894 
  (0.801) (0.215) (0.143) 
ID (%) (+) -0.002195243 0.02513446 -0.0153398 
  (0.768) (0.304) (0.747) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.01697588 0.0454396 0.06822275 
  (0.041) (0.173) (0.090) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0098605 -0.0235835 0.0227481 
  (0.072) (0.423) (0.528) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0141524 0.0187978 0.0154912 
  (0.006) (0.492) (0.666) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0208682 -0.0307964 -0.0200644 
  (0.224) (0.382) (0.544) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0043227 -0.004718 -0.0036779 
  (0.282) (0.319) (0.373) 
LNASSET (+) -0.1948136 -0.2438132 -0.1890994 
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Table 2-19 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models 
Considering Interaction Effect and Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
  (0.044) (0.022) (0.031) 
ROA* LNBSIZE  -0.0114566  0.0539002 
  (0.832)  (0.522) 
ROA* ID  0.00555784  0.003902012 
  (0.047)  (0.305) 
ROA* FEDIR  -0.000660266  -0.002306195 
  (0.803)  (0.362) 
ROA* INT  -0.0014336  -0.001133 
  (0.266)  (0.507) 
ROA* OWNDIR  -0.0030767  -0.0046742 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
ROA* FINVTR  -0.0032973  -0.0011631 
  (0.498)  (0.822) 
Tobin‟s Q *LNBSIZE   1.502497 1.559937 
   (0.261) (0.228) 
Tobin‟s Q * ID   -0.01334029 0.01315532 
   (0.530) (0.739) 
Tobin‟s Q * FEDIR   -0.02803481 -0.04385137 
   (0.362) (0.207) 
Tobin‟s Q * INT   0.0304646 -0.0123087 
   (0.274) (0.727) 
Tobin‟s Q * OWNDIR   -0.0067232 0.004235 
   (0.778) (0.893) 
Tobin‟s Q * FINVTR   0.0419677 0.0308023 
   (0.190) (0.307) 
Year Dummy     
2007  0.1976418 0.1631835 0.2554968 
  (0.114) (0.274) (0.072) 
2008  0.296902 0.337827 0.2942948 
  (0.039) (0.021) (0.042) 
2009  0.4624294 0.5161333 0.4619191 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
2010  0.5965422 0.7009982 0.667507 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
2011  0.8795036 0.9642317 0.8930958 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2012  1.029096 0.9436759 1.014379 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2013  1.120114 1.040913 1.152564 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2  0.5041 0.3891 0.5278 
Observations  232 232 232 
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This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total assets; 
LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size; ROA* LNBSIZE- 
interaction of ROA and LNBSIZE;  ROA* ID- interaction of ROA and ID; ROA* FEDIR- interaction of ROA 
and FEDIR; ROA* INT- interaction of ROA and INT; ROA* OWNDIR- interaction of ROA and OWNDIR; 
ROA* FINVTR- interaction of ROA and FINVTR; Tobin’s Q *LNBSIZE- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and 
LNBSIZE; Tobin’s Q * ID- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and ID; Tobin’s Q * FEDIR- interaction of Tobin‟s Q 
and FEDIR; Tobin’s Q * INT- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and INT; Tobin’s Q * OWNDIR- interaction of 
Tobin‟s Q and OWNDIR; Tobin’s Q * FINVTR- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and FINVTR; The standard errors 
and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis. 
 
CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with ROA in equation 1 which 
implies that firm performance determines the CEO pay. It is also evident a positive 
association between female directors and CEO pay in equation 1 and 3. This means that 
female directors don‟t have any effective monitoring about CEO compensation issue. The 
empirical result also finds that CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with 
institutional investors and ownership hold by directors in equation 1. Institutional investors 
are not effective enough to restrict CEO compensation. The reason might be institutional 
investors are passive investors or not play their monitoring role in the same industry. CEO 
receives high compensation because directors appoint their nominated person as CEO and 
CEO work on behalf of the directors‟ interest.  CEO pay is negatively and significantly 
associated with firm size in all equations after controlling time. This means that time has a 
significant effect between CEO pay and firm size. The reason might be the transition period 
of changes of government during 2007 to 2008 and stock market turmoil in 2010 to 2011.  
This study finds that CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with the interaction 
effect of ROA and independent directors in equation 1 after controlling time. This result 
indicated that ROA and independent directors have influential joint effect on determination of 
CEO pay.  In addition, CEO pay is negatively and statistically associated with the interaction 
effect of ROA and director ownership. This implies that interaction form of ROA and 
director ownership have less weight in CEO pay and therefore interaction form is less  used 
in determination of  CEO pay.   
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2.8.10 Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Considering Interaction Effect and 
Time Dummy 
CEO pay at lagged models are observed using time dummy and interaction effect of 
firm performance and corporate governance and the results of the regression are  presented in 
Table 2-20.  
The empirical result shows that CEO pay is positively associated with ROA, female 
directors, institutional investors, foreign investors and ownership held by directors in 
equation 1. Firm size is negatively and statistically associated with CEO pay when time is 
controlled. Two factors might be the causes of negative relationship and these are change of 
government during 2007 to 2008 and stock market turmoil in 2010-11. This study finds that 
CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with the interaction form of ROA and 
independent director in equation 1; and Tobin‟s Q and foreign investors. This result indicates 
that these interaction forms have positive influence to increase the CEO pay. On the other 
hand, CEO pay is negatively and statistically associated with the interaction effect of ROA 
and female directors; ROA and institutional investors; ROA and foreign investors; and ROA 
and ownership hold by directors. This result implies that these interaction forms are not 
significant explanatory factors for determination of CEO pay and therefore less used in 
setting CEO pay.  
 
Table 2-20 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models 
Considering Interaction Effect and Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  18.39791 24.92219 22.73067 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA (-1) (%) (+) 0.2954073  0.2078516 
  (0.014)  (0.215) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) (+)  -3.764543 -4.288508 
   (0.393) (0.311) 
LNBSIZE (-1) (+) / (-) 0.087524 -1.738932 -1.93452 
  (0.661) (0.312) (0.223) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.000917304 0.04298732 -0.008984742 
  (0.901) (0.044) (0.866) 
FEDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.02683594 0.03794916 0.08025891 
  (0.006) (0.407) (0.136) 
INT (-1) (%) (+) 0.0113795 -0.016605 0.0348726 
  (0.042) (0.584) (0.292) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) / (-) 0.015552 0.0114874 0.0015678 
  (0.005) (0.697) (0.967) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0299901 -0.0543317 -0.0379954 
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Table 2-20 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models 
Considering Interaction Effect and Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
  (0.053) (0.054) (0.205) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (-) -0.0047959 -0.0049252 -0.0040729 
  (0.232) (0.332) (0.325) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) -0.1751755 -0.2375202 -0.1396382 
  (0.075) (0.035) (0.086) 
ROA(-1) * LNBSIZE(-1)  -0.0195433  0.0316727 
  (0.706)  (0.685) 
ROA(-1)* ID(-1)  0.0043871  0.0041945 
  (0.048)  (0.318) 
ROA(-1)* FEDIR(-1)  -0.0045561  -0.0059192 
  (0.120)  (0.022) 
ROA(-1)* INT(-1)  -0.0020941  -0.0017446 
  (0.079)  (0.220) 
ROA(-1)* OWNDIR(-1)  -0.0039817  -0.0052467 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROA(-1)* FINVTR(-1)  -0.0066828  -0.0066115 
  (0.091)  (0.170) 
Tobin‟s Q (-
1)*LNBSIZE(1) 
  1.541118 1.608097 
   (0.324) (0.263) 
Tobin‟s Q(-1) * ID(-1)   -0.0279618 0.007463 
   (0.100) (0.858) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1)* FEDIR(-
1) 
  -0.0213197 -0.0462413 
   (0.611) (0.322) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1)* INT(-1)   0.0237561 -0.0218169 
   (0.406) (0.482) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) * 
OWNDIR(-1) 
  -0.0007513 0.0176637 
   (0.977) (0.595) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1)* 
FINVTR(-1) 
  0.0599402 0.0575564 
   (0.024) (0.020) 
Year Dummy     
2008  0.2874408 0.2394034 0.3427307 
  (0.024) (0.121) (0.019) 
2009  0.2565066 0.3194711 0.239608 
  (0.053) (0.013) (0.064) 
2010  0.5129781 0.5649962 0.4946677 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2011  0.5892872 0.6521359 0.6252221 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
2012  0.79613 0.882063 0.7776278 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 81  
 
Table 2-20 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models 
Considering Interaction Effect and Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
2013  0.9454417 0.8921019 0.9031275 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2  0.5008 0.3504 0.5282 
Observations  202 202 202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA(-1) (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets of previous year; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR(-1)- Percentage of 
Female directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by the number of female directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board; INT(-1)- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution of previous year; 
OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board of previous year. It is computed 
by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage 
of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity of previous year; LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of 
previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  ROA(-1) * LNBSIZE(-1) - interaction of ROA and 
LNBSIZE of previous year;  ROA(-1) * ID(-1) - interaction of ROA and ID of previous year; ROA(-1) * 
FEDIR(-1) - interaction of ROA and FEDIR of previous year; ROA(-1) * INT(-1) - interaction of ROA and 
INT of previous year ; ROA(-1) * OWNDIR(-1) - interaction of ROA and OWNDIR of previous year; ROA(-
1) * FINVTR(-1) - interaction of ROA and FINVTR of previous year; Tobin’s Q(-1)  *LNBSIZE(-1) - 
interaction of Tobin‟s Q and LNBSIZE of previous year ; Tobin’s Q (-1) * ID(-1) - interaction of Tobin‟s Q 
and ID of previous year ; Tobin’s Q (-1) * FEDIR(-1) - interaction of Tobin‟s Q and FEDIR of previous year; 
Tobin’s Q (-1) * INT(-1) - interaction of Tobin‟s Q and INT of previous year; Tobin’s Q(-1)  * OWNDIR(-1) 
- interaction of Tobin‟s Q and OWNDIR of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)  * FINVTR(-1) - interaction of 
Tobin‟s Q and FINVTR of previous year; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are 
calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented in 
the parenthesis.  
 
2.8.11   Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models using Fixed Effect Method 
Table 2-21 represents the regression results of determinants of CEO pay at level 
models using fixed effect in panel method. This analysis tries to find out whether there exist 
any variation in determinants of CEO pay between pooled method and panel method using 
the fixed effect.   
The empirical results report that there is a positive correlation between CEO pay and 
Tobin‟s Q which implies that CEO pay depends on external firm performance. CEO pay is 
positively and statistically associated with firm size and this result indicates that firm size is a 
significant determinant of CEO compensation and CEO pay increases with the firm size. 
Hypothesis 7 assumes that there is a positive relationship between the presence of foreign 
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ownership and CEO pay and this empirical result shows the positive and significant 
association of foreign ownership and CEO pay. This result indicates that foreign investors are 
highly concerned about their investment and they demand qualified talented person as CEO 
and pay high compensation to CEO.  
 
Table 2-21 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Using Fixed 
Effect Method 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -0.4638899 -0.5047826 -0.5056588 
  (0.776) (0.755) (0.756) 
ROA(%) (+) 0.0032729  0.0013446 
  (0.730)  (0.889) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  0.0596236 0.0588112 
   (0.006) (0.009) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) 0.0183215 0.0164697 0.0134834 
  (0.878) (0.878) (0.910) 
ID (%) (+) -0.002940824 -0.002745405 -0.002721633 
  (0.377) (0.415) (0.415) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.00091478 0.000962445 0.000972971 
  (0.713) (0.697) (0.696) 
INT (%) (+) -0.0032622 -0.0030606 -0.0030514 
  (0.132) (0.150) (0.155) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) -0.0040131 -0.0038828 -0.0038312 
  (0.220) (0.222) (0.237) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0061672 0.0061366 0.0061398 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0001927 -0.0001724 -0.0001823 
  (0.710) (0.711) (0.714) 
LNASSET (+) 0.6478906 0.6470482 0.6472356 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F (9,29)  28.68 30.08 28.31 
Probability>F  0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the panel regression using the fixed effect method of the total CEO 
remuneration which denotes : LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  
ROA is calculated by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of 
Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total 
number of directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female 
directors divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and 
 83  
 
t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error clustered at the firm level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
2.8.12 Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models using Random Effect Method 
Determinants of CEO pay at level models are investigated using the random effect in 
panel method and the regression results are presented in Table 2-22.  
 
Table 2-22 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Using 
Random Effect Method 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  2.104647 1.811995 1.93476 
  (0.253) (0.300) (0.278) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.0098831  0.0076056 
  (0.609)  (0.703) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  0.0878781 0.0854155 
   (0.016) (0.033) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.1411624 -0.111964 -0.1379734 
  (0.226) (0.339) (0.228) 
ID (%) (+) -0.000140422 -0.000138465 0.000115569 
  (0.967) (0.968) (0.973) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.002602888 0.00254345 0.002686786 
  (0.270) (0.249) (0.248) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0008423 0.0007243 0.0009714 
  (0.788) (0.802) (0.753) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0031925 0.0025039 0.0031658 
  (0.475) (0.514) (0.466) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0031855 0.0033369 0.0031743 
  (0.415) (0.371) (0.411) 
DEBT2TE  (-) -0.0013703 -0.001195 -0.0013088 
  (0.026) (0.066) (0.018) 
LNASSET (+) 0.553056 0.5592767 0.5556605 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald Chi2 (9)  251.38 263.89 288.54 
Probability>Chi2  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the panel regression using the random effect method of the total CEO 
compensation which denotes : LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  
ROA is calculated by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of 
Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total 
number of directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female 
directors divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
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Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and 
t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error clustered at the firm level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical result finds that CEO pay depends on the firm performance because 
there is a positive and significant association between CEO pay and Tobin‟s Q. Hypothesis 9 
assumes that there is a positive relationship between firm size and CEO pay. The empirical 
result reveals that CEO pay is positively and statistically associated with firm size which 
means that firm size plays a significant role in determination of CEO pay. It is common that 
CEO pay will increase with the increase of firm size. Moreover, hypothesis 8 assumes that 
there is negative relationship between CEO pay and leverage. CEO pay is negatively and 
significantly associated with leverage. This result implies that debt holders monitor the 
activities of CEO and restrict the CEO pay if any action is against the interest of the 
shareholders.   
 
2.8.13 Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models by Changing the Measurement of 
Leverage 
Determinants of CEO pay at level models are reexamined by changing the 
measurement of leverage in Table 2-23. Leverage is measured by debt to equity ratio in the 
analysis part.  If equity is negative then debt equity ratio will be negative which may have 
impact on the regression results. Thus, leverage is newly measured by the ratio of debt to 
total assets for examining the robustness of the results and avoiding the negative sign of debt 
equity ratio. 
The empirical analysis shows that the regression results are same between Table 2-23  
and Table 2-9 in terms of firm performance (ROA and Tobin‟s Q), board size, independent 
director, female director, institutional investors, director ownership and foreign investors. 
This result indicates that CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with firm 
performance (ROA  and Tobin‟s Q) and significantly negatively associated with board size.  
Independent director, female director, director ownership, institutional investors and foreign 
investors have no significant monitoring role in restricting the CEO pay. The major 
differences between Table 2-23 and Table 2-9 are firm leverage and firm size. When leverage 
is measured by debt to total assets, this analysis finds that there is no significant association 
of CEO pay with firm size and leverage. This result implies that creditors also have no 
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bargaining power in restricting the CEO pay and firm size is not a significant explanatory 
factor in determination of CEO pay. 
 
Table 2-23 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Level Models Changing the 
Measurement of Leverage 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  13.79    16.20    13.87    
  (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      
ROA (%) (+) 0.0756    0.0688  
  (0.037)       (0.056)     
Tobin‟s Q (+)  0.302    0.267    
   (0.005)      (0.001)      
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.526    -0.393   -0.521    
  (0.006)     (0.039)     (0.006)     
ID (%) (+) 0.0201    0.0229    0.0210    
  (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.000)      
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.0121    0.0125    0.0129    
  (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)        
INT (%) (+) 0.0120    0.0126    0.0123    
  (0.004)      (0.003)      (0.003)      
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0225    0.0216    0.0231    
  (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.00202 0.00565 0.00203 
  (0.754)     (0.386)     (0.749)     
DEBT2TA  (-) -1.004 -2.735   -1.454 
  (0.372)     (0.012)     (0.209)     
LNASSET (+) 0.125 0.0727 0.125 
  (0.199)     (0.470)     (0.193)      
R2  0.318 0.314 0.335 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total assets; 
LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TA- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and 
t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
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2.8.14 Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models by Changing the Measurement of 
Leverage 
Determinants of CEO pay at lagged models are reinvestigated by changing the 
measurement of leverage in Table 2-24.  Leverage is measured by debt to equity ratio of 
previous year in the analysis part.  If equity is negative then debt equity ratio will be negative 
which may have impact on the regression results. Thus, leverage is newly measured by the 
ratio of debt to total assets of previous year for examining the robustness of the results and 
avoiding the negative sign of debt equity ratio.  
 
Table 2-24 
Regression Results of Determinants of CEO Pay at Lagged Models Changing the 
Measurement of Leverage 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  14.82          17.59          15.00          
  (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000) 
ROA (-1) (%) (+) 0.0763    0.0695 
  (0.084)  (0.112) 
Tobin‟s Q (-1) (+)  0.303       0.276       
   (0.023) (0.011) 
LNBSIZE (-1) (+) / (-) -0.469       -0.362    -0.468       
  (0.013) (0.058) (0.012) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.0192          0.0224          0.0198          
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
FEDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0119          0.0122          0.0129          
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INT (-1) (%) (+) 0.0124          0.0130          0.0128          
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) / (-) 0.0224          0.0221          0.0231          
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.00186 0.00543 0.00205 
  (0.796) (0.434) (0.769) 
DEBT2TA (-1) (-) -1.199 -3.335       -1.693 
  (0.485) (0.017) (0.330) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 0.0896 0.0406 0.0872 
  (0.374) (0.694) (0.382) 
R2  0.290 0.290 0.311 
Observations  202 202 202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the total CEO compensation which denotes : 
LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ; ROA(-1) (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net 
profit before tax divided by average total assets of previous year ; Tobin’s Q(-1)- Tobin‟s Q is computed by 
book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets of previous year; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
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by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR(-1)- Percentage of 
Female directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by the number of female directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board; INT(-1)- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution of previous year; 
OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board of previous year. It is computed 
by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage 
of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous year; DEBT2TA(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total assets of previous year; LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of 
previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t 
statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is 
presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical analysis shows that the regression results are same between Table 2-24 
and Table 2-10 in terms of firm performance (ROA and Tobin‟s Q), board size, independent 
director, female director, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors and 
firm size. This result indicates that CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with 
firm performance (ROA and Tobin‟s Q) and large board is more effective than small board in 
restricting the CEO pay. Independent director, female director, director ownership, 
institutional investors and foreign investors have no significant monitoring role in restricting 
the CEO pay. The major difference between Table 2-24 and Table 2-10 is firm leverage. 
When leverage is measured by debt to total assets of previous year, this analysis finds that 
there is no significant association of CEO pay with firm leverage. This result implies that 
creditors also have no bargaining power in restricting the CEO pay.  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
Management compensation research has failed to reach a strong conclusion that CEO 
pay depends on firm performance due to mixed empirical evidence. The empirical result in 
this study document that CEO pay is positively related with ROA and this pay performance 
relationship is statistically significant at 1% level. The empirical result also reports there is a 
positive relationship between Tobin‟s Q (which represents the firm value or growth) and 
CEO pay and it is also significant at 1% level. These two findings indicate that CEO pay is 
determined on the basis of internal and external firm performance i.e. firm performance and 
this conclusion is evident on the basis of the empirical results. Reaz and Arun (2006) study 
stated that CEOs contracts in banks are linked to performance and the empirical result of this 
study supports this statement.  
Board size is negatively and statistically related with CEO pay and it is consistent 
with prior studies (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Fung et al., 2001; Guest, 2008). Theoretical 
literature implies that small board is more effective then large board but this is not applicable 
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in listed banks of Bangladesh. This study finds that large board restricts the CEO pay and 
more effective than small board. Large board reduces the decision making power of the CEO 
through proper monitoring and utilizing the business expertise. Furthermore, CEO becomes 
failure to get reward for high compensation by convincing so many diversified business 
expertise directors.  Independent directors can‟t play their monitoring role in restricting CEO 
pay because independent directors are not effective and independent. Independent directors 
are appointed by the board and their renewal depends on whether independent directors work 
on behalf of the board. Independent director receives only meeting fee and this amount is not 
sufficient enough to play the supervisory role in the board. Moreover, the number of 
independent directors is small enough to play their strong monitoring role in the board.  
Female directors have the positive and significant relationship with CEO pay. This result can 
be interpreted in two ways:  CEO is more active and performs better when board is directed 
and controlled by female directors because female directors are hard worker, timely decision 
maker, efficient in managing the board and understand the market environment. This 
attributes of females directors increase the image of the firm by creating more value to the 
firm. On the other hand, female directors have no voice about CEO compensation issue 
because both female directors and CEO are appointed by the board and the board is mainly 
controlled by the controlling shareholders (sponsor shareholders) to maximum their self 
interest.  
The empirical result finds a positive relationship between institutional investors and 
CEO pay. This can be explained in two ways: First, institutional investors motivate firms to 
give performance based compensation to CEO. On the other hand, role of institutional 
investors is either absent or weak in listed banks of Bangladesh because the mean percentage 
of institutional ownership is only 14.26% which is comparatively less in compare to other 
developed countries.  Moreover, institutional investors are passive investors and institutional 
monitoring is not important governance mechanism in the same or peer group industry to 
restrict the CEO pay.  
Directors appoint their nominated person as CEO who will look at their interests and 
pay high compensation to CEO due to serve their own objectives. Moreover, CEO has no 
opportunity to earn dividend and capital gain from shares because as per bank regulation 
CEO can‟t hold any shares of the bank and directors try to compensate them by paying more 
cash compensation.  The mean percentage of foreign shareholders is only 2.11% and this is 
not sufficient enough to monitor the activities of the CEO in compare to other countries. But 
the positive thing is that number of foreign investors and their investment is increasing 
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nowadays. CEO receives low compensation when the firm debt ratio is high which implies 
that debt holders (mainly depositors) have the power to create pressure on the activities of the 
board and the CEO compensation.  Finally, the empirical result reports that firm size is a 
significant determinant in CEO compensation.  
This study also finds that agency theory is also popular to the regulators, policy 
makers, shareholders and researchers because CEO compensation plays an important role to 
reduce the agency problem and work for the best interest of the shareholders. Bangladesh 
Bank, the regulatory authority, provides the guidelines about the appointment and pay setting 
process of the CEO. Board of directors decides the CEO pay and takes the approval from 
Bangladesh Bank.  Moreover, the assumptions of agency theory are deeply rooted in the 
corporate governance guidelines of the listed banks of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) introduced corporate governance guidelines 
2006 and later revised the corporate governance guidelines in 2012 to ensure better 
governance and these positive changes follow the assumptions of agency theory.  The number 
of independent directors increased from one tenth to one fifth according to corporate 
governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 respectively. The presence of higher number of 
independent directors in the board committee, audit committee and other supporting 
committees also improve the accountability, monitoring and governance of the firm. Board 
dominated by outside independent directors also has the power to change the management if 
the performance of management is weak or engaged in corruption. The position of the 
chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is occupied by different individuals in each 
bank. All the banks also have the separate audit committee. The above practices indicate the 
application of agency theory in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Moreover, following the agency theory, previous research finds that board 
characteristics, ownership structure and external monitoring are the significant explanatory 
factors to determine the CEO compensation. Thus, this study considers firm performance 
such as ROA and Tobin‟s Q; board characteristics (such as board size, proportion of 
independent director and proportion of female directors); and ownership structure (such as 
director ownership, institutional investors and foreign ownership), and external monitoring 
such as firm leverage as the determinants of CEO compensation. This study finds that CEO 
compensation is significantly positively associated with firm performance. This result is 
consistent with the agency theory which states that executive compensation should be linked 
to firm performance.  Board characteristics and ownership structure and external monitoring 
are also used as corporate governance instruments to determine the CEO compensation 
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following the agency theory. But this study also finds that independent directors, female 
directors, institutional investors, foreign investors and directors‟ can‟t play their monitoring 
role in restricting CEO compensation. The number of independent directors and female 
directors increases in recent years but which don‟t have significant positive impact to restrict 
CEO compensation. Institutional investors and foreign investors also don‟t have any 
significant association with CEO compensation due to low ownership. The above result 
indicates that agency problem is higher because corporate governance is weak which 
ultimately increase the total CEO compensation. But effective corporate governance 
mechanisms reduce the agency problem and restrict the total CEO compensation.  In 
addition, the empirical result shows that leverage is negatively associated with CEO pay 
which implies that CEO pay is monitored by the debt holders. The application of above 
variables, result and analysis also indicates that banks are following agency theory in 
determining the CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
The overall findings of this study are (1) CEO compensation is determined on the 
basis of firm performance after controlling other factors; (2) CEO compensation is higher due 
to weak corporate governance mechanisms in the listed banks of Bangladesh and (3) firm size 
is also a significant determinant in CEO compensation.  
In addition, this study also conducted some additional analysis as a robust check and 
finds some variation of the results or sensitivity of the determinants of CEO compensation in 
the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 The determinants of CEO pay at level models and lagged models are examined 
considering the time dummy and find that variation of results with the main analysis in terms 
of foreign investors, leverage and firm size. These results indicates that foreign investors are 
highly concerned about their investment and demand high quality talented person as CEO 
and pay high compensation but debt holders and firm size have no significant association 
with CEO pay when time is controlled.  
Firm performance, governance variables and firm characteristics are generally 
consistent over the years and variables of one year might affect the following years and as a 
result, the problem of serial correlation may arise. Thus, the determinants of CEO 
compensation at level models and lagged models are reinvestigated considering the serial 
correlation issue and find that variation of results with the main analysis in terms of firm size 
only. This result indicates that firm size has no significant association with CEO pay when 
serial correlation is considered.  
 91  
 
 The determinants of CEO compensation at level model and lagged model are 
reinvestigated considering time dummy and serial correlation and find the variation of results 
with the main analysis in terms of firm size only.  This result indicates that firm size is not 
significantly associated with CEO pay when time dummy and serial correlation are 
considered.  
The determinants of CEO pay at level models and lagged models are reexamined 
considering the interaction effect of firm performance with corporate governance and find 
that variation of results with the main analysis in terms of Tobin‟s Q, board size and leverage. 
This result implies that CEO pay is not influenced by these variables when interaction effect 
of firm performance with corporate governance is considered.  
The determinants of quality of corporate governance at level models and lagged 
models are examined considering the interaction effect and time dummy and find that 
variation of results with the main analysis in terms of Tobin‟s Q, board size, leverage and 
firm size. This result indicates that CEO pay is not influenced by these variables when 
interaction effect and time dummy are considered.  
The determinants of CEO compensation at level model are reexamined using fixed 
effect and random effect of panel method. This study finds that variation of results with the 
main analysis in terms of ROA, board size and leverage using fixed effect method. This result 
indicates that CEO pay has no significant association with ROA, board size and leverage.  In 
addition, this study also finds that variation of result with the main analysis in terms of ROA 
and board size using random effect method. This result implies that ROA and board size have 
no significant association with CEO pay.   
The determinants of CEO pay at level models and lagged models are reinvestigated 
by changing the measurement of leverage through the ratio of debt to total assets and find that 
variation of results with the main analysis in terms of leverage and firm size.  This results 
indicates that firm size and leverage has no significant association with CEO pay when the 
measurement of leverage is changed.  
From the above analysis, it is evident that there are some variations of results or 
sensitivity when different types of estimations are conducted. But it is observed that in this 
study, the sample size is not equal in each year, and the sample size ranges twenty six to 
thirty during the study period, and number of observations is comparatively less in total. 
Thus, to get the larger sample size, and greater variation which reduces the standard error, 
this study applies the pooled cross sectional method as the main analysis to find out the 
determinants of CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
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The results of this study should be interest to regulators, practitioners and academics 
who are interested in determinants of CEO compensation and the empirical results provide 
some suggestions to improve the pay literature in Bangladesh and reduce the agency problem 
between shareholders and executives. First, this study finds that only few banks disclose the 
breakdown information of total CEO compensation.  This makes difficult to do rigorous 
research by considering all the components of CEO information. The regulatory authority 
should more concentrate on disclosure of executives‟ information with breakdown in details 
and performance bonus or incentives should be clearly specified. Second, it is evident that 
large board is effective in monitoring CEO pay but role of independent directors are not 
effective enough to control the CEO pay. Generally, the banks disclose the information in 
corporate governance checklist that they complies the minimum requirement of independent 
directors. But whether the independent directors are playing their role as independent is a 
matter of question. This study also finds that institutional investors are not playing their 
monitoring role in limiting the activities of executives and CEO pay. CEO pay is high due to 
weak corporate governance mechanisms in listed banks. Thus, Bangladesh Bank and 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) should more emphasize on 
efficient corporate governance mechanisms. Third, in listed banks, board formulates two 
committees which are executive committee and audit committee. Board decides the 
compensation package of executives and collects the approval from Bangladesh Bank. 
Separate compensation committee is available in the firms of developed countries. But this 
study finds that there is no separate compensation committee in listed banks. Thus, 
Bangladesh Bank should introduce separate compensation committee to design effective 
compensation package for the executives. Fourth, this study finds that stock option and grants 
are widely used in US and UK but there are no use of equity based incentives like stock 
option and grant in listed banks of Bangladesh. The regulatory authority such as Bangladesh 
Bank and Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) should introduce the 
option and grant as incentive for the executives. The uses of stock and grant will also help to 
reduce the agency problem between the managers and shareholders.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation and Its Determinants 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Management compensation reduces the agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also stated that agency problem is reduced by 
aligning the interest of managers and shareholders through management compensation. But 
shareholders raise the burning question that management receives excessive amount from 
their wealth and therefore, management compensation itself promotes the question of agency 
conflict without adequate disclosure of management compensation.  In addition, information 
asymmetry is boosted up when there is lack of timely and quality disclosure of management 
compensation (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen et al., 2004). Agency conflict and information 
asymmetry enhances the demand of disclosure of management compensation to the public 
and quality disclosure of management compensation limits the agency conflict and 
information asymmetry. Moreover, disclosure quality of management compensation plays an 
influential role to stakeholders, researchers, regulators and policymakers to ensure 
transparency and accountability. Thus, disclosure quality of management compensation is an 
emerging issue in academic research nowadays.  
Empirical studies documented public disclosure of CEO compensation is a norm over 
the years in developed countries especially in US (Andjelkovic et al., 2002). Swan and Zhou 
(2006) study stated that UK (Conyon and Murphy, 2000), Canada (Zhou, 2000), Australia 
(Merherbi et al., 2006) discloses executive compensation information in public but most of 
the countries till do not disclose compensation information in public. Similarly, there is 
dearth of empirical research on how CEO compensation disclose in the financial report, 
compensation policy and process, elements of compensation, types of incentives, retirement 
and long term benefits and relationship of CEO compensation disclosure with firm 
performance, corporate governance, firm characteristics and other variables in Bangladesh 
particularly in banks. Thus, there is a gap of research on transparency of CEO compensation 
disclosure using data from Bangladeshi listed banks.  This gap of research inspires me to do 
my research on disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh 
and filling up the gap is my research motivation of this study.  
The research question of this study is to examine the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation and its determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh. The specific research 
questions are: (1) to examine the disclosure practices of CEO compensation of the listed 
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banks by preparing a self structured CEO compensation disclosure index and (2) to examine 
which factors contribute significantly in disclosure practices of CEO compensation. I 
consider firm performance, corporate governance mechanisms including board composition 
and ownership pattern, leverage, firm size, CEO compensation and audit quality variables to 
examine the effect on disclosure of CEO compensation. Markarian et al. (2007) study finds 
that disclosure pattern varies significantly across company structure. Thus, I prepare a self 
structured CEO compensation disclosure index considering compensation policy and process, 
perquisites, bonus, retirement benefit and so on. I want to find out the effect of internal firm 
performance ROA and external firm performance Tobin‟s Q on CEO compensation 
disclosure index.  To ensure transparency and accountability to the stakeholders, I want to 
examine to what extent corporate governance variables are effective in disclosing CEO 
compensation information. I consider board composition (board size, percentage of 
independent directors and presence of female directors in the board) and ownership pattern 
(institutional investors, ownership hold by directors and foreign investors) as the mechanisms 
of corporate governance. Moreover, I want to test whether debt holders have any bargaining 
power about disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  Previous studies stated that firm size 
is a significant explanatory variable in disclosing compensation information. I want to 
examine whether firm size is also a significant explanatory variable in disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Empirical research also finds that 
disclosure is more when compensation is less and vice versa. I try to find out whether there is 
any effect of CEO compensation on disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Finally, I want 
to examine whether audit quality has any significant effect on CEO compensation disclosure.  
This empirical research will contribute to the disclosure literature in many ways: First, 
there is dearth of research of empirical research related to disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Thus, this study will contribute to the 
paucity of CEO compensation disclosure research and will add value to the disclosure 
literature of Bangladesh. Second, this study evaluates the self structured CEO compensation 
disclosure index and  the relationship of CEO compensation disclosure index with firm 
performance, corporate governance variables including board composition and ownership 
pattern, firm characteristics, CEO compensation and audit quality using descriptive statistics, 
correlation matrix and multivariate analysis. This analysis and findings will help to 
understand disclosure practices of CEO compensation in the absence of detailed accounting 
standard and major determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh.  Third, the findings of the study will help to regulators, practitioners, 
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researchers and others to understand the mechanisms of corporate governance and to what 
extent the corporate governance is effective in disclosing CEO compensation disclosure 
index and how firms should modernize the corporate governance mechanisms to enrich the 
comprehensive disclosure of CEO compensation similar to developed countries disclosure. 
Finally, this finding of the research will help to materialize the transparency and 
accountability about CEO compensation disclosure to the stakeholders and reduce the 
information asymmetry and agency cost by resolving the burning question of public whether 
CEO receives excess amount or not.  
In this study, disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its determinants are 
examined considering the listed banks of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) from the period of 
2006 to 2013. This study finds that overall CEO compensation disclosure measured by the 
index is very poor but increased over the years as expected.  The empirical result shows that 
firm performance (ROA), CEO compensation, director ownership, foreign investors and audit 
quality are the significant explanatory factors for CEO compensation disclosure index.  CEO 
compensation disclosure is more transparent when firm performance is high. When firm 
performance is good, they also try to present themselves that they are more accountable to the 
shareholders and attract new investors by disclosing CEO compensation information in more 
details.  This research study shows that disclosure quality of CEO compensation is high when 
CEO receives more compensation. Directors monitoring role is effective in ensuring higher 
disclosure of CEO compensation. Foreign investors are more concerned about their 
investment and they are habituated about the comprehensive disclosure of CEO 
compensation like their home countries and expect same disclosure in listed banks of 
Bangladesh and monitor accordingly.  Moreover, this study reveals that disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation is comparatively high when firm is audited by the affiliated audit firms of 
BIG 4. BIG 4 audit firm ensures higher disclosure and transparency to retain their reputation 
in the global market. But this study also reports that firm size has no significant association 
with CEO compensation disclosure and board size, independent directors, female directors, 
and institutional investors have no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation which means that corporate governance is very weak and inefficient. Creditors 
also don‟t have any bargaining power to increase the quality of disclosure of CEO 
compensation. Finally, this study recommends that government or regulators should more 
emphasize on transparency and accountability of CEO compensation disclosure through 
imposing mandatory disclosure requirement and monitoring of corporate governance 
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mechanisms and thereby, reduce the agency cost and information asymmetry of the 
shareholders. 
This study is organized in the following ways: section 3.2 presents the prior research; 
section 3.3 shows disclosure requirement in Asia; section 3.4 presents the theoretical 
framework; section 3.5 explains selection process of sample; section 3.6 describe the research 
design including hypothesis development, regression models and variables ; section 3.7 
explains the analysis of the results. This section includes CEO compensation disclosure 
index, descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and multivariate analysis; section 3.8 discuss 
the additional analysis considering  time dummy, serial correlation effect, alternative method 
named as TOBIT analysis, fixed effect, random effect, changing the measurement of leverage 
and modified CEO compensation disclosure index.  Finally this paper ends with the section 
3.9 which presents the conclusion and recommendation about the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 
3.2 Prior Research 
Management compensation reduces the agency problem. But management 
compensation itself raises the agency problem without disclosure of compensation 
information. One way to resolve the agency problem is full disclosure of management 
compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Gordon, 2004; 
Swan and Zhou, 2006; Muslu, 2010; Morse et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2011; Melis et al., 
2015). In absence of compensation information, management compensation also generates 
the problem of information asymmetry because shareholders assume that management 
receives excessive amount form shareholders wealth. Disclosure of compensation 
information reduces the information asymmetry (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Swan and Zhou, 2006; 
Laksama, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010; Melis et al., 2015).   
Disclosure of compensation has also some other potential benefits. Bushman and 
Smith (2001) study finds that transparency of information disclosure affects market value.  
Lo (2003) study finds that firms adopting the mandatory disclosure policy had the higher 
stock returns. Melis et al. (2015) study reported that shareholders get the opportunity to 
analyze and give their opinion on directors‟ compensation when compensation information is 
publicly available.  On the other hand, Andjelkovic et al. (2002) study stated that 
shareholders can‟t create pressure on management due to unavailable compensation 
information and board faces less pressure in the absence of public disclosure of executive 
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compensation.  Andjelkovic et al. (2002) study also stated that lack of public disclosure of 
compensation leads to higher agency problems and ineffective remuneration policies.  
Previous studies documented public disclosure of CEO compensation is a norm over 
the years in developed countries especially in US (Andjelkovic et al., 2002). Swan and Zhou 
(2006) study stated that UK, Canada, Australia discloses executive compensation information 
but most of the countries till do not disclose compensation information in public. Disclosure 
pattern also varies significantly across company structure (Markarian et al., 2007).  
Empirical studies mainly documented the relationship of disclosure of compensation 
with firm performance, corporate governance, firm characteristics and other variables.  
Disclosure related literature mainly emphasize on CEO compensation  disclosure or CEO 
compensation disclosure index or individual directors compensation or individual directors 
compensation index or executive compensation or executive compensation disclosure index  
as dependent variable. The independent variables are used firm performance (ROA, ROE and 
Tobin‟s Q); corporate governance mechanisms including board composition (board size, 
independent directors, outsiders) ownership structures (family ownership, government 
ownership, director ownership, foreign investors, institutional investors, dispersed 
ownership),  Firm characteristics (leverage, firm‟s size, growth, experience) , audit issue 
(audit quality, audit committee, change of auditor),  CEO  issue (compensation of CEO, 
change of compensation of CEO, ) and other variables ( compensation committee, cross 
listing status, public scrutiny, possibility of takeover or merger, prior adoption of shareholder 
value oriented approach, media coverage).  
Firm performance affects the quality of compensation disclosure. Wallance and Naser 
(1995) stated that firms have the tendency to disclose good news broadly and faster than bad 
news. Empirical result is mixed.  Coulton et al. (2001) study find that disclosure transparency 
of CEO compensation is significantly and positively associated with firm performance.  But 
Malek (2015) study doesn‟t find any significant relation between disclosure of individual 
executive directors‟ compensation and firm performance.  When firm performance is poor, 
directors‟ compensation requires more clarification (Wade et al., 1997).   Melis et al. (2015) 
study stated that poorly performing firms disclose compensation information in more details 
to limit negative publicity. 
Disclosure policy of compensation is also influenced by effective corporate 
governance mechanisms. Compensation disclosure and corporate governance are mutually 
complementary in reducing agency problems (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Coles, 2008).  
Clarkson et al. (2006) study finds that corporate governance is the significant explanatory 
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variable for compensation disclosure but Coulton et al. (2001) study finds that corporate 
governance mechanisms have no significant relation with CEO compensation disclosure.  
 
Table 3-1 
Summary Studies of the Determinants of Disclosure of CEO Compensation 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Disclosure  
Measure 
Disclosure 
Determinants 
Findings 
Coulton, 
James 
and 
Taylor 
(2001) 
198 
observat
ion of 
Australi
an firms  
1998 to 
2000 
Tobit 
regressio
n 
analysis 
Disclosure 
transparency 
through disclosure 
index 
 Firm size 
 Firm 
performance 
 Firm growth 
 CEO 
compensation 
 Outsiders 
(holding more 
than 5% shares) 
 Insiders  
 Board size 
 Proportion of 
outside directors 
 CEO duality 
 Audit Quality  
 Audit Committee 
 Compensation 
committee 
 
 Disclosure transparency is 
positively and significantly 
associated with firm size and 
performance.  
 CEO remuneration is 
negatively and statistically 
associated with disclosure 
transparency.  
 There is no significant 
association between firm 
growth and disclosure 
transparency. . 
 There is no significant 
association of block holder 
and insider ownership with 
disclosure transparency. 
 No significant association of 
governance attributes like 
board size, outside directors, 
CEO duality, audit quality, 
audit committee and 
compensation committee 
with disclosure index.  
 
Clarkson 
et al. 
(2006) 
124 
Australi
an firms 
1998 to 
2004 
Pooled 
generaliz
ed least  
squares 
technique
s 
CEO 
compensation 
disclosure 
 Firm Size 
 Firm 
performance 
 Firm Growth 
 Leverage 
 Corporate 
Governance 
 Audit Quality 
 Cross listing 
status 
 Public scrutiny 
 Change of CEO 
 Change of 
Auditor 
 Possibility of 
takeover or 
merger  
 CEO compensation 
disclosure is positively and 
significantly associated with 
firm size, corporate 
governance, auditor quality, 
cross listing status and public 
scrutiny and all other 
variables are not significant.  
Chizema 
A. (2008) 
126 
firms 
from 18 
industri
al 
sectors 
2002 to 
2005 
Logistic 
regressio
n 
Disclosure of 
individual 
executive 
compensation 
 Institutional 
ownership 
 Foreign 
ownership 
 Dispersed 
ownership 
 Bank ownership 
 Family 
ownership 
 Institutional ownership is 
positively and significantly 
associated with disclosure.  
 No significant relationship 
between foreign ownership 
and disclosure.  
 Dispersed ownership is 
positively and significantly 
associated with disclosure. 
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Table 3-1 
Summary Studies of the Determinants of Disclosure of CEO Compensation 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Disclosure  
Measure 
Disclosure 
Determinants 
Findings 
 State ownership 
 Size of the 
supervisory 
board 
 Firms prior 
adoption of 
shareholder value 
oriented practice 
 Firm experience 
(age) 
 There is no association of 
bank and family ownership 
with disclosure. 
 State ownership has a 
positive and significant 
coefficient with disclosure. 
 Size of the supervisory board 
is negatively and statistically 
associated with disclosure. 
 Disclosure is comparatively 
higher when firms adopt a 
prior shareholder value 
oriented practice. 
 Firm experience is 
significantly negatively 
associated with disclosure. 
Malek 
(2014) 
200 
sample 
compani
es 
2000 to 
2008 
Kruskal-
Wallies 
and 
Mann-
Whitney 
Wilcoxon 
Disclosure of 
Executive 
Director‟s 
Compensation 
 
 
 Reforms in 
Malaysian 
regulatory 
framework 
 Level of voluntary disclosure 
of executive directors 
compensation is increased 
after reform in Malaysian 
regulatory framework i.e. 
positive relationship between 
disclosure level and 
regulatory reform.  
Melis, 
Gaia and 
Carta 
(2014) 
Non 
financia
l firms 
of Italy 
and UK 
235 and 
1528 
respecti
vely.  
2009 Cross 
sectional 
analysis 
in the 
main 
model 
and tobit 
regressio
n as an 
additiona
l 
analysis. 
Extent of 
voluntary 
disclosure of 
directors 
compensation 
 Disclosure is 
higher whether in 
UK or Italy 
 Ownership 
diffusion 
 Outside 
shareholder 
attendance at the 
shareholder‟s 
general meeting. 
 Level of media 
coverage. 
 Level of CEO 
compensation. 
 Change of CEO 
compensation.  
 Firm‟s market 
performance. 
 Outside 
shareholder‟s 
dissenting votes. 
 
 Voluntary disclosure is 
comparatively higher in UK 
in compare to Italy.  
 Voluntary disclosure is 
positively and significantly 
associated with ownership 
diffusion in UK.  
 There is no association 
between voluntary disclosure 
and outside shareholder 
attendance in UK and Italy.  
 Media coverage has the 
positive and significant 
association with voluntary 
disclosure in Italy.  
 CEO compensation and 
change of CEO compensation 
have no association on 
voluntary disclosure in UK 
and Italy.  
 Voluntary disclosure is more 
when market performance is 
poor and dissenting votes 
exists. 
Malek 
(2015) 
1406 
firm 
years 
observat
ion of 
Malaysi
an 
2000 to 
2008 
Logit 
regressio
n 
analysis 
Disclosure of 
individual 
executive 
directors 
compensation 
 Family 
ownership 
 Government 
ownership 
 Foreign 
ownership 
 Director 
 Family owners limit the 
disclosure of individual 
executive compensation 
publicly.  
 Government ownership is 
positively associated with 
disclosure of individual 
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Table 3-1 
Summary Studies of the Determinants of Disclosure of CEO Compensation 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Disclosure  
Measure 
Disclosure 
Determinants 
Findings 
compan
y  
ownership 
 Debt 
 Independent 
director 
 Audit quality 
 Firm size 
 Firm 
performance 
 Firm growth 
 
executive compensation.  
 Foreign ownership is 
negatively associated with 
disclosure but the result is not 
significant. 
 Disclosure is positively and 
statistically associated with 
director ownership. 
 Debt is negatively associated 
but the result is not 
significant. 
 Independent directors are 
positively and statistically 
associated with disclosure. 
 Audit quality is positively 
and significantly associated 
with disclosure. 
 Firm size is positively and 
statistically associated with 
disclosure of individual 
executive director‟s 
compensation. 
 Firm performance is 
positively associated with 
disclosure but not significant. 
 Firm growth is also positively 
associated with disclosure but 
the result is not significant. 
 
 
Firm‟s effectiveness and disclosure policy depends on board size. Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) study finds that small board is more effective than large boards. Andjelkovic et al. (2002) 
study stated that board faces less pressure in the absence of public disclosure of executive 
compensation. Chizema (2008) study documented that size of supervisory board has 
significant negative association with individual disclosure of executive compensation. But 
Coulton et al. (2001) study doesn‟t find any significant association between board size and 
transparency of compensation disclosure.  
Independent directors are the important part of corporate governance mechanisms and 
influence the quality disclosure of management compensation. Fama (1980) stated that 
independent directors can play their monitoring role to mitigate the agency problem. 
Weisbach (1988) study stated that the greater the number of outside directors on the board, 
the stronger the corporate governance of the firm. Jinghui and Dennis (2008) stated that 
independent directors show their integrity and neutrality by ensuring higher disclosure of 
management compensation in the annual report. Malek (2015) study finds that independent 
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directors have the positive but weak relationship with the disclosure of individual 
director‟s compensation. But Coulton et al. (2001) study finds that outside directors have no 
significant association with compensation disclosure index.  
Previous studies also documented that family ownership affects disclosure of 
management compensation.  Ghazali and Weetman (2006) study find that family ownership 
have significant influence on voluntary disclosure of Malaysian companies. Fernandez and 
Nieto (2006) study stated that companies with high family ownership indicate presence of 
family members in the board as directors. Chizema (2008) study stated that nondisclosure of 
individual compensation act as a aligning the interest of management and family owners. 
Malek (2015) study finds that family ownership has the significant negative association with 
the disclosure of individual executive director‟s compensation. Malek stated that role of 
foreign investors and creditors are weak due to dominance of family ownership. Chizema 
(2008) study stated that disclosure of individual compensation negatively affects the interest 
of family members and family members use the power and influence to restrict the 
disclosure. Malek also stated that by disclosing individual directors compensation weaken the 
control of family owners thus family owners maintain their control by restricting the 
disclosure of individual executive compensation. But Chizema (2008) study finds that family 
ownership is not associated with disclosure of individual compensation. 
Institutional investors play their monitoring role by ensuring higher disclosure of 
compensation information to the public. Chizema (2008) study finds that disclosure of 
individual compensation is positively and significantly associated with institutional 
shareholders. Melis et al. (2015) study reported that institutional investors influence the level 
of voluntary disclosure. Georgen and Renneboog (2001) and Stapledon (1996) study find that 
institutions investors are passive investors and institutional monitoring is not an important 
governance mechanism in UK.  
Empirical evidence reports that relationship between director ownership and 
disclosure of compensation is mixed. Melis et al. (2015) study stated that directors are liable 
to disclose compensation policies to the shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that 
directors disclose compensation information to align the interest of managers and 
shareholders. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) study find that director ownership have 
significant influence on voluntary disclosure of Malaysian companies. Malek (2015) study 
finds that director shareholdings have the significant positive association with the disclosure 
of individual director‟s compensation. But Coulton et al. (2001) study doesn‟t find any 
significant association between insider ownership and transparency of compensation 
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disclosure.  
Foreign investors are familiar about comprehensive disclosure of directors‟ 
compensation in their home country (Chizema, 2008). Shan (2009) stated that foreign 
investors have the demand of transparency and accountability and companies disclose details 
information to retain foreign investment. Chizema (2008) doesn‟t find any significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and disclosure of individual executive compensation.  
Chizema (2008) study finds that dispersed ownership is significantly and positively 
associated with disclosure of individual compensation. Melis et al. (2014) study also finds 
that voluntary disclosure is positively and significantly associated with ownership diffusion 
in UK.  
Debt holders are more concerned about disclosure of CEO compensation because they 
want to ensure whether CEO receives excessive amount without paying the debt holders 
installment. Malek (2015) study stated that creditors may limit the extent of financing; 
impose higher interest rate and new covenants. But Clarkson et al. (2006) and Malek (2015) 
studies don‟t find any significant association of leverage with the disclosure of individual 
directors and CEO compensation.   
Empirical studies find that firm size is significantly and positively associated with 
compensation disclosure (Coulton et al., 2001; Clarkson et al., 2006; Chizema, 2008; Malek, 
2015). Lang and Lundholm (1993) study finds that firm size is positively related to disclosure 
quality and quantity. 
Disclosure of management compensation depends on management compensation 
amount. Shareholders can‟t create pressure on management when compensation information 
is unavailable to them ( Andjelkovic et al., 2002). Malek (2015) stated that firms try to avoid 
negative publicity when stakeholders find out that executive receives excessive compensation. 
Melis et al. (2015) study reported that readers doesn‟t get the detailed picture of directors 
compensation in both UK and Italy and bonus information is not clearly revealed though 
bonus is a important part of directors compensation.  Yokoyama (2010) study reported that 
firms must disclose breakdown of compensation for each executives along with details 
decision making process of compensation. Yokoyama (2010) also added that firms should 
disclose compensation information including base pay, stock options, bonuses, retirement 
benefits and others. Coulton et al. (2001) study finds that CEO compensation is negatively and 
statistically associated with transparency of compensation disclosure. But Melis et al. (2014) 
study find that CEO compensation and change of compensation have no association with 
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voluntary disclosure in UK and Italy. Coulton et al. (2001) study finds that there is no 
relationship between disclosure transparency and equity based compensation.  
Audit Quality ensures high quality disclosure of management compensation. Coulton 
et al. (2001) study stated that disclosure is more transparent when firm is audited by big five 
audit firms. Empirical evidence shows the positive relationship between disclosure of 
compensation and audit quality (Clarkson et al., 2006; Bassett et al., 2007;  Malek, 2015). 
But Coulton et al. (2001) study report that audit quality is not associated with disclosure 
index.  
Government involvement makes management compensation more transparent and 
public (Swan and Zhou, 2006) and improves the disclosure quality of individual director‟s 
compensation and set example to others ( Chizema, 2008). Chizema (2008) study stated that 
state owners use the power and influence to support the disclosure of individual 
compensation and create global competition of the economy. Disclosure of compensation is 
positively and significantly associated with state ownership (Chizema, 2008; Malek, 2015). 
But Coulton et al. (2001) study shows that CEO compensation disclosure is not associated 
with ownership or governance variables.  
Some other factors are considered to examine the effect on disclosure of 
compensation in various papers. Firm growth has no significant association with transparency 
of compensation disclosure (Coulton et al., 2001; Clarkson et al., 2006; Malek, 2015).  
Chizema (2008) examined the disclosure of individual compensation on the basis of bank 
ownership, shareholders value oriented approach and firm experience. Chizema (2008) finds 
that disclosure of individual compensation is positively and significantly associated with 
firms which adopted shareholder value oriented approach and negatively associated with firm 
experience.  But Chizema (2008) doesn‟t find any significant association between bank 
ownership and disclosure of individual compensation.  Coulton et al. (2001) study doesn‟t 
find any significant association of transparency of compensation disclosure with CEO 
duality, audit committee and compensation committee. Clarkson et al. (2006) study find that 
CEO compensation disclosure is positively and significantly associated with cross listing 
status and public scrutiny.  
Quality disclosure of management compensation is also affected by the voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Melis et al. (2015) study reported that company discloses 
compensation information voluntarily to reduce information asymmetry and to retain 
legitimacy to the public. Clarkson et al. (2006) study stated that low quality disclosure arises 
from discretion in disclosure choices (Clarkson et al., 2006). Level of voluntary 
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compensation disclosure depends on company‟s information atmosphere (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993, 1996) and country level, institution and firm specific factors (Melis et al., 
2015). On the other hand, mandatory compensation disclosure requirement reduces the 
agency cost (Hope and Thomas, 2008) and increases high quality disclosures and less chance 
of interpretative judgment (Clarkson et al., 2006).  
Empirical evidence also documented the role of regulation and regulatory channels 
for high quality disclosure of compensation information.  Clarkson et al. (2006) study finds 
that high quality disclosure will come out through detailed black letter requirement along 
with principle based legislation and formal regulatory channels. Clarkson et al. (2011) find 
that monitoring over compensation arrangement through regulation increase the executive 
compensation package and decision making process more accountable. Malek (2014) study 
also finds that level of voluntary disclosure of executive directors‟ compensation is increased 
after reform in Malaysian regulatory framework i.e. positive relationship between disclosure 
level and regulatory reform. 
From the above analysis of the literature review, it is evident that most of the 
empirical research on disclosure quality of management compensation and its determinants 
are mainly conducted on developed countries like US (Andjelkovic et al., 2002), UK 
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000), Canada (Zhou, 2000) and Australia (Merherbi et al., 2006). 
But there is dearth of empirical research on how CEO compensation disclose in the financial 
report, compensation policy and process, elements of compensation, types of incentives, 
retirement and long term benefits and relationship of CEO compensation disclosure with firm 
performance, corporate governance, firm characteristics and other variables in Bangladesh 
especially in the banking sector. Thus, there is a gap of research on transparency of CEO 
compensation disclosure and its determinants using data of listed banks of Bangladesh.  This 
research study will fill up the gap by examining the disclosure quality of CEO compensation 
and its determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 
3.3 Compensation Disclosure Requirements in Asia 
Ganu (2014) examined the compensation disclosure requirement based on the 
corporate governance guideline and stock exchange listing rules in Asian country and find 
that:  
Indonesia: Indonesian code of good corporate governance 2006 requires disclosing 
the compensation procedures and total compensation paid to directors and commissioners of 
the board. 
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Malaysia: Code of corporate governance 2012 in Malaysia requires monitoring the 
executive compensation and compensation framework as a whole by the board.  
Philippines: According to Code of Corporate Governance in Philippines, director and 
executive compensation should be clear and transparent and disclose the directors and top 
four executive‟s direct or indirect compensation breaking into fixed and variable components 
in the annual report.  
Singapore: Code of Corporate Governance 2012 in Singapore requires disclosing the 
compensation policy, components of compensation, pay setting process and pay performance 
relationship in annual report.  Firm should also disclose the total amount paid to directors and 
CEO and key management personnel in terms of termination, retirement and post 
employment benefits.  
Thailand: Thailand corporate governance 2006 requires disclosing compensation 
policies, compensation amount and form of compensation of directors and top executives 
individually.  
Vietnam: Vietnam Law on Enterprises 2005 requires disclosing board members, 
directors, and top executives compensation as a separate line item in the annual financial 
statements.  
China: Directors, managers and top officials need to disclose the compensation at pay 
levels and equity incentive plan including grant, exercise price and market price of shares and 
present the total compensation in the tabular format according to China‟s Securities 
Regulatory Commission 2012.  
Hong Kong: Directors and non executive directors‟ compensation policy, pay setting 
process should be formal and transparent according to Hong Kong Exchange Rules and 
Guidance and a significant portion of compensation should be linked to individual 
performance.  
Japan: Directors individual compensation should be disclosed in details if 
compensation exceeds 100 million yen and total compensation amount should be disclosed if 
compensation is less than 100 million according to Regulation of disclosure of corporate 
affairs in Japan. Firms should also disclose the compensation policies, and total compensation 
considering house allowance, retirement allowance and elements of total compensation to 
directors and auditors.   
South Korea: Firms should disclose compensation information individually and pay 
performance relationship in the annual report if annual salaries are more than KRW 500 
million according to new disclosure rule of South Korea. Firms roughly disclose total 
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compensation paid to directors before implementation of new disclosure rules.  
Taiwan: In Taiwan, Corporate governance 2010 requires to disclose total 
compensation paid to directors, managers and top officials and particularly compensation 
policy and procedures, compensation benchmark, compensation package, pay performance 
linkage and analysis of proportion of compensation in terms of net profit after tax.  
India: Corporate governance in India requires disclosing compensation policy and 
amount paid to directors with details breakdown. Compensation package should be designed 
based on short and long term performance and break into fixed and variable components. 
There must be explanation of performance based variable part and pay performance 
relationship. A comparative analysis of compensation package between top and mid level 
managers should also be disclosed.  
Pakistan: In Pakistan, according to Code of Corporate Governance 2012, firms should 
disclose executive and non executive directors total compensation information as separate 
line item and breakdown of compensation information considering salary, fees, benefits and 
performance based incentives.  
Sri Lanka: In Sri Lanka, a separate statement of compensation policy includes details 
compensation information of the executive and non executive members of the board in the 
annual report according to Code of Corporate Governance 2008.  
Bangladesh: In Bangladesh, Code of Corporate Governance requires to disclosure 
compensation information considering incentive structures, compensation policies, and bonus 
and pay policies either in director‟s report or in the annual report.  
Finally, Ganu (2014) study stated that disclosure requirement is “comply or explain” 
basis in Asian countries but it is more transparent in UK in terms of long term incentives and 
pension of total compensation. They also recommend that firms of Asian countries should 
more focus on equity based compensation and pension in following years.  
 
3.4 Theoretical Framework 
A theory is defined as a set of interconnected concepts, explanations, and propositions 
that describe or forecast observable fact in focusing the association of the variables. 
Theoretical framework explains, analyze and improve the disclosure quality of management 
compensation research. Management compensation reduces the agency problem. But 
management compensation itself raises the agency problem without disclosure of 
compensation information. One way to resolve the agency problem is full disclosure of 
management compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 
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Gordon, 2004; Swan and Zhou, 2006; Muslu, 2010; Morse et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 
2011; Melis et al., 2015). Empirical research on disclosure quality of management 
compensation is comparatively less. But most of which mainly used the agency theory due to 
its principal agent relationship. The most popular theory for disclosure quality of 
management compensation is the agency theory.  
Disclosure quality of management compensation plays an influential role to 
stakeholders, researchers, regulators and policymakers to ensure transparency and 
accountability. Management compensation reduces the agency conflict between shareholders 
and managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also stated that agency problem is reduced by 
aligning the interest of managers and shareholders through management compensation. 
Shareholders raise the burning question that management receives excessive amount from 
their wealth and therefore, management compensation itself promotes the question of agency 
conflict. But adequate disclosure of management compensation can resolve the agency 
problem.  In addition, information asymmetry is boosted up when there is lack of timely and 
quality disclosure of management compensation (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen et al., 2004) 
because shareholders assume that management receives excessive amount from shareholders 
wealth. Agency conflict and information asymmetry enhances the demand of disclosure of 
management compensation to the public and quality disclosure of management compensation 
limits the agency conflict and information asymmetry.  Firm performance affects the quality 
of compensation disclosure. Disclosure policy of compensation is also influenced by 
effective corporate governance mechanisms. Clarkson et al. (2006) study finds that corporate 
governance is the significant explanatory variable for compensation disclosure. Board 
characteristics are the important part of corporate governance mechanisms which affect the 
quality disclosure of management compensation. Fama (1980) stated that independent 
directors can play their monitoring role to mitigate the agency problem. Weisbach (1988) 
study stated that the greater the number of outside directors on the board, the stronger the 
corporate governance of the firm. Ownership structures such as institutional investors, 
director ownership and foreign investors also have the significant influence in ensuring 
quality of management compensation through proper monitoring. Debt holders are more 
concerned about disclosure of CEO compensation because they want to ensure whether CEO 
receives excessive amount without paying the debt holders installment. The transparency of 
management compensation disclosure is also influenced by management compensation 
amount and audit quality which ultimately reduce the information asymmetry.  Thus, 
disclosure quality of management compensation and firm performance, corporate governance 
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mechanisms through board characteristics and ownership structures and other variables 
ensure the transparency and accountability and  protect the interest of the shareholders and 
reduce the agency problem and information asymmetry.  
 In summary, agency theory requires in reducing agency problem and information 
asymmetry: separate disclosure of CEO compensation should be made; CEO compensation 
should be disclosed in details with incentives information; board characteristics and ownership 
structures act as an instrument of corporate governance to ensure higher disclosure, transparency 
and accountability; chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should be 
different individuals (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; McColgan, 
2001; Biswas, 2012); separate audit committee; presence of higher number of independent 
directors in the board and audit committee (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 
1992; McColgan, 2001; Biswas, 2012).  
 
3.5 Selection Process of Sample 
In Bangladesh, banking companies started its banking activities with six nationalized 
commercial banks, two state owned specialized banks and three foreign banks after 
independence in 1971. Two types of Banks are operating currently in Bangladesh known as 
scheduled bank and nonscheduled bank. Scheduled banks are fifty six and operate under 
Bank Company Act, 1991 (amended in 2003) and nonscheduled banks are four and 
established for special and definite objective. Scheduled banks are further classified into state 
owned commercial banks (SCBs), specialized banks, private commercial banks (PCBs) and 
foreign commercial banks (FCBs)9. Only thirty private commercial banks shares are traded in 
stock exchange and listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). In this study, only the listed 
commercial banks of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) are considered because only listed banks 
have to comply Bank Company Act 1991 (amended in 2003), Company Act, 1994, regulation 
from the central bank known as Bangladesh Bank (BB) guidelines, corporate governance 
guidelines and disclosure policy issued by the regulatory body named as Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC).  
Total 236 firm years are considered as sample from the thirty listed banks of Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) during the period of 2006 to 2013. Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC), the regulatory authority, introduced corporate governance 
                                                             
9 Source: Bangladesh Bank 
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guideline in 2006 and corporate governance guideline (amendment) in 2012 to ensure proper 
monitoring and governance by the firms. All the banks disclose the corporate governance 
compliance checklist since 2006. Only few banks disclose the corporate governance 
information in details voluntarily.  All listed banks normally disclose compensation of CEO 
as separate line item in the financial statement and details breakdown in the footnotes. CEO 
Compensation policy and process are presented either in the corporate governance report or 
directors report in the annual report.  
The sample of the listed banks is given in the Table 2-4. 
 
[Insert Table 2-4 about Here] 
 
3.6 Research Design 
3.6.1 Hypothesis Development 
In this study, disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its determinants are 
examined in the listed banks of Bangladesh. To examine the disclosure quality, disclosure 
pattern of CEO compensation through self structured disclosure index and significant 
determinants of CEO compensation disclosure index are considered to ensure the 
transparency and accountability to the shareholders. I consider the firm performance (ROA 
and Tobin‟s Q), corporate governance mechanisms through board characteristics (board size, 
independent directors and female directors) and ownership structures (institutional investors, 
director ownership, and foreign investors) firm characteristics (firm size), external monitoring 
(debt to total equity), CEO compensation and audit quality variables to examine the effect on 
CEO compensation disclosure index. The hypothesis are developed based on prior empirical 
research and described below:  
 
Firm Performance 
Empirical studies documented that CEO receives high compensation when firm 
performance is good. Firm provides high compensation to the CEO as their incentive. 
Disclosure is also comparatively higher when firm performance is good. Firms try to disclose 
more information to retain their image in the global market and attract new investors. By 
disclosing more information, firms prove their transparency and accountability to the 
stakeholders. Wallance and Naser (1995) stated that firms have the tendency to disclose good 
news broadly and faster than bad news. Thus, it is evident that firms disclose in details to the 
public when firm performance is excellent. The reason might be firms have the incentive to 
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disclose good news to the public. In addition, by disclosing information, management gives 
the signal to the market that they are working effectively on behalf of the shareholders interest.   
Coulton et al. (2001) study reported that disclosure transparency of CEO compensation 
is significantly and positively associated with firm performance.  On the other hand, Malek 
(2015) study doesn‟t find any significant relation between disclosure of individual executive 
directors‟ compensation and firm performance. When firm performance is poor, firms faces 
higher market pressure (Melis et al., 2015) and directors‟ compensation requires more 
clarification (Wade et al., 1997).  Melis et al. (2015) study stated that poorly performing firms 
disclose compensation information in more details to limit negative publicity. Firms increase 
the level of compensation disclosure in the annual report to limit potential outrage (Liu and 
Taylor, 2008).  
In listed banks of Bangladesh, it is assumed that score of CEO compensation 
disclosure index will be comparatively high when firm performance is good. Higher 
performing firms want to disclose compensation information in more details to inform the 
stakeholders that they are working on behalf of the shareholders interest and they are more 
transparent and accountable to the public. Thus on the basis of above discussion I develop my 
first hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between firm performance 
and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between ROA and CEO 
compensation disclosure index. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and 
CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, I consider both internal and external firm performance. Internal firm 
performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and external firm performance is 
measured by Tobin‟s Q. I want to examine whether internal or external firm performance 
have significant influence on CEO compensation disclosure index.  
 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
To align the interest of managers and shareholders, corporate governance 
mechanism is introduced. Effective corporate governance mechanisms ensure to reduce the 
agency conflict and information asymmetry between shareholders and management. 
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Previous studies documented that comprehensive disclosure on compensation resolve the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Gordon, 2004; 
Muslu, 2010; Morse et al., 2011). Compensation disclosure and corporate governance 
are mutually complementary in reducing agency problems (Beekes and Brown, 2006; 
Coles, 2008). Clarkson et al. (2006) study finds that corporate governance is the significant 
explanatory variable for compensation disclosure but Coulton et al. (2001) study finds that 
corporate governance mechanisms have no significant relation with CEO compensation 
disclosure. In this study, I want to examine to what extent corporate governance is effective 
in disclosing compensation information in details in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Thus, I 
use board composition (board size, independent directors and female directors) and 
ownership structures (institutional ownership, director ownership and foreign investors) as 
the instrument of corporate governance variables and find out the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  
 
Board Composition 
Board Size 
A firm‟s apex body is the board of directors (BODs) which formulate policies, 
strategy, monitoring and control the activities of the company. Board of directors (BODs) is 
also act as an internal governance mechanism of the firm. Board of directors (BODs) consists 
of multiple directors who have the diversified business knowledge and experience. Empirical 
studies document that small board is effective for coordination, control and timely decision 
making. On the other hand, the supporter of large board argues that large board is effective. 
Large board includes multiple business expertise and they ensure effective scrutiny of any 
business activities and make quality decision. Board size has the capacity to influence the 
disclosure of CEO compensation. The absence of compensation information increases the 
information asymmetry between the board and shareholders.  Andjelkovic et al. (2002) study 
stated that board faces less pressure in the absence of public disclosure of executive 
compensation. Disclosure of compensation information reduces the information asymmetry 
between shareholders and boards (Swan and Zhou, 2006).  Chizema (2008) study 
documented that size of supervisory board has significant negative association with 
individual disclosure of executive compensation. This result indicates that small board is 
effective with higher disclosure of compensation and support Lipton and Lorsch (1992) study 
which finds that small board is more effective than large boards. On the other hand, Coulton et al. 
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(2001) study doesn‟t find any significant association between board size and transparency of 
compensation disclosure.  
In Bangladesh, board size should be minimum five and maximum 20 according to 
corporate governance guideline 2006 and corporate governance guideline (amendment) 2012. 
The empirical evidence of board size and disclosure quality is mixed. Thus, I develop the 
hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between board size and 
CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris Paribus, there is a negative relationship between board size and 
CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, I consider the natural logarithm of number of directors in the board to find 
out the relationship between disclosure of CEO compensation and board size.  
 
Independent Directors 
One of the important mechanisms of corporate governance is the presence of 
independent directors in the board. Independent directors are the outside directors of the firm 
and they monitor and control the activities of management if the management activities are 
against the interest of the shareholders. Fama (1980) stated that independent directors can 
play their monitoring role to mitigate the agency problem. Effectiveness of corporate 
governance depends on the presence of number of independent directors in the board. 
Weisbach (1988) study stated that the greater the number of outside directors on the board, 
the stronger the corporate governance of the firm. Parthsarathy et al. (2006) stated that presence 
of the higher number of independent directors in the board ensures proper monitoring of the firm 
and limits managerial power to act against the interest of the shareholders. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) study find that independent directors closely monitor the activities of management 
when independent directors own relatively high stockholdings. Shareholders raise the 
question that CEO receives excessive amount from their wealth. Shareholders expect that 
independent directors will monitor the CEO compensation along with the disclosure of CEO 
compensation in details to ensure transparency and accountability. Jinghui and Dennis (2008) 
stated that independent directors show their integrity and neutrality by ensuring higher 
disclosure of management compensation in the annual report. Malek (2015) study finds that 
independent directors have the positive but weak relationship with the disclosure of 
individual director‟s compensation and the reason might be independent directors are not 
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strong enough to mitigate the family dominance on disclosure of individual compensation. 
On the other hand, Coulton et al. (2001) study finds that outside directors have no significant 
association with compensation disclosure index.  
In Bangladesh, all listed banks have to maintain the code of corporate governance. 
According to corporate governance guideline 2006, the number of independent directors is at 
least one tenth or minimum one. Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) 
give more emphasize on presence of independent directors to ensure better corporate 
governance and increase the minimum percentage of presence of independent directors from 
one tenth to one fifth according to corporate governance guideline 2012.  Parthasarathy et al. 
(2006) stated that presence of independent directors serves as internal monitoring mechanism 
to restrict the action of managers and uphold the interest of shareholders. Thus on the basis of 
above discussion and empirical findings, I assume that independent directors will ensure 
better transparency and accountability  by disclosing compensation information in more 
details to the shareholders and develop the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between proportion of 
independent directors and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, I try to find out the role of independent directors on disclosure of CEO 
compensation. The percentage of independent directors is computed by the number of 
independent directors divided by number of total directors in the board.  
 
Female Directors  
Presence of female directors in the board is a part of corporate governance 
mechanism. Previous studies documented that female directors are hard worker, sincere and 
create value to the firm. Female directors‟ participation in the board indicates that they are 
highly efficient and they have the capacity to deal business problems. Female directors also 
contribute to the board by playing their monitoring role on behalf of the shareholders interest. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) study observed the characteristics of female directors in the board 
and find that they are efficient in monitoring and regular in board meeting. Smith et al. (2006) 
study documented that firm performance and image in the market increases when there is 
presence of female directors in the board.  
Participation of female directors in the board is also increasing in Bangladesh 
particularly in Banks. It is assumed that in Bangladesh, female directors are also hard worker, 
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sincere, create value to the firm and have efficient monitoring capacity which leads to higher 
disclosure of CEO compensation. On the other hand, female directors are appointed by the 
controlling shareholders and female directors have no voice or remain inactive in the board 
and work on behalf of the controlling shareholders‟ interest. Controlling shareholders decide 
everything according to their own way to maximize their self interest. It is assumed that 
controlling shareholders disclose compensation information in details to retain the investment 
and attract new investors. Thus, on the basis of above discussion, I assume that female 
directors have the positive association with CEO compensation disclosure index and develop 
my next hypothesis as: 
  
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between proportion of female 
directors and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, I consider the percentage of female directors in the board to find out the 
effect of gender diversity on disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Percentage of female 
directors is computed by the number of female directors in the board divided by the number 
of total directors in the board.  
 
Ownership Structures 
Disclosure of management compensation is influenced by the ownership structures. 
Empirical research used family ownership, block holder share ownership, top ten or top five 
percentage share ownership, institutional ownership, director ownership, government 
ownership, diffused ownership variables on management compensation disclosure. In this 
study, I use institutional ownership, foreign investors and director ownership as the main 
variables on disclosure of CEO compensation and government ownership as the control 
variable in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
 
Institutional Shareholders  
Institutional monitoring is an important mechanism of corporate governance. General 
shareholders are widely scattered and they don‟t have the capacity to create pressure on 
management if any activities of management are against the interest of the shareholders. 
Institutional investors are normally large block holders and they have the capacity to monitor 
the activities of management and limit the action that is against the interest of the 
shareholders. Parthasarathy et al. (2006) study stated that institution plays an active role in 
the shareholder meetings of the company, voice their opinion and ensure that managers need 
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to win their support on matters that require shareholder approval. Institution can also play 
their monitoring role by disclosing compensation information in more details to ensure 
transparency and accountability to the stakeholders. Chizema (2008) study finds that 
disclosure of individual compensation is positively and significantly associated with 
institutional shareholders. Management is also more concerned about disclosure of 
compensation due to pressure from large block holders like institution. Melis et al. (2015) 
study reported that institutional investors influence the level of voluntary disclosure. On the 
other hand, Georgen and Renneboog (2001) and Stapledon (1996) study find that institutional 
investors are passive investors and institutional monitoring is not an important governance 
mechanism in UK.  
In this study, only listed banks are considered to examine the institutional effect on 
CEO compensation disclosure index.  Institutional investors are generally bank and financial 
institutions. Institutional investors are the peer groups in this study since only listed banks are 
considered as sample. It is assumed that institutional investors play their monitoring role by 
disclosing compensation information in more details to ensure transparency and 
accountability and thus develop the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between percentage of 
ownership hold by institution and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, percentage of ownership hold by institution is measured by the number 
of shares hold by the institutional investors divided by the number of total outstanding shares.  
 
Director Ownership 
Directors are the top executive body in the firm. Directors are treated as inside owners 
when they hold shares of the firm.  Directors are more concerned about business activities if 
they hold substantial percentage of firm ownership.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stated that 
director shareholdings stimulate to reach best firm performance. Directors also have the 
power to influence the disclosure pattern of management compensation. There are two types 
of arguments and findings about the management compensation disclosure by the directors. 
The supporter of disclosure of compensation information in details argues that shareholders 
expect from the directors that they will disclose compensation information in more details to 
ensure transparency and accountability.  Melis et al. (2015) study stated that directors are 
liable to disclosure compensation policies to the shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
stated that directors disclose compensation information to align the interest of managers and 
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shareholders. Disclosing directors‟ compensation leads to reduce information asymmetry and   
transfer of shareholders wealth to directors (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Laksama, 2008; Nelson et 
al., 2010).  Liu et al. (2008) and Wade et al. (1997) study stated that when directors 
compensation is high, firms might have the incentives to disclose directors compensation 
information in more details to defend the level as well as any increases of compensation.  
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) study find that director ownership have significant influence 
on voluntary disclosure of Malaysian companies. Malek (2015) study finds that director 
shareholdings have the significant positive association with the disclosure of individual 
director‟s compensation. Malek (2015) also added that executive directors disclose 
compensation information to retain their executive position and evaluate their performance 
by the shareholders. 
On the other hand, the opponent of disclosure of compensation information in details 
argues that directors are not interested to disclose compensation information to the public 
because it may create the public question that management is receiving excessive amount 
from the shareholders wealth. They face more hassle and public debate, when compensation 
information is available to the public.  Andjelkovic et al. (2002) study also stated that 
directors face less pressure when management compensation information is not available for 
public inspection. Bebchuk et al. (2002) stated that directors may secrete their compensation 
information to the shareholders in absence of close controlling. Jensen et al. (2004) study 
stated that when directors hold significant ownership, directors may not act on behalf of the 
shareholders interest. Directors‟ interest may not be aligned with the shareholders interest 
because directors and executives may have reciprocal self interest (Swan and Zhou, 2006).  
Coulton et al. (2001) study doesn‟t find any significant association between insider 
ownership and transparency of compensation disclosure.  
In listed banks of Bangladesh, most of the directors are sponsor shareholders and 
sponsor shareholders decide everything according to their own way to maximize the self 
interest. But the empirical evidence shows the mixed result, thus develop the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between percentage of 
ownership hold by all directors and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Ceteris Paribus, there is a negative relationship between percentage of 
ownership hold by all directors and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
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In this study, percentage of shares held by all directors in the board is considered. The 
percentage of ownership of directors is computed by number of shares hold by all directors 
divided by total number of shares outstanding.  
 
Foreign Investors  
Foreign investors are more concerned about their investment and they demand the 
full disclosure of compensation to ensure transparency and accountability about CEO 
compensation. Foreign investors are habituated in comprehensive disclosure of CEO 
compensation in their home country and they expect the same scenario in their investing 
region. Chizema (2008) stated that foreign investors are familiar about comprehensive 
disclosure of directors‟ compensation in their home country.  They are more conscious about 
transparency and accountability and create pressure on management to disclose 
compensation information in details. Management is also aware about behavior of foreign 
investors and they want to disclose compensation information in details to retain the foreign 
investment as well as attract new foreign investors. Moreover, disclosure of compensation 
information in details will also create the positive image of the firm to the foreign investors 
and public. Shan (2009) stated that foreign investors have the demand of transparency and 
accountability and companies disclose details information to retain foreign investment. On 
the other hand, Malek (2015) study finds that foreign ownership is negatively associated with 
the disclosure of individual director‟s compensation but the result is not significant. Chizema 
also (2008) study doesn‟t  find any significant relationship between foreign ownership and 
disclosure of individual executive compensation.  
In Bangladesh, foreign investors are also increasing over the years in the listed banks. 
Foreign investors are concerned about their investment and habituated with comprehensive 
disclosure of CEO compensation to ensure transparency and accountability and the same 
behaviors of foreign investors is also expected in listed banks of Bangladesh and thus develop 
the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 7: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between percentage of 
ownership hold by foreign investors and CEO compensation disclosure 
index. 
 
In this study, percentage of foreign ownership is computed by the number of shares 
hold by the foreign investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding.  
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External Monitoring 
Leverage is used as the proxy of external monitoring. Debt holders are the external 
monitors and they also have the capacity to create pressure on management if any activities 
of management are against the interest of debt holders. John and John (1993) stated that debt 
holders control the firm and decision making power of management when there is presence 
of external debt. Debt holders are more concerned about disclosure of CEO compensation 
because they want to ensure whether CEO receives excessive amount without paying the 
debt holders installment. Malek (2015) stated that disclosure of individual executive 
directors‟ compensation might be influenced by the agency relationship between firms and 
creditors. But Clarkson et al. (2006) and Malek (2015) studies don‟t find any significant 
association of leverage with the disclosure of individual directors and CEO compensation.   
Malek (2015) stated that management receives excessive compensation instead of 
paying creditors debt. Creditors claim to disclose details information to judge the compliance 
level with debt covenants (Wallace and Naser, 1995). To disclose compensation information 
in details, debt holders create pressure on management and impose various restrictions. 
Malek (2015) study stated that creditors may limit the extent of financing; impose higher 
interest rate and new covenants. Since creditors have monitoring capacity and interest about 
the details disclosure of CEO compensation and thus develop the hypothesis as:    
 
Hypothesis 8: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between leverage and CEO 
compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, leverage is computed as the ratio of debt to equity. Debt to equity ratio 
is computed by book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity.  
 
Firm Size 
Firm size is a significant factor for disclosing compensation information. It is 
common that large firms disclosure compensation information in more details than small 
firms. Large firms ensure that they are more transparent and accountable and disclose 
compensation information in details to retain the image of the firm in the competitive market. 
Empirical studies find that firm size is significantly and positively associated with 
compensation disclosure (Coulton et al., 2001; Clarkson et al., 2006; Chizema, 2008; Malek, 
2015). Coulton et al. (2001) study find that larger firms disclose in details about managerial 
compensation. Large firms‟ disclosure is comparatively higher than small firms (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Coulton et al., 2001; Werner and Zimmermann, 2006). Firm size also 
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affects the disclosure quality and it is evident in the study of Lang and Lundholm (1993). 
They find that firm size is positively related to disclosure quality and quantity. In the listed 
banks of Bangladesh, I also assume the positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation disclosure and thus develop the hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, natural logarithm of book value of total assets is considered as the proxy 
of firm size.  
 
CEO compensation  
Management compensation reduces the agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers. But management compensation itself promotes the agency conflict and 
information asymmetry without quality disclosure of management compensation. 
Shareholders raise the burning question that CEO receives excessive amount from 
shareholders wealth. Quality disclosure of management compensation again reduces the 
agency conflict and information asymmetry. Empirical studies also documented that 
disclosure of compensation reduces i.  the agency conflict (Swan and Zhou, 2006)  ii. 
information asymmetry (Bebchuk et al., 2002;  Laksama, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010) iii. 
agency conflict and information asymmetry (Melis et al., 2015) and transfer of shareholders 
wealth to directors (Bebchuk et al., 2002;  Laksama, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010) and 
shareholders know about compensation amount and compensation process (Swan and Zhou , 
2006).  
Andjelkovic et al. (2002) and Chizema (2008) study find that firms were reluctant to 
incorporate the disclosure of executive and individual‟s compensation information in details. 
But disclosure of management compensation depends on management compensation amount. 
Shareholders can‟t create pressure on management when compensation information is 
unavailable to them ( Andjelkovic et al., 2002). CEOs who receives high compensation faces 
public scrutiny (Melis et al., 2015) and firms try to avoid negative publicity when 
stakeholders find out that executive receives excessive compensation (Malek, 2015).  
Yokoyama (2010) study reported that firms should disclose compensation information 
including base pay, stock options, bonuses, retirement benefits and others for each executives 
along with details decision making process of compensation. Nagar et al. (2000) study finds 
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that disclosure of executives compensation is influenced by nature of compensation 
especially equity based compensation. 
Empirical evidence of disclosure of compensation is mixed based on the 
compensation amount. Coulton et al. (2001) study find that compensation disclosures are 
significantly less transparent for CEOs who have relatively high compensation and reversely, 
firms with relatively low compensation provide relatively more transparent disclosure about CEO 
compensation i.e. CEO compensation is negatively and statistically associated with 
transparency of compensation disclosure. But Melis et al. (2014) study find that CEO 
compensation and change of compensation have no association with voluntary disclosure in 
UK and Italy. Coulton et al. (2001) study finds that there is no relationship between 
disclosure transparency and equity based compensation. 
In Bangladesh, all listed banks disclose the total compensation amount of CEO but 
some banks do not disclose compensation information with details breakdown information.  
Based on the above empirical studies and discussion, I assume that banks try to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency conflict by disclosing compensation information in more 
details and thus develop the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 10: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between CEO compensation 
and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, natural logarithm of CEO compensation is considered as the proxy of 
CEO compensation.  
 
Audit Quality 
Audit firm ensures the compliance, quality of reporting and disclosure issues. When 
firm is audited by BIG audit firms it is assumed that quality of reporting and disclosure will 
be comparatively high. Renowned audit firms maintain their quality to retain the reputation 
and brand name in the global market. Public also rely on the renowned audit firms because 
audit firms don‟t consider any discrepancy or violation of law. Coulton et al. (2001) study 
stated that disclosure is more transparent when firm is audited by big five audit firms, 
because of audit firms‟ reputation about high quality reporting.  Malek (2015) stated that 
engaging renowned external audit firms increase creditworthiness of firms financial 
reporting. Malek also added that external auditor restrict the chance for expropriation of 
personal benefits by controlling shareholders. Renowned auditor makes sure that managers 
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apply accounting and disclosure policy effectively to avoid the expropriation of firms‟ wealth 
(Guedhami and Pittman, 2006).  
Empirical evidence shows the positive relationship between disclosure of individual 
executive directors‟ compensation and audit quality (Malek, 2015).  Clarkson et al. (2006) 
study finds that CEO compensation disclosure is positively and significantly associated with 
auditor quality. Bassett et al. (2007) study also finds that disclosure of compensation in 
Australia is significantly associated with audit quality. On the other hand, Coulton et al. 
(2001) study report that audit quality is not associated with disclosure index.  
Fan and Wong (2002) study find that agency problem can be reduced by recruiting 
renowned audit firms in the Asian country.  Renowned audit firms are not conscious to meet 
client‟s demand (Wallace and Naser, 1995) and maintain highest standards to ensure the 
reputation and brand image in the market (Bassett et al., 2007). In Bangladesh, all the listed 
banks are audited by external audit firms. Most of the audit firms are affiliated with the BIG 4 
audit firms. Thus, on the basis of above discussion I assume that disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation will be higher when firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 and 
develop the hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Ceteris Paribus, there is a positive relationship between audit quality and 
CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
In this study, audit quality is measured by the affiliation of audit firms of BIG 4.  
Prominent BIG 4 audit firms are Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), Deloitte, Price 
Water House Coopers (PWC) and Ernst and Young (EY). The affiliated audit firms in 
Bangladesh with BIG 4 are Rahman Rahman Huq (RRH) with KPMG, A. Qasem & Co with 
Ernst and Young (EY), Hoda Vasi Chowdhury & Co with Deloitte, and Nurul Faruk Hasan & 
Co (Nufhas) with Price Water House Coopers (PWC).  But any listed banks are not audited 
by the Nufhas audit firms during the period of 2006 to 2013. If the listed bank is audited by 
the affiliated audit firms of BIG 4, then score one otherwise score is zero.  
 
Control Variable 
Government Ownership: 
In this study, government ownership is used as the control variable. As a regulator 
government introduces the disclosure requirement and guideline and ensures transparency 
and accountability and set the example for other companies. Since government work as a 
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policy maker and regulator in listed banks of Bangladesh, thus, disclosure on CEO 
compensation disclosure index is examined after controlling the government ownership.  
Chizema (2008) study stated that state owners use the power and influence to support the 
disclosure of individual compensation and create global competition of the economy. 
Government involvement makes management compensation more transparent and public 
(Swan and Zhou, 2006) and improves the disclosure quality of individual director‟s 
compensation and set example to others (Chizema, 2008). Eng and Mak (2003) study stated 
that state owned companies disclose information in details to maintain the agency 
relationship with minority and external shareholders. Disclosure of compensation is 
positively and significantly associated with state ownership (Chizema, 2008; Malek (2015). 
But Coulton et al. (2001) study shows that CEO compensation disclosure is not associated 
with ownership or governance variables.  
In this study, government ownership is measured by the number of shares owned by 
the government divided by total number of shares outstanding.  
 
3.6.2 Models 
In this study, it is observed that the sample size is not equal in each year, and the 
sample size ranges twenty six to thirty during the study period, and number of observations is 
comparatively less in total. Thus, to get the larger sample size and greater variation which 
reduces the standard error, this study applies the pooled cross sectional method to test the 
hypothesis. The disclosure quality of CEO compensation is measured through CEO 
compensation disclosure index which is the dependent variable in the models. Firm 
performance, corporate governance including board composition and ownership structures, 
firm characteristics, CEO compensation, audit quality and control variables are used as 
independent variable to show the effect on disclosure of CEO compensation disclosure index.  
Disclosure quality of CEO compensation model is described below:  
 
CEODINDEX = β0 + β1Firm Performance + β2 Board Composition + β3Ownership   
Structures + β4 External monitoring+ β5 Firm Characteristic + β6 CEO 
compensation + β7 Audit Quality + β8 Control variable+ ɛ 
 
The models are further restructured on the basis of above equation: 
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CEODINDEX =  β0 + β1 ROA + β2 LNBSIZE + β3 ID + β4 FEDIR + β5 INT+ β6 OWNDIR 
+β7  FINVTR+β8  DEBT2TE+β9  LNASSET + B10  LNTCEOP+ 
B11AUDQ+ B12OWNGOV+ ɛ ………………………………………....(1) 
 
CEODINDEX = β0 + β1 TOBIN‟S Q + β2 LNBSIZE + β3 ID + β4 FEDIR + β5 INT+ β6 
OWNDIR +β7  FINVTR+β8  DEBT2TE+β9  LNASSET + B10  LNTCEOP+ 
B11AUDQ+ B12OWNGOV+ ɛ ……………………………………..…..(2) 
 
CEODINDEX = β0 + β1 ROA +β2 TOBIN‟S Q + β3 LNBSIZE + β4 ID + β5 FEDIR + β6 INT 
+β7 OWNDIR+β8 FINVTR+β9 DEBT2TE+β10 LNASSET+ B11 
LNTCEOP+ B12 AUDQ+ B13 OWNGOV+  ɛ……………………...…..(3) 
 
Where,  
 
CEODINDEX CEO compensation disclosure index. 
ROA Return on Assets. ROA is calculated by net profit before tax divided by 
average total assets. In this study, only banks are considered as sample 
and main source of income of banks are interest income. Thus, interest is 
not deducted from net profit before tax.  
Tobin‟s Q Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total assets minus book value of 
total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of 
total assets.  
LNBSIZE Natural Logarithm of number of board Size.  
ID Percentage of independent directors in a board. It is measured by number 
of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors.  
FEDIR Percentage of female directors in a board. It is measured by number of 
female directors in a board divided by total number of directors. 
INT Percentage of ownership held by institution. It is computed by number of 
shares owned by institutions divided by the number of shares 
outstanding.    
OWNDIR Percentage of share ownership held by all directors in a board. It is 
computed by number of shares owned by all directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.   
FINVTR Percentage of ownership held by foreign investors.  It is computed by 
number of shares owned by foreign investors divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. 
DEBT2TE Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity.  
LNASSET Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as 
proxy of firm size.  
LNTCEOP Natural logarithm of total CEO pay.  
AUDQ 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0. 
OWNGOV Ownership held by government. 
 
Definition of variables and their expected relationship with CEO compensation 
disclosure index are given in the Table 3-2.   
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Table 3-2 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variables Variables Explanation  Predicted 
Relationship 
Disclosure Quality of 
CEO compensation 
   
CEO Compensation 
Disclosure Index 
CEODINDEX CEO compensation disclosure Index  
    
Performance    
Return on Assets ROA  Net Profit Before Tax/ Average Total 
Assets 
Positive 
Tobin‟s Q Tobin‟s Q Book value of total assets minus book 
value of total equity plus market value of 
total equity divided by book value of total 
assets 
Positive 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanism 
   
Board Structure 
Information 
   
Board Size LNBSIZE Natural Logarithm of Board Size Positive 
Negative 
Independent Directors ID  %  of Independent directors in a board Positive 
Female Directors FEDIR % of Female directors in a board Positive 
    
Ownership Information    
Institutional Ownership INT % of ownership held by Institution Positive 
Director‟s Ownership OWNADIR % of Ownership held by all directors in a 
board 
Positive 
Negative 
Foreign Investors FINVTR % of Ownership held by Foreign 
Investors 
Positive 
    
External Monitoring    
Debt Ratio DEBT2TE Book value of total debt divided by book 
value of total equity 
Positive 
    
Firm Characteristic    
Firm Size LNASSET Natural logarithm of book value of total 
assets 
Positive 
    
CEO Compensation    
CEO Compensation LNTCEOP Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Pay Positive 
    
AUDIT QUALITY    
Audit Quality AUDQ 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit 
firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0. 
Positive 
    
Control Variable    
Government Ownership OWNGOV Ownership hold by Government  
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3.6.3 Variables 
Only listed banks that are traded on Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) are considered for 
empirical analysis.  The major sources of this empirical analysis are annual report of banks 
that are available at specific bank websites and website of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). The 
financial time period of all listed banks start from 1st January and end at December 31. CEO 
compensation data and other variables cover the time period from 2006 to 2013. The sample 
is considered from 2006 because Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), 
the regulatory authority, introduced corporate governance guideline in 2006 and corporate 
governance guideline (amendment) in 2012 and all banks have to follow corporate 
governance compliance checklist from 2006. But only few banks disclose corporate 
governance information in details voluntarily.  
In this study, the variables include the information of listed banks  CEO compensation 
disclosure index, performance measures such as ROA and Tobin‟s Q, corporate governance 
mechanisms through board composition such as board size, percentage of independent 
directors, presence of female directors in the board and ownership structures like percentage 
of ownership by institution, foreign investors and director ownership and external monitoring 
information such as leverage and firm characteristic such as firm size, total CEO pay, audit 
quality and government ownership variables.  
The most important part of this study is to prepare the self structured CEO 
compensation disclosure index.  A self structured CEO compensation disclosure index is 
prepared on the basis of disclosure guideline and requirements to measure the disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation.  CEO compensation disclosure index includes the details 
compensation information of the CEO. All banks disclose their total CEO compensation 
information in profit and loss account statement as separate line item and details of total CEO 
compensation in the notes. Compensation policy and process are presented either in the 
directors‟ report or corporate governance report in the annual report.  All banks mainly 
provide cash compensation. There are no use of stock options and grants in any banks. CEO 
compensation disclosure index is scored on the basis of information disclosed or not. If the 
particular information related to CEO compensation is disclosed then scores 1 otherwise 0. 
The maximum score is 24 if disclosed all information and the minimum score is 0 if disclosed 
nothing. The individual score is converted into percentage form to make it clear that to what 
percentage banks are disclosing compensation information in details.  The element of CEO 
compensation disclosure index are separate disclosure for CEO compensation, compensation 
process, pay performance relationship, comparative CEO information, segregated CEO 
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compensation, relative importance on fixed and variable components of CEO compensation, 
criteria of setting up the salaries for CEO compensation, components of perquisites ( 
perquisites includes house rent, house maintenance, entertainment, utility, allowances, special 
allowances, leave fare assistance, dearness allowance, medical allowance, security allowance 
and others), bonus and other benefits (bonus includes festival bonus, performance or 
incentive bonus), retirement benefits (provident fund and others) and equity or share based 
payments. The data of CEO compensation disclosure index is manually collected from the 
annual report particularly profit and loss statement, footnotes of the financial statement 
(where details compensation breakdown are presented), director‟s report, corporate 
governance report or separate statement of compensation of the executives. Moreover, I read 
the whole annual report at least three times because CEO compensation information could be 
disclosed in any part of annual reports.  
Firm performance can be measured by internal and external performance. Internal 
performance is measured by return on assets (ROA) and External performance is measured 
by Tobin‟s Q.  ROA is computed by net profit before tax divided by average total assets. Net 
profit and total asset information is collected from consolidated profit and loss account and 
consolidated balance sheet of the annual report. Tobin‟s Q is calculated by book value of total 
assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book 
value of total assets. Book value of total asset and equity information is collected from 
consolidated balance sheet of each bank‟s annual report. Market value of total equity is 
calculated by multiplying the number of outstanding shares with the market price of share of 
each bank. Market price of share is obtained by considering the closing market price at 31st 
December in each year for each bank. Closing market price information is collected from 
annual report of each bank and cross match with the market price information from Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE). Information about outstanding shares is also collected from notes of 
each bank‟s the financial statement and again cross match with DSE monthly review 
published by Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE).  
Corporate governance has the significant influence in disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation and governance mechanisms that are used in this study are board composition 
and ownership structures. Board composition variables are board size, independent directors 
and female directors.  Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) introduced 
corporate governance guideline in 2006 and corporate governance guideline (amendment) in 
2012 and all the listed banks have to follow the corporate governance guideline.  All the 
banks prepare a corporate governance compliance checklist since 2006 and corporate 
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governance report from 2012 with detail explanation of how they manage and follow the 
guidelines and at the end of corporate governance report disclose a checklist of following all 
the required conditions.  The corporate governance variables data are collected from the 
corporate governance compliance checklist and corporate governance report that is the part of 
annual reports. The corporate governance report discloses the details information about board 
structure and function of board, profile of the board members, number of independent 
directors, female directors in the board etc according to corporate governance guideline 2006 
and corporate governance guideline (amendment) 2012. Board size, independent directors 
and presence of female directors‟ information are obtained from both corporate governance 
report and board of directors‟ profile in the annual report. Percentage of independent director 
is computed by the number of independent directors divided by number of total directors in 
the board. Percentage of female directors is also computed in the same procedure that is 
number of female directors in the board divided by total number of directors in the board. 
Ownership structure of the listed banks is considered to know the impact of various 
owners on disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Ownership variables such as institutional 
ownership, foreign investor ownership and director ownership are used in this study. 
Institutional ownership and foreign investor ownership information are obtained from the 
shareholding pattern information in the corporate governance report and in the notes of equity 
section of the annual report. Both institutional information and foreign investor ownership 
information are again cross checked with the published information of Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) monthly review report. Director ownership information required to disclose 
in the corporate governance report. But some companies disclose in the notes of the financial 
statement instead of corporate governance report. Thus, percentage of director ownership is 
collected either from the corporate governance report or in the notes where it is available.  
External monitoring variable such as leverage also has the impact on disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation. Leverage is computed by the book value of total debt divided 
by book value of total equity. Both book value of total debt and book value of total equity 
information are collected from the consolidated balance sheet of the annual report.  
Firm size is a major factor in CEO compensation disclosure index. In this study, total 
asset is used as the proxy of firm size. Book value of total asset is collected from the 
consolidated balance sheet of the annual report. Total asset is normally large amount and 
transformed into natural logarithm of total assets following other empirical studies related to 
executive compensation.  
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Disclosure of CEO compensation also depends on the CEO compensation amount. 
CEO can‟t hold shares as per bank regulation. There are no use of stock option and grants in 
any banks. Thus, all banks mainly provide cash compensation.  All banks disclose their total 
CEO compensation in profit and loss account as separate line item and details of total CEO 
compensation in the notes. But only few banks disclose their detail breakdown in the notes 
such as basic salary, house rent, house maintenance, provident fund, medical facilities etc. As 
details of CEO compensation of all banks are not available in the profit and loss account and 
in the notes, hence, only total CEO compensation is considered for this study. This total CEO 
compensation information is collected from each banks profit and loss account statement and 
total CEO compensation is expressed in Taka value. Total CEO pay is normally large amount 
and it is increased over the years and normally rightly skewed. Thus, total CEO compensation 
is transformed into natural logarithm form to adjust for normality of total pay.  
Audit Quality ensures the quality of reporting and disclosure issues.  In this study, 
audit quality is measured by the affiliation of Bangladeshi audit firms under BIG 4.  
Prominent BIG 4 audit firms are Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), Deloitte, Price 
Water House Coopers (PWC) and Ernst and Young (EY). The affiliated audit firms in 
Bangladesh with BIG 4 are Rahman Rahman Huq (RRH) with KPMG, A. Qasem & Co with 
Ernst and Young (EY) , Hoda Vasi Chowdhury & Co  with Deloitte, and Nurul Faruk Hasan 
& Co (Nufhas) with Price Water House Coopers (PWC).  But any listed banks are not audited 
by the Nufhas audit firms during the period of 2006 to 2013. Information about audit firms of 
listed banks is collected from the annual report. Audit firms information is available in the 
profile of the company, or statement of auditor‟s report or at the bottom of the financial 
statements of the annual report.  
Government ownership variable is considered as the control variable.  Government 
ownership information is collected from the shareholding pattern information in the corporate 
governance report and in the notes of equity section of the annual report. Government 
ownership information is again cross checked with the published information of Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) monthly review report. Any missing data are adjusted with the closet year 
value.  In this study, government ownership is measured by the number of shares owned by 
the government divided by total number of shares outstanding.  
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3.7 Analysis of the Results 
3.7.1 CEO Compensation Disclosure Index  
A disclosure index is a function of several items that are presented in the annual 
report (Botosan, 1997; Prencipe, 2004). Empirical studies on determinants of level of 
disclosure and detailed analysis of their measurement established the validity of disclosure of 
compensation index (Botosan, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). CEO compensation 
disclosure index presents the indirect measurement of the disclosure quality. In this study, 
CEO compensation disclosure index has been prepared on the basis quantitative approach. To 
prepare a self structured CEO compensation disclosure index, disclosure guideline and 
requirements are considered to measure the disclosure quality of CEO compensation. The 
details of the CEO compensation disclosure index are given in the Appendix-1.  
All banks disclose their total CEO compensation information in profit and loss 
account statement as separate line item and details of total CEO compensation in the notes. 
Compensation policy and process are presented in the directors‟ report or corporate 
governance report or separate statement of compensation of the executives in the annual 
report. I read the whole annual report at least three times because CEO compensation 
information could be disclosed in any part of annual reports.  All banks mainly provide cash 
compensation. There are no use of stock options and grants in any banks. CEO compensation 
disclosure index is presented in the appendix and disclosure index is scored on the basis of 
information disclosed or not. If the particular information related to CEO compensation is 
disclosed then scores one otherwise zero. The maximum score is twenty four if disclosed all 
information and the minimum score is zero if disclosed nothing. Disclosure ranges between 
zero and one and higher score means higher disclosure.  The individual score is converted 
into percentage form to make it clear that to what percentage banks are disclosing 
compensation information in details.  CEO compensation disclosure index includes total 
twenty four attributes from the annual report. The element of CEO compensation disclosure 
index are separate disclosure for CEO compensation, compensation process, pay performance 
relationship, comparative CEO information, segregated CEO compensation, relative 
importance on fixed and variable components of CEO compensation, criteria of setting up the 
salaries for CEO compensation, components of perquisites (perquisites includes house rent, 
house maintenance, entertainment, utility, allowances, special allowances, leave fare 
assistance, dearness allowance, medical allowance, security allowance and others), bonus and 
other benefits (bonus includes festival bonus, performance or incentive bonus), retirement 
benefits (provident fund and others) and equity or share based payments.  
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Table 3-3 represents the descriptive statistics of CEO compensation disclosure index 
from 2006 to 2013.  CEO compensation disclosure index report that the average CEO 
compensation disclosure index is 19.87% in 2006 which is the minimum where as maximum 
is 28.47% in 2013. 
 
Table 3-3 
CEO Compensation Disclosure Index (in percentage form) 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 19.87179 8.333333 8.333333 20.83333 25 37.5 9.302605 
2007 30 21.66667 8.333333 8.333333 20.83333 29.16667 50 12.00654 
2008 30 23.19444 8.333333 8.333333 20.83333 29.16667 50 11.71804 
2009 30 24.44444 8.333333 16.66667 22.91667 33.33333 50 12.2207 
2010 30 25 8.333333 16.66667 25 33.33333 50 12.08606 
2011 30 25.41667 8.333333 16.66667 27.08333 33.33333 50 11.64972 
2012 30 27.36111 8.333333 16.66667 29.16667 37.5 50 12.83942 
2013 30 28.47222 8.333333 16.66667 33.33333 37.5 54.16667 13.13444 
Total 236 24.50565 8.333333 12.5 25 33.3333 54.16 12.06598 
 
 
This indicates that CEO compensation disclosure level increase over the year as 
expected. The overall average disclosure level is 24.51% and ranges from 8.33% to 54.17% 
with a standard deviation of 12.07%.  This CEO compensation disclosure index shows that 
lowest record of disclosure is 8.33% and highest record of disclosure is 54.17% by all the 
listed banks during the period of 2006 to 2013.  The empirical evidence reports that CEO 
compensation disclosure score ranges from 11.2% to 59.9% during 1998 to 2004 and overall 
mean disclosure index is 36.05 % in Australia (Clarkson et al., 2006).  Malek (2014) study 
finds that voluntary disclosure of executive compensation in Malaysia is 49.49%. In another 
study in Australia, Clarkson et al. (2011) finds that CEO compensation disclosure range from 
35.1% to 80.2% during 2001 to 2009 and the overall the mean disclosure of CEO 
compensation is 61.27%. In Bangladesh, the overall CEO compensation disclosure index is 
24.51% where as voluntary disclosure of compensation index in Malaysia is 49.49% (Malek, 
2015); and CEO compensation disclosure index in Australia are 36.05 % (Clarkson et al., 
2006) and 61.27% (Clarkson et al., 2011). Thus, it seems that CEO compensation disclosure 
index is very poor in compare to Malaysia and Australia though the measurement of 
compensation index is different in both countries.  
The level of CEO compensation disclosure index increased over the years but some 
banks disclose only compensation information in total without any further break down 
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information. Thus it is difficult to understand for the stakeholders about banks compensation 
policy, pay performance relation, perquisites, performance bonus or incentives and retirement 
benefits in details. Moreover, there is no change of disclosure of CEO compensation from 
2006 to 2013 even in large firms. There may be several reasons: First, large firms are not 
concerned about the disclosure of CEO compensation. Second, large firms skip the detail 
disclosure of CEO compensation to avoid the pressure from public. Third, CEO 
compensation is not an important part of disclosure to the management. Fourth, large firms 
may not disclose compensation information in detail if firms consider CEO compensation 
information is confidential. Finally, shareholders also don‟t have the ability or bargaining 
power to create pressure on management to disclose CEO compensation information in 
details.  To understand and get the idea of the trend of CEO compensation disclosure index, 
line chart is disclosed below:  
 
 
         Figure 3-1: Trend of CEO Compensation Disclosure Index from 2006 to 2013 
 
3.7.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3-4 represents the descriptive statistics of determinants of disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation of the sample of listed banks of Bangladesh from 2006 to 2013. Internal 
firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA) is 2.48% and ranges from 20.52% to 
7.78% where as internal firm performance in Germany are 4.88 % (Chizema, 2008).  External 
firm performance measured by Tobin‟s Q is 1.14 and ranges from 0.92 to 5.78 where as 
average mean of Tobin‟s Q in US banks and UK firms are 1.07 (Pathan and Faff, 2013) and 
1.56 (Ozkan, 2007;  Veprauskaite and Adams, 2013) respectively which indicates that 
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external firm performance (Tobin‟s Q) in listed banks of Bangladesh is smaller than UK 
firms but larger than US banks.  
The average size of the board is 13.90 and maximum board size is 27 where as 
minimum board size is 5. The average board size is lower than Japan but higher than US, UK 
and Chaina10.  According to corporate governance guideline 2006 and corporate governance 
guideline (amendment) 2012, the minimum percentage of independent directors is 10% (one 
tenth or minimum one) and 20% (one fifth) respectively. But the average mean of percentage 
of independent director is only 7.19 % and ranges from 0 to 50%. The minimum percentage 
of independent directors indicates some banks are not complied the corporate governance 
guideline 2006 and corporate governance guideline (amendment) 2012. The average 
percentage of independent director is too small in compare to US, China, Thailand, and 
India11.  
The presence of female directors in the board is increasing nowadays and the 
descriptive summary statistics also shows that mean percentage of female directors in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh is 11.48% and the maximum is 92.31%.  Liang et al. (2013) and 
Pathan and Faff (2013) study report that the percentage of female directors in the board are 
11% and 7.94% respectively which implies that presence of female directors in Bangladesh is 
greater than US banks but similar to China.  
In Bangladesh, institutional investors‟ average ownership is 14.26% and ranges from 
0% to 64.82%. Previous research study reports that institutional shareholding is 31.4% in UK 
(Ozkan, 2007); 17.84% in India (Parthasarathy et al., 2006); 16% in Hongkong (Firth et al., 
1999) and 9.78% in Germany (Chizema, 2008). This research finding indicates that 
institutional ownership in listed banks of Bangladesh is very low in compare to other 
developed countries.  The mean percentage of director ownership is 19.76% and maximum is 
57.15%. The percentage of ownership hold by all directors is 4.19 % in UK (Ozkan, 2007) ; 
44%  in Hongkong  (Firth et al.,1999) and 6.95% in Germany (Chizema, 2008) and this 
findings indicates that director ownership in listed banks of Bangladesh  is smaller than 
Hongkong but greater than  UK  and Germany firms.  The average of foreign investors 
                                                             
10 The average board size is 29.99 in Japan (Basu et al., 2007); 9 in UK firms (Veprauskaite and Adams, 2013); 
13 in US banks (Pathan and Faff , 2013) and 13.80 in China (Liang et al. ,2013).  
 
11 The mean percentage of independent director in listed banks of Bangladesh is only 7.19% where as 70.91% in 
US banks (Pathan and Faff, 2013);  23% in China (Liang et al., 2013); 24% in Thailand (Pathan et al., 2007) ; 
50.61% in India (Parthasarathy et al., 2006). 
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ownership is only 2.11% and ranges from 0% to 37.42%.   The average percentage of 
ownership hold by foreign investors is 24% in Japan (Sakawa et al., 2012); 8.36% in 
Germany (Chizema, 2008); and 16% in China (Fung et al., 2001). This finding indicates that 
foreign investors‟ ownership is too low in compare to Japan, China and Germany and it is 
comparatively difficult to play their monitoring role effectively and efficiently by small 
percentage of foreign investors.  
  
Table 3-4 
Descriptive Statistics of Determinants of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation 
  Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
ROA  (%) 236 2.477707 -20.52043 1.98769 2.917638 3.605306 7.782377 2.717383 
Tobin‟s Q 236 1.135735 0.9243132 1.028214 1.068794 1.146552 5.779525 0.3422262 
BSIZE 232 13.89655 5 11.5 14 15.5 27 4.255639 
ID (%) 232 7.19215 0 0 6.66667 10.55556 50 8.35619 
FEDIR (%) 232 11.47504 0 0 9.09091 16.66667 92.30769 11.87215 
INT (%) 236 14.26262 0 5.6 13.46 20.425 64.82 11.15091 
OWNDIR (%) 236 19.76421 0 8.35 19.23 29.135 57.15 13.64586 
FINVTR (%) 236 2.110751 0 0 0 0.24 37.42 6.29819 
DEBT2TE 236 12.14761 -16.72824 9.488538 11.34883 13.82555 230.9772 15.21685 
Total Asset (in million) 236 97588.41 14302.84 48328.74 81481.92 129086.2 549979.1 71731.33 
CEO Pay (in 
thousands) 236 7788.196 361.08 5280 7836.187 10340.65 21606.09 3534.794 
AUDQ 236 0.3547009 0 0 0 1 1 0.4794481 
OWNGOV (%) 236 4.457451 0 0 0 0 93.23 17.5029 
 
 
External monitoring indicated by leverage and leverage is measured by debt to equity 
ratio. The descriptive statistics show that the mean of debt equity ratio is 12.15 with a 
standard deviation of 15.22.   Total asset represents the firm size and average mean of firm 
size is 97588.41 million with a standard deviation of 71731.33 million and ranges from 
14302.84 to 549979.1 million. The descriptive summary statistics report that CEO 
compensation amount is expressed in thousand and the average CEO compensation amount is 
Taka 7,788,196 and ranges from Taka 361,080 to Taka 21,606,090.  Fernandes (2008) study 
stated that Bank CEO‟s compensation is higher than any other industries in a country and this 
is also evident in listed banks of Bangladesh.  Reaz and Arun (2006) study documented that 
bank executives receives highest amount among all firms in Bangladesh.  
Bank reporting quality depends on the quality of the audit firms. If the bank is audited 
by affiliated audit firm of BIG 4 then it is assumed that disclosure and reporting quality 
would be comparatively higher than any other firms. In this study, audit quality is measured 
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by 1 or 0.  1 represents that the bank is audited by affiliated audit firm of BIG 4 otherwise 0. 
The summary statistics shows that the average mean of audit quality is 35.47% and ranges 
from 0 to 1.  Chizema (2008) study finds that the mean percentage of audit firms is 84.8%. 
Thus, the percentage of audit quality in Bangladesh is very poor in compare to the study of 
Coulton et al. (2001) in Australia.  The average percentage of ownership hold by government 
is 4.46% and maximum is 93.23%.  State ownership in Germany is 2.31%. Government 
ownership in listed banks is comparatively higher than Germany. Government ownership is 
considered as control variable in the regression model.  
 
3.7.3 Correlation Matrix 
Table 3-5 represents the pearson correlation of all variables.  Internal firm 
performance represented by ROA (0.077) is positively related to CEO compensation 
disclosure index. This means that higher internal performance increases the disclosure quality 
of CEO compensation.  External firm performance measured by Tobin‟s Q but the correlation 
matrix report a negative relationship between external firm performance and CEO 
compensation disclosure index which implies that firm performance represented by Tobin‟s 
Q is not a significant factor to higher disclosure of CEO compensation. There is a positive 
relationship between board size (0.077) and CEO compensation disclosure index. This result 
implies that large board is effective in disclosing more information about CEO compensation. 
Large board consists of more business expertise in the board and they ensure better 
transparency and accountability to shareholders by disclosing compensation information in 
details.  
This study finds a positive correlation between independent directors (0.008) and 
CEO compensation disclosure index. The positive correlation indicates that independent 
directors are working effectively on behalf of the shareholders interest and disclose 
compensation information in more details to the public. This study also finds a positive 
correlation between presence of female directors (0.085) and CEO compensation disclosure 
index. This result implies female directors are also contributing significantly in disclosing 
more compensation information to the shareholders.  
CEO compensation disclosure index is positively associated with institutional 
investors‟ ownership (0.023). This means that institutional investors are playing their 
monitoring role in CEO compensation disclosure. CEO compensation disclosure index is 
strongly correlated with director ownership and the correlation is 0.244. This implies that 
directors are more transparent and accountable to the shareholders and they use it as their 
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performance indicator to the public. The correlation matrix table presents that there is a 
positive correlation between foreign investors (0.178) and CEO compensation disclosure 
index. Foreign investors monitoring role is effective in disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation. 
 
Table 3-5 
Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 1              
2 0.077 1             
3 -0.042 -0.131 1            
4 0.077 0.427 -0.146 1           
5 0.008 -0.067 -0.070 -0.286 1          
6 0.085 0.012 -0.117 -0.064 0.034 1         
7 0.023 -0.020 -0.028 0.090 0.029 0.061 1        
8 0.244 -0.132 -0.002 0.366 -0.120 -0.195 -0.025 1       
9 0.178 -0.155 0.044 -0.143 0.046 -0.064 -0.187 -0.083 1      
10 -0.045 0.084 -0.057 -0.060 -0.056 0.027 -0.115 -0.137 0.028 1     
11 0.167 0.228 -0.177 0.278 0.395 0.019 0.036 -0.022 0.151 0.011 1    
12 0.257 0.178 0.009 0.043 0.312 0.177 0.177 0.205 -0.009 -0.208 0.278 1   
13 0.308 0.055 -0.032 -0.123 0.137 0.166 -0.031 0.066 0.170 -0.040 0.144 0.282 1  
14 -0.151 -0.206 -0.001 -0.141 -0.018 -0.135 -0.144 -0.336 -0.083 0.227 0.089 -0.721 -0.184 1 
1-CEO Compensation Disclosure Index; 2- ROA(%); 3- Tobin’s  Q  ; 4- BSIZE (Natural Log ) ; 5- ID  (%) ;        
6- FEDIR (%); 7- INT(%) ; 8- OWNDIR (%); 9-  FINVTR (%)  ; 10- DEBT2TE  ; 11-  TOTAL ASSET 
((Natural Log); 12- CEO Pay (Natural Log ); 13- AUDQ ; 14- OWNGOV(%) 
 
External monitoring is represented by the leverage which is negatively associated 
with CEO compensation disclosure index. This result indicates that debt holders are not 
concerned about the disclosure practices of listed banks of Bangladesh.  Firm size (0.167) is 
positively related with the disclosure index of CEO compensation. It is common that large 
firms‟ disclosure is comparatively higher than small firms. CEO compensation (0.257) is also 
positively related to CEO compensation disclosure index.  This result implies that disclosure 
is comparatively higher when compensation amount is also large.  Disclosure of CEO 
compensation depends on the quality of audit. This study finds a positive relationship 
between audit quality (0.308) and CEO compensation disclosure index. There is a negative 
association between CEO compensation disclosure index and government ownership. This 
result indicates that disclosure of CEO compensation information is comparatively less in 
government firms.  
This study also examine the data set to check the multicollinearity issue in Table 3-6  
and finds that average variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.96 which implies that  there is no 
high correlation with other variables that may create multi co linearity problem and thus this 
data set avoid the multi co linearity problem. 
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Table 3-6 
Checking of Multicollinearity  
 VIF 1/VIF 
ROA (%) 2.07 0.483262 
Tobin‟s Q 1.09 0.914252 
LNBSIZE 2.61 0.382634 
ID (%) 1.66 0.603204 
FEDIR (%) 1.20 0.834223 
INT (%) 1.13 0.881312 
OWNDIR (%) 2.17 0.460683 
FINVTR (%) 1.35 0.741883 
DEBT2TE  1.11 0.904846 
LNASSET 2.20 0.454990 
LNTCEOP 3.65 0.274111 
AUDQ 1.21 0.829737 
OWNGOV(%) 3.99 0.250381 
Mean VIF 1.96  
 
 
3.7.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This study examines which factors affect significantly to CEO compensation 
disclosure index and firm performance, board structures, ownership pattern, firm 
characteristics, CEO compensation, audit quality of BIG 4 firms are used to measure the 
relationship. CEO compensation disclosure index is used as dependent variable and firm 
performance (ROA, Tobin‟s Q), board structures (board size, independent directors, female 
directors), ownership pattern (institutional investors, director ownership and foreign 
investors), firm characteristics (debt to total equity i.e. leverage), CEO compensation and 
audit quality of BIG 4 firms are considered as independent variables to examine the statistical 
relationship between dependent and independent variables.  
Table 3-7 represents the result of the regression models of disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation.  The result of the regression is presented through coefficient which indicates 
the level of relationship between the dependent and independent variables and probability 
which implies the level of relationship is statistically significant or not. One of the 
assumption of OLS is variances are constant i.e. homoskedasticity. But in reality, variances 
are not constant which means there is a presence of heteroskedasticity. To avoid the problem 
of heteroskedasticity, standard error and t statistics are adjusted but both are not reported in 
the regression result for brevity. 
 137  
 
Three equations are used to show the regression effect in CEO compensation 
disclosure index. CEO compensation disclosure index is examined on the basis of individual 
and joint firm performance holding all other factors are constant. Internal firm performance 
(ROA) is used in equation 1 and external firm performance is used in equation 2 and both 
internal and external firm performance are considered in equation 3 to show the impact on 
CEO compensation disclosure index.  
In equation 1, the regression results represent a good fit for the model of CEO 
compensation disclosure index and explain 23.28% variability of CEO compensation 
disclosure index.  Hypothesis one assumes that there is a positive relationship between ROA 
and CEO compensation disclosure index. The empirical result documents a strongly positive 
relationship and significant at 5% level. This result support the hypothesis 1(a) and consistent 
with the findings of Coulton et al. (2001). This result indicates that CEO compensation 
disclosure is more transparent when firm performance is high. When firm performance is 
good, they also try to present themselves they are more accountable to the shareholders and 
attract new investors by disclosing CEO compensation information in more details. 
In this study, corporate governance variables are examined on disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation and corporate governance variable includes board structure and 
ownership pattern. Board structures consist of board size, independent directors and female 
directors where as ownership pattern includes institutional ownership, director ownership and 
foreign investors.  
Hypothesis 2a assumes that there is a positive relationship between board size and 
CEO compensation disclosure index where as hypothesis 2b assumes that there is a negative 
relationship between board size and CEO compensation disclosure index. But the empirical 
result does not find any significant evidence to support the hypothesis 2a and 2b and this 
result is consistent with the study of Coulton et al. (2001). The average size of the board is 14 
and board size in the listed banks of Bangladesh is more than UK and US board size. But the 
result indicates that board size is not a significant explanatory variable to affect CEO 
compensation disclosure.  
Independent directors monitor the activities of the company and work on behalf of the 
shareholders interest. Presence of independent directors in the board ensures proper 
monitoring and disclosure will be comparatively higher and thus assume a positive 
relationship between independent directors and CEO compensation disclosure index in 
hypothesis 3. But the empirical result states that percentage of independent directors is not 
associated with CEO compensation disclosure index and this result is consistent with Coulton 
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et al. (2001) study.  This result can be explained in several ways: First, this result implies that 
independent directors are not effective enough or they are not playing their monitoring role 
effectively in disclosing CEO compensation information in more details. Second, 
independent directors receive only meeting fee in the board meeting and the amount is only 
Taka 5000 per meeting, which is not sufficient enough to play their monitoring role in 
disclosing CEO information in details. Third, Weisbach (1988) provides evidence that the 
greater the number of outside directors on the board, the stronger the corporate governance 
of the firm. Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) emphasize on 
presence of independent directors to ensure better corporate governance and increase the 
presence of number of independent directors 10% to 20% according to corporate governance 
guideline 2006 and corporate governance guideline (amendment) 2012 respectively.  But 
most of the banks disclose independent directors will be appointed immediately or 
appointment is in process. As a result, number of independent directors is not sufficient 
enough to play their monitoring role effectively in the board about disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation.  Fourth, Bogus (1993) study stated that independent directors exist only in the 
theory but all directors are part of management in the practical world. This finding might also 
be applicable in the listed banks of Bangladesh. It is expected that independent directors will 
be nominated or appointed from outside to monitor the activities of the management on 
behalf of the shareholders interest. But it is observed that independent directors are the 
insiders of the firm or they are part of the management. Thus, it is difficult to play their 
monitoring role on behalf of the shareholders interest about CEO compensation disclosure 
when they are part of management or insiders of the firm. The empirical result also reports 
that there is no association between presence of independent directors and disclosure of CEO 
compensation.  Therefore, it can be said that independent directors are also part of 
management.  
Hypothesis 4 assumes that there is a positive relationship between presence of female 
directors and disclosure quality of CEO compensation. The empirical result reports a positive 
and statistically significant relationship at 5% level and this result support the hypothesis 4.  
This result can be explained in two ways: First, female directors are effective and sincere and 
CEO compensation disclosure is higher when board is directed and controlled by female 
directors. On the other hand, female directors are appointed by the controlling shareholders 
and controlling shareholders control the female directors and make decision in the board in a 
way to maximize their self interest. Thus, controlling shareholders want to disclose CEO 
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compensation information in more details to attract new investors and retain existing 
shareholders.  
 
Table 3-7 
Regression results of Determinants of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -71.6173 -71.6898 -69.98998 
  (0.053) (0.057) (0.058) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.7767046  0.7684878 
  (0.030)  (0.033) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -1.134007 -0.9849483 
   (0.200) (0.260) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -1.9998 1.08368 -2.091328 
  (0.548) (0.704) (0.531) 
ID (%) (+) -0.1327593 -0.1282827 -0.1369776 
  (0.209) (0.242) (0.196) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.1184138 0.0955265 0.1147403 
  (0.026) (0.066) (0.033) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0712518 0.0563533 0.0702838 
  (0.332) (0.443) (0.340) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.3061588 0.2286935 0.3059642 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.4697068 0.4778937 0.473146 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0176753 -0.0081048 -0.0185176 
  (0.553) (0.765) (0.518) 
LNASSET (+) 0.0967661 0.1041105 0.0051974 
  (0.946) (0.945) (0.997) 
LNTCEOP (+) 5.479594 5.299465 5.61522 
  (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) 
AUDQ (+) 4.741419 5.049829 4.718854 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
OWNGOV (%)  0.2051065 0.1583433 0.2083372 
  (0.006) (0.028) (0.005) 
R2  0.2328 0.2232 0.2335 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated 
by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of 
total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
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OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
Institutional investors can play their monitoring role effectively in disclosing 
compensation information in more details and thus develop the hypothesis as there is a 
positive association between institutional investors and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
The empirical evidence reports no significant association between CEO compensation 
disclosure index and institutional investors. The reason might be percentage of institutional 
investors is only 14.26 % which is not significant enough to play the monitoring role about 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Second, the empirical research conducted on listed 
banks of Bangladesh, the institutional investors are banks and financial institutions itself, and 
thus institutional investors might not play their monitoring role in the same industry or group.  
Third, institutional investors are passive investors and institutional monitoring is not an 
important mechanism of corporate governance and as a result, they are not concerned about 
CEO compensation and disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  
Hypothesis 6a assumes that there is a positive relationship between director 
ownership and CEO compensation disclosure index where as hypothesis 6b assumes that 
there is a negative relationship between director ownership and CEO compensation 
disclosure index. The empirical result shows a positive and statistical association between 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation and director ownership at 1% level and reject 
negative hypothesis 6b. This result is consistent with Malek (2015) study.  This result implies 
that directors are more transparent and accountable to the shareholders and disclose in details 
about CEO compensation. Second, by disclosing more information of CEO compensation, 
they try to prove that they are working on behalf of the shareholders interest and use it in 
their performance evaluation to the stakeholders. Third, directors might have some financial 
or nonfinancial motivation or incentives by disclosing more information about CEO 
compensation. Fourth, directors are encouraged to disclose CEO compensation in details to 
retain their managerial position or for reappointment. Fifth, directors disclose compensation 
information in more details to defend the level of compensation and any increases of 
compensation and reduce the agency conflict and information asymmetry between the 
shareholders and management. Finally, most of the directors are appointed by controlling 
shareholders and controlling shareholders control everything in a way to maximize self 
interest and controlling shareholders emphasize on disclosing more information about CEO 
compensation to attract new investors and other stakeholders.  
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Foreign investors are more concerned about their investment and they demand more 
transparency and accountability about CEO compensation and thus develop the hypothesis as 
there is a positive relationship between CEO compensation disclosure index and ownership 
hold by foreign investors. This study finds a significant positive relationship between foreign 
investors and CEO compensation disclosure index and this result support the hypothesis 7. 
This result implies that foreign investors monitor the disclosure pattern of CEO compensation 
to ensure transparency and accountability. They demand highly talented person as CEO and 
want to pay high compensation to the CEO and ensure more discloser when compensation is 
also higher.  In addition, foreign investors are habituated about the details disclosure of CEO 
compensation in their home country and they also expect comprehensive disclosure pattern of 
CEO compensation in listed banks of Bangladesh. This findings support the statement of 
Chizema (2008) that foreign investors are familiar about comprehensive disclosure of 
directors‟ compensation in their home country.  Moreover, firms disclose compensation 
information in more details to retain the foreign investment and also to attract new investors 
in the following years.  
Debt holders create pressure on management if any activities are against the interest of 
the debt holders. They demand more transparency and accountability about CEO 
compensation and disclosure and thus develop the hypothesis as there is a positive 
relationship between debt holders and CEO compensation disclosure index. But the empirical 
result does not find any significant relationship between debt holders and CEO compensation 
disclosure index.  This result is also consistent with Malek (2015) study. This means that debt 
holders have weak bargaining power to raise the disclosure quality of CEO compensation. 
Another reason might be debt holders are more concerned about CEO compensation amount 
rather than disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  
It is assumed that disclosure quality of CEO compensation will be higher when the 
firm size is larger and thus develop the hypothesis as there is a positive relationship between 
firm size and CEO compensation disclosure index. This study finds that firm size is not a 
significant explanatory variable for disclosure quality of CEO compensation. This means that 
CEO compensation disclosure is not affected by firm size in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
Empirical studies find that firm size is significantly and positively associated with 
compensation disclosure (Coulton et al., 2001; Clarkson et al., 2006; Chizema, 2008; Malek, 
2015) but this is not applicable in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  This is the important 
finding of this study because disclosure of CEO compensation is very poor even in large 
firms. The reason might be large firms are not concerned about the higher disclosure quality 
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of CEO compensation. Another reason might be large firms are not interested to disclose 
compensation information in public. Andjelkovic et al. (2002) study stated that board faces 
less pressure in the absence of public disclosure of executive compensation. Thus, large firms 
reduce the pressure from public by avoiding the disclosure of CEO compensation.  
Hypothesis 10 assumes that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and CEO compensation disclosure index. This study finds a positive and 
statistical relationship between CEO compensation and CEO compensation disclosure index. 
This result support the hypothesis 10 but opposite of the study of Coulton et al.  (2001). 
Firms disclose compensation information in more details when CEO compensation is high. 
When CEO compensation amount is comparatively less they are not concerned about 
disclosure quality but when CEO compensation is high, they are more concerned about CEO 
compensation disclosure. By disclosing compensation information in details, firms try to 
prove that they are more transparent and accountable to the stakeholders. This practice of 
CEO compensation disclosure also limits the question of public whether CEO receives excess 
amount from the firms and thereby reduce the agency conflict and information asymmetry 
between shareholders and management.  
When a firm is audited by affiliated audit firm of BIG 4 then it is assumed that 
disclosure will be comparatively higher and thus develop the hypothesis as there is a positive 
relationship between CEO compensation disclosure index and audit quality. The empirical 
result shows that audit quality is significantly positively associated with CEO compensation 
disclosure index.  This result supports the hypothesis 11 and consistent with prior studies 
(Clarkson et al., 2006; Bassett et al., 2007; Malek, 2015). BIG 4 audit firms have the 
reputation in the global market and they build up their reputation over the years by ensuring 
transparency and accountability to the public. BIG 4 audit firms make sure whether firms 
disclosing all the requirements including CEO compensation information. Moreover, 
management of the banks also become more conscious and discloses information in details 
because they know that their activities and disclosure pattern will be evaluated by the BIG 4 
affiliated audit firms. It is also advantages to the banks that when listed banks are audited by 
BIG 4 affiliated audit firms then it creates the creditworthiness to the general shareholders, 
investors, regulators and public.  
In equation   2,  run the regression  using external firm performance  named as 
Tobin‟s Q  holding all other factors are constant. The model explains about 22.32% of the 
variability of CEO compensation disclosure index. Hypothesis 1(b) assumes that there is a 
positive relationship between Tobin‟s Q and CEO compensation disclosure index. But this 
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study does not find any significant relationship between Tobin‟s Q and disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation. The reason might be external firm performance is not a significant 
explanatory factor in explaining CEO compensation disclosure index.  
The regression results are almost same in equation 1 and equation 2.  The empirical 
result shows that presence of female directors in the board, director ownership, and 
ownership hold by foreign investors, CEO compensation and audit quality are positively and 
significantly associated with CEO compensation disclosure index. This means that female 
directors, ownership hold by directors, foreign investors, audit quality and CEO 
compensation contribute to higher disclosure quality of CEO compensation and ensure 
transparency and accountability to the stakeholders. But this study does not find any 
significant association of disclosure quality of CEO compensation with board size, 
independent directors, institutional ownership, leverage and firm size.  Board size, 
independent directors and institutional investors have no association with CEO compensation 
disclosure index which means that board size, independent directors and institutional 
investors are not playing their monitoring role in disclosing CEO compensation information 
in details. This finding indicates that corporate governance is weak in monitoring and 
disclosing CEO compensation information to the public. Debt holders also can‟t create 
pressure on management to disclose compensation information in more details. Finally, firm 
size also has no association with disclosure quality of CEO compensation index in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh.  
In equation 3, both internal and external firm performance ROA and Tobin‟s Q are 
considered in the same equation considering all other variables are constant  and rerun the 
regression to find out the effect on disclosure quality of CEO compensation. This model 
explains about 23.35% variability of the CEO compensation disclosure index.  
The results of the regression models are almost similar like equation 1 and 2.  Internal 
firm performance ROA is positively and significantly associated with CEO compensation 
disclosure index.  This means that disclosure of CEO compensation is more transparent when 
internal firm performance is high. But this study doesn‟t find any significant association 
between Tobin‟s Q and CEO compensation disclosure index.  
In equation 3, this study finds that female directors, directors ownership, foreign 
investors, CEO compensation and audit quality are positively and significantly associated 
with disclosure quality of CEO compensation. The findings of the equation 3 are similar like 
both equation 1 and 2. Female directors are effective enough in monitoring the CEO 
compensation disclosure or controlling shareholders disclose the compensation information 
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to maximize self interest by attracting new investors or retain existing shareholders. By 
disclosing compensation information in more details, directors ensure transparency and 
accountability and convince shareholders that they are working on behalf of the shareholders 
interest. In addition, directors use this transparent disclosure of CEO compensation as their 
performance and claim the incentives, retain managerial position and reappointment.  Foreign 
investors are more concerned about their investment and they demand more transparency and 
accountability about CEO compensation. In addition, foreign investors expect same 
comprehensive disclosure of CEO compensation like their home country.  CEO 
compensation is also positively associated with CEO compensation disclosure index. 
Disclosure quality of CEO compensation is more when compensation amount is high and 
firms try to prove that they are more transparent and accountable about CEO compensation. 
Audit quality also ensures higher disclosure of CEO compensation. Management becomes 
more concerned when their work will be evaluated by the affiliated audit firm of BIG 4.  
But this study doesn‟t find any significant relationship with board size, independent 
directors, institutional investors, leverage and firm size in equation 3 and this finding is 
similar in both equations 1 and 2.  Board size doesn‟t have any effect on disclosure of CEO 
compensation. Independent directors and institutional investors are not playing their 
monitoring role effectively in disclosing CEO compensation information in more details. This 
finding indicates that corporate governance is very weak in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Debt holders have weak bargaining power to disclose compensation information in more 
details.  Firm size is a significant explanatory variable in previous studies but this empirical 
research finds no relationship between firm size and disclosure quality of CEO compensation 
in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 
3.8 Additional Analysis  
 In this study, some additional analysis has been conducted to check the robustness of 
the results and those are described below:  
 
3.8.1 Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation Considering Time Dummy 
Table 3-8 represents the regression results of the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation considering time dummy. The result shows that time is a significant factor only 
in 2013 in explaining the disclosure quality of CEO compensation. The reason might be 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) revised corporate governance 
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guideline (amendment) in 2012 and the effect of corporate governance guideline on 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation starts from 2013.  
 
Table 3-8 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation Considering Time 
Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  2.2046 -15.1666 1.766162 
  (0.973) (0.825) (0.979) 
ROA (%) (+) 1.05542  1.06216 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -0.3797459 0.2714629 
   (0.609) (0.725) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -1.931419 2.1361 -1.913956 
  (0.558) (0.436) (0.561) 
ID (%) (+) -0.3002359 -0.2569524 -0.3006771 
  (0.023) (0.059) (0.023) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.1346832 0.105915 0.1356678 
  (0.017) (0.054) (0.017) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0817576 0.0609608 0.0822254 
  (0.266) (0.411) (0.265) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.2424103 0.1550048 0.2424252 
  (0.008) (0.054) (0.008) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.5220402 0.516791 0.5212801 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0175509 -0.002948 -0.017601 
  (0.542) (0.915) (0.545) 
LNASSET (+) -1.942009 -1.396953 -1.921543 
  (0.314) (0.497) (0.324) 
LNTCEOP (+) 3.855761 3.790154 3.827449 
  (0.147) (0.167) (0.152) 
AUDQ (+) 5.602227 5.829185 5.617556 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
OWNGOV (%)  0.1679516 0.1103656 0.1675602 
  (0.066) (0.227) (0.067) 
Year Dummy     
2007  2.046641 1.94142 2.024014 
  (0.451) (0.486) (0.457) 
2008  1.629546 1.575727 1.617976 
  (0.590) (0.605) (0.594) 
2009  2.966417 2.617025 2.951386 
  (0.383) (0.443) (0.387) 
2010  1.418282 1.795322 1.31334 
  (0.708) (0.645) (0.739) 
2011  3.647936 2.707823 3.634103 
  (0.366) (0.511) (0.370) 
2012  7.66028 6.299033 7.671724 
  (0.117) (0.212) (0.117) 
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Table 3-8 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation Considering Time 
Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
2013  10.78225 8.867763 10.804 
  (0.040) (0.096) (0.040) 
R2  0.2565 0.2385 0.2565 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated 
by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of 
total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
 
There is no change of result in Table 3-8 in compare to Table 3-7 in terms of ROA, 
Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent director, female directors, institutional ownership, 
director ownership, foreign investors, debt to equity, firm size and audit quality after 
considering the time effect which implies that the result of these variables are consistent with 
or without time adjustment.   
Internal firm performance measured by ROA, female directors, director ownership, 
foreign investors and audit quality are positively and statistically associated with disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation disclosure and this result of Table 3-8 is exactly similar with 
the regression result of Table 3-7.  But Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent directors, 
institutional ownership, debt to equity, firm size have no significant association with the 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation and this result is also similar between Table 3-8 and 
Table 3-7.  
CEO compensation is not significantly associated with disclosure of CEO 
compensation and this result indicates that there is a difference between Table 3-8 and Table 
3-7 after controlling time. The regression result shows that the directional sign of CEO 
compensation is positive as expected but the result is not statistically significant. This result 
 147  
 
implies that time has significant impact on the relationship between disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation and CEO compensation amount.  
 
3.8.2   Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation Considering Serial Correlation  
Table 3-9 represents the regression results of disclosure quality of CEO compensation 
considering the serial correlation issue. Firm performance and governance variables are 
generally consistent over the years and variable of one year might affect the following years 
and as a result, the problem of serial correlation may arise. Thus, the results of the regression 
are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to avoid the problem of 
serial correlation.  
There is no change of result in Table 3-9 in compare to Table 3-7 in terms of Tobin‟s 
Q, board size, independent directors, institutional ownership, director ownership, foreign 
investors, debt to equity, firm size, CEO compensation and audit quality after considering the 
serial correlation. This result implies that these variables are consistent with or without 
adjustment of serial correlation. 
Director ownership, foreign investors, CEO compensation and audit quality are 
positively and statistically associated with disclosure quality of CEO compensation and this 
result of Table 3-9 is exactly similar with the regression result of Table 3-7.  But Tobin‟s Q, 
board size, percentage of independent directors, institutional ownership, debt to equity, firm 
size have no significant association with the disclosure quality of CEO compensation and this 
result is also similar between Table 3-9 and Table 3-7.  
 
Table 3-9 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation Considering 
Serial Correlation 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -71.6173 -71.6898 -69.98998 
  (0.173) (0.189) (0.185) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.7767046  0.7684878 
  (0.173)  (0.177) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -1.134007 -0.9849483 
   (0.289) (0.341) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -1.9998 1.08368 -2.091328 
  (0.695) (0.814) (0.682) 
ID (%) (+) -0.1327593 -0.1282827 -0.1369776 
  (0.389) (0.443) (0.376) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.1184138 0.09552645 0.1147403 
  (0.267) (0.367) (0.285) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0712518 0.0563533 0.0702838 
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Table 3-9 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation Considering 
Serial Correlation 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
  (0.651) (0.720) (0.656) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.3061588 0.2286935 0.3059642 
  (0.025) (0.034) (0.026) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.4697068 0.4778937 0.473146 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0176753 -0.0081048 -0.0185176 
  (0.407) (0.677) (0.380) 
LNASSET (+) 0.0967661 0.1041105 0.0051974 
  (0.960) (0.960) (0.998) 
LNTCEOP (+) 5.479584 5.299465 5.61522 
  (0.083) (0.115) (0.079) 
AUDQ (+) 4.741419 5.049829 4.718854 
  (0.068) (0.055) (0.069) 
OWNGOV (%)  0.2051065 0.1583433 0.2083372 
  (0.113) (0.226) (0.108) 
R2  0.2328 0.2232 0.2335 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated 
by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of 
total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity- heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at 
the firm level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The major differences are internal firm performance measured by ROA and 
percentage of female directors between Table 3-9 and Table 3-7 after considering the serial 
correlation.  ROA and female directors have the positive correlation with the disclosure of 
CEO compensation as expected but the results are not statistically significant. The reason 
might be the role of female directors is either ineffective or weak and they remain silent and 
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work on behalf of the controlling shareholders‟ interest and ROA is not significant factor for 
disclosure of CEO compensation when serial correlation is adjusted. 
 
3.8.3   Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation Considering Time Dummy and Serial 
Correlation  
The regression results of disclosure quality of CEO compensation considering the 
time dummy and serial correlation are presented in the Table 3-10. Firm performance and 
governance variables are generally consistent over the years and variable of one year might 
affect the following years and as a result, the problem of serial correlation may arise. 
Moreover, there might be some effect of time dummy also.  Thus, this regression models 
considers both time dummy and serial correlation jointly to show the effect on disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation.  
The regression result shows that time dummy is not associated with the disclosure of 
CEO compensation in any years. This means that time has no significant effect on disclosure 
of CEO compensation.  There is no change of result in Table 3-10 in compare to Table 3-7 in 
terms of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent directors, institutional ownership, director 
ownership, foreign investors, debt to equity, firm size, and audit quality after considering the 
serial correlation and time dummy. This result implies that these variables are consistent with 
or without adjustment of time dummy and serial correlation.  
 
Table 3-10 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation 
Considering Time Dummy and Serial Correlation 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  2.2046    -15.1666    1.766162    
  (0.985 ) (0.898) (0.988) 
ROA (%) (+) 1.05542      1.06216    
  (0.083 )  (0.083 ) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -0.3797459    0.2714629    
   (0.744) (0.800) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -1.931419    2.1361     -1.913956    
  (0.693) (0.633) (0.695) 
ID (%) (+) -0.3002359    -0.2569524     -0.3006771    
  (0.165 ) (0.270) (0.165) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.1346832    0.105915    0.1356678    
  (0.235) (0.339 ) (0.231) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0817576     0.0609608    0.0822254    
  (0.610) (0.706) (0.609) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.2424103    0.1550048    0.2424252    
  (0.095) (0.211 ) (0.096) 
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Table 3-10 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation 
Considering Time Dummy and Serial Correlation 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.5220402    0.516791    0.5212801    
  (0.002 ) (0.003 ) (0.002 ) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0175509    -0.002948    -0.017601    
  (0.519 ) (0.912 ) (0.521 ) 
LNASSET (+) -1.942009    -1.396953    -1.921543    
  (0.533) (0.663 ) (0.544) 
LNTCEOP (+) 3.855761    3.790154    3.827449    
  (0.387) (0.416) (0.390) 
AUDQ (+) 5.602227     5.829185     5.617556    
  (0.039 ) (0.035 ) (0.039) 
OWNGOV  0.1679516    0.1103656    0.1675602     
  (0.301) (0.519) (0.303) 
Year Dummy     
2007  2.046641    1.94142    2.024014    
  (0.307) (0.330) (0.322 ) 
2008  1.629546      1.575727    1.617976    
  (0.627) (0.622 ) (0.633) 
2009  2.966417    2.617025    2.951386    
  (0.502 ) (0.541) (0.508) 
2010  1.418282    1.795322    1.31334    
  (0.792) (0.747) (0.815) 
2011  3.647936    2.707823     3.634103    
  (0.563) (0.663) (0.567) 
2012  7.66028    6.299033    7.671724    
  (0.344) (0.433) (0.343) 
2013  10.78225    8.867763    10.804    
  (0.239) (0.325) (0.238) 
R2  0.2565 0.2385 0.2565 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated 
by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of 
total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
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are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity- heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at 
the firm level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical result shows that internal firm performance measured by ROA, director 
ownership, foreign investors, and audit quality are positively and statistically associated with 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation and this result of Table 3-10 is exactly similar with 
the regression result of Table 3-7.  But Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent directors, 
institutional ownership, debt to equity, firm size have no significant association with the 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation and this result is also similar between Table 3-10 
and Table 3-7.  
The result also report that female directors and CEO compensation are not statistically 
associated with disclosure quality of CEO compensation and these two are the major 
differences between Table 3-10 and Table 3-7 after considering time dummy and serial 
correlation. The role of female directors is either ineffective or weak and they remain silent 
and work on behalf of the controlling shareholders‟ interest. CEO compensation has the 
positive association with CEO compensation disclosure but the result is not significant. This 
means that CEO compensation is not an important factor and thus CEO compensation doesn‟t 
affect the disclosure quality when time dummy and serial correlation are adjusted at the same 
time.  
 
3.8.4 TOBIT Regression 
The score of CEO compensation disclosure index is considered alternatively as the 
dependent variable. In this part, I use the TOBIT regression method instead of ordinary least 
square (OLS) since the dependent variable is censored.  The descriptive statistics and the 
regression results of CEO compensation disclosure index are described below using the 
TOBIT regression method:   
 
3.8.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of CEO Compensation Disclosure Index (expressed in 
score) 
Table 3-11 represents the descriptive statistics of CEO compensation disclosure index 
in score during the period of 2006 to 2013.  The table reports that the average score of CEO 
compensation disclosure index is 4.77 in 2006 which is minimum score and the maximum 
score is 6.83 in 2013. This implies that the score of CEO compensation disclosure index 
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increases over the year as expected. The overall mean score of CEO compensation disclosure 
index is 5.88 and ranges from 2 to 13 with standard deviation 2.90.  
 
Table 3-11 
Descriptive Summary Statistics for CEO Compensation Disclosure Index (Score) 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 4.769231 2 2 5 6 9 2.232625 
2007 30 5.2 2 2 5 7 12 2.88157 
2008 30 5.566667 2 3 5 7 12 2.812329 
2009 30 5.866667 2 4 5.5 8 12 2.932968 
2010 30 6 2 4 6 8 12 2.900654 
2011 30 6.1 2 4 6.5 8 12 2.795933 
2012 30 6.566667 2 4 7 9 12 3.081461 
2013 30 6.833333 2 2 8 9 13 3.152266 
Total 236 5.881356 2 3 6 8 13 2.895836 
 
The lowest record score of CEO compensation disclosure index is 2 and the highest 
record score is 13 during 2006 to 2013. CEO compensation disclosure index includes 24 
items and each item score 1 and thus total maximum score is 24. But the table shows that the 
average score of CEO compensation disclosure is only 5.88 out of 24.   
 
 
Figure 3-2: Trend of CEO Compensation Disclosure Index (expressed in score) 
 
The score of CEO compensation disclosure index is also presented through graph line 
in Figure 3-2. This indicates very poor disclosure of CEO compensation. Coulton et al. 
(2001) study reported that disclosure transparency index is 4.7, 4.7 and 5.2 in 1998, 1999 and 
2000 respectively and the overall mean disclosure index is 4.9 out of 9 in Australia. But the 
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disclosure of CEO compensation index score is very low in compare to Australia. The main 
reason is most of the banks disclose only total compensation amount without further 
breakdown information. There is no change of disclosure of CEO compensation from 2006 to 
2013 even in large firms. Large firms are not concerned about disclosure or they skip the 
disclosure to avoid the pressure from public.  
 
3.8.4.2 Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation using TOBIT Method 
Table 3-12 represents the regression results of disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation using the TOBIT method as the dependent variable CEO compensation 
disclosure index score is censored. The regression result reports that there is no change of 
result in Table 3-12 in compare to Table 3-7 in terms of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, board size, 
independent directors, female directors, institutional ownership, director ownership, foreign 
investors, debt to equity, firm size, CEO compensation, and audit quality.  Disclosure quality 
of CEO compensation is positively and significantly associated with internal firm 
performance ROA, female directors, director ownership, foreign investors, CEO 
compensation and audit quality. But the result of the regression doesn‟t find any significant 
association of CEO compensation disclosure index with Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent 
directors, institutional ownership, debt to equity and firm size. The results of the regression 
are exactly the same in TOBIT and OLS method.  
 
Table 3-12 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation using TOBIT 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -17.54261 -17.5588 -17.1542 
  (0.044) 0.048 0.049 
ROA (+) 0.1890733  0.1871103 
  (0.025)  (0.027) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -0.2709624 -0.2346384 
   (0.190) (0.251) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.5177747 0.2342244 -0.5395005 
  (0.512) (0.728) (0.495) 
ID (%) (+) -0.03161687 -0.03051249 -0.03262228 
  (0.202) (0.236) (0.188) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.02850765 0.02295347 0.02763234 
  (0.022) (0.059) (0.027) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0170728 0.0134524 0.0168423 
  (0.321) (0.433) (0.327) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0749226 0.0560295 0.0748732 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.1131748 0.1151376 0.11399932 
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Table 3-12 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation using TOBIT 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0042445 -0.0019107 -0.0044451 
  (0.545) (0.765) (0.510) 
LNASSET (+) 0.0499219 0.0514417 0.0280527 
  (0.886) (0.888) (0.936) 
LNTCEOP (+) 1.299477 1.255375 1.331822 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) 
AUDQ (+) 1.122344 1.197953 1.117 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
OWNGOV  0.0489496 0.037559 0.0497198 
  (0.005) (0.026) (0.004) 
Psedo R2  0.0537 0.0511 0.0539 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the TOBIT regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated 
by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of 
total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
3.8.4.3 Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation using TOBIT Method Considering 
Time Dummy 
Table 3-13 represents the regression result of the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation using the TOBIT method and considering the time dummy. The regression 
result report that time is a significant factor only in 2013. Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC) improved the corporate governance guideline in 2012 
through amendment and the effect of corporate governance guideline on CEO compensation 
disclosure starts from 2013. The empirical result finds that there is no change of result 
between Table 3-13 and Table 3-7 in terms of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent 
directors, female directors, institutional ownership, director ownership, foreign investors, 
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debt to equity, firm size and audit quality. Internal firm performance ROA, female directors, 
director ownership, foreign investors and audit quality are significantly positively associated 
with the disclosure of CEO compensation index.  This study doesn‟t find any significant 
association of CEO compensation disclosure index with Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent 
directors, institutional ownership, leverage and firm size.  
The major difference is CEO compensation between Table 3-13 and Table 3-7. CEO 
compensation is positively associated with the disclosure of CEO compensation but the result 
is not significant after controlling the time dummy. Though the relationship between CEO 
compensation and disclosure of CEO compensation is not significant, but the empirical result 
shows that time dummy is significant only in 2013. The reason might be Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) revised corporate governance guideline in 
2012 and improvised corporate governance effect starts from 2013. 
 
Table 3-13 
Regression results of Disclosure Quality of CEO compensation using TOBIT 
Considering  Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -0.4518083 -4.640254 -0.5611315 
  (0.977) (0.775) (0.972) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.2552381  0.2569135 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -0.0900837 0.067447 
   (0.599) (0.704) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -0.5056491 0.4788529 -0.501327 
  (0.514) (0.458) (0.516) 
ID (%) (+) -0.07149622 -0.06103997 -0.07160562 
  (0.019) (0.052) (0.019) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.0322141 0.02526471 0.03245869 
  (0.013) (0.046) (0.013) 
INT (%) (+) 0.019673 0.0146456 0.0197893 
  (0.245) (0.391) (0.243) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.0600214 0.0388534 0.0600258 
  (0.006) (0.047) (0.006) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.1252781 0.1240039 0.1250893 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0043222 -0.0007891 -0.0043347 
  (0.518) (0.902) (0.520) 
LNASSET (+) -0.4244715 -0.2931794 -0.4193701 
  (0.365) (0.557) (0.375) 
LNTCEOP (+) 0.9282663 0.9121703 0.9212332 
  (0.130) (0.149) (0.134) 
AUDQ (+) 1.328693 1.383933 1.332495 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 3-13 
Regression results of Disclosure Quality of CEO compensation using TOBIT 
Considering  Time Dummy 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
OWNGOV (%)  0.0405554 0.0266219 0.0404583 
  (0.054) (0.205) (0.055) 
Year Dummy     
2007  0.4802477 0.4548276 0.4746215 
  (0.443) (0.479) (0.448) 
2008  0.3713932 0.3586152 0.3685108 
  (0.595) (0.61) (0.598) 
2009  0.6807171 0.5966159 0.6769701 
  (0.390) (0.452) (0.392) 
2010  0.3013847 0.3925111 0.2752955 
  (0.733) (0.665) (0.764) 
2011  0.8276276 0.6009342 0.8241715 
  (0.381) (0.533) (0.383) 
2012  1.763536 1.435585 1.766349 
  (0.128) (0.230) (0.127) 
2013  2.537929 2.075845 2.543312 
  (0.038) (0.094) (0.037) 
Psedo R2  0.0599 0.0550 0.0599 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the TOBIT regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated 
by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of 
total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
There is no difference of disclosure quality of CEO compensation index between 
TOBIT and OLS method considering the time dummy. The regression results are same 
between Table 3-13 and Table 3-8 in terms of ROA, Tobin‟s Q, board size, independent 
directors, female directors, institutional ownership, director ownership, foreign investors, 
debt to equity, firm size, CEO compensation and audit quality. This means that ROA, female 
 157  
 
directors, director ownership, foreign investors and audit quality are positively and 
significantly associated with the disclosure of CEO compensation index. Tobin‟s Q, board 
size, institutional investors, leverage and firm size are not statistically associated with the 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation. CEO compensation is positively associated with the 
disclosure of CEO compensation but the result is not significant and independent directors 
have negative statistical relationship with the disclosure of CEO compensation and these 
results are similar between TOBIT and OLS method after controlling time.  
 
3.8.5 Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation using Fixed Effect  
Table 3-14 represents the regression results of the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation using fixed effect. I want to check is there any significant effect of fixed effect 
on disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  The regression result reports that institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with the disclosure of CEO compensation. This means 
that institutional monitoring is not effective about disclosure of CEO compensation index. 
This can be explained several ways: First, institutional investors are passive investors. 
Second, they are not concerned about CEO compensation disclosure. Third, institutional 
monitoring is not an important governance mechanism in the listed banks. Fourth, 
institutional investors may not play their role in the same industry or peer group. The results 
find that all other variables have no significant association with the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation.  
 
Table 3-14 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO compensation using Fixed Effect 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -69.75683 -68.83183 -69.37796 
  (0.095) (0.099) (0.096) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.1628048  0.1813101 
  (0.428)  (0.367) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -0.4498258 -0.5589818 
   (0.260) (0.083) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -4.56194 -4.116963 -4.517862 
  (0.108) (0.127) (0.111) 
ID (%) (+) -0.02968096 -0.03463047 -0.03159773 
  (0.685) (0.637) (0.669) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.01590247 0.01405651 0.01527516 
  (0.798) (0.821) (0.807) 
INT (%) (+) -0.0494057 -0.0530575 -0.0511306 
  (0.072) (0.060) (0.067) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.2223294 0.213724 0.2208949 
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Table 3-14 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO compensation using Fixed Effect 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
  (0.204) (0.215) (0.209) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.0548474 0.0546452 0.0547136 
  (0.598) (0.594) (0.599) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0118305 -0.0104499 -0.0119405 
  (0.169) (0.167) (0.164) 
LNASSET (+) 0.722834 0.6572554 0.6887087 
  (0.739) (0.764) (0.752) 
LNTCEOP (+) 5.450646 5.509545 5.51428 
  (0.127) (0.123) (0.125) 
AUDQ (+) 1.844444 1.879534 1.844161 
  (0.289) (0.278) (0.291) 
OWNGOV (%)  -0.5257367 -0.5639251 -0.5201216 
  (0.282) (0.249) (0.277) 
F  3.46 3.8 3.52 
P>F  0.0031 0.0016 0.0023 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the panel regression using the fixed effect method of  the disclosure quality 
of CEO compensation which denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on 
Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is 
computed by book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity 
divided by book value of total assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; 
ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a 
board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed 
by the number of female directors divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of 
ownership holds by Institution; OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is 
computed by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- 
Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book 
value of total equity; LNASSET- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of 
firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit 
firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics 
are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
 
3.8.6 Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation using Random Effect  
Disclosure quality of CEO compensation is examined using the random effect and the 
results of the regression are presented in the Table 3-15. The regression result finds that 
leverage is negatively associated with the disclosure of CEO compensation. This result can be 
explained in several ways: First, external monitoring role is either ineffective or weak. 
Second, creditors don‟t have the bargaining power to influence the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation. Third, debt holders are more concerned about the CEO compensation rather 
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than disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  The results also find that all other variables 
are not significant to influence CEO compensation disclosure index. 
 
Table 3-15 
Regression Results of Disclosure Quality of CEO Compensation using Random 
Effect 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -78.41148 -77.83721 -77.67403 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.2256406  0.2435857 
  (0.290)  (0.244) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -0.5073553 -0.6405959 
   (0.173) (0.040) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -4.329619 -3.694444 -4.311957 
  (0.108) (0.153) (0.109) 
ID (%) (+) -0.04233906 -0.04845102 -0.04431672 
  (0.564) (0.510) (0.550) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.02167313 0.01847581 0.02066982 
  (0.706) (0.747) (0.720) 
INT (%) (+) -0.0429288 -0.0476392 -0.0446083 
  (0.157) (0.125) (0.139) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.225119 0.211679 0.2241018 
  (0.145) (0.159) (0.149) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.1023142 0.1014868 0.1013333 
  (0.264) (0.255) (0.270) 
DEBT2TE  (+) -0.0134956 -0.011586 -0.137027 
  (0.084) (0.086) (0.076) 
LNASSET (+) 1.210592 1.161281 1.152384 
  (0.491) (0.515) (0.517) 
LNTCEOP (+) 4.971541 5.009615 5.062352 
  (0.114) (0.112) (0.111) 
AUDQ (+) 2.108873 2.159433 2.103012 
  (0.210) (0.196) (0.213) 
OWNGOV(%)  0.0720432 0.0600676 0.0742052 
  (0.555) (0.616) (0.544) 
Wald chi2(12)  45.50 44.59 47.05 
P>chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the panel regression using the random effect method of  the disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation which denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA 
(Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- 
Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total 
equity divided by book value of total assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board; ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in 
a board divided by total number of directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed 
by the number of female directors divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of 
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ownership holds by Institution; OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is 
computed by number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- 
Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book 
value of total equity; LNASSET- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of 
firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit 
firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics 
are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
3.8.7   Determinants of Disclosure quality of CEO Compensation by Changing the 
Measurement of Leverage 
Determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation are reexamined by changing 
the measurement of leverage in Table 3-16. Leverage is measured by debt to equity ratio in 
the analysis part.  If equity is negative then debt equity ratio will be negative which may have 
impact on the regression results. Thus, leverage is newly measured by the ratio of debt to 
total assets for examining the robustness of the results and avoiding the negative sign of debt 
equity ratio. 
 
Table 3-16 
Regression results of Determinants of Disclosure quality of CEO Compensation by 
Changing the Measurement of Leverage 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -71.92 -52.53 -73.59 
  (0.100)     (0.231)     (0.095)     
ROA (%) (+) 0.751    0.772     
  (0.055)      (0.047)      
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -0.702 -1.005 
   (0.358) (0.247) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -1.919 -0.320 -1.893 
  (0.585) (0.926) (0.590) 
ID (%) (+) -0.131 -0.122 -0.136 
  (0.220) (0.269) (0.205) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.117     0.101   0.113     
  (0.027) (0.057) (0.036) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0725 0.0667 0.0706 
  (0.326) (0.368) (0.342) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.306       0.269       0.303       
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.468       0.491       0.469       
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT2TA (+) -0.312 -10.50 1.420 
  (0.977) (0.333) (0.896) 
LNASSET (+) 0.0733 -0.284 0.0441 
  (0.962) (0.855) (0.977) 
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Table 3-16 
Regression results of Determinants of Disclosure quality of CEO Compensation by 
Changing the Measurement of Leverage 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
LNTCEOP (+) 5.532       5.447     5.658       
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
AUDQ (+) 4.751       4.858       4.749       
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
OWNGOV (%)  0.203       0.177     0.205       
  (0.007) (0.018) (0.007) 
R2  0.232 0.225 0.233 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : CEODINDEX-  CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA is calculated 
by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book value of 
total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of total 
assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent 
directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of 
directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female directors 
divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TA- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical analysis shows that there is no difference between Table 3-16 and 
Table 3-7 after changing the measurement of leverage. The regression results are same 
between Table 3-16 and Table 3-7 in terms of firm performance (ROA and Tobin‟s Q), board 
size, independent director, female director, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign 
investors, leverage, firm size, CEO compensation and audit quality. The empirical results find 
that firm performance (ROA), CEO compensation, audit quality, director ownership and 
foreign investors are the significant explanatory factors for CEO compensation disclosure 
index. But board size, independent directors, female directors, and institutional investors have 
no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO compensation which means that corporate 
governance is very weak and inefficient. This study also shows that firm size has no 
significant association with the disclosure of CEO compensation and creditors don‟t have any 
bargaining power to increase the quality of disclosure of CEO compensation.  
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3.8.8 Modified CEO Compensation Disclosure Index- An Alternative Method 
This study develops modified CEO compensation disclosure index using an 
alternative method. The modified CEO compensation disclosure index is prepared following 
the same disclosure guideline and requirements.  CEO compensation disclosure index is 
scored on the basis of information disclosed or not. If the particular information related to 
CEO compensation is disclosed then scores one otherwise zero. The maximum score is 
twelve if disclosed all information and the minimum score is zero if disclosed nothing. 
Disclosure ranges between zero and one and higher score means higher disclosure.  The 
individual score is converted into percentage form to make it clear that to what percentage 
banks are disclosing compensation information in details.  The modified CEO compensation 
disclosure index includes total twelve attributes from the annual report.  The modified CEO 
compensation disclosure index includes separate disclosure for CEO compensation, 
compensation process, pay performance relationship, comparative CEO information, 
segregated CEO compensation, relative importance on fixed and variable components of 
CEO compensation, consideration of peer groups, criteria of setting up the salaries for CEO 
compensation, perquisites, bonus and other benefits, retirement benefits, and share based 
payment. The modified CEO compensation disclosure index excludes the breakdown 
information or components of perquisites, bonus and other benefits and retirement benefits of 
the previous CEO compensation disclosure index.  
 
Table 3-17 
Modified CEO Compensation Disclosure Index (in percentage form) 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 35.89744 16.66667 16.66667 41.66667 50 58.33333 14.67599 
2007 30 36.38889 16.66667 16.66667 41.66667 50 66.66666 16.00457 
2008 30 38.33333 16.66667 25 41.66667 50 66.66666 15.41259 
2009 30 41.11111 16.66667 33.33333 41.66667 50 66.66666 15.77095 
2010 30 41.66667 16.66667 33.33333 41.66667 50 75 16.08169 
2011 30 42.22222 16.66667 33.33333 41.66667 50 75 15.77095 
2012 30 45 16.66667 33.33333 50 58.33333 75 17.45273 
2013 30 47.5 16.66667 33.33333 50 58.33333 100 20.54688 
Total 236 41.10169 16.66667 25 41.66667 50 100 16.76315 
 
 
Table 3-17 represents the descriptive statistics of modified CEO compensation 
disclosure index from 2006 to 2013. CEO compensation disclosure index report that the 
average CEO compensation disclosure measure by the index is 35.90 % in 2006 which is the 
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minimum where as maximum is 47.5 % in 2013. This indicates that CEO compensation 
disclosure level increase over the year as expected. The overall average disclosure level is 
41.10 % and ranges from 16.67 % to 100 % with a standard deviation of 16.76%.  This CEO 
compensation disclosure index shows that lowest record of disclosure is 16.67% and highest 
record of disclosure is 100% by all the listed banks during the period of 2006 to 2013.  The 
overall CEO compensation disclosure measured by the index is 41.10% which indicates very 
poor quality disclosure of the listed banks of Bangladesh but the positive sign is that overall 
quality of CEO compensation is increasing over the years as expected.  
 
3.8.8.1 Determinants of Disclosure quality of CEO Compensation using Modified CEO 
Compensation Disclosure Index:  
Table 3-18 presents the regression results of determinants of disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation using modified CEO compensation disclosure index. The modified CEO 
compensation disclosure index is used as the dependent variable. The modified CEO 
compensation disclosure index includes total twelve attributes such as separate disclosure for 
CEO compensation, compensation process, pay performance relationship, comparative CEO 
information, segregated CEO compensation, relative importance on fixed and variable 
components of CEO compensation, consideration of peer groups, criteria of setting up the 
salaries for CEO compensation, perquisites, bonus and other benefits, retirement benefits, and 
share based payment from the annual report and score one for each item and then the total 
score is converted into percentage form. 
The empirical analysis shows that there is no difference between Table 3-18 and 
Table 3-7 in terms of firm performance (ROA and Tobin‟s Q), independent director, female 
director, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, leverage, firm size, and 
CEO compensation after using the modified CEO compensation disclosure index. The 
empirical results find that firm performance (ROA), CEO compensation, director ownership 
and foreign investors are the significant explanatory factors for modified CEO compensation 
disclosure index. But independent directors, female directors, and institutional investors have 
no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO compensation which means that corporate 
governance is very weak and inefficient. This study also shows that firm size has no 
significant association with the modified CEO compensation disclosure index and creditors 
don‟t have any bargaining power to increase the quality of modified CEO compensation 
disclosure index. The major differences between Table 3-18 and Table 3-7 are board size and 
audit quality. This study finds that small board is more effective than large board in ensuring 
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better quality of CEO compensation but audit quality has no significant association with 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation after using the modified CEO compensation 
disclosure index.  
 
Table 3-18 
Regression results of Determinants of Disclosure quality of CEO Compensation 
using Modified CEO Compensation Disclosure Index 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -170.0    -170.6    -168.6    
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA (%) (+) 0.936   0.929  
  (0.053)  (0.056)     
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -1.055 -0.875 
   (0.357) (0.449) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -8.177  -4.420 -8.258  
  (0.081) (0.271) (0.079) 
ID (%) (+) -0.495    -0.488    -0.498    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.0599 0.0335 0.0567 
  (0.404) (0.643) (0.439) 
INT (%) (+) -0.115 -0.132 -0.115 
  (0.232) (0.171) (0.230) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.433    0.340    0.433    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.574    0.583    0.577    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT2TE (+) -0.0569  -0.0450 -0.0576  
  (0.084) (0.141) (0.071) 
LNASSET (+) 2.043 2.081 1.962 
  (0.326) (0.335) (0.348) 
LNTCEOP (+) 10.90    10.64    11.03    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AUDQ (+) 3.934 4.314  3.914 
  (0.102) (0.077) (0.105) 
OWNGOV (%)  0.309    0.251   0.311    
  (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) 
R2  0.264 0.256 0.264 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : M_CEODINDEX-  Modified CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA 
is calculated by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book 
value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of 
total assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of 
Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total 
number of directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female 
directors divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
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owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
 
3.8.8.2 Determinants of Disclosure quality of CEO Compensation using Modified CEO 
Compensation Disclosure Index and by Changing the Measurement of Leverage   
Determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation are reexamined using 
modified CEO compensation disclosure index and by changing the measurement of leverage 
in Table 3-19.  The modified CEO compensation disclosure index is used as the dependent 
variable. The modified CEO compensation disclosure index includes total twelve attributes 
such as separate disclosure for CEO compensation, compensation process, pay performance 
relationship, comparative CEO information, segregated CEO compensation, relative 
importance on fixed and variable components of CEO compensation, consideration of peer 
groups, criteria of setting up the salaries for CEO compensation, perquisites, bonus and other 
benefits, retirement benefits, and share based payment from the annual report and score one 
for each item and then the total score is converted into percentage form. In addition, leverage 
is measured by debt to equity ratio in the analysis part.  If equity is negative then debt equity 
ratio will be negative which may have impact on the regression results. Thus, leverage is 
newly measured by the ratio of debt to total assets for examining the robustness of the results 
and avoiding the negative sign of debt equity ratio.  
The empirical analysis shows that there is no difference between Table 3-19 and 
Table 3-7 in terms of firm performance (ROA and Tobin‟s Q), board size, independent 
director, female director, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, firm 
size, CEO compensation and audit quality after using the modified CEO compensation 
disclosure index and changing the measurement of leverage.  The empirical results find that 
firm performance (ROA), CEO compensation, audit quality, director ownership and foreign 
investors are the significant explanatory factors for modified CEO compensation disclosure 
index. But board size, independent directors, female directors, and institutional investors have 
no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO compensation which means that corporate 
governance is very weak and inefficient. This study also shows that firm size has no 
significant association with the modified CEO compensation disclosure index. The major 
difference is firm leverage between Table 3-19 and Table 3-7. This study finds that creditors 
 166  
 
have significant association with disclosure quality of CEO compensation after using the 
modified CEO compensation disclosure index. This result indicates that creditors have the 
bargaining power to increase the quality of CEO compensation disclosure index.  
 
Table 3-19 
Regression results of Determinants of Disclosure quality of CEO Compensation 
using Modified CEO Compensation Disclosure Index and by Changing the 
Measurement of Leverage 
 Expectation (1) (2) (3) 
Constant  -217.0       -183.8       -219.8       
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
ROA (%) (+) 1.285      1.321     
  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Tobin‟s Q (+)  -1.199 -1.717 
   (0.255) (0.103) 
LNBSIZE (+) / (-) -6.317 -3.583 -6.273 
  (0.192) (0.446) (0.195) 
ID (%) (+) -0.503       -0.487       -0.512       
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FEDIR (%) (+) 0.0534 0.0270 0.0467 
  (0.453) (0.711) (0.521) 
INT (%) (+) -0.124 -0.134 -0.127 
  (0.198) (0.167) (0.190) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) / (-) 0.386       0.322       0.380       
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.531       0.570       0.532       
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
DEBT2TA (+) 23.25   5.812 26.21   
  (0.097) (0.698) (0.060) 
LNASSET (+) 2.874 2.263 2.824 
  (0.187) (0.307) (0.197) 
LNTCEOP (+) 10.86       10.71       11.07       
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AUDQ (+) 4.252   4.435   4.248   
  (0.079) (0.069) (0.080) 
OWNGOV (%)  0.282     0.237     0.285       
  (0.011) (0.028) (0.010) 
R2  0.266 0.255 0.267 
Observations  232 232 232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation which 
denotes : M_CEODINDEX-  Modified CEO compensation Disclosure Index ; ROA (Return on Assets)-  ROA 
is calculated by net profit before tax divided by average total assets; Tobin’s Q- Tobin‟s Q is computed by book 
value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity divided by book value of 
total assets; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of 
Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a board divided by total 
number of directors; FEDIR- Percentage of Female directors in a board. It is computed by the number of female 
directors divided by total number of directors in the board; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; 
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OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares 
owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by 
Foreign Investors; DEBT2TA- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets; LNASSET- 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNTCEOP- Natural 
Logarithm of Total CEO Salary ;  AUDQ- 1 if firm is audited by affiliated audit firms of BIG 4 otherwise 0; 
OWNGOV- Ownership hold by Government.  The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
Management compensation resolve the agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers but lack of quality disclosure raises the problem of agency problem and 
information asymmetry. The empirical research tries to find out the disclosure pattern of CEO 
compensation and determinants of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh.  
CEO compensation disclosure index reports that disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation seems very poor in compare to other developed countries like Malaysia and 
Australia. The disclosure pattern of CEO compensation is increased over the years as 
expected but the overall disclosure quality is not satisfactory enough. Most of the banks 
disclose only total compensation information and there is no change or improvement of 
disclosure pattern from 2006 to 2013. When compensation information is available to 
shareholders; they might consider that management receives excessive amount from their 
wealth and thus, create extra pressure on management.  Therefore, management tries to skip 
to disclose compensation information in details and minimize the pressure and extra 
complexity. But disclosure quality can be improved and discretionary judgment can be 
reduced through mandatory disclosure requirement. Thus, the regulatory authority should 
make the disclosure requirement mandatory and should monitor the disclosure pattern on a 
regular basis.  
Firm performance, corporate governance mechanisms including the board 
composition and ownership pattern, firm characteristics, CEO compensation and audit quality 
are considered to find out the effect on disclosure quality of CEO compensation index. In this 
study, I have tried to find out where the regulator, policymaker and firms should give more 
emphasize to ensure the transparency of high quality disclosure. 
Internal firm performance measured by ROA is positively and significantly associated 
with the disclosure of CEO compensation but external firm performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q is not associated with CEO compensation disclosure. This result indicates that 
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CEO compensation disclosure is more transparent when internal firm performance is high. 
When internal firm performance is good, firms try to spread this good news faster and present 
the compensation information in more details and prove themselves that they are more 
transparent and accountable to the shareholders and public. The positive association between 
internal firm performance and disclosure of CEO compensation also increase the image of the 
firm in the market and attract new investors.  
Board size has no association with the disclosure quality of CEO compensation and 
this is evident in all equations in the regression models. The average board size in listed 
banks of Bangladesh is more than UK and US board size but this board size doesn‟t have any 
significant effect on CEO compensation disclosure.  Independent directors ensure better 
corporate governance by playing their monitoring role in the board meeting as well as CEO 
compensation disclosure issue. But this study finds that independent directors are not 
positively associated with disclosure quality of CEO compensation. This means that 
independent directors are not effective enough to play their monitoring role in CEO 
compensation disclosure. The number of independent directors and meeting fee are not 
sufficient enough to play their significant role in disclosure quality of CEO compensation. 
Most of the independent directors are insiders or part of management in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh.  Female directors are positively and significantly associated with disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation in all equations. This means that female directors are effective 
enough in monitoring the CEO compensation disclosure. But the reality is that female 
directors are appointed by the controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders decides 
everything to maximize their self interest by attracting new investors and retaining the 
existing shareholders. Female directors have no voice in the board and work on behalf of the 
shareholders interest. Thus, female directors have no influential role over the controlling 
shareholders on disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  
This study finds that institutional investors also have no association with the 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation. This means that institutional investors are not 
effective enough to play their monitoring role. The reason might be institutional investors are 
either passive investors or institutional monitoring on CEO compensation disclosure is not an 
important mechanism of corporate governance. In addition, institutional investors might not 
play their monitoring role effectively in the same industry or group.   Director ownership is 
significantly and positively associated with the disclosure quality of CEO compensation. By 
disclosing compensation information in more details, directors ensure transparency and 
accountability and convince shareholders that they are working on behalf of the shareholders 
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interest. Directors disclose CEO compensation in details to justify the level of compensation 
and any increase of compensation and high quality disclosure of compensation reduces the 
agency conflict and information asymmetry. In addition, directors use this transparent 
disclosure of CEO compensation as their performance and claim the incentives, retain 
managerial position and reappointment. Disclosure quality of CEO compensation is also 
positively associated with the foreign investors. Foreign investors are more concerned about 
their investment and they demand more transparency and accountability about the CEO 
compensation disclosure because they are familiar with comprehensive disclosure of 
management compensation in their home country. In addition, firms also disclose the 
compensation information in more details to attract new investors as well as to retain the 
continuous flow of existing investment.  
The empirical result reports that creditors have no significant association with 
disclosure of CEO compensation. Creditors don‟t have any significant bargaining power to 
influence the disclosure of CEO compensation or they are concerned about the compensation 
amount of CEO rather than high quality disclosure. This study reports that no significant 
association between firm size and disclosure of CEO compensation. This study indicates that 
larger firms are not concerned about the higher disclosure of CEO compensation. It is 
observed that large firms disclose only total amount compensation rather than details 
information about compensation policy, process, perquisites, bonus and retirement and long 
term benefits. It is also documented that there is no change of disclosure of CEO 
compensation from 2006 to 2013. The regulatory authority should more concentrate on this 
issue and make the disclosure requirement mandatory for all the firms and should monitor the 
disclosure pattern on regular basis.  
Coulton et al. (2001) study find that compensation disclosures are significantly less 
transparent for CEOs who have relatively high compensation and reversely, firms with relatively 
low compensation provide relatively more transparent disclosure about CEO compensation.  But 
the empirical result of the listed banks shows that disclosure is more transparent when CEO 
receives high compensation and vice versa. Shareholders may raise the question management 
receives excessive amount from their wealth and this higher disclosure of CEO compensation 
mitigate the agency conflict and information asymmetry between shareholders and managers.  
Audit firms ensure whether firms complying the all rules regulation and disclosure 
requirement according to Bangladesh Bank guideline, Company act 1994, Bank Company act 
1991 and Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC). This study finds that 
disclosure of CEO compensation is positively and significantly associated with audit quality. 
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Audit quality through high quality reporting, disclosure and brand image in the global market 
ensures the creditworthiness of the firm to the shareholders, investors, regulators and public.  
This study also finds that agency theory is also popular to the regulators, policy 
makers, shareholders and researchers because disclosure quality of CEO compensation plays 
an important role to reduce the agency problem and information asymmetry and work for the 
best interest of the shareholders. Bangladesh Bank, the regulatory authority, provides the 
guidelines about the appointment and pay setting process of the CEO. Board of directors 
decides the CEO pay and takes the approval from Bangladesh Bank. CEO compensation 
disclosure should be made as separate line item in the financial statement and disclosure 
should be made in details in the notes. It is evident that CEO compensation is disclosed as 
separate line item in the profit and loss account and break down of CEO compensation is 
disclosed in the footnotes. This study finds that overall CEO compensation disclosure is very 
poor but increased over the years as expected. In addition, incentives information is not 
clearly disclosed which ultimately increase the agency problem and information asymmetry.  
Moreover, the assumptions of agency theory are deeply rooted in the corporate governance 
guidelines of the listed banks of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC) introduced corporate governance guidelines 2006 and later revised the 
corporate governance guidelines in 2012 to ensure better governance and these positive 
changes follow the assumptions of agency theory.  The number of independent directors 
increased from one tenth to one fifth according to corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 
2012 respectively. The presence of higher number of independent directors in the board 
committee, audit committee and other supporting committees also improve the 
accountability, monitoring and governance of the firm. Board dominated by outside 
independent directors also has the power to change the management if the performance of 
management is weak or engaged in corruption. The position of the chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is occupied by different individuals in each bank. All the banks also 
have the separate audit committee. The above practices indicate the application of agency 
theory in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Moreover, following the agency theory, empirical studies mainly documented the 
relationship of disclosure of CEO compensation with firm performance, corporate 
governance, and other variables.  Thus, this study considers firm performance, corporate 
governance mechanisms, CEO compensation and audit quality as the determinants of 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Board characteristics and ownership structure and 
external monitoring are also used as corporate governance instruments to determine the 
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disclosure quality of CEO compensation following the agency theory. The empirical result 
shows that firm performance (ROA), CEO compensation, director ownership, foreign 
investors and audit quality are the significant explanatory factors for CEO compensation 
disclosure index. But board size, independent directors, female directors, and institutional 
investors have no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO compensation which means 
that corporate governance is very weak and inefficient. Creditors also don‟t have any 
bargaining power to increase the quality of disclosure of CEO compensation. Agency 
problem and information asymmetry is higher when corporate governance is weak. But 
according to agency theory, effective corporate governance mechanisms through board size, 
independent directors, female directors, institutional investors and creditor increase the 
transparency and accountability of the CEO compensation disclosure and reduce the agency 
problem and information asymmetry. The application of above variables, result and analysis 
also indicates that banks are following agency theory in determining the disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Thus, the basic findings from this study are summarized below: 
First, overall disclosure quality of CEO compensation measured by the index is very 
poor but increased over the years as expected. Most of banks do not disclose the 
compensation information in full details due to lack of mandatory disclosure requirement 
guideline and monitoring from the regulatory authority. The empirical result shows that firm 
size has no association with the disclosure of CEO compensation. Therefore, it is evident that 
large firms disclose only total compensation without any further information of compensation 
breakdown, compensation policy and process, perquisites, bonus, retirement and long term 
benefits. Moreover, it is also observed that there is no change or improvement of disclosure 
pattern of CEO compensation from 2006 to 2013. This implies that the disclosure of CEO 
compensation in 2013 is same as like in 2006.  Second, the empirical result of the study finds 
that CEO compensation disclosure is positively associated with firm performance (ROA), 
director ownership, foreign investors, CEO compensation and audit quality. This means that 
ROA, director ownership, foreign investors and CEO compensation have the significant 
positive influence on higher quality disclosure of CEO compensation.  Third, female directors 
have the positive association with the disclosure of CEO compensation but female directors 
are mainly appointed by the controlling shareholders and they have no voice in the board and 
work on behalf of the controlling shareholders‟ interest. This implies that monitoring role of 
female directors about CEO compensation disclosure is either absent or weak. Moreover, this 
study doesn‟t find any significant association of CEO compensation disclosure with board 
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size, independent directors and institutional ownership. Board size, independent directors, 
female directors, and institutional investors have no monitoring role on CEO compensation 
disclosure. These four important instruments of corporate governance indicate that corporate 
governance is very weak and inefficient. Therefore, disclosure quality of CEO compensation 
in the listed banks of Bangladesh is reduced by ineffective corporate governance 
mechanisms. This result is also consistent with the Coulton et al. (2001) study that finds that 
corporate governance mechanisms have no significant relation with CEO compensation 
disclosure.  
In addition, this study also conducted some additional analysis as a robust check and 
finds some variation of the results or sensitivity of the determinants of disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation.  
The determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation at level models are 
examined considering the time dummy and find that variation of results with the main 
analysis in terms of CEO pay only.  This result indicates that disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation is not associated with CEO compensation amount when time is controlled.  
Firm performance, governance variables and firm characteristics are generally 
consistent over the years and variable of one year might affect the following years and as a 
result, the problem of serial correlation may arise. Thus, the determinants of disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation at level models are reexamined considering the serial 
correlation issue and find that variation of results with the main analysis in terms of ROA 
only. This result indicates that ROA is not a significant factor for disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation when serial correlation is considered.  
The determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation at level models are 
reinvestigated considering time dummy and serial correlation and find the variation of results 
with the main analysis in terms of CEO pay only.  This result indicates that CEO 
compensation is not an important factor and CEO compensation doesn‟t affect the disclosure 
quality of CEO compensation when time dummy and serial correlation are considered.  
The dependent variable is censored and thus TOBIT method, an alternative approach, 
is used to find out the determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation and find that 
no variation of results with the main analysis which implies that regression results are exactly 
same in TOBIT and OLS method.  In addition, the determinants of disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation at level models are reinvestigated considering the time dummy in the TOBIT 
method and find that variation of results with the main analysis in terms of CEO pay only. 
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This result indicates that disclosure quality of CEO compensation is not associated with CEO 
compensation amount when time is controlled in the TOBIT method.  
The determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation at level models are 
reexamined using fixed effect and random effect of panel method. This study finds that 
variation of results with the main analysis in terms of ROA, director ownership, foreign 
investors, CEO pay and audit quality using fixed effect and random effect method.  This 
result indicates that disclosure quality of CEO compensation is not influenced by these 
variables when panel method is considered.  
The determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation at level models are 
reexamined by changing the measurement of leverage through the ratio of debt to total assets 
and find that no variation of results or sensitivity with the main analysis.  
The determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation at level models are 
reinvestigated using modified CEO compensation disclosure index and find that variation of 
results with the main analysis in terms of board size and audit quality.  This result indicates 
that small board is more effective than large board in ensuring better quality of CEO 
compensation but audit quality has no significant association with disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation when modified CEO compensation disclosure index is considered.  
The determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation are reinvestigated using 
modified CEO compensation disclosure index and by changing the measurement of leverage 
through the ratio of debt to total assets and find that variation of results or sensitivity with the 
main analysis in terms of leverage. This result indicates that creditors have the bargaining 
power to increase the quality of CEO compensation disclosure index when modified CEO 
compensation disclosure index and changing measurement of leverage are considered.  
From the above analysis, it is evident that there are some variations of results or 
sensitivity when different types of estimations are conducted. But it is observed that in this 
study, the sample size is not equal in each year, and the sample size ranges twenty six to 
thirty during the study period, and number of observations is comparatively less in total. 
Thus, to get the larger sample size,  and greater variation which reduces the standard error, 
this study applies the pooled cross sectional method as the main analysis to find out the 
determinants of disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
The empirical results of the disclosure quality of CEO compensation should be 
interest to stakeholders, researchers, regulators and policymakers. This study provides some 
suggestions to develop the transparency of CEO compensation disclosure and thereby, reduce 
the agency cost and information asymmetry between shareholders and managers in the listed 
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banks of Bangladesh. First, this study finds that there is no comprehensive guideline about 
the disclosure of CEO compensation in the corporate governance guideline 2006 and 2012 
and Bangladesh Accounting Standard (BAS) other than Bangladesh Bank guideline. Clarkson 
et al. (2006) stated that compulsory disclosure requirements increases high quality disclosures 
and less chance of interpretative judgment. Thus, the regulatory authority should establish a 
comprehensive disclosure guideline including the minimum (mandatory) and voluntary 
disclosure requirement and include as part of corporate governance guideline. Second, this 
study finds that there is no separate compensation committee in designing effective 
compensation package for directors and management and employees in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh in compare to other developed countries. Thus, a separate compensation 
committee should be established to ensure the transparency and accountability of the 
compensation and disclosure issues. Third, it is also evident that there is no change or 
improvement of disclosure pattern of CEO compensation from 2006 to 2013. This implies 
that the disclosure of CEO compensation in 2013 is same as like in 2006.  Thus, the 
regulatory authority and internal compensation committee should more emphasize on 
disclosure in details about compensation policy and process, pay performance relation, 
separate disclosure, segregated compensation, variable and fixed elements, compensation of 
peer groups, criteria of setting up salaries, component of perquisites, bonus and other 
benefits, retirement benefits, share based payments etc. and monitor the disclosure practices 
regularly to ensure transparency and accountability to the stakeholders. Finally, this study 
finds that board size, independent directors, female directors, institutional investors and 
creditors have no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO compensation which means 
that governance is very weak and inefficient. Thus, the regulatory authority should more 
focus on corporate governance mechanisms and corporate governance mechanisms should be 
modernized based on the global market demand and board size, female directors, independent 
directors, institutional investors and creditors should play their monitoring role effectively to 
raise the disclosure quality of CEO compensation.   
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Chapter 4 
Corporate Governance Quality: Measurement and Determinants Analysis 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Corporate governance has received massive attention in recent years in an emerging 
country like Bangladesh because corporate governance ensures better monitoring and meets 
the company‟s objective or shareholders demand of value maximization and interest of other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance monitors management effectiveness and makes sure legal 
conformity by preventing improper and irregular behavior (Turrent and Ariza, 2016) and 
ensures protection of shareholders rights and investors confidence (La porta et al., 2000). 
Quality of corporate governance also scrutinizes the transparency and accountability of the 
firm‟s governance related issues and helps to assess whether the firm is better or poorly 
governed.  
Corporate governance is a relevant issue in academic research because of chain of 
financial scandals worldwide (Turrent and Ariza , 2016) and various corporate scandals such 
as Enron and Andersen in US and Marconi in UK increases the demand of effective corporate 
governance (Khanchel, 2007).  Private firms like Standard and Poor (S&P), Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001) and Mckinsey also require extensive reform of corporate 
governance practices (Khanchel , 2007). In Asia, analysis of corporate governance practices 
has increased after Asian economic crisis in 1997 (Ariff et al., 2007). Academics, 
practitioners and regulators and monitoring authorities emphasized on corporate governance 
quality, measured by corporate governance rating or benchmarking, and which is used as an 
instrument to identify or predict the determinants of success or failure (Lazarides et al., 2008; 
Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011). Shareholders, investors, and advisors are interested to know 
the practices and compliance of corporate governance other than financial position and 
performance and market players increase the demand of corporate governance rating as it 
works as a reliable source of information for decision making (Ariff et al., 2007). 
Corporate governance quality is defined as code of governance, rules, regulation, and 
best practices related to governance and developed to assess whether best governed or worst 
governed firms. Corporate governance is a system used to direct and monitor the firms 
(Cadbury committee, 1992). But there is no uniform policy to define corporate governance 
quality as the code of governance, rules and regulation, and best practices vary based on the 
firm, industry, country and time period. Silveira et al. (2009) study stated that corporate 
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governance standard and quality vary in the firms within the same country and Klapper and 
Love (2004) study also observed a large variation of corporate governance quality in the 
same contractual environment and find that governance rating is higher in countries when 
legal system is weak and vice-versa. Biswas (2012) study stated that boundary of corporate 
governance quality should be determined considering the agreed set of rules and practices. 
Empirical research on corporate governance quality and its determinants are mainly 
based on US (Khanchel, 2007; Silveira et al., 2009; Turrent and Ariza, 2016), UK (Barucci 
and Falini, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011), Canada (Gordon et al., 
2012), Africa (Waweru, 2014a,b), Korea (Black et al., 2006b) and Malaysia (Ariff et al., 
2007) and Bangladesh (Biswas, 2012). Most of the researchers developed the self structured 
corporate governance index to assess the quality of corporate governance where as only few 
researchers used the corporate governance index provided by rating agencies. In Bangladesh, 
no rating agency provides the corporate governance index and even no database is available 
to measure the quality of corporate governance. Only Biswas (2012) study developed a self 
structured index to assess the quality of corporate governance considering non financial 
companies of Bangladesh. It is said that banking sector is highly organized and developed 
and regulated by various laws. Moreover, corporate governance guideline 2006 is revised in 
2012 which includes some additional requirement for better governance.  But there is dearth 
of empirical research study of corporate governance quality and its determinants in the 
banking sector of Bangladesh. Thus, there is gap of research in the governance literature 
particularly in the banking sector of Bangladesh.  It would be interesting to conduct the 
empirical research and fill up the research gap on corporate governance quality and its 
determinants in an emerging country like Bangladesh especially in banking sector.  
 
This study mainly addresses two research questions: 
RQ1: What is the quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh? 
RQ 2: What are the determinants of quality of corporate governance in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh? 
 
To resolve the RQ1, this study develops an index of corporate governance quality 
considering ownership information, shareholder rights, financial transparency, board, 
management structure and process, external auditing information, risk management 
information, tax management information, and corporate responsibility, compliance and 
stakeholder information. The overall quality of corporate governance provides the 
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information to what extent banks are applying or practicing corporate governance attributes. 
Moreover, corporate governance quality indicates that whether the firm is a better governed 
firm or poor governed firms. The second research question (RQ2) deals with the determinants 
of quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Board characteristics 
such as board size and proportion of independent director, ownership structure such as 
institutional ownership, director ownership and foreign investor, external monitoring such as 
leverage and firm characteristics such as firm size and firm age are considered to find out the 
determinants of corporate governance quality. The determinants of corporate governance 
quality help to asses which factors are important in corporate governance quality and which 
factors are inactive or not playing the significant role in improving corporate governance 
quality.  
This research study contributes to the corporate governance literature in many ways: 
First, there is dearth of research studies relating to corporate governance quality and its 
determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Thus, this study will provide a remedy for the 
paucity of governance research and will add value to the literature of quality of corporate 
governance in Bangladesh. Second, this study develops a unique self structured corporate 
governance index as a proxy of corporate governance quality for the banking sector of 
Bangladesh. Third, this study investigates the quality of corporate governance through tem 
wise, category wise, and overall analysis over the time period in the banking sector of 
Bangladesh.  The different types of analysis will show that to what extent banks are 
practicing corporate governance attributes and whether they are better governed or worst 
governed firm. Fourth, this study investigates the determinants of corporate governance 
quality through board characteristics, ownership structure, external monitoring and firm 
characteristics using multiple regression analysis. Thus, the regression analysis will help to 
understand which factors are contributing significantly and which factors are inactive or not 
playing the significant role in improving corporate governance quality.  Finally, the findings 
of this study will help to the regulator and policy maker to understand and identify the actual 
scenario and weakness of corporate governance practices. Thus, the regulator may emphasize 
on weak point of corporate governance issues and include some new issues as a mandatory 
requirement in the corporate governance guidelines which will improve the quality of 
corporate governance in the banking sector of Bangladesh. 
This study investigates the quality of corporate governance and its determinants 
considering the listed banks of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) of Bangladesh during the 
period of 2006 to 2013. To measure the corporate governance quality, a self structured 
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governance index is developed including total 285 attributes and divided into eight sub 
categories using the corporate governance guidelines, regulatory requirement of Bangladesh 
Bank, listing requirement, disclosure practices and previous empirical governance literature.  
The empirical study shows that overall corporate governance quality measured by the 
index is only 52.37% which indicates poor quality of corporate governance in the listed banks 
of Bangladesh although it said that banking sector is well organized, highly developed and 
regulated by various laws all over the world. The empirical result finds that quality is higher 
in shareholder rights (78.53%) and external auditing information (73.08%) but quality is 
lower in risk management information (42.55%), board, management structure and process 
(46.90%), and tax management information (52.96%) and financial transparency and 
information in the annual report (56.91%) among the sub categories of governance quality. 
The empirical analysis also presents that overall corporate governance quality is drastically 
increased in 2012 because of significant improvement in board, management structure and 
process and financial transparency and information in the annual report. Newly corporate 
governance guidelines 2012 include some new issues (such as criteria and qualification of 
independent director; some additional statements in the directors report; mandatory 
requirement of separation of chairman and CEO; constitution of audit committee, chairman 
of audit committee; role of audit committee; duties of CEO and CFO on financial statements; 
and collection of compliance certificate from professional accountant or secretary) which 
have ultimate effect on quality of board, management structure and process and financial 
transparency and information in the annual report. This study also observed that governance 
quality is very low in most of the voluntary attributes (such as age, joining date, educational 
qualification, experience and  expertise of directors, CEO, CFO, head of internal audit, 
company secretary; duties of  board of directors, independent directors, executive committee,  
and management; attendance of executive committee meeting, audit committee meeting; 
having at least 75% attendance  of board members or independent directors in board meeting, 
executive committee meeting and audit committee meeting etc.) and even some mandatory 
attributes (such as having an holding minimum qualification shares by each director; jointly 
hold minimum qualification of shares by directors and sponsors; independent director with 
minimum requirement, duties of CEO, CFO, head of internal audit and company secretary 
etc.) are violated by most of the banks.  This study recommends that regulatory authority 
should more emphasize on overall as well as individual attributes of board, management 
structure and process, financial transparency, risk management and tax management 
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information through effective monitoring or imposing mandatory requirement in the 
corporate governance guidelines.  
This study also investigates the determinants of corporate governance quality in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh. Board characteristics (board size and board independence), 
ownership structure (institutional ownership, director ownership and foreign investors), 
external monitoring (firm leverage) and firm characteristics (firm size and firm age) are 
considered to measure the determinants of corporate governance quality. This study finds that 
firm size, small board, independent director, director shareholdings and newly firms are the 
significant explanatory variables in determining the corporate governance quality but 
institutional shareholders, foreign investors and creditors have no significant monitoring role 
or power to improve the quality of corporate governance. This study also recommends that 
institutional investors, foreign investors and creditors should play their effective monitoring 
role to improve better quality of corporate governance.  
This empirical research study is organized in the following ways: section 4.2  prior 
research;  section 4.3 presents the settings applicable for banks which includes legal 
framework, institutional framework, and corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012; 
section 4.4  shows theoretical framework of corporate governance; section 4.5 shows the 
sample selection; section 4.6 explain the research design including research model, 
development of hypothesis and variables; section 4.7 describe the analysis of corporate 
governance quality through overall, category wise and item wise analysis over the time 
period;  section 4.8 discuss the analysis of corporate governance quality and its determinants 
using descriptive analysis, correlation matrix and multiple regression analysis;  section 4. 9 
explain the additional analysis of corporate governance quality and its measurement and 
section 4.10 present the overall conclusion including recommendations.  
 
4.2 Prior Research 
There is no uniform basis to measure the corporate governance quality.  Corporate 
governance quality is measured by different names such as corporate governance ranking, 
corporate governance score, corporate governance index, corporate governance quality in 
percentage form, corporate governance rating etc. though the basic objectives are same. Most 
of the researchers used the self structured index to measure the corporate governance quality 
due to absence of database of corporate governance index.  The composition of corporate 
governance quality varies based on the regulatory requirement, attributes of corporate 
governance guidelines, disclose practices, legal environment, firms characteristics and 
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country perspective.  Corporate governance quality helps to assess whether firms are 
practicing better quality or worst quality in governance issues. The rating of corporate 
governance distinguish the firms between best and worst (Daily and Dalton, 2004; Khanchel, 
2007).  Khanchel (2007) study also stated that corporate governance ratings are important 
because investors (like institutional investors) use the rating to perform a crucial role in the 
capital market and management give special emphasize on corporate governance when rating 
of corporate governance is at bottom line. Previous empirical literature measured the 
corporate governance quality and its determinants in different ways which are explained 
below:  
 
Table 4-1 
Summary Studies of the Corporate Governance Quality and its Determinants 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Measurement of 
Quality of CG 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Determinants of 
CG Quality 
(Independent 
Variables) 
Findings 
Klapper 
and 
Love 
(2004) 
Total 374 
companies of 
14 emerging 
market such 
as Brazil, 
Chile, Hong 
Kong, India, 
Indonesia, 
Korea, 
Malaysia, 
Pakistan, 
Philippines, 
Singapore, 
South Africa, 
Taiwan, 
Thailand, 
and Turkey. 
 
2010 Ordinary 
least 
square 
(OLS) 
regressio
n 
Corporate 
governance ranking 
consist of total 57 
qualitative and binary 
yes/no questions 
under seven 
categories 
(management 
discipline, 
transparency, 
independence, 
accountability, 
responsibility, 
fairness, and social 
awareness 
 Firm size 
 Composition of 
firm assets (fixed 
capital to total 
sales) 
 Growth 
opportunities 
 Legal system 
 Issuance of 
American 
Depositary 
Receipts (ADR) 
 Corporate governance 
ranking is significantly 
positively associated 
with growth 
opportunities,  issuance 
of ADR 
  Firms with higher 
proportion of fixed 
assets is negatively and 
statistically  associated 
with corporate 
governance 
 But there is no 
significant association 
of corporate 
governance ranking 
with firm size and legal 
system. 
Barucci 
and 
Falini 
(2005) 
 277 
companies in 
2002 and 275 
Companies 
in 2003  
listed on 
Italian stock 
exchange 
2002 
to 
2003 
Log 
likelihoo
d 
Corporate of 
governance is 
measured by three 
governance attributes 
such as composition 
of board of directors 
and selection of 
directors, activity of 
board of directors and 
board of auditors. 
 Institutional 
investors 
 Outside block 
holders ownership 
 Largest 
shareholder 
ownership 
 Growth 
opportunities 
 Firm Size 
 
 Corporate governance 
quality is positively 
affected by 
institutional investors 
and firm size.  
 Largest shareholder 
ownership negatively 
affects the corporate 
governance.  
 There is no significant 
association of good 
governance with large 
block holders and 
growth opportunities  
Durnev 
and Kim 
(2005) 
344 
companies in 
27 countries  
2000 Cross 
sectional 
country 
Governance index is 
measured by three 
different scores that 
 Investment 
opportunities 
 External financing 
 Corporate governance 
is positively associated 
with ownership 
 181  
 
Table 4-1 
Summary Studies of the Corporate Governance Quality and its Determinants 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Measurement of 
Quality of CG 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Determinants of 
CG Quality 
(Independent 
Variables) 
Findings 
random 
effect 
regressio
n  
are composite index; 
investor protection 
and social awareness. 
Composite index is 
measured by taking a 
simple average of the 
six categories which 
are : discipline 
(managerial 
incentives and 
discipline towards 
value-maximizing 
actions); transparency 
(timely and accurate 
disclosure); 
independence (board 
independence); 
accountability (board 
accountability); 
responsibility 
(enforcement and 
management 
accountability); 
protection (minority 
shareholder 
protection).  
 Ownership 
concentration 
 
concentration, growth 
opportunities and 
external financing. 
 
Beiner 
et al. 
(2006) 
109 Swiss 
firms of 
Swiss 
Exchange 
(SWE) 
2002 Three 
stage 
least 
square 
method  
Corporate 
governance index 
(CGI) is based on 
survey responses of 
total 38 
questions/attributes 
into five categories 
(Corporate 
governance 
commitment (5 
elements); 
Shareholders‟ rights 
(7 elements); 
Transparency (5 
elements); Board of 
directors and 
executive 
management (15 
elements); Reporting 
and auditing (6 
elements)) 
 Firm size 
 Growth 
opportunities 
 Firm‟s value 
(Tobin‟s Q) 
 Firm‟s 
performance 
 Asset composition 
(Intangible assets 
to total assets) 
 Board size 
  Leverage 
 Outsider 
representation on 
the board  
 Largest 
shareholder 
ownership 
  Largest outside 
block holder 
ownership 
 Corporate governance 
index is positively and 
significantly associated 
with firm‟s value and  
firm‟s size 
  Board size, firm 
performance, growth 
opportunities and 
leverage  are 
negatively associated 
with corporate 
governance index 
 But there is no 
significant association 
of corporate 
governance index with  
asset composition, 
outsider representation 
on the board , largest 
shareholder ownership, 
largest block holder 
ownership. 
Black et 
al. 
(2006b) 
Total 453 
listed firms 
(including 
418 small 
and 35 large 
 2001 Ordinary 
least 
square 
regressio
n (OLS) 
Corporate 
governance index is 
measured by  total 39 
elements into five sub 
indices (shareholder 
 Firm size 
 Firm risk 
 Tangible asset 
intensity 
 Intangible asset 
 Corporate governance 
index is significantly 
and positively 
associated with firm 
size and  firm risk. 
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Table 4-1 
Summary Studies of the Corporate Governance Quality and its Determinants 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Measurement of 
Quality of CG 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Determinants of 
CG Quality 
(Independent 
Variables) 
Findings 
firms) of 
Korean 
Stock 
Exchange 
(KSE) 
rights (5 elements); 
board structure (4 
elements); board 
procedure (26 
elements); disclosure 
(3 elements); 
ownership parity (1 
element)) and this 
index is based on 
survey of governance 
practices of Korean 
Stock Exchange 
(KSE).  
intensity and 
growth 
opportunities 
 Capital intensity 
and growth 
opportunities 
 Sales growth 
 Firm‟s 
profitability 
 Equity Finance 
 Ownership 
 Firm leverage 
 Firm age 
 Market share 
 Export oriented 
industries 
 Firm‟s profitability, 
tangible asset intensity  
are negatively 
statistically associated 
with corporate 
governance index 
 But there is no 
significant association 
of corporate 
governance index with 
sales growth, equity 
finance, leverage, firm 
age,  ownership, 
market share,  export 
oriented industries, 
intangible asset 
intensity and growth 
opportunities and 
capital intensity and 
growth opportunities 
Ariff et 
al. 
(2007) 
90 public 
listed 
companies 
based on 
corporate 
governance 
reporting  
initiative  
(CGI) 2004 
2004 Logistic 
regressio
n 
Initially, firms are 
classified as top 50% 
and bottom 50% of 
the corporate 
governance ratings 
and corporate 
governance ranking 
is measured using 
dichotomous 
variables which 
consider 1 if the firm 
is listed as top 50%  
in the corporate 
governance rankings 
otherwise code zero.  
 Firm‟s 
profitability 
 Firm‟s leverage 
 Firm‟s growth 
 Firm‟s value 
 Firm‟s size 
 Firm‟s age 
 Ownership 
structure 
 Countries of 
operation 
 Corporate governance 
ranking is positively 
and significantly 
associated with firm 
size. 
 But there is no 
significant association 
of corporate 
governance ranking 
with firm‟s 
profitability, leverage, 
growth, value, age, 
ownership structure 
and countries of 
operation.  
Khanche
l (2007) 
624 US listed 
and non 
financial 
firms  
1994 
to 
2003 
Ordinary 
least 
square 
(OLS) 
regressio
n  
Four indices ((board 
of directors, 4 
elements),  
(board committees, 6 
elements), (audit 
committee ,5 
elements) and 
(overall or total 
index)) summarize 
the governance 
quality 
 
 
 Firm performance 
 Institutional 
ownership 
 Directors and 
officer ownership 
 Growth 
opportunities 
 Firm Size 
 Intangible assets 
 External financing 
needs 
 Investment 
opportunities 
 
 
 Governance quality is 
statistically significant 
and positively 
associated with firm 
size, investment 
opportunities, 
intangible assets, 
directors and officers‟ 
ownership, institutional 
ownership and external 
financing needs.  
 But there is no 
association of 
governance quality 
with firm performance 
and growth 
opportunities.   
Silveira Total 823 1998 Pooled Corporate  Future growth  Corporate governance 
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Table 4-1 
Summary Studies of the Corporate Governance Quality and its Determinants 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Measurement of 
Quality of CG 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Determinants of 
CG Quality 
(Independent 
Variables) 
Findings 
et al. 
(2009)  
firm years 
observations 
of 200 
financial and 
non financial  
firms listed 
on Sau Paulo 
Stock 
Exchange of 
Brazil 
to 
2004 
ordinary 
least 
square 
(OLS) 
and fixed 
Effect 
regressio
n 
method 
governance quality is 
measured by 
corporate governance 
index which includes 
four sub indices 
(disclosure; board 
composition and 
functioning; ethics 
and conflicts of 
interest; and 
shareholder rights) 
opportunities 
 Nature of 
operations 
(Tangibility of 
assets) 
 Firm size 
 Issuance of 
American 
Depository 
Receipts (ADR) 
 Adhesion to 
Bovespa‟s special 
listing segments 
 Ownership 
structure includes 
control right and 
cash flow rights 
 Firm performance 
 Firm Value 
(Tobin‟s Q) 
 Controlling 
shareholders 
(state, family, 
foreign and block 
holder) 
index is positively and 
significantly associated 
with growth, firm size, 
firm value, issuance of 
American Depository 
Receipts (ADR), 
adhesion to Bovespa‟s 
special listing 
segments, block holder 
ownership 
 Ownership 
concentration (voting 
and cash flow right) 
and family controlled 
firms are negatively 
associated with 
corporate governance 
index.  
 There is no significant  
association of 
corporate governance 
index with Nature of 
operations (Tangibility 
of assets), state 
ownership and foreign 
ownership.  
 
Lazaride
s and 
Drim 
petas 
(2011) 
Total 303 
observations 
of sixty (60) 
firms ranked 
among the 
two major 
stock indexes 
(FTSE-20 
and FTSE-
40) of Greek 
capital 
market  
2001 
to 
2006 
An 
ordinal 
probit 
regressio
n 
Governance quality is 
measured by 
corporate governance 
index which includes 
12 elements such as 
CEO duality, audit 
committee,  
 independent 
directors on audit 
committee, 
compensation 
committee, nominee 
committee for board 
members, committee 
for evaluation and 
recruitment of  
executives, internal 
statute, code of 
ethics, disclosure of 
board members 
biographical notes, 
compensation, 
executive 
 Top five 
shareholders 
(ownership) 
 Firm performance  
(ROA and Tobin‟s 
Q) 
 Firm size 
 Leverage 
 Investment 
opportunities 
 CEO ownership 
 Executive 
committee size 
 No of firms that 
board members 
participate in as 
members of their 
board of directors 
 Percentage of  
board members 
resigned from the 
board 
 Own capital to 
sales 
 Number of 
employees 
 Corporate governance 
quality is positively 
associated with firm 
size , participation in 
more than one board of 
board members , CEO 
ownership and own 
capital to sales,  
 Large number of 
executive is negatively 
associated with 
governance quality.  
 There is no significant 
association of 
governance quality 
with number of 
employees, stock 
market capitalization, 
firm performance, 
ownership, leverage, 
investment 
opportunities, merger 
and acquisition and 
number of resignation 
of board members. 
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Table 4-1 
Summary Studies of the Corporate Governance Quality and its Determinants 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Measurement of 
Quality of CG 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Determinants of 
CG Quality 
(Independent 
Variables) 
Findings 
compensation and 
number of 
independent members 
 Stock market 
capitalization 
 Merger and 
acquisition 
Biswas 
(2012) 
Total 2305 
firm year 
observations 
of non 
financial 
companies of 
Bangladesh  
1996 
to 
2009 
Pooled 
Ordinary 
Least 
Square 
(OLS) 
regressio
ns 
Corporate 
governance quality is 
measured by total 
148 elements 
considering five sub 
indices which are 
ownership structure 
and investor rights 
(15 elements); 
financial 
transparency and 
information 
disclosure in the 
annual report (24 
elements); corporate 
responsibility and 
compliance (16 
elements); board and 
management 
structure and process 
(80 elements) and 
auditing (13 
elements) 
 Growth 
opportunities 
 Insider ownership 
 Institutional 
ownership 
 Foreign ownership 
 Firm Size 
 Leverage 
 Composition of 
assets (proportion 
of tangible assets) 
 Volatility 
 Subsidiary of  
foreign company 
 Firm age 
 Corporate governance 
quality is significantly 
positively associated 
with growth 
opportunities,   insider 
ownership, foreign 
ownership,  firm size, 
subsidiary of  foreign 
company, and  firm 
age.  
 Corporate governance 
quality is significantly 
negatively associated 
with leverage and 
proportion of tangible 
assets. 
  There is no significant 
association of 
corporate governance 
quality with 
institutional investors 
and volatility.  
Gordon 
et al. 
(2012) 
702 
companies 
listed on 
TSX 
(Toronto 
Stock 
Exchange) 
Venture 
Exchange  
2004 Ordinary 
Least 
Square 
(OLS) 
regressio
ns 
Corporate 
governance score is 
based on 22 key 
guidelines of the 14 
TSX corporate 
governance 
guidelines 
 Board size 
 Large block 
holder ownership 
 Firm‟s leverage 
 Type of auditor 
 Firms value 
(market value of 
equity) 
 Corporate governance 
score is positively and 
significantly associated 
with large block holder 
ownership, board size, 
leverage, firms value 
and auditor.  
 
Waweru 
(2014a) 
Total 247 
firm year 
observations  
of 50 largest 
firms  listed 
on 
Johannesbur
g Stock 
Exchange 
(JSE) of 
South Africa 
2006 
to 
2010 
Ordinary 
least 
square 
(OLS) 
regressio
n 
Corporate 
governance quality is 
measured by 
shareholder 
concentration 
(ownership 
structure), board size 
and proportion of non 
executive director 
(board composition) 
 Firm performance 
 Firm Size 
 Leverage 
 Investment 
opportunities 
 Audit Quality 
 
 Firm size is positively 
associated with quality 
of corporate 
governance.  
 Corporate governance 
quality is significantly 
negatively associated 
with leverage and 
investment 
opportunities. 
 There is no significant 
association of quality 
of corporate 
governance with firm 
performance and audit 
quality. 
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Table 4-1 
Summary Studies of the Corporate Governance Quality and its Determinants 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Measurement of 
Quality of CG 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Determinants of 
CG Quality 
(Independent 
Variables) 
Findings 
Waweru 
(2014b) 
247 firm 
years of 50 
largest 
companies 
listed on 
Johannesbur
g Securities 
Exchange  
(JSE) of 
South Africa 
and 234 firm 
years of 49 
companies 
listed on 
Nairobi 
Stock 
Exchange  
(NSE) of 
Kenya 
2006 
to 
2010 
Ordinary 
least 
square 
(OLS) 
regressio
n 
Corporate 
governance quality is 
measured by total 51 
elements considering 
six  sub indices 
which are board (19 
elements);charter/law
s (5 elements); audit 
(6 elements); director 
composition (6 
elements); 
progressive practices   
(11 elements); and 
ownership (4 
elements) 
 
 Firm performance 
 Firm Size 
 Leverage 
 Investment 
opportunities 
 Audit Quality 
 
 Corporate governance 
quality is significantly 
and positively 
associated with audit 
quality and firm 
performance in South 
Africa, and Kenya.  
 In Kenya, firm size and 
investment opportunity 
are positively 
significantly associated 
with corporate 
governance quality.  
 Corporate governance 
quality is significantly 
and positively 
associated with 
leverage in South 
Africa. 
 Audit quality and firm 
performance are the 
main factors 
influencing the quality 
of corporate 
governance in Kenya 
and South Africa.   
Tchuigo
ua 
(2015) 
178 micro 
financial 
institutions 
rated by 
Planet rating 
2001 
to 
2011 
Pooled 
ordered 
logit 
method 
Governance quality is 
measured by 
governance rating 
scores  which covers 
(governance, 
information, risk 
management, 
activity, funding and 
liquidity, efficiency 
in short form, called 
GIRAFE) and this 
score is  provided by 
Planet rating, famous 
rating agencies 
specially in micro 
finance 
 Board size 
 Board expertise 
 CEO chairman 
duality 
 Audit committee 
 Board activity 
 Ownership type 
 
 Governance quality is 
positively and 
statistically associated 
with board expertise  
and board activity.  
  Ownership type is 
negatively associated 
with governance 
quality. 
 But there is no 
significant association 
of governance quality 
with board size, CEO 
chairman duality, audit 
committee 
 
Turrent 
and 
Ariza 
(2016) 
Total 826 
observations 
of 128 
highest 
ranked 
companies 
on the stock 
exchange 
indices of 
Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile 
2004 
to 
2010 
Pooled 
Ordinary 
least 
square 
(OLS) 
and 
Generali
zed 
method 
of 
moments 
Corporate 
governance rating  
(CGR) includes total 
43 items in four sub 
indices which are 
composition and 
performance of the 
board ( 24 elements),  
shareholders rights (8  
elements), ethics and 
conflicts of interest (7 
 Board size 
 Legal system 
 Proportion of 
independent 
director (board 
composition) 
 CEO duality 
 Presence of 
women in the 
board 
 Ownership 
 In OLS method, 
corporate governance 
rating is significantly 
positively associated 
with board size, board 
independence, legal 
system, stakeholder 
orientation, leverage, 
firm age, firm size and 
negatively associated 
with gender and 
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Table 4-1 
Summary Studies of the Corporate Governance Quality and its Determinants 
Study Sample Time 
Period 
Research 
Design 
Measurement of 
Quality of CG 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Determinants of 
CG Quality 
(Independent 
Variables) 
Findings 
and Mexico (GMM)  elements) and other 
information related 
with CG (6 elements) 
concentration 
 Family controlled 
firms 
 Stakeholder 
orientation 
 Firms with an 
innovation 
strategy 
 Firm size, age, 
leverage and 
performance are 
used as control 
variables in the 
models.  
 
innovation strategy 
but there is no 
significant association 
with CEO duality, 
ownership 
concentration, family 
controlled firms and 
firm performance.  
 In GMM method, 
corporate governance 
rating is significantly 
positively associated 
with board 
independence, 
ownership 
concentration, 
stakeholder orientation 
and firm age and 
negatively associated 
with board size but 
there is no significant 
association with legal 
system, CEO duality, 
gender, family 
controlled firms, 
strategy, leverage, 
firm size and firm 
performance.  
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Klapper and Love (2004) Study  
Klapper and Love (2004) study examined the determinants of corporate governance at 
firm level. They considered total 374 firms of 14 emerging markets such as Brazil, Chile, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey in 2010.  
Corporate governance ranking is measured by total 57 qualitative questions that have 
binary yes or no answer to avoid subjectivity. The questions covered six broad categories 
such as management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, 
fairness, and exclude social awareness due to no relevance with corporate governance. 
Corporate governance ranking is made on the average of first six categories of questions that 
are collected from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA).  
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The sample includes 58% firms from East Asia, 19% firms from South Asia, 11% 
firms from Latin America which implies that sample is not distributed equally. The 
descriptive statistics presents that the average mean of corporate governance index is 54.11 
and ranges from 11.77 to 92.77 with a standard deviation of 14. It is also evident that the 
mean of corporate governance index 31.85 in Pakistan and 66.53 in South Korea which 
implies that governance index varies country to country. It is also found that corporate 
governance index ranges from 17.25 to 66.68 in Pakistan which indicates a larger variation 
within countries. From the above analysis, they stated that corporate governance varies 
widely in the sample and the variation is not systematically associated. 
The major determinants of corporate governance are firm size, composition of firm 
assets (fixed capital to total sales), growth opportunities, legal system and issuance of 
American depositary receipts (ADR). They used the ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
method to find out the determinants of corporate governance at firm level. They find that 
corporate governance ranking is significantly positively associated with growth opportunities 
and issuance of ADR and negatively associated with firms with higher proportion of fixed 
assets but there is no significant association of corporate governance ranking with firm size 
and legal system. This result implies that past growth rates have significant positive influence 
on good governance and corporate governance ranking is higher when firms trade shares in 
US countries where legal system is weak but corporate governance is lower in firms that have 
higher proportions of fixed assets. They also find that corporate governance varies widely in 
the sample and the average corporate governance is lower in countries with weaker legal 
system.  
 
4.2.2 Barucci and Falini (2005) Study  
Barucci and Falini (2005) study evaluated the determinants of corporate governance 
in Italian Financial Market. They considered 277 companies in 2002 and 275 companies in 
2003 listed on Italian Stock Exchange.  
Corporate of governance is measured by three governance attributes such as 
composition of board of directors and selection of directors, activity of board of directors and 
board of auditors. Composition of board of directors includes board size, proportion of 
independent directors, appointment of directors, disclosure of directors profile before 
appointment, chairman of the board is independent. CEO duality, independence of internal 
control committee, appointment committee, independence of compensation committee, and 
defining exclusive power of the board are considered to measure activity of board of 
 188  
 
directors. Board of auditors include threshold to present a list to appoint auditors, size of 
board of auditors is minimum three, and company is controlled by shareholders coalition.  
They find that quality of corporate governance is high in general but quality is low on 
some points such as power of the board of directors, role of independent directors and 
director appointment. They also find that chairman is independent in few companies; 
appointment of directors is not transparent; few companies adopted five members in board of 
auditors; appointment committee is rare and existence of internal and compensation 
committee but only few companies have independent committees.  
The major determinants of corporate governance are institutional investors, outside 
block holder ownership, largest shareholder ownership, growth opportunities and firm size. 
They find that corporate governance quality is positively affected by institutional investors 
and firm size and negatively associated with largest shareholder ownership but there is no 
significant association of good governance with large block holders and growth opportunities.  
 
4.2.3 Durnev and Kim (2005) Study  
Durnev and Kim (2005) study examined the quality of corporate governance practices 
and potential determinants such as firm characteristics and legal environment of corporate 
governance quality at firm level. They considered total 344 companies of 27 countries and 
collected score from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and Standard and Poor (S&P).  
Corporate governance index includes composite index, investor protection and social 
awareness to measure the quality of corporate governance. Composite index is again 
measured by simple average of six categories of corporate governance (such as discipline 
(managerial incentives and discipline towards value maximizing actions); transparency 
(timely and accurate disclosure); independence (board independence); accountability (board 
accountability); responsibility (enforcement and management accountability) and protection 
(minority shareholder protection)) of CLSA groups which considers 57 questions that have 
binary answers yes or no and  minimize analysts subjectivity. They also added that protect is 
the direct measure of investor protection against theft and more relevant to ownership rather 
than composite index and thus single out protect from six CLSA governance categories.  
The major determinants of quality of corporate governance practices are growth 
opportunities, need for external funding and ownership concentration. They find that 
corporate governance and disclosure practices widely vary within countries but reduce with 
strength of investor‟s legal protection. They also find that firm attributes such as investment 
opportunities, external financing and ownership structure influence the variation of within 
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countries. They also find that investment opportunities, external financing and ownership are 
the major determinants of quality of corporate governance and disclosure practices.  They 
also added that the relationship is stronger in less investor friendly countries which indicate 
that corporate governance practice is better where firms have the poor legal environment.  
 
4.2.4 Beiner et al. (2006) Study  
Beiner et al. (2006) study investigated corporate governance quality and the 
determinants of corporate governance quality. They considered total 109 firms of Swiss 
Exchange in 2002.  
Corporate governance index (CGI) is based on survey responses of total 38 
questions/attributes, which includes the recommendation of Swiss code of best practice and 
divided into five sub categories such as corporate governance commitment (5 elements); 
shareholders‟ rights (7 elements); transparency (5 elements); board of directors and executive 
management (15 elements); reporting and auditing (6 elements).  Corporate governance 
commitment includes value oriented management and control of the firm follows corporate 
governance principles; annual financial statement explicitly refer to the firm specific 
corporate governance practices; corporate governance guidelines in written form; governance 
guidelines accessible for all stakeholders; and corporate governance compliance officer is 
responsible for regular reporting to the board of director.  One share one vote principle; 
disclosure of detailed analysis of deviation from previous sales and earnings targets; facilities 
available for personal exercising of shareholder voting rights via internet and proxies;  
facilities to follow parts of general shareholder meeting using modern communication like 
internet;  invitation to apply for registration into the company‟s register of shareholders;  
article of association lower to an appropriate degree the statutory threshold for shareholders 
to place items on the agenda;  article of association lower to an appropriate degree the 
statutory threshold for shareholders to convene an extra ordinary general shareholder meeting 
are considered to measure shareholder right. Transparency includes analyst and investor meet 
on regular basis; equal treatment in discrimination of information to investors and financial 
analysts; availability of annual financial statement, agenda of shareholder meeting, and 
minutes of meeting in electronic form; disclosure of shareholdings in non group of companies 
if shareholding below the statutory threshold; major announcements with schedule are 
provided to investors and analyst in advance.  Rules in writing to deal the conflict and 
account trading of members of the board and executive board; specific principles in writing 
for compensation of board of directors and executive management; disclosure of changes in 
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agreement and plans; disclosure of compensation for members of governing bodies including 
variable and fixed components; disclosure of stock ownership for members of governing 
bodies individually in the notes of financial statement; selection process to appoint the board 
members in writing; availability of sufficient member to deal complex matter and perform  
specific task; acceptance of maximum five mandates  in board of directors in non group listed 
companies by the board member and executive management; evaluation of performance of 
executive management by the board of directors;  tenure of board members exceed three 
years; staggered terms of office for board members; minimum four board meeting; 
independent members of the board are from Swiss ; minimum two audit committee meeting 
and meeting of audit committee with the head of external audit before disclosure of annual 
financial statement are considered to measure board of directors and executive management.  
Reporting and auditing includes publication of quarterly reports; annual and interim financial 
statement in accordance with internationally recognized accounting principle; discussion of 
risk management system in annual financial statement; publication of annual financial 
statement within 90 days of the financial year; publication of interim report within 45 days of 
the reporting period and rule for auditor to perform other services.  Corporate governance 
index is measured by assigning a value of minimum 1 and maximum 5 based on the 
acceptance level of each question and add one point for each subsequent acceptance level on 
the five-scale answering range and finally compute simple sum of all 38 questions. Corporate 
governance index is normalized to have a value of between 0 and 100. The higher acceptance 
level or higher governance index implies that firm is practicing better corporate governance.   
The descriptive statistics presents that the average mean of corporate governance 
index is 58.46 and median is 59.21 which indicates symmetric distribution and ranges from 
25 to 90.13 with a standard deviation of 14.34.  
The major determinants of corporate governance index are firm size, growth 
opportunities, firm‟s value (Tobin‟s Q), firm‟s performance, asset composition (Intangible 
assets to total assets), board size, leverage, outsider representation on the board, largest 
shareholder ownership and largest block holder ownership. They used the three stage least 
square method to find out the determinants of corporate governance quality. They find that 
corporate governance index is positively and significantly associated with firm‟s value and 
firm‟s size and negatively associated with board size, firm performance, growth opportunities 
and leverage but there is no significant association of corporate governance index with asset 
composition, outsider representation on the board, largest shareholder ownership and largest 
outsider block holder ownership.  
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4.2.5 Black et al. (2006b) Study 
Black et al. (2006b) Study examined the factors that affect the corporate governance 
practices. They considered total 453 firms including 418 small and 35 large firms of Korean 
Stock Exchange (KSE) in 2001.  
Corporate governance index is measured on the basis of survey responses of corporate 
governance practices of Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) in 2001. Corporate governance index 
includes total 39 governance elements and divided into five equally weighted subcategories 
(each category 0-20) such as shareholder rights (5 elements); board structure (4 elements); 
board procedure (26 elements); disclosure (3 elements); ownership parity (1 element). Uses 
of cumulative voting for election of shareholders, permission of voting by mail, choice of 
shareholder meeting date and  location to encourage attendance, disclosure of director 
profiles in advance of shareholder meeting, and board approval for related party transaction 
are considered for shareholder rights. Board composition, existence of audit and outside 
director nominating committee are considered for board structure.  Board procedure includes 
procedure of board committee (such as minimum 75% attendance on average of directors, 
agenda items are recorded in board minutes, CEO duality, existence of evaluation of 
directors, existence of governing board meeting, holding minimum four board meeting, 
having one or more foreign outside directors, no payment for outside director, outside 
director obtain outside advise at company expense, existence of evaluation system for outside 
directors, shareholders approve outside directors total pay, minimum 75% attendance on 
average of outside directors, code of conduct for outside directors,  designation of contact 
person to support outside directors, outside directors presence in board meeting, firm not 
giving funds to outside directors to buy company shares) and audit committee (such as audit 
committee having more than 2/3 outside directors, existence of governance of audit 
committee, having accounting expert in audit committee, recommendation of external auditor 
by the audit committee at shareholder meeting,  appointment of head of internal audit, written 
minutes for audit committee  meeting, reporting of activities of audit committee at 
shareholder meeting,  minimum 75% attendance on average of members of audit committee, 
meeting of audit committee with external auditor to review the financial statements, 
minimum two meetings of audit committee). Investor relation activities, disclosure of director 
resumes, existence of English disclosure are considered for disclosure sub index. Ownership 
parity sub category includes ownership parity.  
The descriptive statistics presents that the average mean of corporate governance 
index is 29.21 and ranges from 12.73 to 59.33 with a standard deviation of 6.96 for small 
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firms and 51.82 and ranges from 30.22 to 70.55 with a standard deviation of 10.70 for large 
firms. It is also evident that the average mean of- shareholder rights is 2.99 and 5.6 for small 
and large firms respectively; board structure is 0.85 for small firms and 14.71 for large firms; 
board procedure is 8.16 and 11.87 for small and large firms respectively; disclosure 
subcategory is 0.69 for small firms and 3.24 for large firms and ownership parity is 16.53 and 
16.40 for small and large firms respectively.    
The major determinants of corporate governance practices are firm size, firm risk, 
tangible asset intensity, intangible asset intensity and growth opportunities, capital intensity 
and growth opportunities, sales growth, firm‟s profitability, equity finance, ownership, firm 
leverage, firm age, market share and export oriented industries. They used the ordinary least 
square regression methods to find out the determinants of corporate governance practices. 
They find that corporate governance index is significantly positively associated with firm size 
and firm risk. They also find that capital intensity, tangible asset intensity, profitability and 
equity finance are significant but becomes insignificant with different and full set of control 
variables. But there is no significant association of corporate governance index with sales 
growth, leverage, firm age, ownership, market share, export oriented industries, intangible 
asset intensity and growth opportunities.  This result implies that firm size and firm risk have 
the significant influence on corporate governance practice. They also added that corporate 
governance is better ensured for larger firms.  
 
4.2.6 Ariff et al. (2007) Study 
Arriff et al. (2007) study find out the determinants of firm level governance in 
Malaysia. They considered total 90 publicly listed firms of the corporate governance 
reporting initiative of 2004 and classified into two categories as top 50 percent and bottom 50 
percent to find out the difference between classified firms.  
Corporate governance ranking is measured by the dichotomous variables which score 
1 if the firm is listed in the top 50 percent in the corporate governance ranking and otherwise 
score 0.  They stated that corporate governance ranking considers the dichotomous variable 
and independent variables includes both nominal and dichotomous variables but dichotomous 
variable violate the assumption of normality and thus they used the logistic regression. They 
also added that logistic regression analysis does not depend on the normality of independent 
variables.  
In this study, the major factors of corporate governance are profitability, leverage, 
growth, firm valuation, size, age, ownership structure, and countries of operation. They find 
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that firm size has the significant association to determine the corporate governance rating and 
other variables have no significant relationship with rating of corporate governance.  They 
concluded that this finding will help them to develop the effective and efficient corporate 
governance structure and short long term strategies.  
 
4.2.7 Khanchel (2007) Study  
Khanchel (2007) study examined the corporate governance measurement and its 
determinants considering total 624 nonfinancial firms of US from 1994 to 2003.  
He considered the board size, board composition, board meeting, CEO duality, 
compensation and nominating committees meetings, independence of committees, 
competence of audit committee members, audit committee meetings and reputation of 
auditors as the attributes of corporate governance and then divided into four broad categories 
such as board of directors, board committees, audit committee, and overall or total index to 
measure the strength of governance quality. Board size, separate chair dummy, outside 
directors, board meetings are considered to measure board of directors;  existence of 
compensation committee and nominating committee, CEO not on compensation committee 
and nominating committee and, meetings of compensation committee and nomination 
committee are considered to measure the compensation and nominating committee i.e. board 
committee;  existence of an audit committee, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, 
auditor is a BIG 4, members financial expertise are considered to measure audit committee 
and board of directors, board committee and audit committee  jointly measure corporate 
governance.  
He finds that the average mean of board index is 49.92 and ranges from 13.25 to 
91.75 with a standard deviation 12.51; the average mean of compensation and nominating 
committees are 50.19 and minimum 20.83 and maximum 75 with a standard deviation 12.03 
and the average of audit index is 51.2 and the minimum and maximum are 6 and 76.4 
respectively with a standard deviation 12.98 and the overall mean of total governance index 
is 50.78 and ranges from 22.78 to 73.61 with a standard deviation of 8.61. He added that 
firms which exercise the best monitoring systems have the governance index 73.61 and firms 
which practice the worst governance have the governance index 22.78.  
He investigated the determinants of corporate governance by using the ordinary least 
square regression method. The regression model considers the four indices as the dependent 
variable and firm characteristics as the independent variables.  The determinants are firm 
performance, institutional ownership, directors and officer ownership, growth opportunities, 
 194  
 
firm size, intangible assets, external financing needs, investment opportunities. He finds that 
firm size, intangible assets, investment opportunities, directors and officers ownership are 
significantly positively associated with each governance index other than board index. He 
stated that corporate governance is stronger for those firms which have the higher intangible 
assets, investment opportunities, external financing and size. He also finds that each 
governance index is positively associated with institutional ownership and external financing 
needs but governance quality is not influenced by growth opportunities and performance.  
He mentioned that the problem of corporate governance could not solved by only 
increasing the corporate governance quality or using the best practices of other firms. Finally, 
he concluded that a unique governance model should consider the internal strength and 
relationship based corporate governance process to enhance the corporate governance 
practices.  
 
4.2.8 Silveira et al. (2009) Study  
Silveira et al. (2009) study examined the determinants of firm level corporate 
governance quality in Brazil. They considered total 823firm year observations of 200 
financial and non financial firms listed on Sao Paulo Stock Exchange of Brazil during 1998 
to 2004.  
Corporate governance quality is developed following the index of corporate 
governance practices of Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) study. Corporate governance 
index in this study includes total 24 objective questions which are collected from publicly 
available secondary data. If the answer of each question is positive score 1 point otherwise 0 
and the total score ranges from 0 to 24 which indicates from lowest to best governance 
quality. Total 24 objective questions of corporate governance quality are divided into four 
sub-categories such as: disclosure (6 questions); board structure and operation (6 questions), 
ethics and conflicts of interest (6 questions) and shareholder rights (6 questions).  Disclosure 
of potential conflict of interest like related party transaction; disclosure of violation of 
corporate governance practices; producing mandatory financial reports within required time; 
uses of international accounting standards; using leading global auditing firm and disclosure 
of compensation for board members and CEO are considered to measure the subcategory of 
disclosure. Board composition and functioning includes CEO duality; having monitoring 
committee like auditing, nominating and compensation committee; board independence; 
board size within code of best practices; continuation of service more than one following the 
code of best practices; having the audit board. Controlling shareholders owns less than 50% 
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of voting shares; percentage of non-voting shares less than 20% of the total capital; 
controlling shareholders ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights is greater than 1; firm is free 
from undergoing CVM enquiries regarding governance malpractices; firm is free from CVM 
convictions and fines for governance malpractices in last five years; firm submit to arbitration 
in lieu of regular legal procedures in case of corporate governance malpractices are 
considered to measure the ethics and conflicts of interest.  Shareholder rights include firm 
charter grant additional voting rights beyond the legal requirement; firm grant tag-along 
rights beyond the legal requirement; firm charter facilitate process of voting to all 
shareholders beyond the requirement; pyramid structure reduce the controlling power of 
controlling shareholders; having shareholder agreements that reduce the control power; free-
float is higher than or equal to what is requires in Bovespa L1 trading segment.  They used 
equally weighted method to compute the corporate governance index. They argued that this 
equally weighted method is less questionable than any other difficult weighting method 
though it involves subjective evaluation.  
The descriptive summary statistics presents corporate governance index (CGI) on a 
scale of 0 to 10 during 1998 to 2004. It is evident that the average mean of corporate 
governance index is 4.16 and 5.00 in 1998 and 2004 respectively which indicates the overall 
quality of corporate governance is poor though it is improving slowly over the year. It is also 
evident that the average mean of- disclosure is 6.26 and 6.64 in 1998 and 2004 respectively; 
board of directors is 3.48 and 4.77 in 1998 and 2004 respectively; ethics and conflicts of 
interest is 4.16 and 4.59 in 1998 and 2004 respectively; shareholder rights is 2.75 and 4.02 in 
1998 and 2004 respectively. The above result indicates that firms are performing better in 
terms of disclosure and firms are performing poor regarding shareholder rights.  
The determinants of corporate governance quality growth opportunities, nature of 
operations, firm size, issuance of American Depository Receipts, Adhesion to Bovespa‟s 
special listing segments, ownership structure includes control right and cash flow rights, firm 
performance, firm value and controlling shareholders such as state, family, foreign, block 
holder shares. They used pooled OLS and fixed effect regression to find out the determinants 
of corporate governance quality.  They find that corporate governance index is positively and 
significantly associated with growth, firm size, firm value, issuance of American Depository 
Receipts (ADR), adhesion to Bovespa‟s special listing segments, block holder ownership and 
negatively associated with ownership concentration (voting and cash flow right) and family 
controlled firms but there is no significant  association of corporate governance index with 
nature of operations (tangibility of assets), state ownership and foreign ownership. They also 
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find that firms controlled by different and large block holders ensure better quality of 
corporate governance but corporate governance quality is weak for family controlled firms.  
 
4.2.9 Lazarides and Drimpetas (2011) Study 
Lazarides and Drimpetas (2011) study examined the corporate governance quality and 
its determinants in Greece. They considered the total sample of 303 observations of 60 firms 
of two stock indexes (FTSE-20 and FTSE-40) of the Greek capital market from 2001 to 2006.  
Total 12 elements are considered to assess the corporate governance quality which includes 
CEO duality, audit committee, compensation committee, nominee committee for board 
members, number of independent members, number of independent members on audit 
committee, committee for the evaluation and recruitment of executives, internal statute, code 
of ethics of for corporate governance, disclosure of board members biographical notes, 
disclosure of board members and executives compensation.  They collected data from the 
annual report and developed the index of corporate governance quality considering binary 
variable and score 1 if the answer of the variable is true otherwise score 0 and corporate 
governance score ranges from 0 to 12.  They stated that if the corporate governance index is 
low, it does not mean that the firm has low level of corporate governance and if the corporate 
governance index is high, it does not mean that firm is practicing best corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
They stated that corporate governance index is influenced by time, sector and index 
ranking.  They classified the corporate governance index into two groups and first group 
consider the value between 1 to 4 and second group consider the value of 6 to 8. They find 
that only 16.5% of the firm is ranked in the second group but 80% of the firm is ranked in 
first group and they find that corporate governance quality is not high in Greece.  They also 
divided the firms into FTSE-20 index and FTSE-40 index and find that larger firms (FTSE-
20) practice higher corporate governance than small firms. They also find that corporate 
governance index of financial firms are higher than non financial firms.  
The determinants of corporate governance index are CEO ownership, number of 
executive board members, number of firms that the board members participate in as members 
of their board of directors, percentage of board members resigned from the board, merger, 
number of employees, stock market capitalization, own capital to sales, top five shareholders, 
firm performance, firm size, leverage and investment opportunities. They used the ordinal 
probit regression method to find out the determinants of corporate governance.  They find 
that corporate governance index is positively associated with firm size, CEO ownership, own 
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capital to sales and number of firms that the board members participate in as members of 
their board of directors and negatively associated with number of executive board members 
and other variables have no significant relationship with corporate governance index.  They 
observed that quality of corporate governance is low in Greece in compare to international 
best governance practices and firm size, leadership, power concentration and board 
characteristics are the major explanatory variables for corporate governance quality. They 
added that balance of internal power mainly determine the quality of corporate governance 
instead of firm performance and market for corporate control. 
Finally, they concluded that policy makers should emphasize the determinants of 
corporate governance quality and develop the legal regulatory framework to improve the 
level of corporate governance quality.  
 
4.2.10 Biswas (2012) Study 
Biswas (2012) study stated that there is absence of analyst forecast and corporate 
governance database in Bangladesh. He measured the corporate governance quality on the 
basis of disclosure in the annual report. To measure the corporate governance quality, he 
considered the all the items of corporate governance guidelines 2006, regulatory and legal 
requirement, disclosure practices of listed companies and elements from previous literature of 
corporate governance disclosure. He stated that corporate governance quality is composed of 
total 148 elements into five broad sub categories such as ownership structure and investor 
rights (15 attributes), financial transparency, and information disclosure in the annual report 
(24 attributes), board, management structure and process (80 attributes), auditing (13 
attributes), and corporate responsibility and compliance (16 attributes).  He also stated that 
ownership transparency, ownership concentration and shareholder rights are considered to 
measure the ownership structure and investor rights; board of directors statement according to 
corporate governance guidelines, related party transactions and other disclosures are 
considered to measure the financial transparency and information in the annual report; board 
of directors composition, functions, supporting sub-committees, compensation of board and 
executive members, internal control systems are considered to measure the board, 
management structure and process; auditor‟s appointment, rotation, audit activities and audit 
fee including non audit fee are considered to measure the quality of auditing; firms 
responsibility towards stakeholders like shareholders, employees, government, creditors, and 
others are considered to measure corporate responsibility and compliance.  
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He considered the annual reports of publicly listed companies excluding financial 
companies of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) from 1996 to 2009 and the total observations is 
2305 firm years. Corporate governance quality is measured by corporate governance score 
and score 1 for each attributes if the firm comply the requirement of the attributes otherwise 
score 0 following the study of Cooke (1989, 1993), Williams (2001), Bujaki and McConomy 
(2002), Barako et al. (2006). He stated that any undisclosed attributes scored 0 which avoid 
the judgment error during coding process and this is considered following the study of Morris 
et al. (2011).   He also stated that any undisclosed item means (1) the firm does not have the 
attributes; or  (2) the firm  has the attributes but it is immaterial to disclose it or (3) the firms 
has attributes, it is material but the firm chose not to disclose it. He used the un-weighted 
disclosure model and all attributes are scored equally to avoid subjectivity and this equally 
weighted system is consistent with Cooke (1989, 1993).  After scoring of all attributes, 
corporate governance score is computed by adding the scores and the score ranges from 0 to 
148.  
The average mean of corporate governance score 35.81 and ranges from 12 to 104 
with a standard deviation of 17.512. The lowest mean score is 23.68 in 2006 and the highest 
mean score is 62.79 in 2009 and the score is increased over the year as expected and he stated 
that listed companies adopted various changes in their governance after implementation of 
corporate governance guidelines 2006 but the governance score in different areas like board, 
management structure and process are low in compare to other countries. He also stated that 
listed firms have developed their governance slowly over the year.  
The major determinants of this study are growth opportunities, insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, leverage, composition of assets, 
volatility, subsidiary of foreign company and firm age and he used the pooled ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression to find out the determinants of corporate governance quality.  He 
finds that corporate governance quality is positively associated with growth opportunities, 
insider ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, foreign subsidiary and firm age and 
negatively associated with leverage and composition of assets, but there is no significant 
association of corporate governance quality with institutional ownership and volatility. 
 
4.2.11 Gordon et al. (2012) Study 
Gordon et al. (2012) study examined the determinants and effects of corporate 
governance practices in small publicly traded Canadian firms. They considered total 702 
companies listed on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) Venture Exchange in 2004 and 
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developed a unique corporate governance index. They stated that several researchers used the 
corporate governance score that is available in public (Klein et al., 2005), some researcher 
used the existing technique such as analysis of principal components and some others 
researchers developed their self governance indices (Bujaki and McConomy, 2002 and 
Gompers et al., 2003) to measure overall governance quality. They developed the corporate 
governance score considering 22 key factors of 14 TSE corporate governance guidelines and 
the score is computed by adding all 14 relevant TSX guidelines.  
They divided the corporate governance score in two categories such as board 
composition and policies. Board composition includes board independence, independent 
directors in audit committee, compensation committee, and nominating committee, CEO 
duality, Chairman of the board, existence of a process for performance evaluation of the 
board, its members and supporting committees, directors‟ independence to meet with 
management, chairman of the board is an independent director, availability of nominating 
committee, compensation committee and corporate governance committee and each item is 
scored 1 and adding of all items compute the score of composition where as policies include 
strategic position, code of conduct or ethics, orientation and education program for the board, 
external advisors affiliation, evaluation of board effectiveness, policy of disclosure and policy 
is computed after deducting the composition score from corporate governance score. 
The descriptive statistics presents that the average mean of corporate governance 
score is 3.223 and ranges from 0 to 19 with a standard deviation of 3.94. The average of 
board composition is 1.96 and minimum is 0 and maximum is 11 with a standard deviation of 
2.08 and average mean of policies is 1.27 and ranges from 0 to 9 with a standard deviation of 
2.49.  
In this study, the determinants of corporate governance are board size, large block 
holder ownership, firm‟s leverage, type of auditor and firm value. They find that corporate 
governance and board composition are significantly positively associated with block holder 
ownership, larger board size, higher leverage, higher firm value and auditor type where as 
policies is positively associated with board size, firm value and auditor. 
They concluded that owners and managers should focus on good governance because 
good governance is the main driving force of small firm.  
 
4.2.12 Waweru (2014a) Study 
Waweru (2014) study examined the factors influencing the quality of corporate 
governance in South Africa.  He investigated the firm characteristics such as firm 
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performance, size, leverage, audit quality and investment opportunities on corporate 
governance quality from the agency theory perspective in South Africa.  He considered panel 
data of total 247 firm year observations of 50 largest firms listed on Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) of South Africa during 2006 to 2010.  
Quality of corporate governance is measured by board size, proportion of non 
executive director and shareholder concentration. Board size is measured by the total number 
of directors, proportion of non executive director is computed by percentage of non executive 
directors on the board and shareholder concentration is measured by the percentage of shares 
held by 10 largest shareholders to total shares.  
The descriptive statistics presents that corporate governance quality is high in South 
Africa which implies that firms highly comply the corporate governance requirements. The 
average mean of ownership concentration is 63.2% which indicates high involvement of 
institutional investors. The average mean of board size is 13.8 and ranges from 4 to 27 which 
indicate that all the sample firms followed the listing code of JSE. The proportion of non 
executive director is 73.8% which implies that boards are controlled by non executive 
director.  
The determinants of corporate governance quality are firm performance, firm size, 
leverage, investment opportunities and audit quality.  He used fixed effect of ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression method to find out the determinants of corporate governance quality. 
He finds that firm size, leverage and investment opportunities are the main explanatory 
factors in determining the quality of corporate governance in South Africa.  Corporate 
governance quality is significantly positively associated with firm size and negatively 
associated with leverage and investment opportunities but there is no significant association 
of corporate governance quality with firm performance and audit quality.  
He states that the findings of the study will improve quality of corporate governance 
and reduce the corporate failure and protect the interest of minority shareholders and thus 
concluded that high quality of corporate governance is the precondition of a good business.  
 
4.2.13 Waweru (2014b) Study 
Waweru (2014b) study examined the determinants of corporate governance quality in 
Kenya and South Africa. He used a panel data of 247 firm year observations of 50 largest 
companies listed on Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) of South Africa and 234 firm 
year observations of 49 companies listed on Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2006 to 
2010. 
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Quality of corporate governance index is measured by corporate governance index. 
Corporate governance index is divided into six sub-categories such as board (19 attributes), 
charter or laws (5 attributes), audit (6 attributes), director composition (6 attributes), 
progressive practices (11 attributes) and ownership (4 attributes). He considered total 51 
binary attributes to measure the corporate governance score. Each item is scored 1 if the 
attributes is present otherwise score is 0.  
The descriptive statistics presents that the average mean of quality of corporate 
governance score is 37.48 or 73.3% and ranges from 25 to 45 with a standard deviation of 
3.4051 in South Africa which indicates that firms are highly following the corporate 
governance requirements in South Africa. The descriptive statistics also presents that the 
average mean of quality of corporate governance score is 26.35 or 52% and ranges from 16 to 
34 with a standard deviation of 1.96 in Kenya  which indicates that corporate governance 
quality in Kenya is lower than South Africa.  
The determinants of corporate governance quality are firm level characteristics such 
as firm performance, leverage, investment opportunities, firm size and audit quality. He used 
the fixed effect of ordinary least square regression method to determine the corporate 
governance quality.  He finds that firm performance and audit quality are the significant 
explanatory variables that affect the corporate governance quality in South Africa and Kenya 
and there exist other differences in the corporate governance quality in two countries. In other 
words, corporate governance quality is significantly positively associated with firm 
performance and audit quality in both South Africa and Kenya.  
He concluded that high operating performance influence the quality of corporate 
governance and high quality of corporate governance reduce information asymmetry and 
conflict of interest and thereby ensures larger shareholder wealth.  
 
4.2.14 Tchuigoua (2015) Study 
Tchuigoua (2015) study examined the determinants of corporate governance quality at 
micro financial institutions.  He considered 178 micro financial institutions of 53 countries 
rated by Planet Rating during 2001 to 2011.  
Planet Rating, the specialized rating agency for micro financial institutions, provided 
the corporate governance score that is used to measure the corporate governance quality. 
Corporate governance rating score include governance, information, risk management, 
activity, funding and liquidity, efficiency, (in short form, GIRAFE) to measure corporate 
governance at microfinance institutions.  
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He identified the board characteristics such as board size, board expertise, powerful 
CEO (CEO Chairman Duality), audit committee, board activity and ownership type which 
influence the quality of corporate governance of micro financial institutions.  He used the 
pooled ordered logit and pooled OLS to find out the determinants of governance at micro 
financial institution.  He finds that board characteristics such as board expertise, board 
activity and ownership are the major factors in determining the quality of corporate 
governance at micro financial institutions. Governance quality at micro financial institutions 
is significantly positively associated with board expertise and board activity and negatively 
associated with ownership type. He also finds that governance quality is not associated with 
board size and CEO duality. 
He concluded that large number of customers can be served by effective corporate 
governance at micro financial institutions.   
 
4.2.15 Turrent and Ariza (2016) Study  
Turrent and Ariza (2016) study examined the rating of corporate governance from the 
institutional perspective in Latin America. They considered total 826 observations of 128 
highest ranked companies on the stock exchange of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
during 2004 to 2010.  
Corporate governance rating includes total 43 items, with a maximum value of 100, 
and divided into four sub categories such as composition and performance of the board, 
shareholder rights, ethics and conflicts of interest and other information related to corporate 
governance and each sub category is weighted as 53, 18, 16 and 13% respectively.  Mission 
and functions of the board, board independence including CEO duality, presence of 
supporting committee (corporate governance, compensation, nominating and auditing), board 
compensation, selection, removal or reelection procedures, profile of directors including 
norms of conduct of board members, disclosure of relationship between directors and 
shareholders and directors shareholding are considered to measure the sub category of 
composition and performance of the board and most of the items (minimum 14 out of 24) 
consider board independence in this sub category.  Shareholder rights include description of 
shareholder voting process, pyramidal structures that reduce the concentration of control, 
information of the notice of meeting and agenda, shareholder agreements and resolutions 
proposed for its adoption. Conflict of interest and related party transactions, penalty for 
breach of good governance, composition of ownership, company operations with its directors 
and managers and significant transaction between the company and significant shareholders 
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are considered to measure the ethics and conflicts of interest.  Other related information with 
corporate governance includes use of international accounting principles, service of a 
recognized auditing firm, sanctions against the management for breach of corporate 
governance practices, financial performance disclosure and practices of good governance.  
They computed the weighted sum of four sub categories.   
The descriptive statistics presents that the average mean of corporate governance 
rating is 0.36, 0.48, 0.53 and 0.66 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico respectively and the 
average mean of overall corporate governance rating is 0.53 and ranges from 0.12 to 0.81 
with a standard deviation of 0.17 in 2004. It is also evident that the average mean of 
corporate governance rating is 0.64, 0.72, 0.64 and 0.78 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico respectively and the average mean of overall corporate governance rating is 0.70 and 
ranges from 0.37 to 0.88 with a standard deviation of 0.12 in 2010.  They find that corporate 
governance rating is increased over the year after comparing between 2004 and 2010 because 
good governance and regulation have increased and changed over time. They also added that 
codes of good governance and different level and mechanism of corporate transparency of 
each country influence  corporate governance rating and thus rating varies country to country.  
The major determinants are legal system, board size, CEO duality, gender diversity, 
ownership concentration, family controlled firms, stakeholder orientation and innovation 
strategy and the control variables are leverage, firm age, firm size and firm profitability. They 
used ordinary least square regression method including year and industry dummy with robust 
estimator and generalized method of moments (GMM) to control for endogeneity and risk of 
biased result due to correlation between explanatory variables and error term.  In OLS 
method, corporate governance rating is significantly positively associated with board size, 
board independence, legal system, stakeholder orientation, leverage, firm age, firm size and 
negatively associated with gender and innovation strategy but there is no significant 
association with CEO duality, ownership concentration, family controlled firms and firm 
performance. In GMM method, corporate governance rating is significantly positively 
associated with board independence, ownership concentration, stakeholder orientation and 
firm age and negatively associated with board size but there is no significant association with 
legal system, CEO duality, gender, family controlled firms, strategy, leverage, firm size and 
firm performance. Finally, they show that board independence, ownership concentration and 
stakeholder orientation strongly affect the corporate governance rating but corporate 
governance rating is negatively associated with board size.  
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They concluded that internal and external dimension of corporate governance 
mechanisms minimize the conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders 
according to agency theory and thus, managers should be more active in determination of 
corporate governance policies.   
From the above literature review, it is clear that most of the research on corporate 
governance quality measurement and its determinants are mainly based on US (Khanchel, 
2007; Silveira et al., 2009; Turrent and Ariza, 2016), UK (Barucci and Falini, 2005; Beiner et 
al., 2006 and Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011), Canada (Gordon et al., 2012), Africa 
(Waweru, 2014a,b), Korea (Black et al., 2006b) and Malaysia (Ariff et al., 2007). Most of the 
researchers developed their self structured corporate governance index on the basis of code of 
best practice or governance guidelines, listing requirement, disclosure practices, corporate 
law or law applicable for companies, and previous literature to measure the corporate 
governance quality where as few researcher used the corporate governance index provided by 
rating agencies. It is also observed that the variation- in each item and total attributes of 
corporate governance; categories or sub-indices of corporate governance; scoring in each 
item; weighted and un-weighted method; guidelines or requirement in the code of best 
practice or corporate governance; listing requirement; disclosure practices; time period; 
financial and non financial companies and statistical method. Thus, it is evident that 
assessment or measurement process of corporate governance quality and its determinants are 
different and there is no uniform policy or approach to measure corporate governance quality 
and its determinants.  
In Bangladesh, there is no corporate governance database or absence of rating of 
corporate governance by the rating agencies. Biswas (2012) study measured the corporate 
governance quality and its determinants in non financial companies of Bangladesh. He 
developed a self structured corporate governance index by including 148 items into five 
broad categories to measure corporate governance quality. In addition, he considered 
corporate governance guidelines 2006 only. But there is dearth of research studies related to 
measure the corporate governance quality and its determinants in the banking sector of 
Bangladesh. Thus, there is a literature gap in the governance literature particularly in the 
banking sector of Bangladesh. It is said that banking sector is the most organized and 
regulated by laws all over the world. Moreover, corporate governance guideline is revised in 
2012 in Bangladesh. Thus, it would be interesting to conduct the empirical research and fill 
up the research gap on corporate governance quality and its determinants in an emerging 
country like Bangladesh especially in banking sector after considering corporate governance 
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guidelines 2006 and 2012, company act 1994, bank company act, disclosure practices, listing 
requirement and previous literature.  
 
4.3 The Settings Applicable for Banks  
The setting for banks mainly consists of legal framework, institutional framework and 
comparative analysis of corporate governance guidelines. All the banks have to go through 
these frameworks to operate the banking activities in Bangladesh for the interest of the 
shareholders.  It is said that banking sector is well organized and developed and highly 
governed firms than manufacturing firms because of  so many laws and regulation of the 
institutions and various amendment of the corporate governance guidelines. The setting 
applicable for banks is described below:  
 
4.3.1 Legal Framework for Bank12 
Banks are regulated by various laws such as securities laws, listing rules, company act 
1994, corporate governance code, banking law, bankruptcy act 1997 and income tax 
ordinance1984. The main objectives of these laws are to regulate the bank for interest of the 
shareholders, investors and banks.  
 
Securities Law Framework 
Securities and exchange ordinance 1969 is an ordinance which provide the protection 
of investors, issue the securities, and regulate the capital market in Bangladesh.  
Securities and Exchange Commission act 1993 which provide the provision in 
establishment of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission for the protection of 
interest of investors in securities and development of the securities markets.  
 
Listing Rules                                                                         
 The companies should follow some rules and regulations to be listed in Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE). The requirement of minimum paid up capital and shareholders are 20 
                                                             
12 Website of Securities and exchange ordinance 1969 , Securities and Exchange Commission act 1993, Listing 
Rules, Company Act 1994, Corporate Governance Guideline, Bangladesh Bank, Bank company act 1991, 
financial institutions act 1993, Bankruptcy Act 1997, Income Tax Ordinance 1984, Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC), Dhaka Stock Exchange, Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC), ICAB and 
ICMAB, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and world bank, 2009, Chowdhury  (2015), Sharmin (2012) and 
Uddin and Choudhury (2008) studies.  
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million Taka and at least 400 shareholders respectively to be listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE).  
 
Company Act 1994 
Banks and financial institutions also have to follow the company act 1994.  Company 
act 1994 provides the guidelines about formation, functions and termination of companies.  
Company act 1994 also includes provisions for organizational structure, appointment, duties 
and responsibilities of directors, management of companies, shareholder of companies, 
appointment and responsibilities of external auditor, share capital, winding up, financial 
disclosure, audit requirements, and transparency and accountability. Company act also 
provide the instructions related to power and responsibilities of regulatory bodies such as 
RJSC and the jurisdiction of the court (Chowdhury, 2015).  
 
Corporate Governance Guideline 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) introduces corporate 
governance guidelines in 2006 to improve better governance.  All the listed companies have 
to “comply or explain” the corporate governance issues according to corporate governance 
guidelines 2006 issued by the BSEC but corporate governance guidelines 2012 requires the 
firm to disclose on “comply basis”.  Corporate governance guidelines 2006 includes 
information about board size, independent director, responsibilities of the chairman of the 
board and CEO, director report to the shareholders, appointment of CFO, head of internal 
audit, company secretary, audit committee constitution and reporting of audit committee, 
scope of external auditors etc. BSEC again revised corporate governance guidelines in 2012.  
The new corporate governance guidelines includes some new issues such as criteria and 
qualification of independent director; some additional statements in the directors report; 
mandatory requirement of separation of chairman and CEO; constitution of audit committee, 
chairman of audit committee; role of audit committee; duties of CEO and CFO on financial 
statements; and collection of compliance certificate from professional accountant or 
secretary. Corporate governance guidelines requires the firm to disclose on comply basis.  
 
Banking Law 
Bangladesh Bank order 1972 establishes the Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, 
which regulate the activities of banking companies. Bangladesh Bank provides the instruction 
about constitution, recruitment, duties and responsibilities, accountabilities of board and audit 
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committee of banks and financial institutions.  Bangladesh Bank also provides the guidelines 
for corporate governance through banking regulations and policy department (BRPD) 
circulars.  Bangladesh Bank is the apex body to control and regulate monetary and financial 
systems.  Bank company act 1991 which is amended in 2003 and 2013 and financial 
institutions act 1993 specified the roles and responsibilities of firms of the banking and 
financial sector (Chowdhury,  2015).   
 
Bankruptcy Act 1997  
Bankruptcy act 1997 provides the guidelines about the winding up provision of the 
company act for the interest of the companies and shareholders (Sharmin, 2012).  
 
Income Tax Ordinance 1984: 
Income tax ordinance 1984 is an ordinance to consolidate and amend the law relating 
to income tax. This ordinance provides the provision of disclosure, audit and penalties for 
contravention of fiscal and revenue issues (Sharmin, 2012). 
 
4.3.2 Institutional Framework for Banks13 
Banking sector is mostly organized and developed because several institutions 
regulate the bank to ensure the better governance for the interest of the shareholders and 
investors. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) study stated that governance regulation mainly 
originated from four established institutions such as BSEC, stock exchange, accounting 
profession and registrar of Joint stock companies (RJSC).  The institutional framework for 
banks is described below:  
 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) is the regulator of capital 
market. The BSEC was established on 8 June, 1993 under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act. The regulator works with one chairman and four commissioners and 
                                                             
13 Website of Securities and exchange ordinance 1969 , Securities and Exchange Commission act 1993, Listing 
Rules, Company Act 1994, Corporate Governance Guideline, Bangladesh Bank, Bank company act 1991, 
financial institutions act 1993, Bankruptcy Act 1997, Income Tax Ordinance 1984, Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC), Dhaka Stock Exchange, Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC), ICAB and 
ICMAB, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and world bank, 2009, Chowdhury  (2015), Sharmin (2012) and 
Uddin and Choudhury (2008) studies.  
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implements the responsibility of formulating securities legislation and administer. The 
mission of BSEC are protection of investor‟s interest in securities, develop and maintain of 
fair, transparent and efficient securities markets and ensure proper issuance of securities and 
compliance with securities laws. The BSEC is a statutory body and attached to the ministry of 
Finance.  BSEC also provide notifications, directives and instructions to avoid fraudulent and 
unfair trade practices. The main functions of BSEC are: regulating the business of the stock 
exchanges or any other securities market; registering and regulating the business of stock 
brokers, sub-brokers, share transfer agents, merchant bankers, and manager of issues, trustee 
of trust deeds, register of an issue, underwriters, portfolio managers, investment advisers and 
other intermediaries in the securities market; registering, monitoring and regulating of 
collectivee investment scheme including all forms of mutual funds; monitoring and 
regulating all authorized self regulatory organizations in the securities market; prohibiting 
fraudulent and unfair trade practices relating to securities trading in any securities market; 
promoting investors education and providing training for intermediaries of the securities 
market; prohibit insider trading in securities; regulating the substantial acquisition of shares 
and take-over of companies; and undertaking investigation and inspection, inquiries and audit 
of any issuer or dealer of securities, the stock exchanges and intermediaries and any self 
regulatory organization in the securities market. BSEC also has the legal power to collect 
more information and ask for explanations of any issues from the company and can impose 
penalty in violation of law.  
 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
Dhaka Stock exchange (DSE) is established in 1954 and registered as a public limited 
company. DSE activities are regulated by its articles of association rules and regulations and 
by laws along with securities and exchange ordinance 1969, companies‟ act 1994 and 
Securities and Exchange Commission act-1993.  The major functions of DSE are listing of 
companies, monitoring the activities of listed companies, market administration and control, 
market surveillance, investors‟ grievance cell, investors protection fund, providing the screen 
based automated trading of listed securities, and settlement of trading.   
 
Bangladesh Bank 
Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh and apex regulatory body for the 
country‟s monetary and financial system, was established in 1972 under the Bangladesh Bank 
order. Bangladesh Bank has nine board members who are appointed by the government. 
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Bangladesh Bank as the central bank regulates and monitors the commercial banks and 
banking institutions. Bangladesh Bank provide monetary policy and prudential regulations 
such as ensuring minimum capital requirements, applying limits on loan concentration and 
insider borrowing and providing guidelines for asset classification and income recognition. 
Bangladesh Bank also reinforces the governance structure of banks for better disclosure and 
transparency standards. Bangladesh Bank operates following the banking companies‟ act 
1991, which is later amended in 2003 and 2013, and financial institutions act 1993. 
Bangladesh Bank also plays the role for promoting and developing the domestic financial 
market.  
 
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) 
The registrar of joint stock companies is the „license issuing authority‟ which provides 
facilities for formation of companies and collects the record of all ownership related issues. 
All the registered firms have to present all financial and non financial information to the 
registrar of joint stock companies.  The activities of RJSC are regulated by company act 
1994.  The registrar of joint stock companies is supervised by the ministry of commerce. 
RJSC deals the registration and ensures lawful administration of the entities under the 
provision of applicable act such as companies and trade organizations (company act, 1994); 
societies (societies registration act, 1860) ; and partnership firms (partnership act, 1932).  
RJSC deals with major business processes such as name clearance, registration, returns filing, 
issuance of certified copies, winding up and struck off.  
 
Accounting Bodies 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), the national 
professional accounting body of Bangladesh, established under the Bangladesh Chartered 
Accountants Order in 1973. ICAB is ministered by the Ministry of Commerce, Government 
of the people‟s republic of Bangladesh. ICAB regulate accountancy profession, administer its 
members and students, and ensure sound professional ethics and code of conduct by its 
members, specialized training and professional expertise in accounting, auditing, taxation, 
corporate laws, management consultancy, information technology and related subjects in 
order to provide consistently high quality of service for the interest of the public. ICAB also 
regulate the auditing firms to ensure the fairness of financial statements in accordance with 
accounting standards. ICAB adopted the International Accounting Standard (IAS) and 
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International Standards on Auditing (ISA) in the name of Bangladesh Accounting Standards 
(BAS) and Bangladesh Standards for Auditing (BSA) respectively.  
 
The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB), the 
national body of the professional cost and management accountants of Bangladesh, 
established with the prime objective of promoting and regulating the cost and management 
accounting profession in the country. The mission of ICMAB is to develop, equip and 
promote cost and management accounting profession with highest professional standard to 
ensure the better services of the society.  ICMAB offers education and training to the students 
and research. ICMAB is a statutory organization and works under the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) is a non profit, non political research center and 
established in 2000. BEI emphasize on growth of private enterprise and foreign policy and 
security issues in Bangladesh. BEI promotes issues of importance to the private section and 
seeks to initiate essential measure and influence policy for the development of a market 
oriented economy. BEI organizes training program for directors of listed companies, banks, 
financial institutions, NGOs, and SOEs. BEI issued a voluntary code of corporate governance 
for company, SOEs and NGOs in 2004.  The code of corporate governance is comparatively 
more complete than governance guidelines but most of firms don‟t apply the code of 
corporate governance due to voluntary requirement.  
 
4.3.3   Corporate Governance Guidelines 2006 and 2012 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) introduce corporate 
governance guidelines in 20 February, 2006 on „comply or explain‟ basis to ensure corporate 
governance for the interest of the general investors and capital market.  Comply or explain 
basis implies that listed firms of stock exchange should comply the condition of corporate 
governance guidelines or should explain in case of non compliance.  Bangladesh Securities 
and Exchange Commission (BSEC), the regulatory authority further revised the corporate 
governance guidelines of 2006 and issued corporate governance guidelines 2012 on „comply‟ 
basis in 07 August, 2012.   
To improve the quality of board governance and to increase the accountability to 
minority shareholders are the two major objectives of code of corporate governance (Biswas, 
2012).  Biswas (2012) study also finds that independent director requirement, board 
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statement, CEO and CFO certification on financial statements and reporting and compliance 
of corporate governance are the key changes in the corporate governance guidelines.  
 
4.3.3.1   Comparative analysis of corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012  
The similarities and dissimilarities between corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 
2012 are presented in the Table 4-2.  
 
Table 4-2 
Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Guidelines 2012 and 2006 
Items Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2012 Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2006 Changes 
1. Board of Directors 
Board‟s 
Size 
1.1 Board members should be within 5 to 20 1.1 Same No 
Independe
nt 
directors 
1.2 (i) Independent directors should be at least 
one fifth (1/5) of the total number of 
directors 
1.2 (i) Independent directors should 
be at least one tenth (1/10) or 
minimum one of the total 
number of directors 
Yes 
1.2 
(ii-a) 
Independent directors should not hold any 
shares of the company or hold less than 
1% shares of the total paid up shares of 
the company. 
1.2 (i) Same but described as part of 
explanation of 1.2 (i), not as a 
separate part of compliance. 
Yes 
1.2 
(ii-b) 
Independent directors should not be the 
sponsor of the company. Independent 
directors should not be connected with 
any sponsor, director or shareholder who 
holds 1% or more shares of the total paid 
up shares of the company on the basis of 
family relationship. Family members of 
the independent directors should not hold 
above mentioned shares of the company.  
1.2 (i) There is no information of 
holding shares of the family 
members of independent 
directors. Other than the above 
information all are same but 
described as part of 
explanation of 1.2 (i), not as a 
separate part of compliance. 
Yes 
1.2 
(ii-c) 
Independent directors should not have 
any other relationship such as pecuniary 
with the company, or subsidiary or 
associated companies 
1.2 (i) Same but described as part of 
explanation of 1.2 (i), not as a 
separate part of compliance 
Yes 
1.2 
(ii-d) 
Independent director should not be a 
member, director, or officer of any stock 
exchange 
1.2 (i) Same but described as part of 
explanation of 1.2 (i), not as a 
separate part of compliance 
Yes 
1.2 
(ii-e) 
Independent director should not be a 
shareholder, director or officer of any 
member of stock exchange or an 
intermediary of the capital market 
1.2 (i) Same but described as part of 
explanation of 1.2 (i), not as a 
separate part of compliance 
Yes 
1.2 
(ii-f) 
Independent director is not a partner, or 
an executive or was not a partner or an 
executive during the preceding 3 years of 
the concerned company‟s statutory audit 
firm 
 No information Yes 
1.2 
(ii-g) 
Independent director should not be an 
independent director in more than three 
(3) listed companies 
 No information Yes 
1.2 
(ii-h) 
Independent director has not been 
convicted by the court of competent 
jurisdiction as a defaulter in payment of 
loan to bank or  non bank financial 
 No information Yes 
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Table 4-2 
Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Guidelines 2012 and 2006 
Items Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2012 Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2006 Changes 
institution (NBFI) 
1.2 
(ii-i) 
Independent director has not been 
convicted for a criminal offense involving 
moral turpitude 
 No information Yes 
1.2 
(iii) 
Independent directors shall be appointed 
by the BODs and approved by the 
shareholders in the annual general 
meeting (AGM) 
1.2 
(ii) 
Independent directors should 
be appointed by the elected 
directors 
Yes 
1.2 
(iv) 
Post of independent director(s) should not 
remain vacant for more than 90 days 
 No information Yes 
1.2 
(v) 
The board  place a code of conduct for all 
members of the board and  compliance of 
the code is recorded annually 
 No information Yes 
1.2 
(vi) 
The tenure of office of an independent 
director should be for a period of three 
years and extended for 1(one) term only 
 No information Yes 
Qualificati
on of 
Independe
nt Director 
1.3 (i) Independent director should be a  
knowledgeable individual with integrity 
and have the ability to ensure compliance 
with financial, regulatory, and corporate 
laws and make meaningful contribution 
to the business 
 No information Yes 
1.3 
(ii) 
Independent director should be a business 
leader /corporate leader/ bureaucrat/ 
university teacher with economics / 
business studies or law background / 
professionals like chartered accountants 
(CA), cost and management accountants 
(CMA) and chartered secretaries. The 
independent directors must have 12 years 
of corporate management / professional 
experiences.  
 No information Yes 
1.3 
(iii) 
The qualification of independent director 
may be relaxed with the prior approval of 
BSEC 
 No information Yes 
Chairman 
of the 
Board and 
Chief 
Executive 
Officer 
(CEO) 
1.4 Chairman of the board and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) should be 
different individuals and the chairman of 
the board should be elected from among 
the directors of the company. The board 
should clearly define the respective roles 
and responsibilities of the chairman and 
CEO. 
1.3 All are same except Chairman 
of the board and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) 
should be preferred by 
different individuals 
Yes 
The 
Director‟s 
Report to 
Sharehold
ers 
1.5 (i) Industry outlook and possible future 
developments in the industry 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(ii) 
Segment wise or product wise 
performance 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(iii) 
Risk s and concerns  No information Yes 
1.5 
(iv) 
Discussion on cost of goods sold, gross 
profit margin and net profit margin 
 No information Yes 
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Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Guidelines 2012 and 2006 
Items Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2012 Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2006 Changes 
1.5 
(v) 
Discussion on continuity of any extra 
ordinary gain or loss 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(vi) 
Basis for related party transaction- a 
statement of all related party transactions 
should be disclosed in the annual report 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(vii) 
Utilization of proceeds from public 
issues, right issues and/or through any 
other instruments 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(viii) 
Explanation  of deterioration of financial 
results  if the company goes for initial 
public offering (IPO), Repeat public 
offering (RPO), rights offer and direct 
listing 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(ix) 
Explanation of management if significant 
variance occurs between quarterly 
financial performance and annual 
financial statement in the annual report 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(x) 
Remuneration to directors including 
independent directors 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(xi) 
Fairness of the financial statements (state 
of affairs, result of operations, cash flows 
and changes in equity) which is prepared 
by the management 
1.4 
(a) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xii) 
Proper books of account of the issuer 
company have been maintained 
1.4 
(b) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xiii) 
Appropriate accounting policies have 
been consistently applied in preparation 
of the financial statement and accounting  
estimates are based on reasonable and 
prudent judgment 
1.4 
(c) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xiv) 
Financial statements have been prepared 
following International Accounting  
Standards(IAS) / Bangladesh Accounting 
Standards (BAS) / International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) / Bangladesh 
Financial Reporting Standards (BFRS), as 
applicable in Bangladesh  and any 
departure there-from has been adequately 
disclosed 
1.4 
(d) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xv) 
Internal control system is sound in design 
and implemented and monitored  
effectively 
1.4 
(e) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xvi) 
The company‟s ability to continue as a 
going concern. If the company is not 
considered to be  a going concern,  the 
fact and reason should be disclosed 
1.4 (f) Same No 
1.5 
(xvii) 
Significant deviation from the last years 
in operating result should be highlighted 
and explanation should be given for this 
deviation  
1.4 
(g) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xviii) 
Key operating and financial data of at 
least preceding five years should be 
summarized  
1.4 
(h) 
Key operating and financial 
data of at least preceding  
three years should be 
summarized 
Yes 
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Items Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2012 Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2006 Changes 
1.5 
(xix) 
If the issuer company has not declared 
dividend (cash or stock) for the year,  
explanation should be given 
1.4 (i) Same No 
1.5 
(xx) 
Number of board meeting and attendance 
of each directors should be disclosed 
1.4 (j) Same No 
1.5 
(xxi-
a) 
Pattern of shareholding should be 
reported to disclose the aggregate number 
of  shares along with name wise details 
held by parent/subsidiary/associated 
companies and other related parties 
1.4 
(K-i) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xxi-
b) 
Pattern of shareholding should be 
reported to disclose the aggregate number 
of  shares along with name wise details 
held by directors, chief executive officer 
(CEO), company secretary, chief 
financial officer, head of internal audit 
and their spouses and minor children 
1.4 
(K-ii) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xxi-
c) 
Pattern of shareholding should be 
reported to disclose the aggregate number 
of  shares along with name wise details 
held by executives 
1.4 
(K-
iii) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xxi-
d) 
Pattern of shareholding should be 
reported to disclose the aggregate number 
of  shares along with name wise details 
held by shareholders holding 10% or 
more voting interest in the company 
1.4 
(K-iv) 
Same No 
1.5 
(xxii-
a) 
In case of appointment /reappointment of 
director, the company should disclose a 
brief resume of the director to the 
shareholders 
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(xxii-
b) 
In case of appointment /reappointment of 
director, the company should disclose to 
the shareholders about the nature of 
director expertise in specific functional 
areas  
 No information Yes 
1.5 
(xxii-
c) 
In case of appointment /reappointment of 
director, the company should disclose to 
the shareholders about the  names of 
companies in which the person holds the 
directorship and the membership of 
committees of the board  
 No information Yes 
2. Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Head of Internal Audit and Company Secretary (CS) 
Appointm
ent 
2.1 The company should appoint CFO, head 
of internal audit and company secretary. 
The board of directors should clearly 
define respective roles, responsibilities 
and duties of the CFO, head of internal 
audit and company secretary 
2.1 Same No 
Requireme
nt to 
attend the 
board 
meeting 
2.2 The CFO and company secretary should 
attend in meeting of the board of 
directors. If the agenda of the meeting is 
related to their personal matters, they 
should not attend in board meeting  
2.2 Same No 
3. Audit Committee 
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Items Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2012 Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2006 Changes 
Audit 
Committee 
3(i) The company should have an audit 
committee, as a subcommittee of the 
board of directors 
3 Same No 
3(ii) The audit committee should assist the 
board of directors in ensuring that 
financial statements reflect true and fair 
view of the state of affairs of the 
company and ensure good monitoring 
system within the business 
3 Same No 
3(iii) The audit committee is responsible to the 
board of directors and  duties  of audit 
committee are clearly stated  in writing 
3 Same No 
Constitutio
n of audit 
committee 
3.1 (i) The audit committee should be consist of 
at least three members 
3.1 (i) Same No 
3.1 
(ii) 
The board of directors should appoint the 
members of the audit committee who 
should be directors of the company and at 
least one member should be the 
independent director  
3.1 
(ii) 
Same No 
3.1 
(iii) 
All members of the audit committee 
should be financially literate and at least 
one member should have accounting or 
financial management experience 
 No information Yes 
3.1 
(iv) 
The board of directors should appoint the 
new audit committee member(s) to fill up 
the vacancy immediately or not more 
than one month from the date of vacancy 
to ensure continuity of the performance 
of  audit committee, if audit committee 
members are lower than prescribed 
number of three persons due to expiry of 
the term or any other circumstances 
3.1 
(iii) 
Same No 
3.1 
(v) 
The company secretary should act as the 
secretary of the audit committee 
 No information Yes 
3.1 
(vi) 
The quorum of the audit committee 
should not constitute without at least one 
independent director 
 No information Yes 
Chairman 
of the 
audit 
committee 
3.2 (i) The board of directors should select one 
member of the audit committee to be the 
chairman of the audit committee. The 
chairman of the audit committee should 
be an independent director 
3.2 (i) The board of directors should 
select one member of the audit 
committee to be the chairman 
of the audit committee. 
Yes 
3.2 
(ii) 
Chairmen of the audit committee should 
remain present in the annual general 
meeting 
 No information Yes 
  3.2 
(ii) 
Chairman of the audit 
committee should have a 
professional qualification or 
knowledge, understanding and 
experience in accounting or 
finance 
Yes 
Role of 
audit 
committee 
3.3(i) The audit committee should oversee the 
financial reporting process 
 No information Yes 
3.3(ii) The audit committee should monitor 
choice of accounting policies and 
 No information Yes 
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principles 
3.3(iii
) 
The audit committee should monitor 
internal control risk management process 
 No information Yes 
3.3(iv
) 
The audit committee should oversee 
hiring and performance of external 
auditors 
 No information Yes 
3.3(v) The audit committee should review along 
with the management, the annual 
financial statements before submission to 
the board 
 No information Yes 
3.3(vi
) 
The audit committee should review along 
with the management, quarterly and half 
yearly financial statements before 
submission to the board for approval 
 No information Yes 
3.3(vi
i) 
The audit committee should review the 
adequacy of internal audit function 
 No information Yes 
3.3(vi
ii) 
The audit committee should review 
statement of significant related party 
transactions submitted by the 
management 
 No information Yes 
3.3(ix
) 
The audit committee should review 
management letter or letter of internal 
control weakness issued by statutory 
auditors 
 No information Yes 
3.3(x) The company should report to the audit 
committee about the uses/application of 
funds on a quarterly basis when money is 
raised through initial public offering 
(IPO)/ repeat public offering (RPO) / 
right issue. Moreover, the company 
should prepare the statement of funds 
utilized for the purpose other than those 
stated in the offer document /prospectus 
on an annual basis 
 No information Yes 
Reporting 
of the 
audit 
committee 
to board of 
directors 
3.4.1 
(i) 
The audit committee should report its 
activities to the board of directors 
3.3.1(
i) 
Same No 
3.4.1 
(ii-a) 
The audit committee should immediately 
report on conflicts of interest  to the 
board of directors  
3.3.1(
ii-a) 
Same No 
3.4.1 
(ii-b) 
The audit committee should immediately 
report on suspected or presumed fraud or 
irregularity or material defect of the 
internal control system to the BODs 
3.3.1(
ii-b) 
Same No 
3.4.1 
(ii-c) 
The audit committee should immediately 
report on suspected infringement of laws, 
including securities related laws, rules 
and regulations to the BODs 
3.3.1(
ii-c) 
Same No 
3.4.1 
(ii-d) 
The audit committee should immediately 
report any other relevant matters to the 
BOD 
3.3.1(
ii-d) 
Same No 
Reporting 
of the 
audit 
3.4.2 If the audit committee has identified any 
significant issue that is violated by BODs 
and management, the audit committee 
3.3.2 Same No 
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on 
CG Guideline 2012 Secti
on 
CG Guideline 2006 Changes 
committee  
to the 
Authoritie
s 
should report such finding to the BSEC 
Reporting 
of the 
audit 
committee 
to the 
Sharehold
ers and 
General 
Investors 
3.5 The audit committee  should report its 
activities including any report made to 
the board of directors and this report 
should be signed by the chairman of the 
audit committee and disclosed in the 
annual report 
3.4 Same No 
4. External/ Statutory Auditors 
External/ 
Statutory 
Auditors 
4 (i) The company should not engage its 
external/statutory auditor to perform 
appraisal or valuation services or fairness 
opinions 
4 (i) Same No 
4 (ii) The company should not engage its 
external/statutory auditor to perform 
financial information systems design and 
implementation 
4 (ii) Same No 
4 (iii) The company should not engage its 
external/statutory auditor to perform book 
keeping or other services related to the 
accounting records or financial statement 
4 (iii) Same No 
4 (iv) The company should not engage its 
external/statutory auditor to perform 
broker dealer services 
4 (iii) Same No 
4 (v) The company should not engage its 
external/statutory auditor to perform 
actuarial services 
4 (iv) Same No 
4 (vi) The company should not engage its 
external/statutory auditor to perform 
internal audit services 
4 (v) Same No 
4 (vii) The company should not engage its 
external/statutory auditor to perform any 
other service that the audit committee 
determines 
4 (vi) Same No 
4 
(viii) 
No partner or employee of the external 
audit firms  should possess any share of 
the  company during the tenure of audit 
engagement of that company 
 No information Yes 
5. Duties of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
Duties of 
CEO and 
CFO 
6(i-a) CEO and CFO should certify to the board 
that they have reviewed the financial 
statements for the year and these 
statements are free from material untrue 
statement,  or  omission of material fact 
or  misleading statements   
 No information Yes 
6(i-b) CEO and CFO should certify to the board 
that they have reviewed the financial 
statements for the year   and  these 
statements present the true and fair view 
 No information Yes 
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of the company and comply existing 
accounting standards and applicable laws 
6(ii) CEO and CFO should certify to the board 
that to their best of knowledge, company 
are not dealing any transactions  that is 
fraudulent, illegal or violation of code of 
conduct 
 No information Yes 
6. Reporting and Compliance of Corporate Governance 
Reporting 
and 
Complianc
e of 
Corporate 
Governanc
e 
7 (i) The company should obtain a certificate 
of compliance of conditions of corporate 
governance guideline from professional 
accountant/ secretary (Chartered 
Accountant/ Cost Management 
Accountant / Chartered Secretary) and the 
company should send the copy of 
certificate of compliance of corporate 
governance guideline to the shareholders 
along with the annual report on a yearly 
basis 
 No information Yes 
7(ii) The directors of the company should state 
that the company has complied the 
condition of corporate governance in 
accordance with the annexure attached 
5 Same No 
 
From the Table 4-2, the comparative analysis between corporate governance 
guidelines 2006 and 2012 is explained below: 
 
4.3.3.1.1 Board of Directors  
Board Size 
Board size should be not less than 5 and not more than 20 according to corporate 
governance guidelines 2006 and 2012.  
 
Independent Director 
Corporate governance guidelines 2012 incorporated some additional requirement for 
independent directors in compare to corporate guidelines 2006. Independent director 
increased from one tenth (1/10) or minimum one (CG guideline 2006) to one fifth (1/5) (CG 
guideline 2012) to ensure better governance. Corporate governance guidelines 2006 
explained some criteria as part of explanation of independent director means, not as a part of 
compliance. But corporate governance guidelines 2012 incorporated those criteria of 
independent director means as the mandatory compliance requirement. Independent director 
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should not –hold more than 1% shares of the paid up shares; be the sponsor of the company; 
have any pecuniary relationship; be the member, director or officer of any stock exchange; 
director or shareholder or officer of stock exchange; be the partner, executive during the 
preceding three years of the concerned company‟s statutory audit firm; be an independent 
director in more than three listed companies;  be a loan defaulter convicted by the court; be 
convicted for a criminal offense according to corporate governance guidelines 2012. In 
addition, independent director should be appointed by the board of directors and approved by 
the shareholders in the annual general meeting; post should not be remain vacant for more 
than 90 days, tenure of independent director should be for a period of three years and 
extended for one term only and compliance of code of conduct by the board members.  
There was no information about qualification of independent director in corporate 
governance guidelines 2006 but new corporate governance guidelines 2012 fix the 
qualification of independent director. New guidelines requires independent director should   - 
be knowledgeable with integrity and have the ability to ensure compliance with financial, 
legal and corporate laws and make meaningful contribution to business; be a business leader 
or corporate leader or bureaucrat or university teacher having economics or business studies 
or law background or professionals like chartered accountants (CA), cost and management 
accountants (CMA) and chartered secretary (CS); have at least twelve years of professional 
or corporate management experiences. The qualification of independent director might be 
relaxed in special cases with the prior approval of the commission.  
 
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
The position of chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should preferably filled 
by different individuals according to corporate governance guidelines 2006 which means that 
separation of chairman and CEO is preferred but not mandatory requirement. But corporate 
governance guidelines 2012 require position of chairman and CEO should be filled by 
different individuals and it is mandatory.  Both guidelines 2006 and 2012 require that 
chairman of the board should be elected among the directors of the company and the roles 
and responsibilities of chairman and CEO should be defined clearly by the board.   
 
The Directors’ Report to the Shareholders 
Directors of the company should report to the shareholders by including some 
additional statements in the directors‟ report. Both corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 
2012 requires additional statement about the fairness of the financial statements; maintenance 
 220  
 
of appropriate books of accounts; constant application of accounting policies; financial 
statements are prepared following accounting standard like IAS, BAS, IFRS, BFRS; 
efficiency of internal control systems,  compliance of assumption of going concern; 
significant deviation from last year‟s operating results; key operating and financial results in 
a summarized form at least preceding three years; explanation for failure to pay dividend;  
number of board members meetings along with attendance of each director; and aggregate 
and name wise details of pattern of shareholdings.  
But corporate governance guidelines 2012 requires new additional statements about 
industry outlook and possible future development in the industry; segment based and product 
based performance; risk and concern; discussion on cost of goods sold, gross profit margin, 
net profit margin, extraordinary gain or loss; related party transactions; utilization of proceeds 
from public issues, right issue or any other instruments; explanation for deterioration of 
financial results if the company goes for initial public offering, repeat public offering, rights 
offer, direct listing; explanation of variance of quarterly financial performance with annual 
financial statements; remuneration to directors along with independent directors; key 
operating and financial results in a summarized form at least preceding five years; and these 
additional statements were not incorporated in previous governance guidelines 2006.  
In addition, in case of appointment or reappointment of directors, the company should 
disclose a brief resume of director, nature of expertise in functional areas and name of the 
companies where directors have the membership or directorship interest according to new 
corporate governance guidelines 2012.  
 
4.3.3.1.2  Appointment of Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Head of Internal Audit and 
Company Secretary  
The company should appoint the chief financial officer, head of internal audit and 
company secretary and board should define roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO, 
head of internal audit, and company secretary according to both corporate governance 
guidelines 2006 and 2012.  
 
Requirement to Attend the Board Meetings 
There is no difference between corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 in 
terms of attendance of board meeting. CFO and company secretary should attend the board 
meeting but they should not attend in board meeting if the agenda is related to their personal 
matters according to governance guidelines 2006 and 2012.  
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4.3.3.1.3 Audit Committee 
Both the guidelines 2006 and 2012 require that audit committee, a sub-committee of 
the board, should be formed and this committee should be responsible to the board of 
directors.  In addition, the guidelines also requires that duties of the audit committee should 
be clearly stated in writing and the audit committee should assist the board of directors to 
make sure that financial statements present the true and fair view of the company and good 
monitoring system is present in the business.  
 
Audit Committee Formulation 
The audit committee should consist of three members including at least one 
independent director. The members of the audit committee should be directors of the 
company and they should be appointed by the board of directors. The guidelines 2006 and 
2012 also require that if audit committee members are lower than prescribed number of three 
persons due to expiry of the term or any other circumstances, board of directors should recruit 
the new audit committee member(s) immediately or maximum one month from the date of 
vacancy to ensure continuity of the performance of the audit committee.   
New corporate governance guidelines 2012 incorporate some new issues as part of 
constitution of the audit committee such as all members of the audit committee should have 
financial literacy and minimum one member should have the experience of accounting or 
financial management, company secretary should act as the secretary of the audit committee, 
and minimum one independent director should be present to fulfill the quorum of audit 
committee meeting.  
 
Chairman of the Audit Committee 
Corporate governance guidelines 2006 stated that chairman of the audit committee 
should be selected by the board and should have professional qualification or knowledge, 
understanding and experience in accounting or finance. But corporate governance guidelines 
2012 require that the chairman of the audit committee should be an independent director and 
he should present in the annual general meeting.  
The previous guidelines 2006 emphasized only the chairman of the audit committee 
who should have professional qualification or knowledge, understanding and experience in 
accounting and finance where as the new guidelines 2012 requires that all the members of the 
audit committee should have financial literacy and minimum one member should have 
accounting or financial management experience and chairman should be an independent 
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director. Moreover, the new guidelines also include the presence of the chairman in the 
annual general meeting (AGM) which was not exist in earlier corporate governance 
guidelines 2006.  
 
Role of the Audit Committee 
Previous corporate governance guideline 2006 doesn‟t explain anything about the role 
of audit committee where as new corporate governance guideline 2012 discuss the role of the 
audit committee. The audit committee should oversee or monitor or review - about the 
financial reporting process; accounting policies and principles; external auditor recruitment 
and performance; quarterly, half yearly and annual financial statements before submission to 
the board; internal audit function; material related party transaction submitted by 
management; management letter or letter of internal control weakness issued by statutory 
auditor. The company should report to the audit committee about  the uses/application of 
funds on a quarterly basis when money is raised through initial public offering (IPO) )/ repeat 
public offering (RPO) / right issue. Moreover, the company should prepare the statement of 
funds utilized for the purpose on an annual basis.  
 
Reporting of Audit Committee to the Board of Directors 
According to both corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012, the audit 
committee should report its activities to the board of directors and immediately report to 
BODs in the following cases such as conflict of interests, presumed or suspected irregularity 
or fraud; or significant deficiency in internal control systems, suspected violation of laws 
including securities laws, rules and regulations, and any other significant matter.  
 
Reporting of Audit Committee to the Authorities 
Corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 stated that if the audit committee has 
identified any significant issue that is violated by BODs and management, the audit 
committee should report such finding to the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC). 
 
Reporting of Audit Committee to the Shareholders and General Investors 
The audit committee should report its activities including any report made to the 
board of directors and this report should be signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
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and disclosed in the annual report according to both corporate governance guidelines 2006 
and 2012.  
 
4.3.3.1.4 External/Statutory Auditor 
Both corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 require that the issuer company 
should not engage its external / statutory auditor to perform some services and these services 
are appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions ; design and implementation of 
financial information system; book keeping or other services related to accounting records or 
financial statements; broker dealer or actuarial services; internal audit services and any other 
services that the audit committee determines.  
In addition, no partner or employees of the external audit firms should hold any shares 
of the client‟s company during their tenure of audit assignment and this item is included as 
new item as part of external or statutory auditor in the corporate governance guidelines 2012.  
 
4.3.3.1.5 Duties of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
Duties of CEO) and CFO are included as new item in the corporate governance 
guidelines 2012. CEO and CFO, to the best of their knowledge and belief, should certify to 
the board that to the best of their knowledge and belief- they reviewed the financial 
statements and these statement are free from material misstatement or omission of material 
fact or misleading statement; and these statements present the true and fair view of the 
company‟s affairs and in compliance of existing accounting standards and laws; and company 
are not dealing any transactions that is fraudulent, illegal or violation of code of conduct.  
 
4.3.3.1.6 Reporting and Compliance of Corporate Governance  
Directors of the company should report that the company has fulfilled all the 
conditions in accordance with the corporate governance annexure 2006 and 2012 in the 
directors‟ report.  
But new corporate governance guidelines 2012 require one additional requirement as 
part of reporting and compliance of corporate governance. This new requirement says that the 
company should obtain a compliance certificate from the professional accountant or secretary 
like chartered account or cost and management accountant or chartered secretary and this 
compliance certificate should be sent to the shareholders along with the annual report on a 
yearly basis.  
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From the above analysis, it is observed and can be summarized that corporate 
governance guidelines 2012 introduces some new issues such as criteria and qualification of 
independent director; some additional statements in the directors report; mandatory 
requirement of separation of chairman and CEO; constitution of audit committee, chairman 
of audit committee; role of audit committee; duties of CEO and CFO on financial statements; 
and collection of compliance certificate from professional accountant or secretary. These are 
the major changes in corporate governance guidelines 2012 in compare to corporate 
governance guidelines 2006.  
Corporate governance guidelines have some positive implications. First, this guideline 
will improve the quality of corporate governance practices of the company. Second, 
compliance of guidelines will enhance transparency and accountability to the shareholders. 
Biswas (2012) study also stated that new corporate governance guidelines will improve the 
corporate governance practices of the listed companies in Bangladesh. He also added that 
new guideline will indirectly reduce the cost of monitoring of regulator and general investors 
because the company needs to obtain a certificate of compliance of corporate governance 
guidelines from the chartered accountant or cost and management accountant or a chartered 
secretary and this certificate ensure the verification of the contents of compliance of 
corporate governance guidelines.  
 
4.3.3.2   Areas of Further Improvement of Corporate Governance Guidelines 
The regulatory authority should consider some additional issues as part of corporate 
governance guidelines such as: 
There is no guideline or instruction in the corporate governance guideline 2006 and 
2012 about how tax should be reported in the financial statements.  All the firms submit the 
tax return according to income tax law or income tax ordinance but the reporting quality is 
very poor in the annual report in absence of information in the corporate governance 
guideline. Corporate governance guidelines should include how tax should be reported, 
additional statement of tax compliance and computation (current and deferred tax) in details, 
area of tax rebate etc. Bala and Moniruzzamand (2011) study also recommend to report tax as 
part of corporate governance.  
Bangladesh Bank, the central bank and regulatory authority, introduced some 
guidelines about the risk reporting and mentioned about only six kind of risk such as:  credit, 
asset liability management, foreign exchange, money laundering, internal control and 
information and communication technology risks. There was no information about risk 
 225  
 
reporting in corporate governance guideline 2006. Corporate governance guideline 2012 
requires that directors should include an additional statement in the director‟s report about 
risk and concerns. But there are no specific guidelines in the corporate governance 2006 and 
2012, what kind of risk should be reported other than Bangladesh Bank guidelines, how risk 
should be measured and managed, how many risk should be considered, how to deal with 
about future risk. As a result, most of the firms reporting quality is not up to the mark. Thus, 
risk management and reporting guideline should be in details in the corporate governance 
guidelines.  
In the most of the developed and developing countries, there exist a separate 
nomination and compensation committee. But there are no separate nomination committee 
and compensation committee according to corporate governance guideline. Boards of 
directors nominate and decide the compensation of the management and employees. But a 
separate nomination and compensation committee would be most effective for company and 
will reduce workload of the board of directors. Corporate governance guidelines should 
incorporate separate nomination and compensation committee as part of corporate 
governance guidelines. Biswas (2012) study also recommends these two committees as part 
of corporate governance.  
Most of the firms have no appropriate measurement tools or techniques to evaluate 
the performance of the board. It is also almost difficult for the firm to evaluate individual and 
independent director‟s performance. Thus, corporate governance guidelines should set the 
guideline to measure the individual or board performance. Biswas (2012) study also arguing 
in favor of individual or overall performance analysis of the board.  
Corporate governance guidelines 2012 and 2006 increase the proportion of 
independent directors in the board. Most of the firms have the minimum number of 
independent directors but it is difficult to assess the true independence of the board, audit 
committee, executive committee, risk management committee and other supporting 
committee without any specific criteria or guidelines. Thus, regulatory authority should 
include specific criteria or requirement in the corporate governance guidelines to judge the 
true independence of the independent directors. Biswas (2012) study also supported this 
recommendation.  
Thus, to ensure higher quality of corporate governance and transparency, the 
regulatory authority should consider these issues such as tax reporting, risk management and 
reporting; individual and overall performance analysis of the board and independent 
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directors; separate nomination and compensation committee; assessment of true 
independence of the board and its supporting committees etc.  
 
4.4 Theoretical Framework  
A theory is defined as a set of interconnected concepts, explanations, and propositions 
that describe or forecast observable fact in focusing the association of the variables.  
Theoretical framework explains, analyze and improve the corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is an integral part of business and widely used by the regulator, policy maker, 
firms, businessmen, and academics. But there is no specific framework to define the scope of 
corporate governance.  Biswas (2012) study also stated that scope of good corporate 
governance is not clear in governance literature. Regulators and researchers define the 
corporate governance based on various legal, theoretical, and philosophical grounds which 
help to improve the understanding of corporate governance.  The most popular theory for 
corporate governance is the agency theory (Biswas, 2012). Most of the corporate governance 
literature mainly used agency theory as the theoretical framework (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Aguilera et al., 2008; Biswas, 2012).   
Agency theory is the influential theory for corporate governance.  The importance of 
corporate governance originates from the agency conflict between shareholders and managers 
(Hart, 1995; Roe 1996). Corporate governance can also plays a vital role to reduce the agency 
conflict and agency cost.  Agency theory explains the relationship between managers and 
shareholders and corporate governance mechanisms make the alignment of the interest of 
managers and shareholders (Lopes and Walker, 2012).   
The objective of corporate governance is to control the opportunistic behavior of 
management according to agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The supporters of agency 
theory stated that corporate governance is a set of monitoring and controlling instruments 
which minimize the opportunistic behavior of management and decrease the information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Gillian, 2006).  Biswas (2012) study stated that insiders 
always seek for opportunity and controlling or monitoring mechanisms should be applied to 
protect the minority shareholders from expropriation by insiders according to agency theory. 
Turrent and Ariza  (2016) study also stated that firm should adopt the internal and external 
mechanisms of corporate governance following the agency theory to decrease the agency 
cost.  Liew (2007) study stated that agency theory also leads to reform of corporate 
governance which reduces the agency conflict in the developing country. Adoption of 
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corporate governance practices depends mainly on macro level such as legal system and code 
of corporate governance and inter organizational level such as board characteristics, 
ownership structure and firm leverage (Boliari and Topyan, 2007; Campbell, 2007; Turrent 
and Ariza, 2016). Eisenhardt (1989) and Demski and Feltham (1978) study stated that 
shareholders or principal should concentrate on information systems like reporting process, 
board of directors and different levels of management in response to invisible behavior of 
management.  
In summary, the agency theory requires that for better governance: emphasize should 
be given on board characteristics, ownership structure and firm leverage to improve the 
corporate governance practices (Boliari and Topyan, 2007; Campbell, 2007; Turrent and 
Ariza, 2016) ;  chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should be different 
individuals (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; McColgan, 2001; 
Biswas, 2012); separate audit committee; presence of higher number of independent directors 
in the board and audit committee (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; 
McColgan, 2001; Biswas, 2012); board size should be small (Jensen, 1993; Biswas, 2012); 
and institutional investors should play as an effective important instrument of corporate 
governance (Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Solomon et al., 2002; Al Najjar, 2010).  
 
4.5 Selection Process of Sample  
Total 234 firm years are considered as sample from the thirty listed banks of Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) during the period of 2006 to 2013.  Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC), the regulatory authority, introduced corporate governance 
guidelines in 2006 and new corporate governance guidelines (amendment) in 2012 to ensure 
better governance of the firms. All the banks have to prepare the corporate governance 
compliance checklist since 2006. Only few banks disclose the corporate governance 
information in details voluntarily. The sample of the listed banks is given in the Table 2-4. 
 
[Insert Table 2-4 about Here] 
 
4.6 Research Design 
4.6.1 Hypothesis Development 
In empirical research, the major determinants of corporate governance quality are 
board size, board independence, presence of women in the board, firm size, composition of 
firm assets, firm performance, firm value, growth opportunities, investment opportunities, 
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external financing, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, 
largest shareholder ownership, director ownership, CEO ownership, CEO duality, audit 
quality, leverage and firm age. But some variables (presence of women in the board, 
composition of firm assets, firm performance, firm value, growth and investment 
opportunities, external financing, largest shareholder ownership, audit quality, CEO duality 
and ownership) are excluded due to simplicity, data complexity, availability and applicability 
in the context of listed banks of Bangladesh. In this study, board characteristics (such as 
board size and board independence), ownership structures (such as institutional ownership, 
director ownership, and foreign investors), external monitoring (such as firm leverage) and 
firm characteristics (such as firm size and firm age) are considered as the determinants of 
corporate governance quality.  
The hypotheses are developed considering the previous empirical literature and 
applicability in listed banks of Bangladesh which are described below: 
 
Board Characteristics 
Board Size  
Agency theory has significant role in board setting. Agency theory presents the 
importance of the board as monitoring and controlling instrument in corporate governance 
practices and to avoid corporate failure. Fama and Jensen (1983) study also stated that agency 
problem arises due to separation of ownership and managers and board as a controlling 
instrument reduce the agency problem and agency cost.  McColgan (2001) study identified 
seven categories of control mechanisms to reduce the agency problem and board structure 
and process is one the major mechanism of control. Board of directors is specially known as 
internal corporate governance mechanism. Board of directors mainly set the strategy, monitor 
and control the activities of management for the interest of the shareholders. Board ensures 
high quality of corporate governance and corporate governance quality depends on the size of 
the board of directors. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) study also supported that board 
size is key factor for ensuring better governance.   
Board monitor and control the activities of management but it is difficult to say which 
board is effective either large board or small board for ensuring corporate governance quality.  
There is no accepted consensus about the size of board in the corporate governance literature. 
Gandia (2008) and  Turrent and Ariza (2016) study stated that number of directors should be 
reasonable in the board because functional and monitoring capacity are directly influenced by 
board size.  Some researcher argues that large board is effective for ensuring higher quality 
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while others argues that small board is more effective to ensure higher quality of corporate 
governance.  
 The proponents of large board argues that large board consisting of  diversified and 
experienced members, effectively monitor, coordinate and control the activities of 
management, utilize the resources efficiently, and thus ensure corporate governance quality at 
higher level.  The proverb says that “Two head is better than one” and large boards pursuing 
the proverb includes so many diversified and experienced members and take the effective 
decision for the interest of the shareholders.  Empirical evidence also stated that large board 
is effective for ensuring high quality of corporate governance because large board have more 
number of experienced members with diversified background (Laksamana, 2008; Turrent and 
Ariza, 2016); monitor management activities more efficiently and ensure proper utilization of 
resources (Goodstein et al., 1994; Beasley, 1996; Karamanou and Vafes, 2005) with better 
governance (Gordon et al., 2012).  
 In contrast, empirical research identified that large boards:  have agency risk 
(Tchuigoua, 2015), diversified opinion (Turrent and Ariza, 2016) and coordination problem 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Beiner et al. , 2006; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008; Waweru, 2014a; Tchuigoua, 2015); weakly monitor management activities 
and governance (Barucci and Falini , 2005); have less concern in evaluating management 
performance (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Waweru, 2014a); 
take more time to make effective decision (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008; Waweru, 2014a); restrain its members in motivating and participating in 
strategic decision formulation (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005); organization is not structured 
(Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Waweru, 2014a); is controlled 
by management (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Waweru, 
2014a) or forward the decision making power to management (Tchuigoua, 2015); have the 
problem of information asymmetries between independent directors and insiders (Harris and 
Raviv, 2008), free riding behavior and conflict of interest among board members (Tchuigoua, 
2015); create low market value in concentrated ownership (Barucci and Ceccacci, 2005); is 
dysfunctional (Khanchel, 2007) and thus large board is not effective for ensuring higher 
quality of corporate governance (Barucci and Falini , 2005; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; 
Tchuigoua, 2015 and Turrent and Ariza, 2016).  
 Agency theory prefers that small board is effective for controlling the behavior of 
management (Biswas, 2012).  The proponent of small board argues that small board is more 
effective than large board in ensuring higher quality of corporate governance. Small board 
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monitor and control in a systematic way than large board. Moreover, coordination and timely 
decision is easier in small board.  Prior studies find that small board is more effective because 
coordination and communication problems are less (Khanchel, 2007) and ensures good 
governance (Barucci and Falini, 2005). Jensen (1993) study stated that small board size is 
more effective for decision making and reducing CEO domination. But Barucci and Falini 
(2005) study stated that the relationship between board size and corporate governance is 
ambiguous and small board is controlled by the controlling shareholders.  
To make a comparative analysis between large board and small board, empirical 
research finds that small board is better and effective than large board because large board 
have the agency problem (Tchuigoua , 2015); coordination and communication problem 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Beiner et al. ,2006; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008; Waweru, 2014a; Tchuigoua, 2015); monitoring and free riding problems 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Tchuigoua, 2015).  But Gordon et al. (2012) study stated that 
board size is large in larger firms and large firms have the ability to appoint highly qualified 
personnel as board members where as board size is small in smaller firms and small firms 
have not ability to apply best corporate governance practices due to its limited resources. 
Empirical research finds that the relationship between board size and corporate 
governance quality is mixed. Some studies find that large board is positively associated with 
corporate governance quality (Barako et al., 2006; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Gordon et 
al., 2012) while other studies find that small board is more effective than large board and 
small board is negatively associated with corporate governance quality (Barucci and Falini, 
2005; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Turrent and Ariza, 2016). But Tchuigoua 
(2015) study find that there is no significant association of board size with corporate 
governance quality.  
From the above discussion and literature review, it is difficult to conclude the 
direction between corporate governance quality and board size and thus develop the 
hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between board size and corporate 
governance quality. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between board size and corporate 
governance quality. 
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Independent Director  
Corporate governance is introduced to protect the interest of shareholders. 
Independent director, as the major instrument of corporate governance, protect the interest of 
the shareholders and maximize shareholder value. Rouf (2011) study also supported that 
independent director is the driving force for shareholder value maximization. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) study stated that concept of board independence or independent director is 
developed on the basis of agency theory and suggest that board should consist of majority of 
independent directors for better supervision of management. Agency theory prefers 
appointment of higher number of independent directors in the board which improve the 
corporate governance (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992). Board 
independence (independent/outside directors) plays a key role in reducing agency conflict 
between owner and manager and agency cost (Abdullah, 2015; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003).    
Board effectiveness depends on the more number of the independent directors in the 
board.  Independent directors are appointed to work on behalf of the shareholders interest. 
The role of independent directors is to make sure that management is liable to the 
shareholders and interest of shareholders is well managed (Waweru, 2014a). Independent 
directors are treated as outsiders of the firm and effectively monitor the performance of 
management (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Kaplan and Minton, 1985; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008) using their diversified knowledge and experience. Presence of more independent 
directors in the board also controls the self maximization behavior of management, family 
owners and large group of shareholders. Independent directors may change the management 
and control management activities if any decision or activities of management are against the 
interest of the shareholders.  
Board including the outside independent directors has the capacity to diminish the 
corruption of management (Mehran 1995) and to remove the management if the performance 
is poor (Weisbach, 1988). Shapiro (2006) study also supported that management self 
maximization interest can be reduced by presence of more independent directors in the board.  
Independent directors can alter the CEO if performance of the CEO is not satisfactory and 
firm performance reduces drastically (Khanchel, 2007).  Independent directors are also more 
concerned about compliance of corporate governance attributes and monitor accordingly.  
Moreover, they build up their reputation in the market by maintaining their true independence 
and ensuring higher corporate governance quality.  
Empirical research finds that presence of higher proportion of independent directors 
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has some positive consequences such as- enhance the monitoring quality over management 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983, Weir and Laing, 2003; Chau and Leung, 2006; Samaha 
et al., 2012); increase corporate governance reporting quality (Parsa et al., 2007;  Abdullah, 
2015); increase financial statement quality (Samaha et al.,  2012); increase financial 
disclosure quality (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 2004); reduce  fraud in 
financial statement (Beasley, 1996; Waweru, 2014a; Abdullah, 2015); reduce scope of 
earnings management ( Peasnell et al. 2000; Chtourou et al. , 2001; Xie, 2003; Samaha et al., 
2012); and finally ensures higher  performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008; Ajinkya et al., 2005;  Waweru, 2014a).  
Most of the empirical studies find the positive relationship between corporate 
governance quality and independent directors and this result implies that independent 
directors ensure effective monitoring and control to retain their image in the market (Samaha 
and Dahawy, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012;  Turrent and Ariza, 2016). In Bangladesh, 
proportion of independent directors increases from one tenth (i.e. 10%) or minimum one 
(corporate governance guidelines, 2006) to one fifth i.e. 20% (corporate governance 
guidelines, 2012) which means that regulatory authority  is more emphasized on importance 
of independent directors to protect the interest of shareholders. This study expects a positive 
impact of independent directors on corporate governance quality and thus, develops the 
hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent directors 
and corporate governance quality. 
 
Ownership Structure  
Institutional Ownership  
Institutional ownership is the major instrument of corporate governance. Institutional 
owners may have significant influence on corporate governance quality.  But the role of 
institutional investors in the firm depends on the magnitude of institutional investors‟ 
ownership.  Institutional investors are normally bank, insurance company and other non 
banking financial institution. Following the agency theory, Al Najjar (2010) study especially 
emphasized on institutional investors and stated that the institutional investors act as a 
monitoring instrument. He also stated that institutional investors are part of corporate 
governance and they play their monitoring role in the firms and spread the information to 
other shareholders. He also added that institutional investors monitor management activities 
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and control the firm and thereby reduce the agency conflict and the demand of capital market 
for external monitoring and ensure better governance.  Kaplan and Minton (1994) study finds 
that an important instrument of corporate governance is the financial institutions especially 
the banks in Japan.  Solomon et al. (2002) study added that the major instrument of corporate 
governance reform is the financial institutions.  
Institutional investors are more concerned about quality of corporate governance 
because they have significant ownership in the firm. Prior research also finds that institutional 
investors strongly monitor the firm when they have significant portion of investment (Admati 
et al., 1994; Al- Najjar, 2010) and benefits from monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986;  
Farooque et al., 2007; Al- Najjar, 2010). Institutional investors using diversified knowledge 
and experience monitor the activities of management and restrict them if any activities are 
against the interest of the shareholders and thereby ensure quality of corporate governance at 
higher level. Institutional monitoring is important because institutional investors have strong 
power or influence to change the decision of management or replace management. 
Institutional investors monitor the activities of management through institutional ownership 
and trading capacity (Gillan and Starks, 2002; Al-Najjar, 2010) and participating in the board 
(board member works as the representative of the institution)) and ensure better transparency 
and corporate governance (Biswas, 2012). Kruapong (2011) study added that institutional 
investors influence the firm to maintain and develop better governance otherwise they 
withdraw their investment and invest in better governance firms. 
Management becomes more careful to ensure high quality corporate governance 
because they know that their activities will be monitored by the institutional investors. They 
also try to ensure higher level of corporate governance to attract and retain potential and 
existing investors. Moreover, they ensure better governance and use it as a performance 
indicator during their performance evaluation and promotion.  
In contrast, the role of institutional investors may not be strong if institutional 
ownership is not significant enough. Empirical research also support that institutional 
investors may not play their influential role or become inactive or inefficient due to low 
ownership (Farooque et al., 2007; Biswas, 2012); lack of incentive (Monks, 1995; Khanchel, 
2007);and conflict of interest (acting as owners and beneficiaries)(Khanchel, 2007). 
Institutional investors may not play their influential role to ensure higher governance in the 
same industry or peer group. Institutional monitoring may not be an effective instrument for 
better governance. In addition, Khanchel (2007) study argued that role of institutional 
investors is debatable. He observed that in prior studies, institutional investors have 
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significant influence on corporate governance only when corporate governance is strong or 
succeed otherwise not. He also added that   institutional investors invest in a firm that have 
previous good record of better governance, thus they are beneficial for owning shares not for 
their influential institutional role.  Barucci and Falini (2005) study also observed that role of 
institutional owners are not influential in general and in the Italian financial market, 
institutional investors chose the firm that has better governance.  
Empirical research finds that institutional investors is significantly positively 
associated with corporate governance quality (Barucci and Falini, 2005; Khanchel, 2007; 
Kruapong, 2011).  In Bangladesh, Biswas (2012) study finds that institutional investors hold 
only 15.65% in the non financial companies and thus expect a positive relationship between 
institutional investors and governance quality. But Biswas (2012) study find that there is no 
significant association between institutional investors with corporate governance quality.  
After the above discussion and analysis of literature review, it would be interesting to check 
the role of institutional investors in the listed banks of Bangladesh and thus develop the 
hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate 
governance quality.  
 
Director Ownership  
Agency problem occurs due to separation of owners and managers and director 
ownership (non executive director) work as an instrument to resolve the agency problem 
between owners and managers and thereby reduce the agency cost. Director ownership is also 
a major instrument of corporate governance which aligns the interest of directors and 
shareholders in the same line and thus ensures higher governance.  
Corporate governance quality is higher when director owns a major percentage of 
ownership. Directors want to ensure that they are highly concerned about quality of corporate 
governance and thus monitor and maintain better governance. They have direct access and 
inside information of the firm thus they can take effective decision which ultimately affects 
the governance quality.  They try to practice high quality of corporate governance to attract 
and retain potential and existing investors. They maintain good governance practices and use 
it as performance indicator during evaluation of directors‟ performance and reappointment of 
directors.   
Directors, having significant ownership, enjoy the benefits and bear negative effect of 
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management activities and thereby reduce the agency cost by aligning the interest of 
shareholders and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Samaha et al., 2012). When directors 
have significant ownership, they have more incentive to develop the quality of corporate 
governance rather than extracting personal benefits.  Director ownership also influences the 
management motivation such as higher percentage of director ownership motivates the 
management for firm wealth maximization and lower percentage of director ownership 
motivates the management for personal benefit maximization. Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Samaha et al. (2012) study also supported that agency problem is increased due to director 
low ownership. They also added that when directors have low ownership, managers are more 
concerned about bonus and other benefits and less concerned about firm performance.  
Prior studies also documented that director ownership is one of the instruments of 
corporate governance and work as a substitute of disclosure (Samaha et al., 2012) and 
reduces the demand of extra monitoring and transparency (Kelton and Yang, 2008;  Samaha 
et al., 2012). Most of the empirical research used ownership, ownership concentration, 
management ownership, largest shareholder ownership and (largest) block holder ownership 
as the proxy of ownership variables and these studies documented that corporate governance 
quality is positively associated with ownership concentration (Durnev and Kim, 2005); block 
holder ownership (Silveira et al., 2009; Gordon et al., 2012); managerial ownership( 
Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011); and negatively associated with largest shareholder 
ownership (Barucci and Falini, 2005; Tchuigoua, 2015); ownership concentration (including 
voting right and cash flow right) (Silveira et al., 2009).  But there is no significant association 
of corporate governance quality with ownership (Black et al., 2006b; Ariff et al., 2007; 
Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011); larger block holders ownership (Barucci and Falini, 2005; 
Beiner et al., 2006); and largest shareholder ownership (Beiner et al., 2006).  
Only few studies used director ownership as the determinants of corporate governance 
quality. Khanchel (2007) study finds that director and officers‟ ownership is significantly 
positively associated with corporate governance quality.  Biswas (2012) study also 
documented the positive relationship between corporate governance quality and insider 
ownership. In Bangladesh, controlling shareholders are very powerful and influential party 
and they want to ensure better governance to maximize their personal benefits. Moreover, 
directors are mainly the controlling shareholder and thus expect a positive relationship 
between corporate governance quality and director ownership and develop the hypothesis as: 
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Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between director ownership and corporate 
governance quality.  
 
Foreign Ownership  
Corporate governance quality also depends on foreign ownership. Foreign investors 
have the significant influence to ensure higher quality of corporate governance.  Foreign 
investors are more concerned about the corporate governance quality when they have the 
involvement of huge investment.  Corporate governance quality is higher if firm have the 
foreign investment because foreign investor demand high level of quality of corporate 
governance and monitor accordingly.  Biswas (2012) study also supported that higher foreign 
ownership increases the demand of information and better governance. Higher quality of 
corporate governance ensure to the  foreign investors that firm is maintaining the appropriate 
governance policy and their investment fund is safe and secured.  If the corporate governance 
quality is not satisfactory, foreign investors may reduce their investment. Other researches 
find that foreign ownership increases the information asymmetry (Bokpin and Isshaq, 2009) 
and agency cost (Broberg et al., 2010); monitoring cost and disclosure quality (Tsamenyi et 
al., 2007; Wang et al. (2008).   
Management become more conscious and tries to ensure to the foreign investors that 
they are highly involved in maintaining the higher standard of corporate governance. Broberg 
et al. (2010) study also stated that management ensures the transparency and effective 
corporate governance mechanisms to the foreign investors. Management discloses more 
voluntary information to attract and retain potential and existing investors. Management also 
have the incentives (like performance incentives) to maintain higher level of corporate 
governance.  
Samaha (2014) study supported that quality of corporate governance increases with 
the increase of foreign ownership. But Silverira et al. (2009) study doesn‟t find any 
significant association between corporate governance index and foreign ownership. In 
Bangladesh, Biswas (2012) study finds that foreign investors hold only 1.79% investment in 
non financial listed companies and this ownership is very low but documented a significant 
positive relationship of corporate governance quality with foreign ownership. Biswas (2012) 
study examined the relationship between corporate governance quality and foreign ownership 
in listed non financial companies of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). But, it would be 
interesting to find out the relationship in financial companies and thus develop the hypothesis 
as: 
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Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and corporate 
governance quality.  
 
External Monitoring 
Leverage  
Corporate Governance quality depends on firms leverage.  Creditors closely monitor 
the firm due to their higher demand of corporate governance and they create pressure or 
impose restriction to ensure better governance. Creditors should evaluate financial strength, 
governance quality, risk management procedure and reputation in the market during their 
loan agreement (Armstrong et al., 2010; Biswas, 2012).  Firms with high leverage should 
develop the quality of corporate governance to achieve creditor‟s confidence (Biswas, 2012).  
Creditors like banks closely monitor and create pressure on high leverage firms for 
improvement of corporate governance (Cho and Kim, 2003; Gordon et al., 2012) and thus 
other governance measures are less used (Black et al., 2006b). Biswas (2012) study also 
argued that agency cost can be reduced by debt and it work as an alternative instrument of 
governance measure that ultimately ensures higher governance. Black et al. (2006b) study 
explained two theories such as substitution story and reverse causation story related to 
leverage. According to substitution story, they stated that firms having higher debt faces 
creditor close monitoring and have less concern about equity capital which causes weaker 
governance. In reverse causation story, weak governed firms have less opportunity to use 
equity and thus depend on debt. They also recommended investors pressure story which 
indicated that creditors should demand better governance with other good terms to the firm 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003).  
 Most of the firms depend on bank loan for external financing because capital market 
is weak in the developing countries (Waweru et al., 2011). Investor protection motivates the 
investors for external finance (La Porta et al., 1999). Firms which have profitable investment 
opportunities demand higher external financing (La Porta et al., 1999;  Durnev and Kim, 
2005; Khanchel, 2007) and demand of external financing acts as an influential factor to 
improve better corporate governance (Anand et al., 2006; Khanchel, 2007).  
In contrast, leverage may be negatively influence corporate governance quality. 
Creditors may not have strong bargaining power on management to ensure better governance. 
Creditors may not play their monitoring role due to politics. Creditors also may not have 
concern about quality of corporate governance because credit monitoring is not a significant 
part of corporate governance.  
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Empirical evidence of corporate governance quality with leverage is mixed. Leverage 
is significantly positively associated with corporate governance quality (Black et al., 2003; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gordon et al., 2012; Waweru, 2014b).  Ariff et al. (2007) study 
stated that leverage is positively associated with corporate governance and they explained 
two reasons, first firms with high leverage develop better governance to achieve higher image 
and second, creditors like financial institution  create pressure in the highly leverage firms to 
ensure corporate governance.  
On the other hand, few studies find that leverage is negatively associated with 
corporate governance quality which implies that firms with high leverage are connected with 
poor governance (Faccio et al., 2001; Friedman et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Biswas, 
2012; Waweru, 2014a). In addition, other research studies documented that there is no 
significant association between corporate governance quality with leverage (Black et al., 
2006b; Ariff et al., 2007; Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011).  In Bangladesh, Biswas (2012) 
study stated that debt ratio is 69.61% in non financial companies and loan disbursement 
process is frequently influenced by politics and thereby creditors may not play their 
monitoring role.  On the basis of above discussion and literature review, it is evident that 
empirical evidence is mixed and thus I develop the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 6a:  There is a positive relationship between leverage and corporate governance 
quality. 
 
Hypothesis 6b:  There is a negative relationship between leverage and corporate 
governance quality.  
 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size  
Firm size is a significant factor in explaining corporate governance quality. It is 
assumed that large firms ensure higher quality of corporate governance. The reason might be: 
First, larger firms have enough resources, skilled employees and strong financial support to 
comply the corporate governance rules and regulation. Second, large firms provide more 
voluntary and mandatory corporate governance information to meet the demand of 
shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders. Third, large firms are more concerned about 
corporate governance quality to increase their market share and to retain their reputation in 
the market.  
 239  
 
Empirical research documented that larger firms have higher agency problem because 
monitoring is difficult for large firms and thereby concluded an ambiguous relationship 
between firm size and corporate governance (Jensen, 1986; Klapper and Love, 2004; Barucci 
and Falini , 2005; Ariff et al., 2007;  Khanchel, 2007).  Khanchel (2007) study also stated that 
big firms have the higher agency problem and thus require a high quality of corporate 
governance (Black et al., 2006b; Ariff et al., 2007; Silveira et al., 2009; Waweru, 2014a). 
Large firms have financial capital and human resources which are necessary to execute 
corporate governance at highest level (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Silveira et al., 2009; Biswas, 
2012; Waweru, 2014a). Large firms draw special attention of the stakeholders and 
stakeholders made a critical analysis of the large firm (Dunerv and Kim, 2002; Waweru, 
2014a). Thus, large firms deal with extra pressure to execute better governance and failure to 
apply of better governance will lead them to lose stakeholders confidence and reputation as 
well.  
On the other hand, small firms‟ operational activities and monitoring are 
comparatively easier in compare to large firms but it is difficult to apply and maintain the 
corporate governance regulation for small firms.  Small firms have limited resources and 
financial support to bear additional cost for quality of corporate governance. Nevertheless, 
small firms may practice higher quality corporate governance to create strong position in the 
market and to attract new potential investors. Rapid growth and external capital demand 
motivate the small firms to ensure better quality of corporate governance (Jensen, 1986; 
Klapper and Love, 2004;  Ariff et al., 2007; Khanchel, 2007; Silveira et al., 2009; Biswas, 
2012; Waweru, 2014a, 2014b). Klapper and Love (2004) and Silveira et al. (2009) study 
stated that both large and small firms have the motivation to voluntarily implement the 
corporate governance quality at highest level.  
The empirical evidence of firm size and corporate governance quality is mixed. Most 
of the empirical studies find that firm size is significantly positively associated with corporate 
governance quality (Barucci and Falini, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006b; Ariff et 
al., 2007; Khanchel, 2007; Silveira et al., 2009; Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011; Biswas, 
2012; Gordon et al., 2012; Waweru, 2014a, 2014b).  Some studies find that firm size is 
negatively associated with corporate governance quality (Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and 
Caylor, 2006; Fama and French, 1992). Only few studies find that there is no association 
between corporate governance quality and firm size (Klapper and Love, 2004). In previous 
studies,  natural logarithm of assets (Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006b; Silveira et al. ; 
2009; Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011; Biswas , 2012) and  natural logarithm of sales 
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(Klapper and Love, 2004; Barucci and Falini, 2005; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Ariff et al., 
2007) are used as the proxy of firm size.  On the basis of above discussion and empirical 
evidence, thus develop the hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between firm size and corporate governance 
quality.  
 
Firm Age  
Firm age is also a significant determinant to ensure higher quality of corporate 
governance. Corporate governance quality and reporting varies based on age of the firm. It is 
assumed that old firms have higher quality of corporate governance because old firms already 
established in the market and they practiced corporate governance for long time and 
developed corporate governance quality over the year based on regulatory requirement and 
stakeholder demand. Black et al. (2006b) and Biswas (2012) study also stated that corporate 
governance system is better in older firms because they get enough time to develop the 
corporate governance and meet the internal requirement and investor demand. Ariff et al. 
(2007) study stated that older firms are better firms and older firms are supposed to have 
appropriate system and operation, sufficient resources and high reputation which contribute 
to higher governance. Older firms have the opportunity to learn from their previous 
experience or from others firms about the effect of higher or lower quality of corporate 
governance (Ariff et al., 2007).  Most of the old firms have the capacity to bear the additional 
cost of application or maintenance of corporate governance. But old firms may reluctant to 
ensure higher quality of corporate governance as they are already established in the market 
and less demand to attract new shareholders.  
In contrast, corporate governance quality is higher for newly firms. The reason might 
be: First, newly firms want to ensure higher quality of corporate governance to survive in the 
market and try to create the confidence of investors, shareholders and regulators on them. 
Biswas (2012) study also stated that younger firms show greater corporate governance quality 
because they have to survive in the market with the competition of old firms.  Second, newly 
firms become more conscious about the regulatory and voluntary corporate governance 
practices and provide more information to the potential investors and other interested users to 
increase and retain their market share.  But newly firms may not ensure better quality of 
corporate governance due to additional cost of implementation or maintenance of corporate 
governance. Newly firms also become reluctant to reveal more information due to threat of 
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losing competitive advantage, higher cost of information analyzing and in lack of relative 
information (Turrent and Ariza, 2016).  
The empirical evidence of corporate governance quality and firm age is mixed.  
Biswas (2012) and Turrent and Ariza (2016) study documented a positive relationship 
between firm age and corporate governance quality. But Lei (2006) study reported that 
corporate governance quality is statistically negatively associated with firm age. Other studies 
find that there is no significant association of corporate governance and firm age (Black et al., 
2006b; Ariff et al., 2007; Haque, Arun and Kirkpatrick, 2011). In previous studies, firm‟s 
years of incorporated (Ariff et al., 2007) or established (Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011) or 
listed (Black et al., 2006b; Biswas, 2012) are used as the proxy of firm age. On the basis of 
above mixed discussion and empirical evidence, I developed the hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 8a: There is a positive relationship between firm age and corporate governance 
quality. 
 
Hypothesis 8b: There is a negative relationship between firm age and corporate 
governance quality. 
 
4.6.2 Model 
This study deals with corporate governance quality and its determinants. Corporate 
governance quality is critically explained using the descriptive statistics including overall and 
subcategories of governance quality over the years, item wise analysis and graph. In addition, 
it is observed that the sample size is not equal in each year, and the sample size ranges twenty 
six to thirty during the study period, and number of observations is comparatively less in 
total. Thus, to get the larger sample size and greater variation which reduces the standard 
error, this study applies the pooled cross sectional method to test the hypothesis. The 
determinants of governance quality are examined based on the following model:  
 
Q_CG =   β0 + β1 Board Composition + β2 Ownership   Structures + β3 External Monitoring + 
β4 Firm Characteristic + ɛ 
 
Where Q_CG presents the quality of corporate governance; board composition 
includes board size and board independence; ownership structure includes institutional 
ownership, director ownership and foreign ownership; external monitoring presents the firm‟s 
leverage and firm characteristics include firm size and firm age.  
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The models are further restructured on the basis of above equation: 
Q_CG = β0 + β1LNBSIZE + β2 ID + β3 INT+ β4 OWNDIR + β5 FINVTR+ β6 DEBT2TE+ β7 
LNASSET+ β8 LNFAGE +ɛ 
 
Where, 
 
Q_CG Corporate governance quality 
LNBSIZE Natural Logarithm of number of board size.  
ID Percentage of independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of 
independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors.  
INT Percentage of ownership held by institution. It is computed by number of 
shares owned by institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding.    
OWNDIR Percentage of shares ownership held by all directors in a board. It is 
computed by number of shares owned by all directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.   
FINVTR Percentage of ownership held by foreign investors. It is computed by 
number of shares owned by foreign investors divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. 
DEBT2TE Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity.  
LNASSET Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy 
of firm size.  
LNFAGE Natural logarithm of firm age which considers the firm age from 
establishment 
 
Definition of variables and their expected relationship with corporate governance 
quality are given in the Table 4- 3.  
 
Table 4-3 
Definition of Variables 
Variables Variables Explanation  Predicted 
Relationship 
   
Corporate Governance 
Quality 
   
Corporate governance 
quality 
Q_CG Quality of corporate governance  
    
Board Structure 
Information 
   
Board Size LNBSIZE Natural Logarithm of Board Size Positive 
Negative 
Independent Directors ID  %  of Independent directors in a board Positive 
    
Ownership Structure    
Institutional Ownership INT % of ownership held by Institution Positive 
Director‟s Ownership OWNDIR % of Ownership held by all directors in 
a board 
Positive 
Foreign Investors FINVTR % of Ownership held by Foreign 
Investors 
Positive 
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Table 4-3 
Definition of Variables 
Variables Variables Explanation  Predicted 
Relationship 
    
External Monitoring    
Debt Ratio DEBT2TE Book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total equity 
Positive 
Negative 
    
Firm Characteristic    
Firm Size LNASSET Natural logarithm of book value of 
total assets 
Positive 
Firm Age LNFAGE Natural logarithm of firm age Positive 
Negative 
 
4.6.3 Variables 
Only listed banks that are traded on Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) are considered for 
empirical analysis.  The major sources of this empirical analysis are annual report of banks 
that are available at specific bank websites and website of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). The 
financial time period of all listed banks start from 1st January and end at December 31. 
Corporate governance quality data and other variables cover the time period from 2006 to 
2013. The sample is considered from 2006 because Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC), regulatory authority, introduced corporate governance guideline in 
2006 and corporate governance guideline (amendment) in 2012 and all banks have to prepare 
the corporate governance compliance checklist since 2006. Only few banks disclose 
corporate governance information in details voluntarily.  
In this study, the variables include corporate governance quality, board characteristics 
such as board size, percentage of independent directors, ownership structures such as 
percentage of ownership by institution, foreign investors and director ownership and external 
monitoring information such as leverage and firm characteristic such as firm size and firm‟s 
age.  
The most important part of this study is to compute the corporate governance quality. 
Corporate governance quality index is developed considering corporate governance 
guidelines 2006 and 2012, Bangladesh Bank guidelines, listing rules of Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE), disclosure practices, Biswas (2012) study and other previous empirical 
literature. Corporate governance quality considers total 285 attributes of governance and 
divided into eight subcategories such as quality of ownership information (13 attributes) ; 
quality of shareholder rights information (13 attributes); quality of financial transparency and 
information in the annual report information ( 49 attributes); quality of board, management 
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structure and process information (134 attributes) ; quality of external auditing information 
(12 attributes) ; quality of risk management information (35 attributes); quality of tax 
management information (15 attributes) ; and quality of corporate responsibility, compliance 
and stakeholder information (14 attributes). The answer of all the attributes is collected from 
the annual report.  If the answer of the attributes is yes (complied or disclosed) then score one 
and all attribute are equally weighted. If the answer of the attributes is no then score zero by 
considering three issues in the annual report such as the attributes is not available in the firm 
or the attributes is available but not material to disclose or attributes is available and it is 
material but the firm chose not to disclose the attributes. This study method considers un-
weighted method and all attributes of governance are scored equally to avoid judgment error. 
Corporate governance quality is measured by adding the score of all attributes of each bank 
and then total score of each bank is divided by total number of attributes and converted into 
percentage form. Thus, corporate governance quality is expressed in percentage form.  
Board characteristics include board size and independent directors. Board size and 
independent directors are obtained from both corporate governance report and board of 
directors‟ profile in the annual report. Percentage of independent director is computed by the 
number of independent directors divided by number of total directors in the board.  
Ownership structure of the listed banks is considered to know the impact of various 
owners on corporate governance quality. Ownership variables such as institutional 
ownership, foreign investor ownership and director ownership are used in this study. 
Institutional ownership and foreign investor ownership information are obtained from the 
shareholding pattern information in the corporate governance report and in the notes of equity 
section of the annual report. Both institutional information and foreign investor ownership 
information are again cross checked with the published information of Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) monthly review report. Any missing data are adjusted with the closet year 
value.  Director ownership information required to disclose in the corporate governance 
report. But some companies disclose in the notes of the financial statement instead of 
corporate governance report. Thus, percentage of director ownership is collected either from 
the corporate governance report or in the notes where it is available.  
External monitoring variable such as leverage also may have the impact on corporate 
governance quality. Leverage is computed by the book value of total debt divided by book 
value of total equity. Both book value of total debt and book value of total equity information 
are collected from the consolidated balance sheet of the annual report.  
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Firm size and firm age also may be the major factor in determination of quality of 
corporate governance. In this study, total asset is used as the proxy of firm size. Book value 
of total asset is collected from the consolidated balance sheet of the annual report. Total asset 
is normally large amount and thus, transformed into natural logarithm of total assets. The data 
of firm age is collected from the profile of bank‟s annual report. Number of years from 
establishment is considered as the firm age and firm age is transformed into natural logarithm 
form.  
 
 
4.7 Analysis of Corporate Governance Quality  
4.7.1 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Corporate Governance Quality 
Table 4-4 represents the descriptive summary statistics of overall corporate 
governance quality. Corporate governance quality includes total 285 attributes and divided 
into eight sub categories such as (1) quality of ownership information (13 attributes); (2) 
quality of shareholder rights information (13 attributes); (3) quality of financial transparency 
and information in the annual report information (49 attributes); (4) quality of board, 
management structure and process information (134 attributes); (5) quality of external 
auditing information (12 attributes); (6) quality of risk management information (35 
attributes);  (7) quality of tax management information (15 attributes); and (8) quality of 
corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information (14 attributes). The detail of 
the checklist of quality of corporate governance is presented in the Appendix 2.  
Each item is equally weighted and score one if attributes of corporate governance 
comply otherwise score zero.  Following the study of Morries et al. (2011) and Biswas 
(2012), any undisclosed attributes score 0 to avoid judgment error in the coding process and 
consider the undisclosed attributes as (1) the attribute is not available in the firm or (2) the 
attribute is available in the firm but it is immaterial to disclose it or (3) the attribute is 
available in the firm, it is material but the firm decided not to disclose the attribute. This 
study considers the un-weighted method and all attributes of governance are scored equally to 
avoid subjectivity and this equally weighted system is used following the study of Cooke 
(1989, 1993) and Biswas (2012). Corporate governance score is measured by adding the 
score of all the attributes of each bank and then total score of each bank is divided by total 
number of attributes and converted into percentage form. Thus, corporate governance quality 
is expressed in percentage form.  
Banking sector is organized and regulated by various laws such as corporate 
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governance guidelines 2006 and 2012, bank company act 1991, and company act 1994 etc. 
Table 4-5 presents the descriptive summary statistics of corporate governance quality from 
2006 to 2013 and the descriptive summary statistics presents that the average mean of 
corporate governance quality measured by the index is only 52.37% which is not good 
enough for the listed banks of Bangladesh and average quality of corporate governance 
ranges from 34.49% to 71.95% with a standard deviation of 14.30%. The lowest quality of 
corporate governance is 6.67% in consecutive two years 2006 and 2007 and the highest 
quality of corporate governance is 82.81% in 2013 as expected. 
 
Table 4-4 
Descriptive Summary Statistics of Overall Corporate Governance Quality 
No. Categories Denoted Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
1 Ownership 
Information (%) 
Q_OWN 
234 66.43658 15.38 53.85 69.23 76.92 100 
17.66011 
2 Shareholders  
Rights (%) 
Q_SR 234 
78.53329 0 76.92 76.92 92.31 100 
18.30107 
3 Financial 
Transparency and 
Information in the 
Annual Report 
(%) 
Q_FT 234 
56.90765 6.12 44.9 57.14 67.35 91.84 
14.96826 
4 Board,  
Management 
Structure and 
Process (%) 
Q_BMP 234 
46.89697 0 34.33 44.03 58.21 84.33 
16.7977 
5 External Auditing 
Information (%) 
Q_AUDT 234 
73.07752 8.33 66.67 75 75 100 
12.29828 
6 Risk 
Management 
Information (%) 
Q_RISK 234 
42.55197 0 25.71 42.86 57.14 88.57 
18.2424 
7 Tax  Information 
(%) 
Q_TAX 234 
52.96278 6.67 46.67 53.33 66.67 86.67 
14.86381 
8 Corporate 
Responsibility, 
Compliance and 
Stakeholder 
Information (%) 
Q_CR_C_S 234 
57.6009 0 42.86 60.715 78.57 100 
24.24288 
 Corporate 
Governance 
Quality (%) 
Q_T_CG 234 
52.36603 6.67 41.05 50.705 63.16 82.81 
14.30467 
 
 
In other words, the banks whose governance structure and monitoring system is best 
have a governance index 82.81% in 2013 and the banks whose governance structure and 
monitoring system is worst have a governance index 6.67% in 2006 and 2007. Corporate 
governance quality is increasing over the years as expected and the major improvement of 
corporate governance quality is from 55.50% in 2011 to 69.46% in 2012 though the highest 
quality of corporate governance is 71.95% in 2013. The major improvement of corporate 
governance quality was in 2012 because the regulatory authority introduced new corporate 
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governance guidelines 2012 which particularly emphasize on quality of financial 
transparency and board, management structure and process information in the annual report.  
  
Table 4-5 
Descriptive statistics of Quality of Corporate Governance Quality 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 34.49346 6.67       32.28           34.915 40 46.67 8.275898        
2007 28 39.53679 6.67 35.965 39.825 45.085 55.44 8.759439 
2008 30 44.50267 32.98 40 43.685 47.72 57.89 6.536693 
2009 30 48.12833 34.04 41.05 48.595 53.68 60.35 7.361807 
2010 30 52.21067 40 44.56 53.33 57.89 69.47 7.642415 
2011 30 55.40267 41.05 49.47 56.49 60 68.77 6.91863 
2012 30 69.462 55.44 64.56 70.18 73.68 81.4 6.111218 
2013 30 71.95333 62.11 68.07 72.105 76.49 82.81 6.031011 
Total 234 52.36603 6.67 41.05 50.705 63.16 82.81 14.30467 
 
 
Table 4-4 also presents that the average mean of quality of ownership information is 
66.44% and ranges from 15.38% to 100% with a standard deviation of 17.66%.  Quality of 
shareholder right information is only 78.53% and minimum is 0% and maximum is 100% 
with a standard deviation 18.30%. Financial transparency is one of the significant part of 
quality of corporate governance and the average mean of quality of financial transparency 
and information in the annual report is 56.91% and ranges from 6.12% to 91.84% with a 
standard deviation of 14.97%.  Corporate governance quality is also depends on quality of 
board, management structure and process information and it is evident that the mean of 
board, management structure and process is 46.90% which indicates moderate quality of 
board information and minimum is 0% and maximum is 84.33%.  External auditing 
information presents only 73.07% on average and ranges from 8.33% to 100%. Risk 
management information also determines the quality of corporate governance and it is 
evident that quality of risk management information is 42.55% on average which is very low 
in this competitive market and risk quality varies from 0% to 88.57%. Corporate governance 
quality includes tax information as a part of corporate governance element and the average 
mean of quality of tax is 52.96% and minimum is 6.67% and maximum is 86.67%.  The 
average mean of corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information is 57.60% 
and ranges from 0% to 100% with a standard deviation 24.24%.  As banking sector is very 
organized, monitored and controlled by central bank and several laws and thus, it is expected 
that high quality of corporate governance as a whole and in all categories. But the descriptive 
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statistics present a different scenario and it is evident that overall quality of corporate 
governance measured by the index is 52.37% only which indicates poor quality of corporate 
governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. This result also implies that 47.63% attributes 
of corporate governance are not complying or following by the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
The empirical result also finds that quality is higher on an average in shareholder rights and 
external auditing information but quality is lower on an average in board, management 
structure and process, financial transparency, risk management and tax management 
information among the sub categories of governance quality. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Behavior of Corporate Governance Quality from 2006 to 2013 
 
In addition, from the figure 4-1, it is also evident that all the subcategories of quality 
of corporate governance are increasing over the years and in recent year, banks are 
maintaining high quality of shareholder right and external auditing practices and low quality 
of tax and risk management practices among the subcategories of corporate governance. The 
figure also presents that corporate governance quality increases rapidly in 2012. The reason is 
new amendment of corporate governance guidelines is introduced in 2012 and new corporate 
governance guidelines made a rapid change of compliance requirement in the segment of 
financial transparency and board, management structure and process. Thus, it is clear that 
mandatory corporate governance guideline imposed by the regulatory authority increased the 
quality of corporate governance.  
 
4.7.2 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Subcategories Corporate Governance Quality 
4.7.2.1 Quality of Ownership Information  
Table 4-6 presents the descriptive summary statistics of quality of ownership 
information. Total 13 attributes related to ownership by sponsors, directors, management and 
executive etc. are considered to assess the quality of ownership information.  
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Quality of ownership information is 66.44% on average and highest average is 
69.74% in 2012 and lowest average is 59.17% in 2006. The minimum and maximum quality 
of ownership information is 15.38% and 100% respectively during the period of 2006 to 
2013. From this statistical analysis, it is evident that though banks are the most regulatory 
financial institution but they are not maintaining high quality of ownership information for 
the interest of the shareholders.  
 
Table 4-6 
Descriptive Statistics of Quality of Ownership Information 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 59.17154 15.38 38.46 61.54 76.92 100 21.18066 
2007 28 63.46143 15.38 53.85 65.385 76.92 100 21.51644 
2008 30 67.43567 38.46 53.85 69.23 76.92 100 17.10351 
2009 30 67.17933 38.46 53.85 69.23 76.92 100 15.76866 
2010 30 67.17967 38.46 61.54 65.385 76.92 100 15.24214 
2011 30 66.92333 38.46 53.85 65.385 76.92 100 17.03939 
2012 30 69.74367 38.46 53.85 69.23 76.92 100 16.27736 
2013 30 69.231 30.77 53.85 69.23 76.92 100 16.77928 
Total 234 66.43658 15.38 53.85 69.23 76.92 100 17.66011 
 
 
4.7.2.2 Quality of Shareholder Rights Information  
Quality of shareholder rights information is presented in the Table 4-7.  Total 13 
items related to annual general meeting, agenda, notice, dividend and communication policy 
etc. are considered to assess the quality of shareholder rights information.  
 
Table 4-7 
Descriptive statistics of Quality of Shareholders Rights Information 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 60.65039 0 69.23 73.075 76.92 92.31 30.64064 
2007 28 67.85643 0 69.23 76.92 76.92 100 25.73115 
2008 30 75.12733 7.69 69.23 76.92 76.92 92.31 15.34334 
2009 30 79.74267 69.23 76.92 76.92 84.62 92.31 7.419692 
2010 30 82.051 69.23 76.92 76.92 92.31 100 8.651348 
2011 30 85.12767 76.92 76.92 80.77 92.31 100 9.24437 
2012 30 86.92233 76.92 76.92 92.31 92.31 100 9.929187 
2013 30 87.69233 76.92 76.92 92.31 92.31 100 9.390107 
Total 234 78.53329 0 76.92 76.92 92.31 100 18.30107 
 
The average mean of quality of shareholder rights information is 78.53% with a 
standard deviation of 18.30% and averages ranges from 60.65% in 2006 to 87.69% in 2013 as 
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expected.  The minimum and maximum quality of shareholder rights is 0% and 100% 
respectively from 2006 to 2013. The quality of shareholder rights is moderate but the positive 
thing is quality is increasing over the year as expected.  
 
4.7.2.3 Quality of Financial Transparency and Information in the Annual Report  
Financial transparency is one of the important segments of corporate governance 
quality and Table 4-8 presents the quality of financial transparency and information in the 
annual report. In this study, total 49 elements including financial statement fairness, going 
concern, projected financial information, compensation of management, additional statement 
of credit rating, value added, market value added etc. are considered as part of quality of 
financial transparency and information in the annual report.  
  
Table 4-8 
Descriptive statistics of Quality of Financial Transparency and Information in the 
Annual Report 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 39.717 6.12       34.69 40.82 44.9 59.18 10.83381 
2007 28 46.1375 8.16 42.86 46.94 51.02 65.31 10.44094 
2008 30 49.65967 32.65 42.86 48.98 59.18 69.39 9.425293 
2009 30 52.652 34.69 46.94 55.1 61.22 73.47 9.959907 
2010 30 57.34767 40.82 48.98 57.14 65.31 75.51 10.11727 
2011 30 60.137 38.78 51.02 61.225 67.35 77.55 10.6616 
2012 30 73.74233 53.06 65.31 74.49 81.63 91.84 10.25012 
2013 30 72.85733 53.06 65.31 73.47 79.59 87.76 8.424673 
Total 234 56.90765 6.12 44.9 57.14 67.35 91.84 14.96826 
 
 
Quality of financial transparency and information in the annual report is only 56.91% 
on average and ranges from lowest average 39.17% to highest average 73.74%. The 
minimum quality of financial transparency and information is 6.12% and maximum is 
91.84% during 2006 to 2013. Quality of financial transparency and information presents to 
what extent the firm is following the transparency and accountability in financial issues. It is 
also evident that quality of financial transparency increases drastically and reached to 73.74% 
in 2012 from 60.14% in 2011 which implies that quality of financial transparency and 
information increased by 22.61% in 2012. The reason is the regulatory authority introduced 
the new corporate governance guidelines in 2012 and new guidelines include many 
provisions related to financial transparency and information. Thus, firms are trying to 
increase their quality of financial transparency and information in the annual report due to 
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mandatory requirement of the corporate governance guidelines but the overall quality of 
financial transparency is far below the from the expectation.  
 
4.7.2.4 Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Board, management structure and process are the major part of corporate governance 
quality and Table 4-9 presents the descriptive summary statistics of board, management 
structure and process information. A firm‟s quality of corporate governance mainly depends 
on the quality of board, management structure and process. In this study, total 134 items 
including board, board and management structure, executive and audit committee, meeting of 
all committees etc. are considered to assess the quality of board, management structure and 
process.  
 
Table 4-9 
Descriptive statistics Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process Information 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 27.95577      0 24.63 27.61 32.84 45.52 8.29928 
2007 28 32.43571 0 28.36 33.955 36.565 51.49 9.013604 
2008 30 38.28433 23.88 32.84 38.81 43.28 55.22 7.663317 
2009 30 41.244 24.63 35.82 41.04 46.27 55.22 7.901429 
2010 30 44.25433 29.85 37.31 44.405 50.75 62.69 8.444833 
2011 30 46.717 33.58 41.04 46.27 52.99 62.69 7.485607 
2012 30 69.054 53.73 64.18 69.775 73.88 81.34 7.068554 
2013 30 71.741 58.21 66.42 72.39 77.61 84.33 6.822307 
Total 234 46.89697 0 34.33 44.03 58.21 84.33 16.7977 
 
 
Quality of board, management structure and process is 46.90% on average and 
minimum average is 27.96% and maximum average is 71.74% from 2006 to 2013.  The 
minimum percentage of quality of board, management structure and process is 0% in 2006 
and 2007 and maximum is 84.33% in 2013 as expected. Quality of board, management 
structure and process is increased to 69.05% in 2012 from 46.72% in 2011 and increased by 
47.80% due to rapid inclusion of mandatory requirement of board, management structure and 
process information in the corporate governance guidelines 2012. Corporate governance 
guidelines 2012 include some new items related to board, management structure and process 
to improve the quality of governance. It is evident that mandatory requirement of the 
corporate governance guidelines develop the quality of board, management structure and 
process as well as overall quality of corporate governance in recent years but the overall 
average mean of board, management structure and process is very low from the expectation.  
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4.7.2.5 Quality of External Auditing Information 
Table 4-10 presents the quality of external auditing information. Quality of external 
auditing information includes total 12 items related to external auditor appointment, duration, 
audit services and fee etc. Quality of external auditing information presents to what extent 
external auditor perform their audit activities and report it in the annual report.  
 
Table 4-10 
Descriptive statistics of Quality of External Auditing Information 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 65.70654     8.33       66.67 70.835 75 91.67 20.45703 
2007 28 67.26321 8.33 66.67 66.67 75 83.33 15.20272 
2008 30 71.94567 41.67 66.67 75 75 91.67 8.034811 
2009 30 71.39 41.67 66.67 75 75 91.67 8.385089 
2010 30 70.83533 41.67 66.67 66.67 75 91.67 8.684443 
2011 30 71.94567 41.67 66.67 75 75 91.67 8.327282 
2012 30 80.832 66.67 75 83.33 83.33 100 6.619286 
2013 30 83.33133 66.67 83.33 83.33 83.33 100 7.258105 
Total 234 73.07752 8.33 66.67 75 75 100 12.29828 
 
The average mean of quality of external auditing information is 73.08% and average 
quality is ranges from 65.71% to 83.33%. The lowest and highest quality of external auditing 
information is 8.33% and 100% respectively. Quality of external auditing information 
increased to 80.83% in 2012 from 71.94% in 2011 and this rapid change just because of new 
corporate governance guidelines 2012. Firms are maintaining high quality of external 
auditing information due to mandatory requirement of corporate governance guidelines.  
 
4.7.2.6 Quality of Risk Management Information 
Risk is the integral part of business and business success depends on minimization of 
risk. Corporate governance quality also depends on quality of risk management information. 
Quality of risk management information provides not only past risk information but also 
deals with projected future risk information. Quality of risk management information 
includes total 35 items which considers risk management committee, meeting, various types 
of risk and future risk etc.  
Quality of risk management information is 42.55% on average which is very low 
nowadays in the competitive market and minimum and maximum average are 20.99% and 
64.67%. The lowest and highest quality of risk management information is 0% and 88.57% 
respectively. Quality of risk management information is 56.95% in 2012 and increased to 
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64.67% in 2013 which is highest in any period.  The reason is Bangladesh Bank, the central 
bank, instruct to all listed banks to formulate a separate risk management committee to 
control and minimize the all kinds of existing and potential risk. Most of the banks are not 
maintaining separate risk management committee and even some banks have the separate risk 
management committee but they didn‟t conduct any risk management meeting till now. Most 
of the banks are also not aware about existing and potential risk and thus, quality of risk 
management is not satisfactory enough.  
 
Table 4-11 
Descriptive statistics of Quality of Risk Management Information 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 20.98846 0 17.14 20 25.71 40 9.317126 
2007 28 25.00036 2.86 20 22.86 30 40 8.505048 
2008 30 29.42833 17.14 22.86 25.71 37.14 54.29 9.524937 
2009 30 38.00033 22.86 25.71 35.715 48.57 71.43 12.78143 
2010 30 48.191 25.71 42.86 48.57 57.14 68.57 11.44704 
2011 30 53.14267 31.43 45.71 54.29 60 77.14 11.49218 
2012 30 56.95233 34.29 48.57 57.14 62.86 82.86 10.97545 
2013 30 64.667 42.86 60 62.86 71.43 88.57 10.51732 
Total 234 42.55197 0 25.71 42.86 57.14 88.57 18.2424 
 
 
4.7.2.7 Quality of Tax Management Information 
Corporate governance quality is also be assessed by firm‟s tax management 
information.  Empirical studies conducted research on tax separately not as part of corporate 
governance. Shareholders, regulatory bodies, tax authority and other stakeholders are 
interested to know about tax management information, tax compliance, tax computation etc. 
Thus, tax management should also be considered as an integral part of corporate governance 
and Table 4-12 presents the quality of tax management information. Bala and Moniruzzaman 
(2011) study also recommended including tax information as part of corporate governance. In 
this study, quality of tax management information includes total 15 items considering tax 
rate, separate tax compliance statement, computation of current and deferred tax etc.  
The average mean of quality of tax management information is 52.96% and average 
ranges from 42.31% to 60% during 2006 to 2013. The minimum quality of risk management 
information is 6.67% and maximum is 86.67%. Most of the firms report the tax management 
information following income tax law, income tax ordinance but there is no information or 
instruction in the corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012.  Due to absence of 
guidelines in the corporate governance 2006 and 2012, most of the firms become reluctant to 
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report the tax management information in detail with computation. Thus, it is evident that 
quality of tax information is very low but it can be improved by including tax compliance 
requirement as part of corporate governance guidelines.  
 
Table 4-12 
Descriptive statistics of Quality of Tax Management Information 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 42.30808      6.67       33.33 43.335 53.33 66.67 15.7701 
2007 28 48.57107 6.67 40 53.33 60 73.33 16.41555 
2008 30 49.55467 13.33 40 53.33 53.33 73.33 12.46403 
2009 30 52 6.67 46.67 53.33 60 73.33 14.68938 
2010 30 54.66733 26.67 46.67 53.33 66.67 80 14.47878 
2011 30 57.333 26.67 46.67 60 66.67 80 13.62817 
2012 30 57.55467 26.67 53.33 56.665 66.67 80 12.43957 
2013 30 60 26.67 53.33 60 66.67 86.67 12.62479 
Total 234 52.96278 6.67 46.67 53.33 66.67 86.67 14.86381 
 
 
4.7.2.8 Quality of Corporate Responsibility, Compliance and Stakeholder Information 
Corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information is considered as 
part of corporate governance quality and Table 4-13 presents the quality of corporate 
responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information. Total 14 items related to corporate 
social responsibility, environmental information, vision, mission, information, code of 
conduct, ethics etc. are included to assess the quality of corporate responsibility, compliance 
and stakeholder information. 
 
Table 4-13 
Descriptive statistics of Quality of Corporate Responsibility, Compliance and 
Stakeholder Information 
Year Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
2006 26 30.22077 0 14.29 28.57 42.86 64.29 18.7693 
2007 28 38.77536 0 28.57 35.71 50 71.43 17.86345 
2008 30 45.00033 7.14 35.71 42.86 57.14 78.57 17.10585 
2009 30 52.381 14.29 35.71 50 71.43 85.71 20.05735 
2010 30 60.23867 28.57 50 64.29 71.43 92.86 18.44433 
2011 30 73.09533 42.86 64.29 78.57 85.71 100 16.31747 
2012 30 76.19067 50 64.29 78.57 85.71 100 15.61858 
2013 30 79.99933 50 64.29 85.71 92.86 100 15.39921 
Total 234 57.6009 0 42.86 60.715 78.57 100 24.24288 
 
Quality of corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder Information is 
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57.60% in total and minimum average is 30.22% in 2006 and maximum average is 79.99% in 
2013. The lowest and highest percentage of quality of   corporate responsibility, compliance 
and stakeholder information is 0% and 100% from 2006 to 2013. It is evident that quality of 
corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information are increasing over the year 
and most of the banks are conscious not only about corporate social responsibility 
information but also about environment and sustainability information. Though, there is no 
information in the corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 but as part of the society, 
banks also maintaining their corporate responsibility to a greater extent than before 
voluntarily.  
 
4.7.3 Item wise Analysis of Corporate Governance Quality  
Corporate governance quality is critically evaluated using item wise analysis which 
gives the in-depth analysis of each segment of corporate governance quality. Moreover, this 
analysis helps to identify high and low quality of corporate governance attributes and the 
regulatory authority and banks will be beneficial for giving more emphasize on those items. 
The item wise analysis of corporate governance attributes are described below: 
 
4.7.3.1  Quality of Ownership Information 
Quality of ownership information is one of the major instruments of corporate 
governance quality. Quality of ownership information includes total 13 attributes related to 
ownership information and presented in the Table 4-14 which finds that: 
Most of the banks are aware about distribution of ownership and it is evident that 
96.15 % firm reports the ownership pattern but changes in shareholdings are reported by only 
84.62% firms. In addition,  95.73 % firm report the ownership held by parent, subsidiary and 
associated companies; 96.15% firms report the ownership held by directors, CEO, CFO, 
company secretary, head of internal audit;  91.03% firms report the ownership held by 
executive and 87.18% firms report the ownership by shareholders holding more than 10%. 
Moreover, 99.15% firms report the classification of shareholding. This result implies that 
banks are practicing better quality in terms of distribution of ownership.  
Sponsors or promoters hold the controlling power of banks but banks provide less 
information about sponsors. It is evident that 48.72% firms provide total number of 
sponsor/promoter information but list or name of sponsors other than directors are reported 
by only 40.17%. Moreover, number of shares held by individual promoter /sponsor other than 
directors is reported by only 13.25% firms. This result indicates that banks are maintaining 
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low quality of sponsor information and they are not interested to disclose their sponsor name 
and ownership information in details to the stakeholders. 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) requires that all 
sponsors/promoters and directors jointly hold minimum 30% shares of the paid up capital. 
But it is evident that only 73.08% firms comply this regulation which implies that remaining 
26.92% firms are not maintaining the requirement though it is mandatory requirement.  
Only 19.23% firms report the name of top 1,3,5,10 shareholders  and 17.95% firms 
report the number of shares hold by top 1,3,5,10 shareholders  which indicates that banks are 
practicing low quality of top shareholders information.  
 
Table 4-14 
I. Quality of Ownership Information 
Sub 
Indices Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
I-1 Does the firm report ownership pattern (% of 
ownership held by sponsors, directors, 
government, institution, foreign and general 
public)? 24 28 30 29 29 29 28 28 225 96.15 
I-2 Does the firm report changes in shareholdings? 21 24 25 24 25 26 26 27 198 84.62 
I-3 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of 
shares held by parent/subsidiary/ associated 
companies and other related parties along with 
name wise details? 21 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 224 95.73 
I-4 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of 
shares held by directors, chief executive officer 
(CEO), company secretary, chief financial 
officer (CFO), head of internal audit, and their 
spouses and minor children along with name 
wise details? 22 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 225 96.15 
I-5 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of 
shares held by executives (top five salaried 
employees other than directors, CEO, company 
secretary, CFO, and head of internal audit) 
along with name wise details? 19 22 27 28 28 29 30 30 213 91.03 
I-6 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of 
shares held by shareholders holding 10% or 
more along with name wise details? 19 21 26 28 27 25 29 29 204 87.18 
I-7 Does the firm provide information about total 
number of promoters/sponsors? 11 14 16 14 13 14 16 16 114 48.72 
I-8 Does the firm report the list (name) of each 
promoters/sponsors other than directors? 9 12 13 12 11 11 13 13 94 40.17 
I-9 Does the firm report the number of shares held 
by individual promoters/ sponsors other than 
directors? 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 31 13.25 
I-10 Does the firm comply that all 
sponsors/promoters and directors jointly hold 
minimum 30% shares of the paid up capital? 18 20 22 21 23 21 24 22 171 73.08 
I-11 Does the firm report the list of top 1, 3,5, 10 or 
20  shareholders  other than directors? 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 45 19.23 
I-12 Does the firm report the number of shares held 
by top 1, 3, 5, 10 or 20 shareholders other than 
directors? 2 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 42 17.95 
I-13 Does the firm disclose the classification of 
shareholders including number of shareholders 
and percentage of shareholding such as up to 
500 shares, 501 to 5000 shares………over 
1,000,000 shares? 25 28 30 30 30 30 30 29 232 99.15 
                             Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234 
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Area of Further Improvement 
Banks should ensure high quality of ownership by providing more information about 
changes in shareholdings, sponsor or promoters and top shareholders name with their 
shareholding and maintaining minimum requirement of paid up capital by sponsor and 
directors jointly. The regulatory authority should also be concerned about quality of 
ownership information and more emphasize on the above information and can impose as 
mandatory requirement of corporate governance.  
 
4.7.3.2  Quality of Shareholder Rights Information 
Quality of corporate governance includes quality of shareholder rights information 
which is presented in the Table 4-15. Quality of shareholders rights information includes total 
13 attributes related to annual general meeting (AGM).  Table 4-15 presents that:   
Most of the banks ensure higher quality of shareholder rights information. It is evident 
that 95.30% firms hold their annual general meeting (AGM) in each year; 95.30% firms hold 
their AGM within 15 months from the previous AGM; 94.44% firms report the process for 
holding AGM; 95.30% firms disclose the notice of AGM; 95.30% firms send the notice of 
AGM to the shareholders at least 14 days before the AGM; 95.30% firms report that AGM 
agenda are available and accessible; 95.30% firms provide information of AGM date and 
location; 95.30% firms report the availability and accessibility of proxy voting; 83.76% firms 
report that proxy form is attached with annual report and 90.17 % firms disclose the dividend 
policy. This result indicates that most the banks are practicing better quality in terms of 
annual general meeting (AGM) issues. 
It is also evident that 31.20% firms report board members attended at annual general 
meeting to answer shareholder questions; 12.39% firms provide the policy for ensuring 
participation in the AGM; 41.88% firms disclose the strategy or policy for effective 
communication with the shareholders and other shareholders. This result indicates that most 
of the banks have no policy or strategy for shareholder participation in the AGM and 
effective communication with stakeholders and even most of the bank‟s board members were 
not present to answer shareholder questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 258  
 
Table 4-15 
II. Quality of Shareholders  Rights Information 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms  
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
II-1 Does the firm hold their annual general meeting 
(AGM) in each year? 20 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
II-2 Does the firm hold current annual general 
meeting (AGM) within fifteen months from the 
previous AGM? 20 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
II-3 Does the firm report the process for holding 
annual general meeting (AGM)? 19 23 29 30 30 30 30 30 221 94.44 
II-4 Does the firm disclose the notice of annual 
general meeting (AGM)? 20 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
II-5 Does the firm send the notice of annual general 
meeting (AGM) to the shareholders at least 14 
days before the AGM? 20 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
II-6 Is the firm‟s annual general meeting (AGM) 
agenda available and accessible? 20 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
II-7 Does the firm provide the information of annual 
general meeting (AGM) date and location? 20 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
II-8 Does the firm report the availability and 
accessibility of proxy voting? 20 24 29 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
II-9 Does the firm attach the proxy form with the 
annual report? 18 19 22 25 27 28 28 29 196 83.76 
II-10 Do the firm‟s board members attend at annual 
general meeting to answer shareholder questions? 3 5 6 8 10 12 14 15 73 31.20 
II-11 Does the firm disclose the policy for ensuring 
shareholders participation in the AGM? 1 1 0 0 3 7 9 8 29 12.39 
II-12 Does the firm disclose dividend policy? 18 24 25 27 28 29 30 30 211 90.17 
II-13 Does the firm disclose the strategy or policy for 
effective communication with the shareholders 
and other stakeholders? 6 7 8 11 12 16 18 20 98 41.88 
                             Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234 
  
 
Area of Further Improvement 
Banks should ensure participation of all members in the annual general meeting and 
they should develop the strategy or policy for effective communication with the all types of 
stakeholders and especially for shareholders participation in the AGM. The regulatory 
authority can impose mandatory requirement for the above low quality issues and they should 
keep close monitoring on the banks for better quality of shareholder rights.  
 
4.7.3.3  Quality of Financial Transparency and Information in the Annual Report 
Table 4-16 presents the quality of financial transparency and information in the 
annual report. Financial transparency is one of the influential factors for determining high 
quality of corporate governance. Quality of financial transparency includes total 49 items and 
Table 4-16 finds that: 
Corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 require some additional statement in 
the director‟s report for ensuring better governance. It is evident that 98.29% firms report 
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fairness of financial statements; 98.29% firms report that accounting estimates are based on 
reasonable and prudent judgment; 99.15% firms report that financial statements have been 
prepared following international accounting standard (IAS)/Bangladesh Accounting standard 
(BAS), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Bangladesh Financial Reporting 
Standards (BFRS); 98.29% firms report that internal control systems is sound in design and 
implemented and monitored effectively and  have the ability to continue as a going concern, 
and any significant deviation from last year operating results; 98.72% firms are meeting 
segment wise or product wise performance and  industry outlook and possible future 
development in the industry and key operating and financial data in summarized form ; 
96.15% firms provide dividend (cash or stock) information along with explanation for 
nonpayment; 96.58% firms are providing discussion on gross profit margin and net profit 
margin; 72.65% firms are reporting on related party transactions along with nature, type, 
element and amount of related party transaction. This result indicates that banks are 
practicing better governance by following above requirements because both corporate 
governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 require this additional statement in the directors‟ 
report.  
Banks are also maintaining low quality of financial transparency and information in 
the annual report in terms of additional statement required by corporate governance 
guidelines 2012. It is  observed that  only 23.50% firms report that most significant areas 
where estimates and judgment have been made; 31.20% firms provide discussion on extra 
ordinary transaction including extraordinary gain or loss; 25.64% firms report the significant 
variance between quarterly financial performance and annual financial statement in the 
annual report; 25.64% firms report on  utilization of proceeds from public issues, right issues 
and or through any other instrument and provide an explanation of deterioration of financial 
results after the firm goes for initial public offering (IPO), repeat public offering (RPO), 
rights offer and direct listing. This result indicates that banks are not maintaining better 
quality because most of the requirements become mandatory in the corporate governance 
guidelines from 2012.  
It is evident that 37.18% firms provide non cash benefits to the chairman of the board 
of directors; 5.98% firms provide non cash benefits to the key personnel of management; 
94.44% firms provide performance related incentives to the key personnel of management. 
This result indicates that most of the banks provide performance related incentives to the 
management and executives but they provide less non cash benefits to the chairman and key 
personnel of management.  
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Financial transparency can be measured by the auditor‟s opinion in the audit report 
and unmodified audit report ensures higher financial transparency of the bank. It is observed 
that 81.62% firms received unmodified audit opinion in the auditor‟s report; 89.74% firms‟ 
financial statements are audited within 120 days from the end of financial year; and 95.30% 
firms annual accounts are approved at an AGM within 9 months from the end of financial 
year. This result indicates that most of banks annual financial statements are audited and 
approved at an AGM within the expected time. It is said that banking sectors is more 
structured and organized and regulated by various laws but 19.38% firms didn‟t receive 
unmodified audit opinion which implies that they are not practicing high quality of financial 
transparency.  
91.03% firms provide the credit rating information but only 16.24% firms achieved 
best credit rating of AA3 or AA+. This result indicates that most of the banks are providing 
credit rating information but only few firms received the highest grading of credit rating 
which indicates low quality of financial transparency.  
It is necessary to provide some additional information to ensure better financial 
transparency of the firm. It is evident that only 16.24% firms report the overall business plan 
including budget/target and achievement of performance. This result indicates that most of 
the banks (83.76%) are not providing achievement of performance according to their target 
and stakeholders are deprived of getting performance analysis report. It is also observed that 
92.31% firms report the events after the balance sheet date; 74.36% firms provide value 
added statement information; 61.97% firms provide economic value added statement 
information; 52.56% firms provide market value added statement information; 57.69% firms 
provide information about market capitalization; 10.26% firms provide market share 
information; 20.09% firms provide information on capital structure; 3.42% firms report the 
ROE or DUPONT analysis. This result indicates that most of the banks are practicing low 
quality of financial transparency in terms of market share information, capital structure and 
ROE analysis.  
It is evident that only 46.15% firms provide separate report on corporate governance 
other than compliance checklist though Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
(BSEC) introduced first corporate governance guidelines in 2006 and revised the corporate 
governance guidelines in 2012. This means that banks are practicing low quality of corporate 
governance information. It is also observed that  95.73% firms provide an explanation in case 
of non compliance; only 25.64% firms obtained a certificate of compliance of conditions of 
corporate governance guidelines from professional accountant/ secretary/chartered 
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accountant/cost management accountant/chartered secretary and send the copy of compliance 
certificate to the shareholders along with annual report on a yearly basis; 98.29% firm‟s 
directors stated that firm has complied all the conditions according to the annexure attached 
in the directors report. Most of the banks are following the conditions of corporate 
governance and providing explanation in case of non compliance but only 25.64% firms 
obtained certificate of compliance because corporate governance guidelines require the 
certificate from 2012 and all the banks have collected this certificate from 2012. Bangladesh 
Bank, the regulatory bank also requires the separate statement for corporate governance 
guidelines but only 35.04% firms provide a separate statement of compliance of Bangladesh 
Bank guidelines for corporate governance. This result implies that 64.96% firms are not 
following regulatory requirement of Bangladesh Bank.  
Considering all financial and non financial firms, professional bodies like The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) and The Institute of Cost and 
Management Accountant of Bangladesh (ICMAB) and others from home and aboard provide 
various awards on the basis of corporate governance, financial statement, annual report and 
institution. Receiving different types of award indicates that firms are following all the rules 
and regulations or ensuring higher transparency in preparing financial statement and annual 
report or practicing better quality of corporate governance among all financial and non 
financial firms. It is evident that 24.36% firms received the best presented accounts and 
reports or annual report; 6.41% firms received award for good corporate governance and 
14.10% firms received best corporate award or financial institution. The positive sign is that 
banks are receiving various awards in the competitive market but the percentage or number of 
firms is not significant enough in the listed banks. In addition, banks are most regulated 
institution in the capital market but only few banks received the award for corporate 
governance which is not a positive sign for the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Banks also practices better quality of financial transparency by providing more 
voluntary information about future. It is observed that 28.21% firms provide separate forward 
looking statement; 80.34% firms report their future prospect, plans and goals; 43.16% firms 
provide  investment in coming years but only 2.99% firms report in details about their 
investment in coming years; 52.56% firms provide projected qualitative information and 
25.64% firms provide projected quantitative information. Most of the banks provide general 
information about future plan, prospect and goal but only few banks are giving separate 
statement for forward looking statement which means that they have less concerned or they 
have no plan in details about future. In addition, banks survival depends on their future 
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investment plan and it is found that only 43.16% firms provide general information about 
investment in coming years but almost 97% firms are not providing any details information 
about future investment and as a result, they may face survival threat in near future.  Though 
percentage and number of banks is not significant enough for projected qualitative and 
quantitative information but it is evident that banks are providing projected qualitative 
information better than quantitative information.  
 
          Table 4-16     
III. Quality of Financial Transparency and Information in the Annual Report 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
III- 1 Does the firm report the fairness of financial 
statements (state of affairs, result of operations, cash 
flows and changes in equity) which is prepared by the 
management? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
III- 2 Does the firm report that accounting estimates are 
based on reasonable and prudent judgment? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
III- 3 Does the firm report the most significant areas where 
estimates and judgment have been made? 0 0 3 5 11 10 12 14 55 23.50 
III- 4 Does the firm report that financial statements have 
been prepared following International Accounting  
Standards (IAS) / Bangladesh Accounting Standards 
(BAS) / International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) / Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards 
(BFRS), as applicable in Bangladesh  and has any 
departure from there  been adequately disclosed? 25 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 232 99.15 
III- 5 Is the firm‟s internal control system sound in design 
and implemented and monitored effectively? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
III- 6 Does the firm report the capability to continue as a 
going concern? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
III- 7 Does the firm disclose the significant deviation from 
the last year‟s operating results?   23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
III- 8 Does the firm provide key operating and financial data 
in summarized from at least preceding three years/five 
years (Corporate Governance Guideline, 2006 and 
2012 respectively)? 24 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 231 98.72 
III- 9 Does the firm provide dividend (cash or stock) 
information and explanation for nonpayment? 22 28 28 29 29 29 30 30 225 96.15 
III- 10 Does the firm report industry outlook and possible 
future developments in the industry? 25 27 29 30 30 30 30 30 231 98.72 
III- 11 Does the firm report segment wise or product wise 
performance? 25 27 29 30 30 30 30 30 231 98.72 
III- 12 Does the firm provide discussion on gross profit 
margin and net profit margin? 24 26 29 29 29 29 30 30 226 96.58 
III- 13 Does the firm provide discussion (rules and 
procedures) on extra ordinary transactions (extra 
ordinary gain or loss)? 0 0 0 0 6 7 30 30 73 31.20 
III- 14 Does the firm report on related party 
transactions/contract and nature, type, element and 
amount of related party transactions/contract? 15 18 20 22 23 23 23 26 170 72.65 
III- 15 Does the firm report on utilization of proceeds from 
public issues, right issues and/or through any other 
instruments? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
III- 16 Does the firm provide an explanation of deterioration 
of financial results after the firm goes for initial public 
offering (IPO), Repeat public offering (RPO), rights 
offer and direct listing? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
III- 17 Does the firm‟s management explain about the 
significant variance between quarterly financial 
performance and annual financial statement in the 
annual report? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
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          Table 4-16     
III. Quality of Financial Transparency and Information in the Annual Report 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
III- 18 Does the firm provide non cash benefits to the 
chairman of the board of directors? 1 4 9 11 13 17 17 15 87 37.18 
III- 19 Does the firm provide non cash benefits to the key 
personnel of management? 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 5 14 5.98 
III- 20 Does the firm provide performance related incentives 
(cash or non cash) to the key personnel of 
management? 24 26 29 29 29 28 28 28 221 94.44 
III- 21 Does the firm disclose of overall business plan 
(budget/target) and achievement (performance)? 1 2 2 4 5 7 8 9 38 16.24 
III- 22 Does the firm receive the unmodified audit opinion in 
the auditor‟s report? 18 18 22 25 27 27 28 26 191 81.62 
III- 23 Are the firm‟s financial statements audited within 120 
days from the end of financial year? 22 22 27 26 29 27 28 29 210 89.74 
III- 24 Are the firm‟s annual accounts approved at an AGM 
within 9 months from the end of financial year? 21 24 28 30 30 30 30 30 223 95.30 
III- 25 Does the firm provide credit rating information? 
18 26 28 29 28 28 28 28 213 91.03 
III- 26 Does the firm achieve AA3 or AA+ for long term 
credit rating? 0 0 1 5 7 12 9 4 38 16.24 
III- 27 Does the firm report the events after the balance sheet 
date? 21 22 28 29 28 29 29 30 216 92.31 
III- 28 Does the firm report market share (position) 
information (remittance, deposit, import, export, 
investment and position in market etc.)? 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 7 24 10.26 
III- 29 Does the firm provide information about market 
capitalization? 5 10 12 16 19 24 25 24 135 57.69 
III- 30 Does the firm report value added statement of the 
current year? 10 18 20 23 25 25 27 26 174 74.36 
III- 31 Does the firm report Economic Value Added 
Statement (EVA)? 5 15 16 18 19 23 25 24 145 61.97 
III- 32 Does the firm report Market Value Added (MVA) 
statement (MVA)? 2 6 10 16 19 22 24 24 123 52.56 
III- 33 Does the firm provide information on the company‟s 
capital structure? 2 4 5 4 5 7 9 11 47 20.09 
III- 34 Does the firm report on DUPONT analysis (ROE 
Decomposition)? 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 8 3.42 
III- 35 Does the firm provide separate report on corporate 
governance other than compliance checklist? 3 6 7 10 17 21 22 22 108 46.15 
III- 36 Does the firm provide an explanation of non 
compliance of corporate governance? 22 26 30 29 30 30 29 28 224 95.73 
III- 37 Has the firm obtained a certificate of compliance of 
conditions of corporate governance guideline from 
professional accountant/ secretary (Chartered 
Accountant/ Cost Management Accountant / Chartered 
Secretary? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
III- 38 Does the firm send the copy of certificate of 
compliance of corporate governance guideline to the 
shareholders along with the annual report on a yearly 
basis? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
III- 39  Does the director state that the firm has complied all 
the condition according to the annexure attached in the 
director‟s report? 
23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
III- 40 Does the firm provide a separate statement of 
compliance of Bangladesh Bank guidelines for 
corporate governance? 1 5 9 11 14 16 15 11 82 35.04 
III- 41 Does the firm receive best presented accounts and 
reports or annual report? 3 6 9 6 11 11 11 0 57 24.36 
III- 42 Does the firm receive awards or accolades for good 
corporate governance practices? 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 2 15 6.41 
III- 43 Does the firm receive best corporate award or financial 
institution? 0 3 3 2 5 8 8 4 33 14.10 
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          Table 4-16     
III. Quality of Financial Transparency and Information in the Annual Report 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
III- 44 Does the firm provide separate forward looking 
statement? 0 1 3 5 9 14 17 17 66 28.21 
III- 45 Does the firm disclose future prospect, plans and 
goals? 14 21 22 24 25 27 27 28 188 80.34 
III- 46 Does the firm report investment in the coming years? 
4 8 8 11 17 16 18 19 101 43.16 
III- 47 Does the firm report in details investment in the 
coming years? 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 7 2.99 
III- 48 Does the firm provide projected qualitative 
information (such as  import, export, remittance, 
deposit, loans, earnings, cash flows, capital,  cost of 
fund, market share and so on)? 7 11 12 13 18 18 21 23 123 52.56 
III- 49 Does the firm provide projected quantitative 
information (such as import, export, remittance, 
deposit, loans, earnings, cash flows, capital,  cost of 
fund, market share and so on)?  2 5 8 9 9 7 9 11 60 25.64 
                              Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234 
  
 
Area of Further Improvement 
Quality of financial transparency includes both mandatory and voluntary attributes 
related to financial issues and it is found that in some cases, quality of  some mandatory 
attributes are very low before 2012 and it is increasing from 2012 because  those items 
become mandatory in the new corporate governance guidelines from 2012.  This study also 
finds that quality of financial transparency is very low especially in voluntary attributes such 
as most significant areas where estimates and judgment have been made (23.50%); non cash 
benefits paid the chairman (37.18%) and key personnel of management (5.98%); 
performance analysis report showing budget/target and achieved performance (16.24%); 
highest credit rating for long term (16.24%); market share information (10.26%); capital 
structure (20.09%); DUPONT or ROE analysis (3.42%); separate report for corporate 
governance (46.15%); award for corporate governance (6.41%); best presented accounts and 
reports(24.36%); best corporate award (14.10%); forward looking statement (28.21%); details 
of investment in coming years (2.99%); projected qualitative ( 52.56%) and quantitative 
information (25.64%). This result indicates that banks are not practicing better quality for 
voluntary attributes. The regulatory authority as well as listed banks should more emphasize 
on voluntary attributes of quality of financial transparency and should provide in details 
information to the stakeholders.  
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4.7.3.4.   Quality of Board, Management structure and Process  
Board, management structure and process are the significant part to assess the quality 
of corporate governance. Quality of board, management structure and process includes total 
134 attributes related to board, independent directors, supporting committee like executive 
committee, audit committee, meeting, attendance, management structure and process etc. 
Table 4-17 presents the quality of board, management structure and process and finds that: 
Board is the internal governance mechanism of a firm. It is found that 99.15% firms 
provide the number and name of directors in the board; 93.16% firms follow the board size 
within 5 to 20 which indicates that remaining 6.84% firms are not following the guidelines of 
regulatory authority; 89.32% firms reorganize the board every year through new 
appointment/rotation/retirement/termination of directors; 38.89% firms provide the brief 
resume of directors to the shareholders which indicates that shareholders have no details 
information about the 61.11% firms directors;  only 17.95% firms director other than 
independent director hold minimum qualification of shares which indicates that remaining 
firms directors violating the rules; 20.94% firms disclose the educational qualification of each 
director which implies that it is difficult to assess  the academic qualification of each director 
for the shareholders; 35.04% firms disclose the director‟s nature of expertise in specific 
functional areas to the shareholders; 7.26% firms disclose the age of each director; 5.98% 
firms provide information about each director‟s joining date in the board; 98.72% firms 
provide information about director interest in other companies;  35.47% firms provide 
information in details about previous employment of directors. This result indicates that most 
of the banks are practicing very low quality in term of brief resume of directors, nature of 
expertise, minimum qualification of shares, age, joining date and educational qualification of 
each director and previous employment of directors. Moreover, some banks are violating the 
company act and corporate governance guidelines in terms of board size and minimum 
qualification of shares of each director.  
Independent directors are appointed to work on behalf of the shareholders interest and 
corporate governance guidelines 2012 increase the proportion of independent directors from 
1/10 or minimum one (Corporate governance guidelines, 2006) to 1/5 or 20%. Moreover, 
corporate governance guidelines 2012 include some additional requirements to be an 
independent director and qualification of independent directors. It is found that 61.11% firms 
have the independent directors though it mandatory to have the independent directors  in all 
firms from 2006; Out of 61.11% firms, 54.70 % firms are following the minimum 
requirement of independent directors  according to corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 
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2012  which indicate that 6.41% firms are not following the minimum requirement of 
independent directors; 57.26% firms identified the independent directors in the board of 
directors or audit committee which indicates that some firms have the independent director 
but they didn‟t identify the name as independent director; 56.84% firms report the direct 
shareholding position of independent directors; 55.13% firms comply that independent 
director is not the sponsor/promoter and don‟t hold more than 1% shares of the paid up 
capital; 23.93% firms independent directors- have no pecuniary relationship with the 
company, are not the member, director, officer, shareholder,  of any stock exchange or 
intermediary of capital market; are not partner or executive or former partner or former 
executive in previous three  years of the concerned company‟s statutory audit firm; have not 
been convicted by the court of competent jurisdiction as a defaulter in payment of loan; have 
not been convicted for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude; 53.42% firms 
independent directors comply that they are not independent director in more than three listed 
companies; 61.11% firms comply that independent directors are appointed by the BODs  and 
approved by the shareholders in the annual general meeting (AGM); 24.79% firms board 
place a code of conduct for all members of the board and compliance of the code is recorded 
annually; 23.93% firms comply that tenure of office of an independent director for a period of 
three years and can be extended for one term only. The above result indicates that most of the 
firms are practicing very low quality and the reason might be most of the attributes become 
mandatory in the corporate governance guidelines from 2012. Only few firms disclose 
independent directors‟ information voluntarily before 2012. The surprising finding is that it is 
mandatory for all the firms to appoint independent directors but only 61.11% firms appointed 
the independent director which implies that remaining 38.89% firms have no independent 
director during 2006 to 2013.   
Corporate governance guidelines 2012 require qualification of independent directors. 
It is evident that 55.98% firms comply that independent directors are knowledgeable with 
integrity and have the ability to ensure compliance with financial, regulatory and corporate 
laws and make meaningful contribution to business; 44.87% firms comply that independent 
directors are the business leader/corporate leader/bureaucrat/university teacher with 
economics/ business studies or law background/professionals like chartered accountants, cost 
and management accountants, and chartered secretaries; 29.91% firms comply that 
independent directors have 12 years of corporate management/professional experiences and 
23.93% firms disclose the relaxation of the qualification and experiences of the independent 
directors with the prior approval of BSEC. This result indicates that most of the banks are 
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practicing very poor quality of qualification of independent directors and only few banks 
fulfill the requirement voluntarily before 2012 but the positive thing is that most of the banks 
are fulfilling these requirements in recent years after inclusion in the corporate governance 
guidelines 2012.  
All banks should disclose the criteria of board member and board size and the roles 
and responsibilities of board, chairman of the board, independent directors and management. 
But it evident that only 36.32% firms disclose the criteria in determining the size of the board 
or to be a member of the board; 77.78% firms disclose the role and responsibilities of the 
board; 64.10% firms define the role and responsibilities of the chairman clearly; 2.56% firms 
disclose the duties and responsibilities of independent directors; 54.70% firms provide a 
separate report or statement of directors‟ responsibility; 57.26% firms disclose the roles and 
responsibilities of board and management separately and clearly. This result indicates that 
banks are not practicing high quality in disclosing the criteria of board member and board 
size and responsibilities of board, chairman, independent directors and management. 
Independent directors are appointed to monitor, control and work on behalf of the 
shareholders interest but the surprising finding is that only 2.56% firms disclose the duties 
and responsibilities of independent directors. The reason might be banks are not interested to 
disclose the responsibilities of independent directors or banks didn‟t specify the particular 
duties and responsibilities of independent directors.   
Board meeting and attendance in board meeting are essential to formulate the plan 
and monitor and implement the strategy and it is evident that 98.72% firms report the number 
of board meeting and board of directors meet at least four times in every year; 83.76% firms 
disclose the attendance of each director of board meeting; only 3.85% firms report that all 
directors attended at least 75% of board meeting which indicates that most of the firms all 
board members were not present in the board meeting; 23.93% firms independent directors 
attended at least 75% of board meeting which implies that independent directors were also 
not regular in board meeting. The above result indicates that all board members including 
independent directors were not regular in board meeting and thus, they are practicing very 
low quality in attendance of board meeting.  
Banks should provide some additional information related to performance evaluation, 
conflict of interest, political affiliation, orientation program and training program for 
directors,  to the stakeholders and it is observed that only 9.40% firms disclose the procedure 
of addressing conflict of interest among board members; 7.26% firms disclose the 
performance evaluation process/criteria system of board of directors; 10.68% firms evaluate 
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performance of the board regularly; 3.85% firms arrange the orientation program for all new 
directors; 15.81% firms arrange professional development and training activities for directors 
; 17.52% firms disclose the political connection of board members; The above result implies 
that most of the banks are disclosing very low quality in terms of conflict of interest, 
performance evaluation, orientation and professional development program and political 
affiliation.  
Executive committee is formulated to support the board of directors and implement 
the strategy. It is evident that 89.32% firms have the executive committee as a sub-committee 
of the board of directors; 81.62% firms disclose the members of executive committee; 
80.77% firms disclose the number of meeting executive committee; 27.78% firms disclose 
the attendance of meeting of executive committee; 6.41% firms executive committee 
members attended at least 75% of executive committee meeting; 67.52% firms disclose the 
duties and responsibilities of the executive committee; 6.84% firms provide the report of 
executive committee; and 47.01% firms provide the report of shariah supervisory committee 
for Islamic banking activities which is also not significant enough. The above result indicates 
that most of the banks have the executive committee, disclose the name of the members, 
meeting and duties and responsibilities but practice very poor quality in terms of executive 
committee report, attendance and maintaining minimum 75% attendance of executive 
committee meeting. 
Audit committee is the sub-committee of the board of directors. Audit committee 
monitor effectively internal control systems and ensure better quality of board, management 
structure and process. It is found that 99.15% firms have the audit committee; 98.29% firms 
audit committee assist the board of directors in ensuring that financial statement reflect the 
true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and ensure good monitoring within 
the business; 98.29% firms audit committee is responsible to the board of directors and their 
duties of audit committee are clearly stated in writing; 8.55% firms disclose the basis of 
selection of audit committee members which indicates that shareholders have less 
information about how members of audit committee are selected; 99.15% firms disclose the 
member of audit committee. The above result indicates that most of the firms are maintaining 
good quality except the basis of selection of audit committee members.   
Corporate governance guidelines 2012 provide some additional requirements in 
composition of audit committee, attendance in AGM, quorum of audit committee meeting 
and chairman and members qualification. It is found that 98.72% firms have at least three 
members; 58.97% firms have at least one independent director; 24.36% firms report that 
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chairman of the audit committee is an independent director; 24.79% firms report that 
chairman of the audit committee attended in AGM; 42.31% firms report that chairman of the 
audit committee have the professional qualification or knowledge, understanding and 
experience in accounting or finance; 70.09% firms report that all members of the audit 
committee are financially literate and at least one members have experience of accounting or 
financial management; 59.83% firms report that company secretary act as the secretary of 
audit committee; 25.64% firms report that quorum of the audit committee  meeting constitute 
at least one independent director. The above result indicates that banks are not practicing very 
good quality because most of the attributes are included in corporate governance guidelines 
from 2012 and banks are following these requirements from 2012.  
There were no guidelines in the corporate governance guidelines 2006 about the role 
of audit committee but corporate governance guidelines 2012 determine the roles of audit 
committee. It is found that audit committee -  oversee the financial reporting process (38.89% 
firms); monitor choice of accounting policies and principles (28.63% firms); monitor internal 
control risk management process (81.20% firms); oversee hiring and performance of external 
auditors (75.64% firms); review annual financial statements with the management before 
submission to the board (82.91% firms); review quarterly and half yearly financial statements 
with the management before submission to the board for approval (50.85% firms); review the 
adequacy of internal audit function (78.63% firms); review statement of significant related 
party transactions submitted by management (25.64% firms); review management letter/letter 
of internal control weakness issued by statutory auditors (52.99% firms) and  25.64% firms 
report to the audit committee about the uses/application of funds on a quarterly basis when 
money is raised through initial public offering (IPO)/ repeat public offering (RPO)/right issue 
and statement of funds utilized for the purpose other than those stated in the offer 
document/prospectus on an annual basis. These results indicates that only few banks are 
complying and disclosing these requirements voluntarily before 2012 but most of the banks 
are complying the requirements from 2012 because those items become mandatory in the 
corporate governance guidelines from 2012.  
Corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 require that audit committee should 
report to the board of directors about its activities, conflict of interest, suspected fraud or 
irregularity, suspected infringement of laws and any other relevant matters. It is found that 
98.29% firms audit committee immediately report its activities and conflict of interest to the 
BODs; 97.86% firms audit committee immediately report on suspected or presumed fraud or 
irregularity or material defect of the internal control system and suspected infringement of 
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laws including securities related laws, rules and regulations to the BODs and 97.86% firms 
audit committee immediately report any other relevant matters to the BODs.  In addition, 
96.15% firms report that audit committee identified significant issue that is violated by the 
BODs and report it to BSEC; 96.15% firms report that audit committee reports its activities to 
the shareholders and general investors and 61.11% firms provide the report of audit 
committee. The above result indicates that most of the banks are practicing very high quality 
due to mandatory requirements in the both corporate governance guidelines but 38.89% firms 
didn‟t provide the audit committee report which should be improved.  
It is necessary to conduct the audit committee meeting and it is found that 99.15% 
firms disclose the number of audit committee meetings and they meet at least two times 
during the year; 97.44% firms disclose the activities or written minutes of audit committee 
meetings; 32.91% firms disclose the attendance of audit committee meetings; only 10.68% 
firms audit committee members attended at least 75% of audit committee meeting and 
11.97% firms independent directors attended at least 75% of audit committee meeting. Most 
of the banks are showing very high quality in conducting the audit committee meeting but 
they also show very poor quality in disclosing the activities of audit committee meeting and 
regular attendance.  
Banks should also provide the details information about the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Head of internal audit and company secretary.  Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is the key personnel to implement the management activities. It is 
found that 27.78% firms provide the educational qualification information of the CEO; 
24.79% firms provide date of joining information of the CEO, 31.20% firms provide 
experience information of the CEO; 67.95% firms provide the roles and responsibilities of the 
CEO. This result indicates that stakeholders are less informed about the CEO‟s educational 
qualification, joining date, experience and role and responsibilities. All banks should appoint 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) but it is evident that 91.03% firms provide the appointment 
of CFO information; 1.28% firms provide the educational qualification, date of joining and 
experience information of the CFO and 61.97% firms disclose the roles, responsibilities and 
duties of the CFO. This result indicates that CFO is not available in all banks and banks are 
providing very low quality information in terms of educational qualification, joining date and 
experience of the CFO. Internal audit monitor the internal control system and internal 
activities of management and head of internal audit is responsible for these activities. It is 
evident that 97.44% firms appoint the head of internal audit; 0.85% firms provide the 
educational qualification and experience of the head of internal audit; 64.96% firms provide 
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the roles and responsibilities of head of internal audit. This result implies that most of the 
banks provide appointment and duties information but they don‟t provide the educational 
qualification and experience information of the head of internal audit. It is found that 99.15% 
firms disclose the appointment of secretary; 2.56% firms provide the educational 
qualification information of the company secretary; 1.71% firms provide the date of joining 
information; 2.99% firms provide experience of the secretary; 64.96% firms disclose the 
roles, responsibilities and duties of secretary. This result indicates that most of the firms are 
practicing very low quality in providing educational qualification, joining date and 
experience information of the secretary. From the above analysis, it is clear that most of the 
banks are reporting the appointment and roles and responsibilities information but they are 
providing very low quality information of the CEO, CFO, head of internal audit and company 
secretary in terms of educational qualification, joining date and experience.  
Corporate governance guidelines 2012 require that CFO and company secretary 
should attend in board meeting other than their personal issues and CEO and CFO should 
certify to the board about financial statements and company. It is found that 98.29% firms 
report that company secretary attended in board meeting; 88.89% firms report that CFO 
attended in board meeting because CEO are not available in all firms; 20.51% firms provide 
separate report or statement on CEO/CFO‟s declaration to the board which indicates that only 
few firms provide this report or statement voluntarily to the stakeholders;  28.63 % firms 
report that CEO and CFO certify to the board that they have reviewed that financial 
statements and these statements are free from material untrue statement, or omission of 
material fact or misleading statements and present the true and fair view of the company and 
comply with existing accounting standards and applicable laws and to their best of 
knowledge firm is not dealing any transaction that is fraudulent, illegal or violation of code of 
conduct. This result implies that only few banks are following this requirement because these 
attributes are included in the corporate governance guidelines from 2012 as mandatory 
requirements.  
Stakeholders are also interested to know about management discussion and analysis, 
succession plan, CEO engagement in other firms, and performance evaluation systems. It is 
found that 14.53% firms provide separate report on management discussion and analysis 
which is very low and stakeholders are less informed about management discussion and 
analysis; 11.11% firms provide existence of (CEO) plan of succession which indicates that 
most of the firms have no succession plan; 43.16% firms report that CEO serves no more 
than two additional boards of other companies which implies that remaining 56.84% firms 
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CEO are involved in more than two additional boards. The above result indicates that banks 
are practicing very low quality in terms of management discussion and analysis, CEO plan of 
succession and CEO involvement in other firms and the reason might be stakeholders have 
less demand on these issues.  It is also observed that 41.88% firms disclose performance 
evaluation of CEO; 36.75% firms disclose performance evaluation of management other than 
CEO; 18.80% firms disclose the performance evaluation process or criteria. This result 
indicates that only few banks are disclosing performance evaluation process or criteria and 
they are practicing very low quality in performance evaluation of CEO, CFO and other senior 
management. 
Transparency about management compensation and structure increase the quality of 
board, management structure and process. It is evident that 27.78% firms provide discussion 
or explanation about remuneration of directors in the corporate governance or director‟s 
report; 15.81% firms provide discussion or explanation about compensation of CEO in the 
corporate governance or director‟s report; 4.27% firms provide the policies on compensation 
of CEO; 16.67% firms report that board of directors fix the remuneration and compensation 
of directors and CEO; 5.98% firms report that board of directors fix the compensation of 
management and employees; 1.71% firms report that they have separate compensation 
committee to fix the compensation of management and employees; 0.85% firms disclose the 
roles and responsibilities of compensation committee for management and employees; 
56.84% firms disclose the appointment of legal advisor which indicates that remaining firms 
have no legal advisor to monitor the legal issue;  This result indicates that most of the banks 
are practicing very low quality and they are not transparent about remuneration and 
compensation of director, CEO, management and employees which ultimately reduce the 
quality of board, management structure and process.  
 
Table 4-17 
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
IV- 1 Does the firm provide the number and name of 
directors in the board? 25 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 232 99.15 
IV- 2 Does the firm follow board size within 5 to 20? 
23 26 30 27 26 26 30 30 218 93.16 
IV- 3 Does the firm reorganize the board every year 
through new appointment/rotation/retirement 
/termination of directors? 18 22 26 29 28 28 28 30 209 89.32 
IV- 4 Does the firm provide the brief resume (profile) of 
directors to the shareholders in case of 
appointment/ reappointment of directors? 1 3 5 6 10 13 27 26 91 38.89 
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Table 4-17 
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
IV- 5 Does the firm‟s each director other than 
independent director(s) hold qualification shares 
(minimum 2% of the paid up capital)? 1 0 1 1 1 1 18 19 42 17.95 
IV- 6 Does the firm disclose educational qualifications 
of each director? 3 4 3 4 4 5 14 12 49 20.94 
IV- 7 Does the firm disclose director‟s nature of 
expertise in specific functional areas to the 
shareholders in case of appointment/ 
reappointment of directors? 0 2 4 5 8 12 26 25 82 35.04 
IV- 8 Does the firm disclose the age (date of birth) of 
the each director? 0 1 0 1 1 2 7 5 17 7.26 
IV- 9 Does the firm provide information about each of 
the directors‟ joining date in the board? 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 14 5.98 
IV- 10 Does the firm provide information about name of 
the companies in which the person holds the 
directorship and membership of committees of the 
board in case of appointment/ reappointment of 
directors? 25 27 30 30 29 30 30 30 231 98.72 
IV- 11 Does the firm provide information in details about 
previous employment/positions of directors? 0 3 5 6 8 12 25 24 83 35.47 
IV- 12 Does the firm have the independent directors in 
the board of directors? 4 7 18 20 18 20 27 29 143 61.11 
IV- 13 Are the independent directors identified in the 
board of directors or audit committee? 2 5 17 19 18 20 25 28 134 57.26 
IV- 14 Does the firm comply the minimum requirement 
of independent directors i.e. at least 1/10 and 1/5 
according to corporate governance guideline 2006 
and 2012 respectively? 4 7 18 20 18 20 16 25 128 54.70 
IV- 15 Does the firm report the direct shareholding 
position of independent directors? 2 5 16 18 17 19 27 29 133 56.84 
IV- 16 Does the firm comply that an independent 
directors are not the sponsor/promoters or 
directors or shareholders of the company and can‟t 
hold  1% or more shares of the total paid up shares 
on the basis of family relationship and also the 
family members of the independent directors can‟t 
hold the above  mentioned shares of the company? 2 5 15 17 17 19 26 28 129 55.13 
IV- 17 Does the firm comply that an independent director 
does not have any other relationship such as 
pecuniary with the company or its subsidiary or 
associated companies? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
IV- 18 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
are not the member, director or officer of any 
stock exchange? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
IV- 19 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
are not the shareholder, director or officer of any 
member of stock exchange or an intermediary of 
the capital market? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
IV- 20 Does the firm comply that an independent director 
are not the partner or executive or former partner 
or former executive in previous three years of the 
concerned company‟s statutory audit firm? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
IV- 21 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
can‟t be an independent director in more than 
three listed companies? 1 3 14 16 17 18 27 29 125 53.42 
IV- 22 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
have not been convicted by the court of competent 
jurisdiction as a defaulter in payment of loan to 
bank or non bank financial institution? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
IV- 23 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
have not been convicted for a criminal offense 
involving moral turpitude? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
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Table 4-17 
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
IV- 24 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
are appointed by the BODs and approved by the 
shareholders in the annual general meeting 
(AGM)? 4 7 18 20 18 20 27 29 143 61.11 
IV- 25 Does the firm comply that posts of independent 
director(s) are not remaining vacant for more than 
90 days? 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 28 54 23.08 
IV- 26 Does the board place a code of conduct for all 
members of the board and compliance of the code 
is recorded annually? 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 30 58 24.79 
IV- 27 Does the firm comply that the tenure of office of 
an independent directors for a period of three 
years and can be extended for 1(one) term only? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
IV- 28 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
are knowledgeable individual with integrity and 
have the ability to ensure compliance with 
financial, regulatory, and corporate laws and make 
meaningful contribution to the business? 2 2 17 16 18 20 27 29 131 55.98 
IV- 29 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
are the business leader /corporate leader/ 
bureaucrat/ university teacher with economics / 
business studies or law background / professionals 
like chartered accountants (CA), cost and 
management accountants (CMA) and chartered 
secretaries? 2 1 10 10 12 14 27 29 105 44.87 
IV- 30 Does the firm comply that independent directors 
have 12 years of corporate management / 
professional experiences? 0 0 4 2 3 5 27 29 70 29.91 
IV- 31 Does the firm disclose the relaxation of the 
qualification and experience of the independent 
directors with the prior approval of BSEC? 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 56 23.93 
IV- 32 Does the firm disclose the role and responsibilities 
of the board? 10 20 21 24 25 26 28 28 182 77.78 
IV- 33 Does the firm disclose the duties and 
responsibilities of independent directors? 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 2.56 
IV- 34 Does the firm provide a separate report or 
statement of director‟s responsibility in respect of 
internal control and audited financial statement? 6 9 14 17 19 21 22 20 128 54.70 
IV- 35 Does the firm disclose the roles and 
responsibilities of board and management 
separately and clearly? 7 11 15 16 19 21 21 24 134 57.26 
IV- 36 Does the firm disclose the factors and criteria 
(basis) in determining the size of the board or to 
be a member of the board? 5 5 8 10 11 14 15 17 85 36.32 
IV- 37 Does the firm disclose the number of board 
meeting during the year? 25 27 30 30 30 30 29 30 231 98.72 
IV- 38 Does the board of directors meet at least four 
times in every year? 25 27 30 30 30 30 29 30 231 98.72 
IV- 39 Does the firm disclose the attendance of each 
director of the board meetings? 15 19 24 26 27 27 29 29 196 83.76 
IV- 40 Do the firm‟s all directors attend at least 75% of 
board meeting? 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 9 3.85 
IV- 41 Do the firm‟s all (or each) independent directors 
attend at least 75% of board meeting? 0 1 4 10 8 10 12 11 56 23.93 
IV- 42 Does the firm disclose the political connection of 
the board members? 0 2 4 5 7 7 8 8 41 17.52 
IV- 43 Does the firm disclose the procedure(s) for 
addressing conflicts of interest among board 
members? 2 2 2 2 1 3 4 6 22 9.40 
IV- 44 Does the firm disclose the performance evaluation 
process /criteria/ system of the board (directors)? 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 5 17 7.26 
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Table 4-17 
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
IV- 45 Does the firm evaluate the performance of the 
board regularly? 1 1 1 1 3 4 6 8 25 10.68 
IV- 46 Does the firm arrange the orientation program for 
all new directors? 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 9 3.85 
IV- 47 Does the firm arrange professional development 
and training activities for directors? 0 0 0 2 5 7 11 12 37 15.81 
IV- 48 Does the firm disclose the appointment of 
chairman who is elected from the directors of the 
board? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
IV- 49 Does the board define the role and responsibilities 
of the chairman clearly? 8 14 16 17 19 23 25 28 150 64.10 
IV- 50 Does the firm have an executive committee as a 
sub-committee of the board of directors? 19 21 26 27 29 29 29 29 209 89.32 
IV- 51 Does the firm disclose the members of executive 
committee? 14 18 22 25 27 28 28 29 191 81.62 
IV- 52 Does the firm disclose the number of meeting of 
executive committee? 17 19 21 24 26 24 29 29 189 80.77 
IV- 53 Does the firm disclose the attendance of meeting 
of executive committee? 3 5 7 6 9 9 13 13 65 27.78 
IV- 54 Do the firm‟s all executive members attend at least 
75% of executive committee meeting? 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 4 15 6.41 
IV- 55 Does the firm disclose the duties and 
responsibilities of the executive committee? 9 12 17 20 23 25 26 26 158 67.52 
IV- 56 Does the firm provide the report of executive 
committee? 0 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 16 6.84 
IV- 57 Does the firm provide the report of shariah 
supervisory committee? 7 9 12 15 16 17 17 17 110 47.01 
IV- 58 Does the firm have an audit committee as a sub-
committee of the board of directors? 25 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 232 99.15 
IV- 59 Does the audit committee assist the board of 
directors in ensuring that financial statements 
reflect true and fair view of the state of affairs of 
the company and ensure good monitoring system 
within the business? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
IV- 60 Is the audit committee responsible to the board of 
directors and are the duties of audit committee 
clearly stated in writing / does the audit committee 
have a written charter? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
IV- 61 Does the firm disclose the basis of selection of 
audit committee members? 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 8 20 8.55 
IV- 62 Does the firm disclose the members of audit 
committee? 25 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 232 99.15 
IV- 63 Does the audit committee have at least three 
members? 24 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 231 98.72 
IV- 64 Does the audit committee have at least one 
independent director? 3 5 17 20 18 20 26 29 138 58.97 
IV- 65 Is the chairman of the audit committee an 
independent director?  0 0 1 2 3 3 19 29 57 24.36 
IV- 66 Does the chairman of audit committee attend in 
the AGM? 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 30 58 24.79 
IV- 67 Does the chairman of the audit committee have the 
professional qualification or knowledge, 
understanding and experience in accounting or 
finance? 8 9 10 10 13 15 17 17 99 42.31 
IV- 68 Are all members of the audit committee 
financially literate and does at least one member 
have experience of accounting or financial 
management (professional qualification or 
graduation in accounting/finance with 12 years‟ 
experience)? 17 17 22 19 24 21 21 23 164 70.09 
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Table 4-17 
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
IV- 69 Does the board of directors appoint the new audit 
committee member(s) to fill up the vacancy 
immediately or not more than one month from the 
date of vacancy to ensure continuity of the 
performance of audit committee, if audit 
committee members are lower than prescribed 
number of three persons due to expiry of the term 
or any other circumstances? 24 25 29 30 30 30 30 30 228 97.44 
IV- 70 Does the company secretary act as secretary of 
audit committee? 8 11 11 15 17 18 30 30 140 59.83 
IV- 71 Does the quorum of the audit committee meeting 
constitute at least one independent director? 0 0 1 3 5 4 23 24 60 25.64 
IV- 72 Does the audit committee oversee the financial 
reporting process? 1 2 5 7 8 8 30 30 91 38.89 
IV- 73 Does the audit committee monitor choice of 
accounting policies and principles? 0 0 1 2 2 2 30 30 67 28.63 
IV- 74 Does the audit committee monitor internal control 
risk management process? 14 19 22 24 25 26 30 30 190 81.20 
IV- 75 Does the audit committee oversee hiring and 
performance of external auditors? 12 13 19 21 25 27 30 30 177 75.64 
IV- 76 Does the audit committee review annual financial 
statements with the management before 
submission to the board for approval? 14 19 21 25 27 28 30 30 194 82.91 
IV- 77 Does the audit committee review quarterly and 
half yearly financial statements with the 
management before submission to the board for 
approval? 5 7 8 10 13 16 30 30 119 50.85 
IV- 78 Does the audit committee review the adequacy of 
internal audit function? 13 14 18 25 27 27 30 30 184 78.63 
IV- 79 Does the audit committee review statement of 
significant related party transactions submitted by 
management? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
IV- 80 Does the audit committee review management 
letters/ letter of internal control weakness issued 
by statutory auditors? 2 5 9 12 17 19 30 30 124 52.99 
IV- 81 Does the firm report to the audit committee about 
the uses/application of funds on a quarterly basis 
when money is raised through initial public 
offering (IPO)/ repeat public offering (RPO) / 
right issue? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
IV- 82 Does the firm prepare the statement of funds 
utilized for the purpose other than those stated in 
the offer document /prospectus on an annual 
basis? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
IV- 83 Does the audit committee immediately report its 
activities to the BODs? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
IV- 84 Does the audit committee immediately report on 
conflict of interest to the BODs? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
IV- 85 Does the audit committee immediately report on 
suspected or presumed fraud or irregularity or 
material defect of the internal control system to 
the BODs? 22 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 229 97.86 
IV- 86 Does the audit committee immediately report on 
suspected infringement of laws, including 
securities related laws, rules and regulations to the 
BODs? 22 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 229 97.86 
IV- 87 Does the audit committee immediately report any 
other relevant matters to the BOD?  22 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 229 97.86 
IV- 88 Does the audit committee identify any significant 
issue that is violated by the BODs and report it to 
BSEC? 23 26 29 29 29 29 30 30 225 96.15 
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Table 4-17 
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
IV- 89 Does the audit committee report its activities to 
the shareholders and general investors? 23 26 29 29 29 29 30 30 225 96.15 
IV- 90 Does the firm provide the report of audit 
committee? 5 9 10 15 23 25 28 28 143 61.11 
IV- 91 Does the firm disclose the number of audit 
committee meetings during the year? 25 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 232 99.15 
IV- 92 Does the audit committee meet at least two times 
during the year? 25 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 232 99.15 
IV- 93 Does the firm disclose the written minutes 
(activities) for audit committee meetings? 24 26 29 29 30 30 30 30 228 97.44 
IV- 94 Does the firm disclose the attendance of audit 
committee meetings? 5 5 7 7 11 10 15 17 77 32.91 
IV- 95 Do the firm‟s all audit committee members attend 
at least 75% of audit committee meeting? 1 2 2 4 7 1 3 5 25 10.68 
IV- 96 Do the firm‟s all (or each) independent directors 
attend at least 75% of audit committee meeting? 0 0 1 3 5 5 7 7 28 11.97 
IV- 97 Does the firm provide educational qualification 
information of CEO? 1 3 5 4 7 10 16 19 65 27.78 
IV- 98 Does the firm provide date of joining information 
of the CEO? 1 3 4 5 6 10 14 15 58 24.79 
IV- 99 Does the firm disclose the experience of the CEO? 
2 3 5 6 9 11 18 19 73 31.20 
IV- 100 Does the firm disclose the role and responsibilities 
of the CEO? 9 16 18 19 22 24 25 26 159 67.95 
IV- 101 Does the firm disclose the appointment of Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO)? 16 25 27 29 29 29 29 29 213 91.03 
IV- 102 Does the firm provide educational qualification 
information of CFO? 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 1.28 
IV- 103 Does the firm provide date of joining information 
of the CFO? 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 1.28 
IV- 104 Does the firm disclose the experience of the CFO? 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 1.28 
IV- 105 Does the firm disclose the roles, responsibilities 
and duties of the CFO? 10 14 15 18 19 19 24 26 145 61.97 
IV- 106 Does the firm disclose the appointment of Head of 
Internal Audit? 21 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 228 97.44 
IV- 107 Does the firm provide educational qualification 
information of the head of internal audit? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0.85 
IV- 108 Does the firm disclose the experience of the head 
of internal audit? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0.85 
IV- 109 Does the firm define the roles, responsibilities and 
duties of the Head of Internal Audit? 11 15 16 18 20 20 25 27 152 64.96 
IV- 110 Does the firm disclose the appointment of 
secretary? 25 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 232 99.15 
IV- 111 Does the firm provide educational qualification 
information of Company Secretary? 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 2.56 
IV- 112 Does the firm provide date of joining information 
of secretary? 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 1.71 
IV- 113 Does the firm disclose the experience of the 
secretary? 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 2.99 
IV- 114 Does the firm disclose the roles, responsibilities 
and duties of the secretary? 11 15 16 18 20 20 25 27 152 64.96 
IV- 115 Does the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) attend in 
the board meeting? 14 23 26 29 29 29 29 29 208 88.89 
IV- 116 Does the secretary attend in the board meeting? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
IV- 117 Do the CEO and CFO certify to the board that 
they have reviewed the financial statements for the 
year and these statements are free from material 
untrue statement, or omission of material fact or 
misleading statements? 0 0 0 2 2 3 30 30 67 28.63 
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Table 4-17 
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  
No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
IV- 118 Do the CEO and CFO certify to the board that 
they have reviewed the financial statements for the 
year and these statements present the true and fair 
view of the company and comply with existing 
accounting standards and applicable laws? 0 0 0 2 2 3 30 30 67 28.63 
IV- 119 Do the CEO and CFO certify to the board that to 
their best of knowledge, company is not dealing 
any transactions that is fraudulent, illegal or 
violation of code of conduct? 0 0 0 2 2 3 30 30 67 28.63 
IV- 120 Does the firm provide separate report or statement 
on CEO/CFO's declaration to the board? 0 0 0 2 2 3 18 23 48 20.51 
IV- 121 Does the firm provide separate report on 
management discussion and analysis? 0 0 2 2 6 5 8 11 34 14.53 
IV- 122 Does the firm provide existence of (CEO) plan of 
succession? 1 1 1 1 1 5 7 9 26 11.11 
IV- 123 Does the CEO serve no more than two additional 
boards of other public companies? 11 12 13 13 13 13 14 12 101 43.16 
IV- 124 Does the firm disclose the performance evaluation 
process or criteria of the management (CEO, CFO 
and others senior management)? 1 1 2 3 5 8 13 11 44 18.80 
IV- 125 Does the firm disclose the performance evaluation 
of CEO/MD? 2 6 10 12 15 19 19 15 98 41.88 
IV- 126 Does the firm disclose performance evaluation of 
the management team other than CEO/MD? 1 5 9 11 13 17 17 13 86 36.75 
IV- 127 Does the firm provide discussion or explanation 
about remuneration of directors in the corporate 
governance or directors report? 1 2 2 5 8 12 17 18 65 27.78 
IV- 128 Does the firm provide discussion or explanation 
about compensation of CEO/MD in the corporate 
governance or director‟s report? 0 1 2 3 3 6 10 12 37 15.81 
IV- 129 Does the firm provide the policies (basis) on 
compensation of CEO/MD? 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 5 10 4.27 
IV- 130 Does the board of directors fix the remuneration 
and compensation of directors and CEO/MD? 0 1 2 3 4 7 10 12 39 16.67 
IV- 131 Does the board of directors fix the compensation 
of management (excluding CEO/MD) and 
employees? 0 1 1 1 1 2 4 4 14 5.98 
IV- 132 Does the separate compensation committee (other 
than directors) fix the compensation of 
management (excluding CEO/MD) and 
employees? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 1.71 
IV- 133 Does the firm disclose the roles and 
responsibilities of compensation committee for 
management (excluding CEO?MD) and 
employees? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0.85 
IV- 134 Does the firm disclose the appointment of legal 
advisor? 12 14 15 16 18 20 19 19 133 56.84 
                              Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234                              
 
 
Area of Further Improvement 
Corporate governance quality mainly depends on board, management structure and 
process quality which includes both mandatory and voluntary attributes of corporate 
governance.  Quality of some attributes are very low during 2006 to 2011 but improving from 
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2012 because corporate governance guidelines 2012 includes some new attributes such as 
criteria and qualification of an independent director, details information of directors during 
appointment/reappointment, constitution and role of audit committee, duties of CEO and 
CFO. It is found that most of the banks are showing very low quality in mandatory attributes 
such as minimum qualification shares of directors;  having independent directors with 
minimum requirements; duties of CEO, CFO, head of internal audit and company secretary 
and voluntary attributes such as age, joining date, educational qualification, experience and  
expertise of directors, CEO, CFO, head of internal audit, company secretary; duties of 
chairman,  board of directors, independent directors, executive committee,  and management; 
factors and criteria to be a member of board of directors and audit committee; attendance of 
executive committee meeting, audit committee meeting; having at least 75% attendance  of 
board members or independent directors in board meeting, executive committee meeting and 
audit committee meeting; report of executive committee, audit committee, shariah 
supervisory committee; political affiliation; addressing conflict of interest among board 
members; existence and practices of orientation program, professional development and 
training program and performance evaluation process for board members, CEO, CFO and 
other senior management; separate report for management discussion and analysis, CEO and 
CFO declaration to the board; discussion of compensation policy and process for directors, 
CEO, CFO and other senior management and employees. The surprising finding is that most 
of banks are violating some mandatory requirements of corporate governance guidelines 
2006 and 2012 and company act 1994. Thus, the regulatory authority and the banks should 
more emphasize on mandatory as well as voluntary attributes of board, management structure 
and process which ultimately increase overall quality of corporate governance.   
 
4.7.3.5  Quality of External Auditing Information  
Quality of external auditing information includes total 12 attributes related to external 
auditor of the firm and presented in the Table 4-18.  Quality of external auditing information 
finds that:  
Corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 require the same guidelines for 
external auditor. It is evident that 98.72% firms provide the discussion or process on 
appointment of external auditor; 59.40% firms disclose the duration of current auditor. It is 
also observed that external auditors are not performing- the appraisal or valuation services or 
fairness opinions of the company (95.73% firms); financial information systems design 
implementation of the company (97.86% firms); book keeping or other services related to the 
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accounting records or financial statement of the company (97.44% firms); broker dealer 
services of the company (96.15% firms); actuarial services of the company (95.73% firms ); 
internal audit services of the company (98.29% firms) and  any service that is determined by 
the audit committee  (98.29% firms). This result indicates that most of the banks are 
maintaining high quality of external auditing information because these attributes are 
mandatory requirement in corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012.  
Corporate governance guidelines 2012 requires additional requirement that partner or 
employee of the external audit firms should not hold any share of the company during the 
tenure of audit engagement and it is evident that all the listed banks from 2012 comply this 
requirement.  
8.12% firms report the amount of non audit fees paid to the auditors and 5.56% firms 
audit fee is higher than non audit fee. This result indicates that banks are maintaining low 
quality of external auditing information. 
 
Table 4-18 
V. Quality of External Auditing Information 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
V-1 Does the firm provide the discussion or process 
on appointment of external auditors? 25 28 30 30 30 30 29 29 231 98.72 
V-2 Does the firm disclose the duration of current 
auditors? 16 13 19 19 14 17 17 24 139 59.40 
V-3 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not 
performing the appraisal or valuation services or 
fairness opinions of the company? 
22 26 29 29 29 29 30 30 224 95.73 
V-4 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not 
performing the financial information systems 
design and implementation of the company? 23 26 30 30 30 30 30 30 229 97.86 
V-5 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not 
performing the book –keeping or other services 
related to the accounting records or financial 
statements of the company? 23 26 30 29 30 30 30 30 228 97.44 
V-6 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not 
performing the broker dealer services of the 
company? 23 26 29 29 29 29 30 30 225 96.15 
V-7 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not 
performing the actuarial services of the 
company? 23 26 29 28 29 29 30 30 224 95.73 
V-8 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not 
performing the internal audit services of the 
company? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
V-9 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not 
performing any service that is determined by the 
audit committee? 23 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 230 98.29 
V-10 Are the firm‟s partner or employee of the 
external audit firms not holding or posing any 
share of the company during the tenure of audit 
engagement? 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 60 25.64 
V-11 Does the firm report the amount of non audit fees 
paid to the auditors? 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 19 8.12 
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Table 4-18 
V. Quality of External Auditing Information 
Sub 
Indices 
Items  No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
V-12 Is the firm‟s amount of audit fee higher than non-
audit fee? 2 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 13 5.56 
                              Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234 
  
 
Area of Further Improvement 
Banks are maintaining high quality of external auditing information because 
maximum attributes are mandatory requirement in both corporate governance guidelines 
2006 and 2012. But banks are practicing low quality in reporting of duration of current 
auditor, non audit fee and comparison of audit and non audit fee. Thus, banks and regulatory 
authority should more emphasize on reporting of duration of current auditor, audit fee and 
non audit fee.  
 
4.7.3.6  Quality of Risk Management Information  
Corporate governance quality is also measured by risk management information. 
Table 4-19 presents the quality of risk management information which includes total 35 
attributes and finds that:  
Corporate governance guidelines 2012 requires additional statement of risk 
management and concerns but there is no requirement for risk in corporate governance 
guidelines 2006.  It is evident that only 55.56% firms provide a separate report on risk 
management though banks are most organized and regulated institution; 49.15% firms have 
risk management committee or division or unit which implies that remaining firms have no 
committee to control or reduce the risk; 18.80% firms provide the list of members of risk 
management committee, division or unit which indicates the stakeholders have no idea 
whether risk is managed and controlled by any efficient personnel; 12.39% firms provide the 
report of risk management committee or chief risk officer and this result indicates that 
remaining 87.61% firms risk management committee, division or unit don‟t provide any 
statement on risk. The above result indicates that most of the banks are practicing low quality 
in terms of separate report on risk management, risk management committee, list of members 
of risk management committee and evaluation report by the risk management committee.  
Only 4.27% firms disclose the number of meetings of risk management committee; 
1.71% firms report the attendance of risk management committee, division or unit and 1.28% 
 282  
 
firm‟s risk management committee members have at least 75% attendance. Bangladesh Bank, 
the central bank, requires formulating a separate risk management committee from 2013. But 
only 10 banks out of 30 banks report that they have formulated the risk management 
committee in 2013 which means that other banks are not maintaining the regulatory 
requirement of Bangladesh Bank. The surprising finding is that firms didn‟t report any 
meeting voluntarily to resolve or minimize the risk before 2013.  
It is evident that 35.47% firms disclose the role and responsibilities of risk 
management committee, division or unit; 62.82% firms disclose the risk management 
strategy, 50.85% firms report the risk management process; qualitative and quantitative 
information of risk management is reported by 98.72% and 47.86% firms respectively. 
Though the corporate governance guidelines don‟t provide any instruction about risk 
management but Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, provide some guidelines about risk 
management. Thus, only few banks are disclosing roles and responsibilities of risk 
management committee, risk management strategy and process, qualitative and quantitative 
risks but most of the banks firms are not practicing this attributes.  
Bangladesh Bank provides the core risk management guidelines for six types of risk 
such as credit risk, asset liability management risk, foreign exchange risk, internal control 
risk, money laundering risk and information and communication technology risk. It is evident 
that 97.86% firms provide discussion on credit risk management; 94.87% firms provide 
discussion on foreign exchange; 76.92% firms provide discussion on asset liability 
management; 86.32% firms provide discussion on internal control and compliance risk 
management; 93.59% firms provide discussion on money laundering and 75.21% firms 
provide discussion on information and communication technology risk. This result indicates 
that most of the banks are practicing better quality in managing and reporting of core risk 
according to Bangladesh Bank guidelines.  
Banks also provide discussion on various risks other than core risk of Bangladesh 
Bank. It is evident that  banks providing discussion on market risk (65.38% firms); 
operational risk (68.80% firms); liquidity risk (53.42%); interest risk (62.82%); reputation 
risk (19.23% firms); equity risk (53.85% firms); settlement risk (5.98% firms); strategic risk 
(8.55% firms); legal risk (8.12% firms); adequate capital risk (93.59% firms); 
business/industry risk (7.69%);  potential or existing government regulations (7.26% firms); 
potential changes in global or national policies (3.42% firms); concentration risk (11.97% 
firms); residual risk (7.69% firms) and fraud risk (9.83% firms). This result indicates that 
most of the banks are reporting on capital risk, operational risk, market risk, interest risk, 
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liquidity risk, equity risk. But only few banks are reporting other types of risk. The reason 
might be all types of risk are not related to each bank or they are not aware about these kinds 
of risk.  
Banks success depends on forecasting and minimization of future risk. It is observed 
that only 38.03% firms provide discussion on stress testing to manage the future shocks and 
potential risk. This result indicates that most of the banks are not dealing or focusing on 
future risk.  
 
Table 4-19 
VI. Quality of Risk Management Information 
 
Sub 
Indices 
 
Items No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
VI-1 Does the firm provide a separate report on risk 
management? 2 5 6 12 24 27 27 27 130 55.56 
VI-2 Does the firm have  the risk management committee or 
division or unit? 1 1 2 16 20 21 24 30 115 49.15 
VI-3 Does the firm provide the list of members of risk 
management committee or division or unit? 0 0 0 1 4 5 7 27 44 18.80 
VI-4 Does the firm provide the report of the risk 
management committee or chief risk officer desk? 1 1 1 2 2 4 7 11 29 12.39 
VI-5 Does the firm disclose the number of meetings of risk 
management committee or division or unit? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 4.27 
VI-6 Does the firm disclose the attendance of risk 
management committee or division or unit? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 1.71 
VI-7 Do the firm‟s all members of risk management 
committee or division or unit attend 75% of risk 
management committee meeting? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1.28 
VI-8 Does the firm disclose the role and responsibilities of 
risk management committee or division or unit? 0 0 0 8 11 18 20 26 83 35.47 
VI-9 Does the firm disclose the risk management strategy 
and policy? 5 8 9 15 24 28 29 29 147 62.82 
VI-10 Does the firm disclose the risk management process? 4 7 14 15 16 18 23 22 119 50.85 
VI-11 Does the firm disclose qualitative (descriptive) 
information of risk management? 24 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 231 98.72 
VI-12 Does the firm disclose quantitative (or numerical) 
information of risk management? 0 0 1 9 20 26 28 28 112 47.86 
VI-13 Does the firm provide discussion on credit 
(investment) risk management? 23 26 30 30 30 30 30 30 229 97.86 
VI-14 Does the firm provide discussion on foreign exchange 
risk management? 21 25 29 28 29 30 30 30 222 94.87 
VI-15 Does the firm provide discussion on asset liability risk 
management? 20 21 24 22 23 22 23 25 180 76.92 
VI-16 Does the firm provide discussion on internal control 
and compliance risk management? 19 22 25 26 26 27 27 30 202 86.32 
VI-17 Does the firm provide discussion on money laundering 
prevention risk management? 22 26 29 28 28 28 28 30 219 93.59 
VI-18 Does the firm provide discussion on information and 
communication technology risk management? 9 13 19 25 27 27 27 29 176 75.21 
VI-19 Does the firm provide discussion on market risk 
management? 6 7 10 19 25 28 29 29 153 65.38 
VI-20 Does the firm provide discussion on operational risk 
management? 5 10 15 20 26 27 29 29 161 68.80 
VI-21 Does the firm provide discussion on liquidity risk 
management? 6 12 14 15 17 18 21 22 125 53.42 
VI-22 Does the firm provide discussion on interest risk 
management? 3 7 12 16 26 26 29 28 147 62.82 
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Table 4-19 
VI. Quality of Risk Management Information 
 
Sub 
Indices 
 
Items No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
VI-23 Does the firm provide discussion on reputation risk 
management? 0 0 1 6 10 9 10 9 45 19.23 
VI-24 Does the firm provide discussion on equity risk 
management? 1 2 5 11 22 27 29 29 126 53.85 
VI-25 Does the firm provide discussion on settlement risk 
management? 0 0 0 1 2 4 4 3 14 5.98 
VI-26 Does the firm provide discussion on strategic risk 
management? 0 0 0 1 4 5 6 4 20 8.55 
VI-27 Does the firm provide discussion on legal risk 
management? 0 0 2 3 4 3 3 4 19 8.12 
VI-28 Does the firm provide discussion on adequate capital 
risk management? 19 25 27 29 29 30 30 30 219 93.59 
VI-29 Does the firm provide discussion on business/industry 
risk? 0 0 1 2 4 4 3 4 18 7.69 
VI-30 Does the firm provide discussion on potential or 
existing government regulations? 0 0 1 2 3 3 4 4 17 7.26 
VI-31 Does the firm provide discussion on potential changes 
in global or national policies? 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 8 3.42 
VI-32 Does the firm provide discussion on (credit) 
concentration risk? 0 0 1 0 5 7 7 8 28 11.97 
VI-33 Does the firm provide discussion on residual risk? 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 5 18 7.69 
VI-34 Does the firm provide discussion on fraud risk 
management? 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 18 23 9.83 
VI-35 Does the firm provide discussion on stress testing to 
manage the future shocks and potential risk? 0 0 1 5 12 20 23 28 89 38.03 
                             Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234 
  
 
Area of Further Improvement 
Bangladesh Bank provides the guidelines for core risk management and corporate 
governance guidelines 2012 requires additional statement of risk management and concerns 
in the directors report. But it is observed that quality of risk management is very poor in 
terms of risk management report, risk management committee, meeting, attendance, roles and 
responsibilities, quantitative risk, risk management strategy and process, discussion of 
various risk other than core risk and future risk etc. Thus, it can be said that overall quality of 
risk management information is very poor due to absence of guidelines in the corporate 
governance guidelines 2006 and 2012. The regulatory authority should provide details 
information about risk management reporting in the corporate governance guidelines.   
 
4.7.3.7  Quality of Tax Management Information  
Tax management information is considered as part of corporate governance and 
presented in the Table 4-20. Quality of tax management information includes total 15 
attributes and Table 4-20 finds that:  
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81.62% firms report the applicable tax rate and 4.70% firms report the effective tax 
rate. This result indicates that most of the banks reporting quality for applicable tax rate is 
good but provides very low quality for effective tax rate. The reason might be they are not 
interested to disclose the effective tax rate information in public.  
Accounting profit differs from taxable profit and taxable profit is calculated on the 
basis of accounting profit after consideration of some adjustment. But it is evident that only 
8.55% firms report the taxable profit and computation of taxable profit which means that 
most of the banks are hiding the information of taxable profit and computation of taxable 
profit. It is also observed that 97.01% firms provide discussion on accounting policies for 
current tax and deferred tax; 95.73% firms report the provision for current tax during the 
year; 79.06% firms reporting the provision for deferred tax during the year; 11.54% firms 
disclose the computation of provision for current tax during the year and 11.11% firms 
disclose the computation of provision for deferred tax during the year.  This result indicates 
that most of the banks are practicing high quality in terms of reporting provision and 
accounting policies for current tax and deferred tax. But they reported very low quality in 
computation of current and deferred tax. Thus, stakeholders have lack of information about 
taxable profit and computation process for taxable profit, current tax and deferred tax.   
All the listed banks should provide the tax assessment information in details. But it is 
evident that 66.24% firms report the tax assessment information; 38.89% firms provide a 
separate statement of tax status and 36.75% firms provide in details information in the tax 
status report. This result implies that listed banks are practicing low quality in tax assessment 
and tax status reporting.  
It is also observed that 64.96% firms provide discussion on tax in the chairman‟s 
report or directors‟ report, 54.70% firms disclose the contribution to national exchequer and 
economy and 52.14% firms disclose that tax services are performed by separate tax advisor 
or external/statutory auditor and 91.45% firms report that they follow the tax as per law. This 
result indicates that most of the banks are also practicing low quality due to absence of 
appropriate reporting guidelines in the corporate governance guidelines.  
 
Table 4-20 
VII. Quality of Tax Management Information 
Sub 
Indices 
Items No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
VII-1 Does the firm disclose the applicable tax rate? 
18 22 24 26 26 26 25 24 191 81.62 
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Table 4-20 
VII. Quality of Tax Management Information 
Sub 
Indices 
Items No of Firms Meeting Attribute % 
 of Firms 
meeting 
attribute 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
VII-2 Does the firm disclose the effective tax rate? 
0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 11 4.70 
VII-3 Does the firm disclose taxable profit and computation of 
taxable profit? 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 20 8.55 
VII-4 Does the firm provide discussion on accounting policies 
for current tax and deferred tax? 24 25 28 30 30 30 30 30 227 97.01 
VII-5 Does the firm report the provision for current tax during 
the year? 23 26 28 28 29 30 30 30 224 95.73 
VII-6 Does the firm disclose the computation of provision for 
current tax during the year? 1 1 2 5 5 5 4 4 27 11.54 
VII-7 Does the firm report the provision for deferred tax 
during the year? 16 23 25 22 24 24 25 26 185 79.06 
VII-8 Does the firm disclose the computation of provision for 
deferred tax during the year? 1 1 2 0 1 6 7 8 26 11.11 
VII-9 Does the firm provide the tax assessment information? 
20 22 23 19 17 17 18 19 155 66.24 
VII-10 Does the firm provide a separate statement of tax status 
or position? 10 12 11 10 11 11 12 14 91 38.89 
VII-11 Does the firm report on tax status showing accounting 
year, assessment year, tax provision, tax liability, excess 
or shortfall of provision, amount paid, required 
provision, assessment status  etc.? 9 11 10 10 11 11 11 13 86 36.75 
VII-12 Does the firm provide discussion on tax in the 
chairman‟s report or director‟s report? 8 13 16 20 23 23 24 25 152 64.96 
VII-13 Does the firm disclose the contribution to national 
exchequer and economy? 6 11 12 14 18 22 22 23 128 54.70 
VII-14 Does the firm disclose that the tax services are 
performed by separate tax advisor or external/ statutory 
auditor? 
10 13 13 16 16 18 18 18 122 52.14 
VII-15 Does the firm report the tax compliance as per law (BAS 
12, Income Tax Ordinance 1984 etc.)? 19 24 28 29 29 29 27 29 214 91.45 
                              Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234 
  
 
Area of Further Improvement 
It is observed that quality of tax management information is very low in terms of 
effective tax rate, taxable profit and computation of taxable profit; computation of provision 
for current and deferred tax; tax assessment information; separate statement for tax status 
showing in details information; contribution to national exchequer, discussion in the 
chairman or director report; tax services performed by separate tax advisor or 
external/statutory auditor. Moreover, there is no information about tax management in the 
corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012. Thus, corporate governance guidelines 
should provide the tax reporting and assessment guidelines to improve the quality of tax 
management information.  
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4.7.3.8 Quality of corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information  
Corporate governance quality includes corporate responsibility, compliance and 
stakeholder information as part of corporate governance. Total 14 attributes are considered to 
assess the quality of corporate responsibility, compliance and stakeholder information and 
presented in the Table 4-21 which finds that:  
Banks should play their responsibilities as part of the society and stakeholders are 
interested to know the details information about corporate social responsibility. It is evident 
that 51.71% firms provide separate report on corporate social responsibility; 93.16% firms 
provide qualitative information and 78.63% firms provide quantitative information about 
corporate social responsibility. This result indicates that most of the banks are practicing 
good quality by providing both qualitative and quantitative information to the stakeholders.  
It is observed that 58.55% firms provide environmental information; 56.41% firms 
provide discussion on environmental policies and performance and 24.36% firms provide 
separate report on environmental issues. This result indicates that banks are more aware about 
environmental issues nowadays and they are trying to improve their reporting quality in 
annual report.  
97.44% firms provide separate report or statement on human resource management; 
75.21% firms provide discussion on appointment and promotion policy of employees and 
11.97% firms provide separate report on sustainability. This result implies that banks are 
practicing high quality for human resource management including employees and low quality 
for reporting of sustainability. In recent years, banks are more aware about sustainability 
issue and trying to include separate sustainability report in the annual report.  
Stakeholders are also want to know the about the firms vision, mission, goals and 
objectives, strategy, core value, distribution of employees etc and it is the responsibility of 
the banks to provide details information to the interested users. It is evident that 32.05% firms 
provide discussion or separate statement of strategy; 88.46% firms provide the vision, 
mission, goals and objectives; 76.07% firms disclose the code of conduct, core values or 
ethics; 23.50% firms provide the distribution of employees by gender and age; 38.89% firms 
have the policy on whistle blower protection for all employees. This result indicates that all 
the banks are not providing its basic information to the users and banks are practicing low 
quality in terms of discussion of strategy, distribution of employees and whistle blower 
protection of employees.   
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Table 4-21 
VIII. Quality of Corporate Responsibility, Compliance and Stakeholder Information 
Sub 
Indices 
Items No of Firms Meeting Attribute 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TOTAL 
(2006 
to 2013) 
% 
 of 
Firms 
meeting 
attribute 
VIII-1 
Does the firm provide separate report on corporate 
social responsibility? 4 6 13 15 17 21 23 22 121 51.71 
VIII-2 
Does the firm provide qualitative information of 
corporate social responsibilities? 17 22 29 30 30 30 30 30 218 93.16 
VIII-3 
Does the firm provide quantitative information of 
corporate social responsibilities? 9 19 23 26 26 27 25 29 184 78.63 
VIII-4 Does the firm provide environment information? 5 8 9 11 18 28 29 29 137 58.55 
VIII-5 
Does the firm provide discussion on 
environmental policies and performance? 5 8 8 11 15 27 29 29 132 56.41 
VIII-6 
Does the firm provide separate report on 
environmental issues? 0 1 0 1 2 15 17 21 57 24.36 
VIII-7 
Does the firm provide separate report or statement 
on human resources management? 25 27 29 29 30 30 30 28 228 97.44 
VIII-8 
Does the firm provide discussion on appointment 
and promotion policy of employees? 14 16 21 22 26 27 26 24 176 75.21 
VIII-9 
Does the firm provide separate report on 
sustainability? 0 0 0 2 2 6 9 9 28 11.97 
VIII-10 
Does the firm provide discussion or separate 
statement of strategy? 1 4 4 10 12 14 15 15 75 32.05 
VIII-11 
Does the firm disclose vision, mission, goals and 
objectives? 16 23 26 27 29 29 28 29 207 88.46 
VIII-12 
Does the firm disclose code of conduct, core 
values or ethics? 13 16 19 19 26 28 28 29 178 76.07 
VIII-13 
Does the firm disclose the distribution of 
employees by gender and age? 1 1 3 6 7 11 11 15 55 23.50 
VIII-14 
Does the firm have the policy on “whistle blower” 
protection for all employees? 0 1 5 11 13 14 20 27 91 38.89 
                             Total No of Firms Available 26 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 234 
  
 
Area of Further Improvement 
Banks are not practicing the high quality in all attributes of quality of corporate 
responsibility, compliance and stakeholders‟ information and thus they should more 
concentrate on those issues and develop the quality especially on separate report on 
sustainability including environmental report , distribution of employees, discussion on 
strategy and whistle blower protection of employees. The higher quality of these issues will 
also improve the overall quality of corporate governance.  
 
4.8 Analysis of Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality  
4.8.1 Descriptive Statistics of Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality  
Table 4-22 present the descriptive summary statistics of the listed banks of 
Bangladesh from 2006 to 2013. The average board size is 13.89 and board size ranges from 5 
to 27. The average mean of percentage of independent director is 7.19% and minimum is 0% 
and maximum is 50%. Institutional investors‟ average ownership is only 14.26% which is 
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very low and ranges from 0% to 64.82%.  
The mean percentage of director ownership is 19.76% and maximum is 57.15%. 
Foreign investors own only 2.11% which is very low and ranges from 0% to 37.42%. 
External monitoring indicated by leverage and leverage is measured by debt to equity ratio 
and the mean of debt equity ratio is 12.14 with a standard deviation of 15.22. Total asset is 
used as the proxy of firm size and the average mean of firm size is 97,588.41 million and 
ranges from 14,302.84 million to 549,979.1 million with a standard deviation of 71,731.33 
million. The average means of firm age is 16.63 years and minimum age is 5 years and 
maximum is 31 years.   
 
Table 4-22 
Descriptive Summary Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum SD 
BSIZE 232 13.89655 5 11.5 14 15.5 27 4.255639 
ID (%) 232 7.19215 0 0 6.66667 10.56 50 8.35619 
INT (%) 236 14.26262 0 5.6 13.46 20.43 64.82 11.15091 
OWNDIR (%) 236 19.76421 0 8.35 19.23 29.14 57.15 13.64586 
FINVTR (%) 236 2.110751 0 0 0 0.24 37.42 6.29819 
DEBT2TE 236 12.14761 -16.72824 9.49 11.34883 13.83 230.9772 15.21685 
Total Asset (in 
million) 
236 
97588.41 14302.84 48328.74 81481.92 129086.2 549979.1 71731.33 
Firm Age 240 16.63333 5 11 14 24 31 7.338707 
 
 
4.8.2   Correlation Matrix 
Pearson correlation matrix between each variable is presented in Table 4-23. 
Corporate governance quality is positively associated with natural logarithm of board size 
(0.0307) which implies that the relationship between board size and corporate governance 
quality is not so strong to ensure better governance. Independent directors (0.5815) have the 
strong relationship with corporate governance quality. This indicates that independent 
directors are very active and play their monitoring role effectively in ensuring better 
governance. Corporate governance quality is also positively associated with institutional 
investors (0.0529) and it indicates that institutional monitoring is also an important 
instrument of corporate governance. Director ownership (0.2266) has the positive association 
with quality of corporate governance which implies that they are playing their active role and 
closely monitor the activities of management to ensure better governance.  
Corporate governance quality has positive association with foreign investors (0.0274) 
and this indicates that relationship between foreign investors and corporate governance 
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quality is not so strong to ensure high quality of corporate governance.  Leverage (-0.1233) is 
negatively associated with corporate governance quality which implies that creditors have the 
capacity to create pressure on management in improving corporate governance quality. Firm 
size (0.7033) is significantly positively associated with quality of corporate governance. This 
strong relationship indicates that corporate governance quality depends on the size of the 
firm. Corporate governance quality is also positively associated with firm age (0.1813) which 
indicates that corporate governance quality is higher for older firms.  
 
Table 4-23 
Correlation Matrix 
 CGQ LNBSIZE ID 
(%) 
INT 
(%) 
OWNDI
R 
(%) 
FINV
TR 
(%) 
DEBT2
TE 
LNASS
ET 
LNFAGE 
CGQ 1         
LNBSIZE 0.0307 1        
ID (%) 0.5815 -0.2857 1       
INT (%) 0.0529 0.0899 0.0291 1      
OWNDIR (%) 0.2266 0.3663 -0.1200 -0.0250 1     
FINVTR (%) 0.0274 -0.1426 0.0465 -0.1874 -0.0833 1    
DEBT2TE -0.1233 -0.0602 -0.0559 -0.1151 -0.1367 0.0276 1   
LNASSET 0.7033 0.2776 0.3950 0.0363 -0.0227 0.1514 0.0106 1  
LNFAGE 0.1813 0.0471 0.0526 0.1468 -0.1269 0.0722 -0.0517 0.4565 1 
 
This study also examine the data set to check the multicollinearity issue in Table 4-24  
and finds that VIF for all variables are less than 2.5 and average VIF is 1.46 which implies 
that  there is no high correlation with other variables that may create multi co linearity 
problem and thus this data set avoid the multi co linearity problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-24 
Checking of Multicollinearity 
 VIF 1/VIF 
LNBSIZE 1.79 0.560177 
ID (%) 1.65 0.607100 
INT (%) 1.09 0.916000 
OWNDIR (%) 1.23 0.814518 
FINVTR (%) 1.20 0.836648 
DEBT2TE 1.05 0.953242 
LNASSET 2.28 0.438745 
LNFAGE 1.42 0.705595 
Mean VIF 1.46  
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4.8.3  Multivariate Analysis of Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality  
4.8.3.1   Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Level Model    
In this study, determinants of corporate governance quality are examined on the basis 
of board characteristics (such as board size and board independence), ownership structures 
(such as institutional ownership, director ownership, and foreign investors), external 
monitoring (such as firm leverage) and firm characteristics (such as firm size and firm age).  
In the regression results, standard errors and t statistics are adjusted to avoid the problem of 
heteroskedasticity.  But it is not reported in the table for the brevity. The level of relationship 
between dependent variable and independent variables are indicated by coefficient and 
probability in the parenthesis shows whether hypothesis are accepted or rejected.  
Table 4-25 represents the regression results of the determinants of corporate 
governance quality at level model. The regression results represent a good fit for the model of 
determinants of corporate governance quality at firm level and explain 69.79% variability in 
corporate governance quality.  
 
Table 4-25 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at  Level Model 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -283.641 
  (0.000) 
LNBSIZE (+/-) -8.797358 
  (0.000) 
ID (%) (+) 0.4605264 
  (0.000) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0680674 
  (0.191) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) 0.3136266 
  (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) -0.0981814 
  (0.277) 
DEBT2TE  (+/-) -0.0922157 
  (0.002) 
LNASSET (+) 14.2768 
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE (+/-) -3.071214 
  (0.029) 
R2  0.6979 
Observation  232 
                                                                                                                                                 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; 
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ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a 
board divided by total number of directors; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; OWNDIR- 
Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares owned by 
directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign 
Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- Natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNFAGE – Natural logarithm 
of firm‟s age; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
Hypothesis 1a assumes that there is a positive association between board size and 
corporate governance quality where as hypothesis 1b assumes that there is negative 
association between board size and corporate governance quality. The empirical result reports 
the significant negative association between board size and corporate governance quality and 
support hypothesis 1b and reject the hypothesis 1a. The empirical result shows that small 
board is associated with higher quality of corporate governance and this is significant at 1% 
level. This result is consistent with the prior studies (Barucci and Falini, 2005; Mak and 
Kusnadi, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Turrent and Ariza, 2016). In prior studies, the empirical 
evidence of relationship between board size and corporate governance quality is mixed but 
this empirical study finds that small board is more associated with better corporate 
governance quality. This result implies that small board is more effective than larger board to 
ensure high quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. The reason 
can be explained in several ways: First, small board monitor and control in a systematic way 
than large board. Second, coordination and timely decision are easier in small board. Third, 
firms have to face more difficulties in large board (such as agency conflict and information 
asymmetry problem, diversified opinion problem , coordination and communication problem, 
weak monitoring and free riding problem, time consuming decision making,  controlled by 
management and conflict of interest) and thus small board is more effective than large board 
in ensuring high quality of corporate governance.  
Board effectiveness depends on board independence and percentage of independent 
directors in the board is used as the proxy of board independence. Independent directors are 
also a major instrument of corporate governance and thus develop the hypothesis 2 as there is 
a positive association between independent directors and corporate governance quality. The 
empirical results find the significant positive association of corporate governance quality with 
percentage of independent director and the result is significant at 1% level. This result 
support the hypothesis 2 and this result is consistent with prior studies (Samaha and Dahawy, 
2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Turrent and Ariza, 2016).  This result can be explained in some 
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ways: First, independent directors are applying the agency theory and they are playing their 
monitoring role effectively to resolve the agency conflict between managers and shareholders 
and thereby reduce agency cost. Second, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
(BSEC), the regulatory authority, increased the proportion of independent directors in the 
board from one tenth (10%) or minimum one (corporate governance guidelines, 2006) to one 
fifth (20%) (Corporate governance guidelines, 2012) and thus higher percentage of 
independent directors are working on behalf of the shareholders interest and ensure high 
quality of corporate governance. Third, corporate governance guidelines 2012 set the criteria 
and qualification of independent directors and all listed banks are following the new 
guidelines and as a result, independent directors are practicing the true independence using 
their diversified knowledge and experience which ultimate have positive impact on corporate 
governance quality. Fourth, independent directors closely monitor the activities of 
management and if management activities are against the interest of shareholders and 
performance is not satisfactory then independent director can control or alter the management 
or CEO. Therefore, management become more aware about their activities and works for 
interest of shareholders and ensures high quality of governance. Fifth, presence of higher 
number of independent directors in the board also control the self maximization behavior of 
management, family owners and group of largest shareholders and ensure better governance 
for the shareholders. Finally, independent director want to ensure high quality of corporate 
governance because they can present it as their performance indicator during reappointment 
or performance evaluation of independent directors.  In addition, they also want to maintain 
their high reputation in the market.   
Institutional investors is one of the major instrument of corporate governance 
mechanisms and they have the capacity to monitor and control the firm for the interest of 
shareholders and thus develop the hypothesis 3 as there is positive relationship between 
corporate governance quality and institutional investors. The empirical evidence shows that 
the relationship between corporate governance quality and institutional investors is positive 
as expected but the result is not significant. This result is also consistent with Farooque et al. 
(2007) and Biswas (2012) studies. This result implies that institutional investors are not 
playing their monitoring role effectively in ensuring higher quality of corporate governance 
in the listed banks of Bangladesh. The possible explanations are: First, institutional investors 
have less concerned about quality of corporate governance in the listed banks. Second, 
institutional monitoring may not be an effective instrument in ensuring better governance in 
the banking industry. Third, institutional investors may not have enough incentive or benefits 
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to monitor the firm in improving corporate governance quality.  Fourth, the role of 
institutional investors depend on the magnitude of ownership in the firm and this is evident 
that they hold only 14.26%  ownership in the listed banks of Bangladesh which is not 
sufficient enough to play their monitoring role effectively in ensuring high quality of 
corporate governance.  Fifth, institutional investors may not play their monitoring role in the 
same industry or peer group. Finally, Khanchel (2007) and Barucci and Falini (2005) study 
observed that institutional investors invest in firm that have prior record of good governance 
and they have no significant or influential role in general in ensuring better  governance. This 
scenario may be also applicable in the listed banks of Bangladesh because they invest in the 
firms that have better governance and they have no significant monitoring role or influential 
power on the firm to improve the governance.  
Agency problem occurs due to separation of shareholders and management and 
director ownership as part of governance instrument resolve the agency problem, reduce the 
agency cost and ensure better governance for the interest of shareholders and thus develop the 
hypothesis 4 as there is a positive association between director ownership and corporate 
governance quality. The empirical results report that director ownership is significantly 
positively associated with corporate governance quality and it is statistically significant at 1% 
level. This result is also consistent with Khanchel (2007) and Biswas (2012) studies. This 
result indicates that directors are working on behalf of the shareholders interest and ensure 
high quality of corporate governance. The possible explanations of this relationship are: First, 
in listed banks of Bangladesh, all directors are non executive directors and they are working 
as a corporate governance instrument to reduce the agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers. They also reduce the demand of extra monitoring and transparency and ensure 
better governance for the interest of the shareholders.  Second, directors want to ensure high 
quality of corporate governance because the interest of shareholders and directors are same. 
They also want to convince to the shareholders that they have extreme concern about the 
quality of corporate governance, thus monitor and maintain the better governance on behalf 
of the shareholders interest.  Third, when directors have significant ownership, they have 
more incentive to develop the quality of corporate governance rather than extracting personal 
benefits. They can use better quality of corporate governance as their performance indicator 
during their performance evaluation and reappointment in the following years. They also 
want to increase their reputation in the market.  Fourth, directors have direct access and 
inside information of the firm thus they can take effective decision which ultimately affects 
the quality of corporate governance.  Fifth, most of the directors are sponsor shareholder and 
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sponsor shareholders ensure better governance to attract and retain potential and existing 
investors in the firm. Finally, directors have diversified knowledge and experience and they 
exercise their experience and knowledge and motivate management for the improvement of 
corporate governance.  
Foreign investors have high demand for better governance, when they have significant 
ownership and they can play their monitoring role to improve the corporate governance 
quality and thus develop the hypothesis 5 as there is a positive relationship between corporate 
governance quality and foreign ownership. The empirical result finds that there is no 
significant statistical relationship between foreign ownership and corporate governance 
quality and this empirical result also consistent with Silveira et al. (2009) study. Foreign 
investors are not active in improving corporate governance quality and the reason might be: 
First, foreign investors don‟t have the bargaining power on management to improve the 
quality of corporate governance. Second, foreign investors may be highly concerned about 
the return of their investment and thus, they may be not aware about the attributes of 
corporate governance quality in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Third, foreign investors have 
more concern about corporate governance quality only when they hold a significant 
percentage of ownership. But the mean percentage of foreign investors is only 2.11% which 
is not significant enough to play their monitoring role to improve the corporate governance 
quality.  
Hypothesis 6a assumes that there is a positive relationship between leverage and 
corporate governance quality and hypothesis 6b predict that there is a negative relationship 
between corporate governance quality and leverage. The empirical result reports that leverage 
is statistically negatively associated with corporate governance quality and significant at 1% 
level and thus supports the hypothesis 6b and rejects the hypothesis 6a. This result is also 
consistent with prior studies (Faccio et al., 2001; Friedman et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006;  
Biswas, 2012; Waweru, 2014a). This result indicates that firms with high leverage have weak 
corporate governance. This result can be explained in various ways: First, credit monitoring 
is not an important instrument for ensuring high quality governance in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh. Second, creditors have no concern about the quality of corporate governance. 
They are mainly concerned with the installment including interest and principal of their 
borrowed amount. Third, creditors don‟t have any bargaining power to create pressure or 
impose restrictions on management to improve better governance.  Finally, Biswas (2012) 
study stated that loan disbursement process is frequently influenced by politics in non 
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financial companies of Bangladesh. Thus, creditors may not play their monitoring role to 
improve the quality of corporate governance due to political factor.   
Large firms have the capacity to bear the additional cost of implementation of 
corporate governance and it is common that large firms will ensure high quality of corporate 
governance and thus develop the hypothesis 7 as there is a positive association between firm 
size and corporate governance quality. The empirical result reports that firm size is 
significantly and positively associated with corporate governance quality and this result is 
significant at 1% level. This result is consistent with prior studies (Barucci and Falini, 2005; 
Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006b; Ariff et al., 2007; Khanchel, 2007; Silveira et al.,  
2009; Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011; Biswas, 2012; Gordon et al., 2012; Waweru, 2014a, 
2014b). This result implies that corporate governance quality increases with firm size. There 
are several explanations: First, large firms have adequate resources, experienced human 
capital, and financial strength to ensure high quality of corporate governance. Second, large 
firms meet the demand of shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders by providing more 
voluntary and mandatory corporate governance information. Finally, larger firms practice 
high quality of corporate governance to increase their market share and reputation in the 
market.  
Hypothesis 8a assumes that there is a positive relationship between firm age and 
corporate governance quality where as hypothesis 8b assumes that corporate governance 
quality is negatively related to firm age. The empirical result report that firm age is 
significantly negatively associated with corporate governance quality and the result is 
significant at 5% level. This result supports the hypothesis 8b and rejects the hypothesis 8a. 
The empirical result is consistent with Lei (2006) study. This result indicates that corporate 
governance quality is higher for young firms rather than old firms. This result can be 
explained in various ways: First, newly firms are more concerned about corporate governance 
quality to survive in the competitive market against the large firms. Second, young firms 
want to ensure better governance because they want to create confidence of investors, 
shareholders, other stakeholders and consider it as a challenge for them. Third, newly firms 
want to increase their market share by attracting new and potential investors and thus they are 
more conscious about the regulatory and voluntary corporate governance requirement and 
practice high quality of corporate governance.  
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4.8.3.2   Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Lagged Model 
Determinants of corporate governance quality are also observed using the lag model 
in Table 4-26. Lag model is considered because corporate governance quality might be 
influenced by previous year‟s determinants. Board characteristics, ownership structure and 
firm characteristic may have significant role in improving corporate governance quality but 
the effect of determinants on corporate governance quality may be not only in current year 
but also in next year. Thus, determinants of corporate governance quality are reexamined 
considering previous years variables such as board size, board independence, institutional 
investors, director ownership, foreign investors, firm leverage, firm size and firm age and 
denoted as board size (LNBSIZE(-1)), board independence (ID (-1) %), institutional investors 
(INT (-1)%), director ownership (OWNDIR (-1)%), foreign investors (FINVTR (-1)%), firm 
leverage (DEBT2TE (-1)), firm size (LNASSET (-1)) and firm age (LNFAGE (-1)). The 
regression result explained 61.42% variability in corporate governance quality.  
 
Table 4-26 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Lagged Model 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -308.4952 
  (0.000) 
LNBSIZE(-1) (+/-) -8.331104 
  (0.001) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.3056815 
  (0.042) 
INT(-1) (%) (+) 0.076148 
  (0.177) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.2707114 
  (0.000) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) -0.0964893 
  (0.312) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (+/-) -0.1131582 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 15.58318 
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE(-1) (+/-) -4.025057 
  (0.012) 
R2  0.6142 
Observation  202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
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by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors ; INT(-1)- Percentage of 
ownership holds by Institution of previous year; OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all 
directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by number of shares owned by directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding ; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous 
year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity of previous year; 
LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of 
firm size. LNFAGE(-1) – Natural logarithm of firm‟s age of previous year; The standard errors and t statistics 
are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
From the Table 4-26, it is evident that small board is more effective than larger board 
in ensuring high quality of corporate governance. Small board monitor and control in a 
systemic way and proper coordination, timely decision and effective communication are 
easier in small board where as large board faces agency conflict, information asymmetry, and 
communication and coordination difficulties. Independent director have significant positive 
association with corporate governance quality. Independent directors follow the agency 
theory and reduce the agency conflict and agency cost and they apply their diversified 
knowledge and experience for true independence and closely monitor and control self 
maximization behavior and activities of management or alter management if any activities of 
management are against the interest of shareholders. Moreover, higher proportion of 
independent directors is working on behalf of the shareholders interest to ensure better 
governance and they can report it as their performance indicator during their performance 
assessment and reappointment. 
The empirical result doesn‟t find any significant association between institutional 
investors and corporate governance quality. Institutional shareholders have less concern 
about corporate governance quality because institutional shareholding may be not an 
important instrument to improve better governance or they may not have enough incentives 
to ensure better governance. Moreover, institutional shareholders may not have influential 
power or control to improve better governance because they hold only 14.26% which is not 
significant enough to play their monitoring role or they invest only those firms which have 
prior record of better governance.  The empirical result reports that corporate governance 
quality is significantly positively associated with director ownership. Directors using their 
diversified knowledge and experience ensure better quality of corporate governance because 
they reduce the agency conflict between owners and managers, they have direct access and 
inside information and thus, and monitor and control on behalf of the shareholders interest 
and present better governance as part of performance indicator for performance evaluation 
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and reappointment. Moreover, most of the directors are sponsor shareholders and sponsor 
shareholders ensure better governance to attract and retain potential and existing investors 
and also to increase their reputation in the market. Foreign investors also have no significant 
association with corporate governance quality. Foreign investors are more conscious about 
quality of corporate governance when they hold significant ownership. The empirical result 
indicates that they have no bargaining power on management to improve the quality of 
corporate governance or they concentrate only on return on investment thus they are not 
aware about the attributes of quality of corporate governance. Moreover, they hold only 
2.11% ownership which is not significant enough to play their monitoring role to improve 
better governance.  
Leverage is negatively associated with corporate governance quality. This result  
implies that credit monitoring is not an important instrument to ensure higher quality of 
corporate governance or creditors don‟t have any bargaining power on management to 
improve better governance or they are mainly worried about their lending amount rather than 
quality of corporate governance. Firm size is a significant determinant in ensuring corporate 
governance quality. Large firms practice high quality of corporate governance because they 
have adequate resources, skilled human capital, and financial strength and they are highly 
concerned to meet the demand of shareholders, regulators, other stakeholders and they want 
to increase the market share and reputation in the market. Corporate governance quality is 
negatively associated with leverage. This result presents that newly firms ensure high quality 
of corporate governance because they want to survive in the competitive market, create 
confidence of the shareholders and regulators and others and attract and retain potential or 
existing investors to increase their market share.  
In summary, corporate governance quality is positively and significantly associated 
with independent director, director ownership and firm size and negatively associated with 
board size, leverage and firm age.  But the empirical result doesn‟t find any significant 
association of corporate governance quality with institutional investors and foreign investors. 
Thus, it is evident that, the regression results are same and there is no difference between 
corporate governance quality at firm level and lagged models.  
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4.9 Additional Analysis 
4.9.1 Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Level Model Considering Time 
Dummy  
Table 4-27 represents the regression result of the determinants of corporate 
governance quality at level model after controlling time effect. The regression results 
explained 83.38% variability in corporate governance quality. The results presents that time 
is a significant factor from 2007 to 2013 in explaining determinants of corporate governance 
quality.   
 
Table 4-27 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Level Model Considering Time Dummy 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -94.86206 
  (0.000) 
LNBSIZE (+/-) -4.279196 
  (0.006) 
ID (%) (+) 0.004032289 
  (0.963) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0591548 
  (0.081) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) 0.0466047 
  (0.234) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.1956119 
  (0.007) 
DEBT2TE  (+/-) -0.0620551 
  (0.006) 
LNASSET (+) 6.308971 
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE (+/-) -5.080165 
  (0.000) 
Year Dummy   
2007  3.147719 
  (0.013) 
2008  5.924359 
  (0.000) 
2009  8.761441 
  (0.000) 
2010  11.85632 
  (0.000) 
2011  14.06679 
  (0.000) 
2012  26.43176 
  (0.000) 
 301  
 
Table 4-27 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Level Model Considering Time Dummy 
 Expectation Results 
2013  28.81523 
  (0.000) 
R2  0.8338 
Observation  232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; 
ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a 
board divided by total number of directors; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; OWNDIR- 
Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares owned by 
directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign 
Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- Natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNFAGE – Natural logarithm 
of firm‟s age; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
There is no change of result between determinants of corporate governance quality at 
level model considering time dummy (Table 4-27) and determinants of corporate governance 
quality at level model (Table 4-25) in terms of board size, leverage, firm size and firm age 
after considering the time effect which implies that the result of these variables are consistent 
with or without time adjustment. Corporate governance quality is significantly positively 
associated with firm size and negatively associated with board size, leverage and firm age. 
This result implies that larger firms‟ practices better corporate governance than small firms 
and small board is more effective than large board in ensuring high quality of corporate 
governance. Moreover, newly firms ensure high quality of corporate governance than old 
firms but creditors don‟t have any strong bargaining power on management to ensure better 
governance.  
But the regression results of some other variables directional sign or significance level 
become changed which implies that time has significant effect on these variables.  The 
empirical result shows that corporate governance quality is positively associated with 
independent director and director ownership as expected but the results are not significant. 
This result implies that independent director and director ownership are not effective in 
ensuring better governance when time is controlled. The regression results also present that 
institutional shareholder and foreign investors have the statistically significant association 
with quality of corporate governance after controlling time.  This result indicates that 
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institutional investors and foreign investors closely monitor the activities of management and 
ensure high quality of corporate governance.  
 
4.9.2 Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Lagged Model Considering 
Time Dummy 
Table 4-28 represents the regression results of determinants of corporate governance 
quality at lagged model considering the time dummy.  Corporate governance quality is 
related to lagged variables such as board size, board independence, institutional investors, 
director ownership, foreign investors, firm leverage, firm size and firm age and denoted as 
board size (LNBSIZE(-1)), board independence (ID (-1)%) , institutional investors (INT(-
1)%), director ownership (OWNDIR (-1)%), foreign investors (FINVTR (-1)%), firm 
leverage (DEBT2TE (-1)), firm size (LNASSET (-1)) and firm age (LNFAGE (-1)).  The 
regression result explained 80.80% variability in corporate governance quality and shows that 
time has a significant effect on CEO pay from 2008 to 2013.  
The regression results of the determinants of corporate governance quality is almost 
same between corporate governance quality at lagged model considering time dummy (Table 
4-28) and corporate governance quality at level model considering time dummy (Table 4-27) 
 
Table 4-28 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Lagged Model Considering Time Dummy 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -90.85959 
  0.001 
LNBSIZE(-1) (+/-) -3.902472 
  (0.018) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.03279229 
  (0.767) 
INT(-1) (%) (+) 0.0444622 
  (0.226) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0385787 
  (0.369) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.1968963 
  (0.010) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (+/-) -0.0710209 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 6.279154 
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE(-1) (+/-) -4.707872 
  (0.000) 
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Table 4-28 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Lagged Model Considering Time Dummy 
 Expectation Results 
Year Dummy   
2008  2.619307 
  (0.049) 
2009  4.656783 
  (0.003) 
2010  7.940738 
  (0.000) 
2011  10.10628 
  (0.000) 
2012  23.14612 
  (0.000) 
2013  23.78822 
  (0.000) 
R2  0.8080 
Observation  202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors ; INT(-1)- Percentage of 
ownership holds by Institution of previous year; OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all 
directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by number of shares owned by directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding ; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous 
year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity of previous year; 
LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of 
firm size. LNFAGE(-1) – Natural logarithm of firm‟s age of previous year; The standard errors and t statistics 
are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
in terms of board size, board independence, director ownership, foreign investors, firm 
leverage, firm size and firm age. The only difference is the institutional investors. 
Institutional investors have the positive association with corporate governance quality as 
expected but the result is not significant (Table 4-28). This result implies that institutional 
investors have no significant monitoring role on management to ensure higher quality of 
corporate governance.   
There is no change of regression results between determinants of corporate 
governance quality at lagged model considering time dummy (Table 4-28) and determinants 
of corporate governance quality at level model (Table 4-25) in terms of board size, leverage, 
firm size and firm age. The empirical results in Table 4-28 finds that board size, leverage and 
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firm age are negatively associated with corporate governance quality but firm size is 
significantly positively associated with corporate governance quality.  This result implies that 
small board, newly firms and large firms are the significant determinant in ensuring high 
quality of corporate governance. But independent director, institutional investors and director 
ownership have the positive association with corporate governance quality but the results are 
not significant. This means that independent directors, institutional investors and director 
ownership have no significant monitoring and controlling role to improve quality of corporate 
governance. Foreign investors have the significant positive association with corporate 
governance quality when time is controlled.  This result indicates that small percentage of 
foreign investors closely monitor on management to improve better governance. 
 
4.9.3 Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Level Model Considering Serial 
Correlation 
Table 4-29 represents the regression results of determinants of corporate governance 
quality at level model considering the serial correlation issue. The regression results explain 
69.79 % variability in corporate governance quality. Board characteristics (includes board 
size and board independence) and ownership structure (includes institutional investors, 
director ownership and foreign investors) and firm characteristics (includes firm size, firm 
leverage, firm age) are generally consistent over the years and variables of one year might 
affect the following years and as a result, the problem of serial correlation may arise. Thus, 
the results of the regression are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level 
to avoid the problem of serial correlation.   
 
Table 4-29 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Level Model Considering Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -283.641 
  (0.000) 
LNBSIZE (+/-) -8.797358 
  (0.004) 
ID (%) (+) 0.4605264 
  (0.006) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0680674 
  (0.291) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) 0.3136266 
  (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) -0.0981814 
 305  
 
Table 4-29 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Level Model Considering Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
  (0.456) 
DEBT2TE  (+/-) -0.0922157 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET (+) 14.2768 
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE (+/-) -3.071214 
  (0.139) 
R2  0.6979 
Observation  232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; 
ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a 
board divided by total number of directors; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; OWNDIR- 
Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares owned by 
directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign 
Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- Natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNFAGE – Natural logarithm 
of firm‟s age; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at the firm level and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
There is no change of regression results between determinants of corporate 
governance quality at level model considering serial correlation (Table 4-29) and 
determinants of corporate governance quality at level model (Table 4-25) in terms of board 
size, independent director, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, 
leverage and firm size. The regression result finds that corporate governance quality is 
significantly positively associated with independent director, director ownership and firm size 
and statistically negatively associated with board size and leverage, but there is no significant 
association of corporate governance quality with institutional investors and foreign investors. 
This result implies that small board, independent director, director ownership and firm size 
are very active and play their significant monitoring role in improving high quality of 
corporate governance but institutional investors, foreign investors and creditors monitoring 
are very weak and have no meaningful contribution in developing the quality of corporate 
governance. The only difference between determinants of corporate governance quality at 
level model considering serial correlation (Table 4-29) and determinants of corporate 
governance quality at firm level (Table 4-25) is firm age. The relationship between firm age 
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and corporate governance quality is negative as before but the result is not statistically 
significant.  
 
4.9.4    Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Lagged Model Considering 
 Serial Correlation  
Determinants of corporate governance quality at lagged model are examined taking 
into consideration of serial correlation and presented in the Table 4-30. The regression results 
explain 61.42 % variability in corporate governance quality. Corporate governance quality 
might be affected by the lagged variables such as board size, board independence, 
institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, firm leverage, firm size and firm 
age and denoted as board size (LNBSIZE(-1)), board independence (ID (-1)%) , institutional 
investors (INT(-1)%), director ownership (OWNDIR (-1)%), foreign investors (FINVTR (-
1)%), firm leverage (DEBT2TE (-1)), firm size (LNASSET (-1)) and firm age (LNFAGE (-
1)).  The results of the regression are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level to avoid the problem of serial correlation.  
The results of the regression between determinants of corporate governance quality at 
lagged model considering serial correlation (Table 4-30) and determinants of corporate 
governance quality at level model considering serial correlation (Table 4-29) are exactly the 
same in terms of board size, board independence, institutional investors, director ownership, 
foreign investors, firm leverage and firm size except firm age. The empirical result shows that 
firm size, independent director and director ownership have significant positive association 
with corporate governance quality where as board size and leverage are negatively associated 
 
Table 4-30 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Lagged Model Considering Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -308.4952 
  (0.000) 
LNBSIZE(-1) (+/-) -8.331104 
  (0.001) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.3056815 
  (0.047) 
INT(-1) (%) (+) 0.076148 
  (0.263) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.2707114 
  (0.000) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) -0.0964893 
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Table 4-30 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Lagged Model Considering Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
  (0.372) 
DEBT2TE (-1) (+/-) -0.1131582 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 15.58318 
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE(-1) (+/-) -4.025057 
  (0.072) 
R2  0.6142 
Observation  202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors ; INT(-1)- Percentage of 
ownership holds by Institution of previous year; OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all 
directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by number of shares owned by directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding ; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous 
year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity of previous year; 
LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of 
firm size. LNFAGE(-1) – Natural logarithm of firm‟s age of previous year; The standard errors and t statistics 
are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
clustered at firm level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
with quality of corporate governance. But the empirical result doesn‟t find any significant 
association of corporate governance quality with institutional investors and foreign investors. 
Firm age is significantly negatively associated with corporate governance quality which 
implies that newly firms are maintaining high quality of corporate governance than old firms.  
There is no significant difference determinants of corporate governance quality at 
lagged model considering serial correlation (Table 4-30) and determinants of corporate 
governance quality at level model (Table 4-25) in terms of board size, board independence, 
institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, firm leverage, firm size and firm 
age which implies that the regression results are exactly same in both method. Corporate 
governance quality is positively associated with independent directors, director ownership 
and firm size and negatively associated with board size, leverage and firm age but 
institutional investors and foreign investors are insignificant in determining the corporate 
governance quality. Small board, newly firms, independent directors, director ownership and 
firm size closely monitor the activities of management and play their active role in improving 
corporate governance quality. On the other hand, institutional investors, foreign investors and 
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creditors don‟t have any strong bargaining power or influential role to develop the corporate 
governance quality.  
 
4.9.5   Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Level Model Considering Time 
Dummy and Serial Correlation 
Table 4-31 represents the regression results of determinants of corporate governance 
quality at level model considering time dummy and serial correlation. The standard error and 
t statistics of the regression are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm level 
and only coefficient and probability are reported in the regression result after considering 
time dummy. The regression result explains about 83.38% variability in corporate 
governance quality. The regression result present that time has a significant impact on 
corporate governance quality during 2007 to 2013.  
The empirical result shows that corporate governance quality is significantly 
positively associated with foreign investors and firm size and negatively associated with 
board size, leverage and firm age but independent director, institutional investors and director 
ownership have no significant relation with corporate governance quality. This result implies 
that firm size, small board, newly firms and foreign investors are the significant explanatory 
variables in determining high quality of corporate governance when time and serial 
correlation are controlled. But creditors, independent directors, institutional investors and 
director ownership have no influential role in improving corporate governance quality after 
considering time dummy and serial correlation.  
 
Table 4-31 
Regression Results of Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at 
Level Model Considering Time dummy and Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -94.86206 
  (0.020 ) 
LNBSIZE (+/-) -4.279196 
  (0.062) 
ID (%) (+) 0.004032289 
  (0.972) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0591548 
  (0.223) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) 0.0466047 
  (0.371) 
FINVTR (%) (+) 0.1956119 
  (0.023) 
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Table 4-31 
Regression Results of Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at 
Level Model Considering Time dummy and Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
DEBT2TE  (+/-) -0.0620551 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET (+) 6.308971 
  (0.001) 
LNFAGE (+/-) -5.080165 
  (0.002) 
Year Dummy   
2007  3.147719 
  (0.004) 
2008  5.924359 
  (0.000) 
2009  8.761441 
  (0.000) 
2010  11.85632 
  (0.000) 
2011  14.06679 
  (0.000) 
2012  26.43176 
  (0.000) 
2013  28.81523 
  (0.000) 
R2  0.8338 
Observation  232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; 
ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a 
board divided by total number of directors; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; OWNDIR- 
Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares owned by 
directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign 
Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity; LNASSET- Natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNFAGE – Natural logarithm 
of firm‟s age; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at the firm level and only probability is presented 
in the parenthesis.  
 
The regression results between determinants of corporate governance quality at level 
model considering time dummy and serial correlation (Table 4-31) and determinants of 
corporate governance quality at level model (Table 4-25) are same in terms of board size, 
institutional investors, leverage, firm size and firm age.  Corporate governance quality is 
significantly positively associated with firm size and negatively associated with board size, 
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leverage and firm age. Institutional investor is positively associated with corporate 
governance quality but the result is not significant. The major differences are independent 
director, director ownership and foreign investors. The empirical result report that only 
foreign investors is significantly positively associated with corporate governance quality but 
independent directors and director ownership have no significant association with quality of 
corporate governance when time dummy and serial correlation are considered.  
 
4.9.6 Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Lagged Model Considering 
Time Dummy and Serial Correlation 
Determinants of Corporate governance quality at lagged model are also examined 
considering time dummy and serial correlation and the regression results are presented in the 
Table 4-32. Corporate governance quality might be influenced by lagged variables such as 
board size, board independence, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, 
firm leverage, firm size and firm age and denoted as board size (LNBSIZE(-1)), board 
independence (ID (-1)%) , institutional investors (INT(-1)%), director ownership (OWNDIR 
(-1)%), foreign investors (FINVTR (-1)%), firm leverage (DEBT2TE (-1)), firm size 
(LNASSET (-1)) and firm age (LNFAGE (-1)).  The regression result explains about 80.80 % 
variability in corporate governance quality. The standard error and t statistics of the 
regression result are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm level to avoid the 
problem of serial correlation and only coefficient and probability are reported in the 
regression result after considering time dummy. The regression result present that time has a 
significant impact on corporate governance quality from 2008 to 2013.  
 
Table 4-32 
Regression Results of Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at 
Lagged Model Considering Time Dummy and Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -90.85959 
  (0.045) 
LNBSIZE(-1) (+/-) -3.902472 
  (0.069) 
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.03279229 
  (0.784) 
INT(-1) (%) (+) 0.0444622 
  (0.376) 
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.0385787 
  (0.484) 
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) 0.1968963 
  (0.056) 
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Table 4-32 
Regression Results of Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at 
Lagged Model Considering Time Dummy and Serial Correlation 
 Expectation Results 
DEBT2TE (-1) (+/-) -0.0710209 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET(-1) (+) 6.279154 
  (0.003) 
LNFAGE(-1) (+/-) -4.707872 
  (0.005) 
Year Dummy   
2008  2.619307 
  (0.008) 
2009  4.656783 
  (0.007) 
2010  7.940738 
  (0.000) 
2011  10.10628 
  (0.000) 
2012  23.14612 
  (0.000) 
2013  23.78822 
  (0.000) 
R2  0.8080 
Observation  202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors ; INT(-1)- Percentage of 
ownership holds by Institution of previous year; OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all 
directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by number of shares owned by directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding ; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous 
year; DEBT2TE(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total equity of previous year; 
LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of 
firm size. LNFAGE(-1) – Natural logarithm of firm‟s age of previous year; The standard errors and t statistics 
are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
clustered at firm level and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
 There is no difference between determinants of corporate governance quality at 
lagged model considering time dummy and serial correlation (Table 4-32)  and determinants 
of corporate governance quality at level model considering time dummy and serial correlation 
(Table 4-31) in terms of board size, board independence, institutional investors, director 
ownership, foreign investors, firm leverage, firm size and firm age. Corporate governance 
quality is significantly positively associated with foreign investors and firm size and 
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negatively associated with board size, leverage, and firm age but there is no significant 
association of corporate governance quality with independent directors, institutional 
investors, and director ownership.   
When time dummy and serial correlation are controlled, the empirical results present 
that determinants of corporate governance quality at lagged model considering serial 
correlation and time dummy (Table 4-32) and determinants of corporate governance quality 
at level model (Table 4-25) are exactly same in terms of board size, institutional investors, 
leverage, firm size and firm age but the major differences are independent directors, foreign 
investors and director ownership. This result indicates that firm size and foreign investors are 
the significant determinant in explaining corporate governance quality. Small board and 
newly firms are highly concerned about corporate governance quality and ensure better 
governance. Institutional investors, independent directors, director ownership and creditors 
don‟t have strong power to improve the higher quality of corporate governance.   
 
4.9.7 Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Level Model using Fixed Effect 
(FE) 
Table 4-33 represents the regression results of determinants of corporate governance 
quality at level model using fixed effect in panel method. This analysis tries to find out 
whether there exist any significant variation in determinants of corporate governance quality 
between pooled method and panel method using the fixed effect.  
The empirical results report that corporate governance is significantly positively 
associated with independent director, and firm size and negatively associated with leverage 
but there is no significant association of corporate governance quality with board size, 
institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors and firm age. This result implies 
that firm size and independent directors are significant explanatory variable in determining 
high quality of corporate governance.  
The empirical result also report that there is no difference between determinants of 
corporate governance quality at level model using fixed effect in panel method (Table 4-33) 
and determinants of corporate governance quality at level model (Table 4-25) in terms of firm 
size, independent director, leverage, institutional investors and foreign investors. Firm size 
and independent directors have significant positive association with corporate governance 
quality but creditors, foreign investors and institutional investors have no influential role in 
improving corporate governance quality. In addition, corporate governance quality also has 
no significant association with board size, firm age and director ownership. This result 
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implies that only firm size and independent director are the explanatory variable in improving 
corporate governance quality at higher level.  
 
Table 4-33 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at 
Level Model using Fixed Effect (FE) 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -387.4248 
  0.001 
LNBSIZE (+/-) -3.356933 
  (0.620) 
ID (%) (+) 0.3605398 
  (0.018) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0063298 
  (0.950) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) 0.169653 
  (0.146) 
FINVTR (%) (+) -0.0096216 
  (0.954) 
DEBT2TE  (+/-) -0.0696605 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET (+) 17.58013 
  (0.002) 
LNFAGE (+/-) 0.9060102 
  (0.945) 
F  145.54 
P>F  (0.0000) 
Observation  232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the panel regression using the fixed effect method of corporate governance 
quality which denotes : CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number 
of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of 
independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by 
Institution; OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by 
number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of 
Ownership hold by Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
equity; LNASSET- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. 
LNFAGE – Natural logarithm of firm‟s age; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at the firm level and 
only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
4.9.8 Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Level Model using Random 
Effect (RE) 
Determinants of corporate governance quality at level model are investigated using 
random effect in panel method and the regression results are presented in Table 4-34.  This 
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analysis tries to present the significant variation in determining corporate governance quality 
between panel method (using random effect) and pooled method.  
 
Table 4-34 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Level Model using Random Effect (RE) 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -344.9758 
  (0.000 ) 
LNBSIZE (+/-) -7.322278 
  (0.053) 
ID (%) (+) 0.415595 
  (0.010) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0566504 
  (0.352) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) 0.2872223 
  (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) -0.0861222 
  (0.450) 
DEBT2TE  (+/-) -0.0862223 
  (0.000) 
LNASSET (+) 16.56147 
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE (+/-) -2.621409 
  (0.381) 
Wald chi2  1227.38 
P>Chi2  (0.0000) 
Observation  232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the panel regression using the random effect method of corporate governance 
quality which denotes : CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number 
of directors in the board; ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of 
independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by 
Institution; OWNDIR- Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by 
number of shares owned by directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of 
Ownership hold by Foreign Investors; DEBT2TE- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
equity; LNASSET- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. 
LNFAGE – Natural logarithm of firm‟s age; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics 
are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error clustered at the firm level and 
only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical results find that corporate governance quality is significantly positively 
associated with independent director, director ownership and firm size and negatively 
associated with board size and leverage, but there is no significant association of corporate 
governance quality with institutional investors, foreign investors and firm age. This result 
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implies that small board, independent director, director ownership and firm size are the 
significant explanatory variables in determining high quality of corporate governance.  
The empirical evidence of this analysis also shows that there is no difference between 
determinants of corporate governance quality at level model using random effect (Table 4-34) 
and determinants of corporate governance quality at level model (Table 4-25) in terms of 
board size, independent director, institutional investors, director ownership, foreign investors, 
leverage and  firm size except firm age. But this result implies that corporate governance 
quality is significantly determined by firm size, small board, independent directors and 
director ownership and there is no significant association of corporate governance quality 
with institutional investors, foreign investors, firm age and creditors.  
 
4.9.9   Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Level Model  by Changing the 
Measurement of Leverage 
Determinants of corporate governance quality at level model are reexamined by 
changing the measurement of leverage in Table 4-35. Leverage is measured by debt to equity 
ratio in the analysis part.  If equity is negative then debt equity ratio will be negative which 
may have impact on the regression results. Thus, leverage is newly measured by the ratio of 
debt to total assets for examining the robustness of the results and avoiding the negative sign 
of debt equity ratio.  
 
Table 4-35 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at  Level Model 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -309.6       
  (0.000) 
LNBSIZE (+/-) -7.143       
  (0.008) 
ID (%) (+) 0.468       
  (0.000) 
INT (%) (+) 0.0779 
  (0.138) 
OWNDIR (%) (+) 0.294       
  (0.000) 
FINVTR (%) (+) -0.105 
  (0.272) 
DEBT2TA (+/-) 11.13 
  (0.479) 
LNASSET (+) 14.76       
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  (0.000) 
LNFAGE (+/-) -3.669       
  (0.008) 
R2  0.690 
Observation  232 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the board; 
ID- Percentage of Independent directors in a board. It is measured by number of independent directors in a 
board divided by total number of directors; INT- Percentage of ownership holds by Institution; OWNDIR- 
Percentage of share ownership holds by all directors in a board. It is computed by number of shares owned by 
directors divided by the number of shares outstanding; FINVTR- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign 
Investors; DEBT2TA- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets; LNASSET- Natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets. Total asset is used as proxy of firm size. LNFAGE – Natural logarithm 
of firm‟s age; The standard errors and t statistics are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.  
 
The empirical analysis shows that there is no difference between Table 4-35 and 
Table 4-25 after changing the measurement of leverage. The regression results are same 
between Table 4-35 and Table 4-25 in terms of board size, independent director, institutional 
investors, director ownership, foreign investors, leverage, firm size, and firm age. The 
empirical results find that small board, independent directors, director ownership, firm size, 
and newly firms are the significant explanatory variables in improving the corporate 
governance quality at higher level.  But foreign investors, institutional investors and creditors 
have no significant association with the quality of corporate governance which implies that 
they have no bargaining power or monitoring role in developing the quality of corporate 
governance.  
 
4.9.10 Determinants of Corporate Governance Quality at Lagged Model by Changing 
the Measurement of Leverage 
Determinants of corporate governance quality at lagged model are reexamined by 
changing the measurement of leverage in Table 4-36. Leverage is measured by debt to equity 
ratio of previous year in the analysis part.  If equity is negative then debt equity ratio will be 
negative which may have impact on the regression results. Thus, leverage is newly measured 
by the ratio of debt to total assets of previous year for examining the robustness of the results 
and avoiding the negative sign of debt equity ratio.  
The empirical analysis shows that there is no difference between Table 4-36 and 
Table 4-26 after changing the measurement of leverage. The regression results are same 
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between Table 4-36  and Table 4-26 in terms of board size, independent director, institutional 
investors, director ownership, foreign investors, leverage, firm size,  and firm age. The 
empirical results find that small board, independent directors, director ownership, firm size, 
and newly firms are the significant explanatory variables in improving the corporate 
governance quality at higher level.  But foreign investors, institutional investors and creditors 
have no significant association with the quality of corporate governance which implies that 
they have no bargaining power or monitoring role in developing the quality of corporate 
governance.  
 
Table 4-36 
Regression Results of the Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Quality at Lagged Model 
 Expectation Results 
Constant  -328.3          
  (0.000)     
LNBSIZE(-1) (+/-) -6.703       
  (0.016)     
ID (-1) (%) (+) 0.336       
  (0.031)      
INT(-1) (%) (+) 0.0910 
  (0.111)     
OWNDIR (-1) (%) (+) 0.262          
  (0.000)      
FINVTR (-1) (%) (+) -0.102 
  (0.319)     
DEBT2TA (-1) (+/-) 9.945 
  (0.603)     
LNASSET(-1) (+) 15.81          
  (0.000) 
LNFAGE(-1) (+/-) -4.345          
  (0.005)     
R2  0.596 
Observation  202 
 
This table shows coefficients from the OLS regression of the corporate governance quality which denotes : 
CGQ- Corporate Governance Quality; LNBSIZE(-1)- Natural Logarithm of total number of directors in the 
board of previous year;  ID(-1)- Percentage of Independent directors in a board of previous year. It is measured 
by number of independent directors in a board divided by total number of directors ; INT(-1)- Percentage of 
ownership holds by Institution of previous year; OWNDIR(-1)- Percentage of share ownership holds by all 
directors in a board of previous year. It is computed by number of shares owned by directors divided by the 
number of shares outstanding ; FINVTR(-1)- Percentage of Ownership hold by Foreign Investors of previous 
year; DEBT2TA(-1)- Book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets of previous year; 
LNASSET(-1)- Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of previous year. Total asset is used as proxy of 
firm size. LNFAGE(-1) – Natural logarithm of firm‟s age of previous year; The standard errors and t statistics 
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are not reported but t statistics are calculated using white‟s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
and only probability is presented in the parenthesis.   
 
4.10 Conclusion 
The demand of corporate governance is increasing due to various scandals around the 
world.  Corporate governance monitors the management activities effectively and ensures the 
transparency and accountability of the firm to the stakeholders. Corporate governance quality 
helps to assess whether the firm is better or worst governed. Most of the researchers 
developed a self structured corporate governance index and few researchers used the 
governance rating provided by the rating agencies to measure the governance quality. 
Corporate governance quality considers governance guidelines, rules and regulations and 
disclosure practices but there is no uniform policy to measure the corporate governance 
quality all over the world. 
This study deals with two basic research questions related to corporate governance. 
The first research question deals with the assessment of corporate governance quality in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh.  A self structured corporate governance index is developed 
considering total 285 attributes and divided into eight sub categories such as ownership 
information, shareholder rights, financial transparency and information in the annual report, 
board, management structure and process, external auditing information, risk management 
information, tax management information and corporate responsibility, compliance and 
stakeholder information.  
Banking sectors is highly developed, organized and governed by various laws all over 
the world and thus expect a high quality of corporate governance but the empirical result 
finds that the average mean of corporate governance quality measured by the index is only 
52.37% which indicates low quality of governance and ranges from on average 34.49% in 
2006 to 71.95% in 2013 as expected. The banks whose governance structure and monitoring 
system is best have a governance index 82.81% in 2013 and the banks whose governance 
structure and monitoring system is worst have a governance index 6.67% in 2006 and 2007. 
But the overall quality of corporate governance is increasing over the year and the rapid 
changes started from 2012 due to adoption of new corporate governance guidelines 2012.  
The empirical result also finds that the average quality of corporate governance 
quality is higher in terms of shareholder rights and external auditing information but the 
average quality of corporate governance is lower in terms of board, management structure 
and process, financial transparency and information in the annual report, risk management 
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information and tax management information among the subcategories of corporate 
governance quality. This study also shows that quality of corporate governance is increasing 
over the year as expected but increases rapidly in 2012 due to significant changes in the 
quality of board, management structure and process and financial transparency and 
information in the annual report. Corporate governance guidelines 2012 introduces new 
issues such as criteria and qualification of independent director; some additional statements in 
the directors report; mandatory requirement of separation of chairman and CEO; constitution 
of audit committee, chairman of audit committee; role of audit committee; duties of CEO and 
CFO on financial statements; and collection of compliance certificate from professional 
accountant or secretary which have ultimate positive effect on quality of  board, management 
structure and process and financial transparency and information in the annual report. Thus, it 
is evident that quality of corporate governance increases rapidly due to inclusion of new 
requirements as mandatory items in the corporate governance guidelines.  
This study also finds that quality of corporate governance is low not only in voluntary 
attributes but also in mandatory attributes. Most of the banks are performing very low quality 
in voluntary attributes. For example- such as age, joining date, educational qualification, 
experience and expertise of directors, CEO, CFO, head of internal audit, company secretary; 
duties of board of directors, independent directors, executive committee, and management; 
attendance of executive committee meeting, audit committee meeting; having at least 75% 
attendance of board members or independent directors in board meeting, executive committee 
meeting and audit committee meeting etc.  Most of the banks are also violating some 
mandatory attributes of corporate governance. For example, corporate governance guidelines 
2006 and 2012 require that all banks must have independent director and number of 
independent director should be one tenth or minimum one and one fifth respectively. But 
independent directors are not available in almost forty percent of the bank and forty five 
percent banks are not maintaining the minimum number of independent directors. In addition, 
all the banks directors should hold minimum 2% qualification shares and sponsor and 
directors should jointly hold minimum 30% shares but it is evident that 82% banks directors 
are not holding minimum qualification shares and 27% banks sponsor and directors are not 
following the mandatory requirement.  
The second research question deals with the determinants of corporate governance 
quality in the listed banks of Bangladesh. The determinants of corporate governance quality 
help to asses which factors are important in corporate governance quality and which factors 
are inactive or not playing the significant role in improving corporate governance quality. 
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Board characteristics such as board size and percentage of independent director, ownership 
structure such as institutional ownership, director ownership and foreign investor, external 
monitoring such as leverage and firm characteristics such as firm size, and firm age are 
considered to find out the determinants of corporate governance quality.  The summary of the 
findings of determinants of corporate governance quality are presented below:  
Small board monitor and control in a systemic way, coordinate effectively, take 
timely decision and have fewer problems of diversified opinion, communication and free 
riding than the large board and thus, this study finds that small board is more effective in 
ensuring better governance. Independent directors, major instrument of corporate governance, 
ensure high quality of corporate governance. The reason might be number of independent 
directors‟ increases in recent years and they are practicing the true independence using their 
diversified knowledge and experience, and playing their monitoring role by controlling and 
limiting the self maximization behavior of management, family owners and group of largest 
shareholders or replacing the management or CEO on behalf of the shareholders interest. In 
addition, they ensure the better governance to create reputation in the market and present 
better governance as their performance indicator during performance evaluation or 
reappointment.   
Institutional investors have no significant association to ensure high quality of 
corporate governance. Institutional investors are not playing their monitoring role effectively 
for ensuring better governance because of low ownership, lack  of incentives or benefits, less 
concern or inactive about quality of corporate governance in the same industry or peer group, 
less effective instrument in the banking sector, or they invest in the firm that have prior 
record of good governance. Director ownership works as a governance instrument to resolve 
the agency conflict between managers and shareholders and ensure high quality of corporate 
governance. The probable explanations are: directors using their diversified knowledge and 
experience motivate management to improve quality of corporate governance; interest of 
directors and shareholders are same;  directors holding the significant ownership have the  
extreme concern about quality of corporate governance and thus monitor and maintain 
effectively for better governance on behalf of the shareholders interest; they have more 
incentive to develop the quality of corporate governance rather than extracting personal 
benefits; they want to present better governance as their performance indicator and 
reappointment and create reputation in the market; to attract or retain potential and existing 
investors ; and they have direct access and inside information to make effective decision for 
high quality of corporate governance. Foreign investors have high demand of better 
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governance but the empirical evident shows no significant association between corporate 
governance quality and foreign investors which implies that they are inactive in improving 
corporate governance quality. The reason might be foreign investors have very low 
ownership or they have no bargaining power on management to improve the quality of 
corporate governance or they are concerned only about their return of investment rather than 
attributes of corporate governance.  
Leverage is negatively associated with corporate governance quality which implies 
that credit monitoring is not an important instrument to ensure better governance or creditors 
don‟t have any bargaining power to improve the governance quality in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh or they are mainly concerned with their installment payment including interest 
rather than governance quality. Large firms have adequate resources, skilled human capital, 
and financial strength and provide more voluntary and mandatory information to meet the 
demand of shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders and ensure better governance and 
thus it is common that firm size is a significant factor in determining the corporate 
governance quality. In addition, they ensure higher quality of corporate governance to 
increase their market share and reputation in the market. Firm age is negatively associated 
with corporate governance quality which implies that newly firms ensure better governance 
than old firms. Newly firms are more concerned about corporate governance quality because 
they want to survive in the competitive market against large firms, create confidence of the 
stakeholders and increase their market share by attracting new and potential investors. 
In summary, small board, independent directors, director ownership, firm size, and 
newly firms are the significant explanatory variables in determining the quality of corporate 
governance which implies that these factors are contributing in improving the corporate 
governance quality at higher level. But foreign investors, institutional investors and creditors 
have no significant association with the quality of corporate governance which implies that 
they have no bargaining power or monitoring role in developing the quality of corporate 
governance.  
This study also finds that agency theory is also popular to the regulators, policy 
makers, shareholders and researchers, and the assumptions of agency theory are deeply 
rooted in the corporate governance guidelines of the listed banks of Bangladesh. The 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) introduced corporate governance 
guidelines 2006 and later revised the corporate governance guidelines in 2012 to ensure 
better governance and these positive changes follow the assumptions of agency theory. 
Corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 increase the transparency and disclosure of 
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the firm and reduce the information asymmetry. The number of independent directors 
increased from one tenth to one fifth according to corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 
2012 respectively. The presence of higher number of independent directors in the board 
committee, audit committee and other supporting committees also improve the 
accountability, monitoring and governance of the firm. Board dominated by outside 
independent directors also has the power to change the management if the performance of 
management is weak or engaged in corruption.  The position of the chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is occupied by different individuals in each bank. All the banks also 
have the separate audit committee. The above practices indicate the application of agency 
theory in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Moreover, following the agency theory, previous research finds that board 
characteristics, ownership structure and external monitoring are significant factors to improve 
the corporate governance quality. Thus, this study considers board characteristics such as 
board size, proportion of independent director, ownership structure such as director 
ownership, institutional investors and foreign ownership, and external monitoring such as 
firm leverage as the determinants of corporate governance quality. Board size and ownership 
structure and external monitoring are also used as corporate governance instruments 
following the agency theory. This study finds that corporate governance quality is 
significantly positively associated with small board, independent directors and director 
ownership. But this study doesn‟t find any significant association of corporate governance 
quality with institutional investors, foreign investors and firm leverage. Agency theory 
prefers small board to ensure better governance. This study also finds that small board is 
more effective than large board in improving corporate governance quality. The number of 
independent directors increases in recent years which also have significant positive impact on 
corporate governance quality. According to agency theory, board effectiveness depends on 
board size and board independence. The empirical result finds that small board and board 
independence both have the positive influence on board effectiveness that ultimately improve 
the corporate governance quality. In listed banks of Bangladesh, directors are non executive 
directors and they monitor the management effectively and ensure the quality of corporate 
governance for the interest of shareholders. Institutional investors and foreign investors also 
act as a major instrument of corporate governance to improve the quality of corporate 
governance but this study doesn‟t find any significant association of institutional ownership 
and foreign ownership with corporate governance quality due to low ownership. Moreover, 
creditors also don‟t have any bargaining power to improve the corporate governance quality. 
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But the application of above variables, result and analysis also indicates that banks are 
following agency theory to improve the quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh.  
In addition, this study also conducted some additional analysis as a robust check and 
finds some variation of the results or sensitivity of the determinants of quality of corporate 
governance.  
The determinants of quality of corporate governance at level model and lagged model 
are examined considering the time dummy and find that variation of results with the main 
analysis in terms of independent director, director ownership, and foreign investor ownership.  
This result indicates that foreign investors closely monitor the activities of management and 
ensure high quality of corporate governance but independent directors and director ownership 
are not effective in ensuring better governance when time is controlled.  
Firm performance, governance variables and firm characteristics are generally 
consistent over the years and variables of one year might affect the following years and as a 
result, the problem of serial correlation may arise. Thus, the determinants of quality of 
corporate governance at level model and lagged model are reexamined considering the serial 
correlation issue and find that no variation of results with the main analysis using the lagged 
model. But this study finds the variation of results with the main analysis using the level 
model in terms of firm age. The relationship between firm age and corporate governance 
quality is negative as before but the result is not statistically significant.   
The determinants of corporate governance quality at level model and lagged model 
are reinvestigated considering time dummy and serial correlation and find the variation of 
results with the main analysis in terms of independent director, director ownership, and 
foreign investor ownership.  This result indicates that foreign investors closely monitor the 
activities of management and ensure high quality of corporate governance but independent 
directors and director ownership are not effective in ensuring better governance when time 
dummy and serial correlation are considered.  
The determinants of corporate governance quality at level model are reexamined 
using fixed effect and random effect of panel method. This study finds that variation of 
results with the main analysis in terms of board size, firm age and director ownership using 
fixed effect method. This result indicates that corporate governance quality has no significant 
association with board size, firm age and director ownership.  In addition, this study also 
finds that variation of result with the main analysis in terms of firm age using random effect 
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method. This result implies that firm age has no significant effect to ensure better quality of 
corporate governance.  
The determinants of corporate governance quality at level model and lagged model 
are reexamined by changing the measurement of leverage through the ratio of debt to total 
assets and find that no variation of results or sensitivity with the main analysis.  
From the above analysis, it is evident that there are some variations of results or 
sensitivity when different types of estimations are conducted. But it is observed that in this 
study, the sample size is not equal in each year, and the sample size ranges twenty six to 
thirty during the study period, and number of observations is comparatively less in total. 
Thus, to get the larger sample size, and greater variation which reduces the standard error, 
this study applies the pooled cross sectional method as the main analysis to find out the 
determinants of quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
The findings of the study should be interest to banks, shareholders, regulators, 
practitioners, and academics who are interested in corporate governance quality and its 
determinants and this study provides some suggestions based on empirical results to improve 
the governance literature in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  First, stakeholders may have 
more demand of voluntary governance information but it is evident that most of the banks 
show a poor quality of corporate governance in voluntary attributes.  The regulatory authority 
and banks should more focus on voluntary attributes of corporate governance and can  
impose as mandatory requirement, if necessary, in the corporate governance guidelines.  
Second, it is common that firms follow the mandatory attributes of corporate governance. But 
it is evident that listed banks are violating even some mandatory attributes of corporate 
governance. Thus, banks and regulatory authority should be more cautious and follow the 
mandatory attributes and the regulatory authority may impose high penalty in violation of 
mandatory attributes. Third, the empirical evidence finds that corporate governance quality is 
low in terms of board, management structure and process, financial transparency, risk 
management and tax management information. Thus, the banks and regulatory authority 
should more emphasize on overall as well as individual attributes of subcategories of 
corporate governance and impose as mandatory requirement, if necessary, in the corporate 
governance guidelines.  Fourth, bank follows the corporate governance guidelines and report 
“comply or explain” or “comply” basis according to corporate governance guidelines 2006 
and 2012 respectively. Most of the banks disclose the governance related issue in the 
compliance checklist table by giving yes or no type information. But most of the banks do not 
provide any discussion or explanation or notes in details about the governance issue in the 
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governance report or director‟s report or any part of the annual report. For example- banks 
should define the role and responsibilities of board of directors, independent directors, CEO, 
CFO, head of internal audit, and company secretary. Most of the banks provide that they are 
complying this information but only few banks discuss or report in details information about 
the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors, independent directors, CEO, CFO, 
head of internal audit and company secretary. Thus, banks should provide more details 
information voluntarily or the regulatory authority should impose mandatory restriction to 
disclose the governance information with details explanation or discussion. Fifth, the 
empirical result finds that institutional investors, foreign investors and creditors have no 
bargaining power to improve the quality of corporate governance. They should develop and 
increase their monitoring capacity and bargaining power to increase the corporate governance 
quality by holding a significant ownership. Sixth, this study evaluates corporate governance 
guideline 2006 and 2012 and finds that there is no information of tax management or 
compliance, risk management and reporting in the corporate governance guidelines. The 
regulatory authority should include tax management and compliance, risk management and 
reporting information in the governance guidelines to improve the quality of governance. 
Finally, this study finds that some of the mandatory attributes (such as having independent 
directors and minimum number of independent directors) are violated by most of the banks 
but there is no information about the penalty or punishment in the annual report. Moreover, 
there is no information of penalty or punishment in the corporate governance guidelines. 
Thus, the regulatory authority should closely monitor the compliance of governance attributes 
and impose a huge penalty in case of violation of attributes and include a separate segment of 
punishment or penalty in the corporate governance guidelines.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of the Thesis 
Agency problem occurs due to separation of management and shareholders and 
management compensation and corporate governance have received massive attention in 
academic research to mitigate the agency problem. Management compensation and quality of 
corporate governance ensure better monitoring, transparency and accountability and meet the 
company‟s objective or shareholders demand of value maximization and interest of other 
stakeholders. To date, most of the prior empirical research examined the CEO compensation 
and corporate governance using firms of different countries like US, UK, Australia, Canada, 
Japan, China, and Malaysia etc. But research on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance has not been examined yet in the developing country especially in Bangladesh in 
compare to other developed and developing countries. Thus, there is a scarcity of research in 
the field of CEO compensation and corporate governance using data from Bangladeshi firms 
especially in the listed banks. In Bangladesh, banking sector is growing very fast and it is 
considered as the promising sector due to its contribution to a significant percentage in 
national GDP.  It is well known that banking sector is well structured, comply the rules 
regulation properly and disclosure is higher in compare to other companies in Bangladesh. 
But till now, there is dearth of empirical research study on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance which especially focuses on the determinants of CEO compensation, quality of 
CEO compensation disclosure, the major determinants of CEO compensation disclosure, 
quality of corporate governance and the significant indicators of corporate governance quality 
in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Moreover, there is no database or index to assess the 
quality of CEO compensation disclosure and quality of corporate governance in the listed 
banks. Thus, there is a gap of research especially in the pay and governance literature of 
Bangladesh. This gap of research inspires me to do my research on CEO compensation and 
corporate governance in listed banks of Bangladesh and filling up the gap is my research 
motivation of this research study. 
This research thesis mainly addresses the following questions to fill up the research 
gaps in the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013:  First, what are the 
major determinants of CEO compensation?  Second, what is the quality of CEO 
compensation disclosure? What are the significant determinants of CEO compensation 
disclosure? Third, what is the quality of corporate governance? What are the significant 
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determinants of corporate governance quality?  The first two research questions are related 
with CEO compensation and the third research question deals with corporate governance. 
Firstly, I examine the determinants of CEO compensation in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. To do so, I try to find out whether there is a 
positive relationship between pay and performance. Shareholders are widely dispersed and 
less informed about the business activities which may increase firm wealth and can‟t monitor 
the each activity of managers and investment opportunities. But effective corporate 
governance mechanisms monitor the activities of managers and mitigate the agency cost born 
by the shareholders. Thus, I also evaluate the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms through board composition and ownership structures in setting CEO pay.  
Executive compensation research finds that firm size is a significant determinant in CEO 
compensation. I try to find out whether this is also applicable in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh. In summary, determinants of CEO compensation are examined through firm 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms (including board composition and ownership 
structures), firm characteristic and external monitoring parameters.  This study focuses on to 
find out the relationship between pay and firm performance; evaluates the effectiveness of 
board composition through size of board of directors, the role of independent directors and 
presence of female directors in setting CEO pay; impact of ownership structures through 
institutional investors, foreign investors and director ownership on CEO pay; and effect of 
firm size and firm‟s leverage on CEO pay.  
This research study finds a positive relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance. This result indicates that improvement in firm performance also increase the 
CEO pay. Board size is negatively related to CEO pay which implies large board is effective 
and restricts the CEO pay. This study also finds that independent directors, female directors, 
institutional investors, and directors‟ can not play their monitoring role in setting CEO 
compensation. CEO pay is higher due to weak corporate governance mechanisms. The 
empirical result shows that firm size is a significant determinant in CEO pay and leverage is 
negatively associated with CEO pay which implies that CEO pay is monitored by the debt 
holders.  
This study provides some suggestions to improve the pay literature in Bangladesh and 
reduce the agency problem between shareholders and executives. First, only few banks 
disclose the breakdown information of total CEO compensation. This makes difficult to do 
rigorous research by considering all the components of CEO information. The regulatory 
authority should more concentrate on disclosure of executives‟ information with breakdown 
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in details and performance bonus or incentives should be clearly specified. Second, large 
board is effective in monitoring CEO pay but role of independent directors are not effective 
enough to control the CEO pay. Generally, the banks disclose the information in corporate 
governance checklist that they complies the minimum requirement of independent directors. 
But whether the independent directors are playing their role as independent is a matter of 
question. This study also finds that institutional investors are not playing their monitoring 
role in limiting the activities of executives and CEO pay. CEO pay is high due to weak 
corporate governance mechanisms in listed banks. Thus, the regulatory authority such as 
Bangladesh Bank and Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) should 
more emphasize on efficient corporate governance mechanisms which will reduce the agency 
cost of the shareholders. Third, in listed banks, board formulates two committees which are 
executive committee and audit committee. Board decides the compensation package of 
executives and collects the approval from Bangladesh Bank. Separate compensation 
committee is available in the firms of developed countries. But in listed banks, there is no 
separate compensation committee. Thus, Bangladesh Bank should introduce separate 
compensation committee to design effective compensation package for the executives. 
Fourth, this study finds that stock option and grants are widely used in US and UK but there 
are no use of equity based incentives like stock option and grant in listed banks of 
Bangladesh. The regulatory authority such as Bangladesh Bank and Bangladesh Securities 
and Exchange Commission (BSEC) should introduce the option and grant as incentive for the 
executives. This stock and grant will also help to reduce the agency problem between the 
managers and shareholders.  
Secondly, I examine disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its determinants in 
the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. The specific research 
questions are (1) to examine the disclosure practices of CEO compensation of the listed banks 
by preparing a self structured CEO compensation disclosure index and (2) to examine which 
factors contribute significantly in disclosure practices of CEO compensation. I prepare a self 
structured CEO compensation disclosure index considering compensation policy and process, 
perquisites, bonus, retirement benefit and so on to measure the disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation.  I consider firm performance, corporate governance mechanisms including 
board composition and ownership pattern, leverage, firm size, CEO compensation and audit 
quality variables to examine the effect on disclosure of CEO compensation. I want to find out 
the effect of internal firm performance ROA and external firm performance Tobin‟s Q on 
CEO compensation disclosure index. To ensure transparency and accountability to the 
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stakeholders, I want to examine to what extent corporate governance variables are effective in 
disclosing CEO compensation information. I consider board composition (board size, 
percentage of independent directors and presence of female directors in the board) and 
ownership pattern (institutional investors, ownership hold by directors and foreign investors) 
as the mechanisms of corporate governance.  Moreover, I want to test whether debt holders 
have any bargaining power about disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  Previous studies 
stated that firm size is a significant explanatory variable in disclosing compensation 
information. I want to examine whether firm size is also a significant explanatory variable in 
disclosure quality of CEO compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Empirical 
research also finds that disclosure is more when compensation is less and vice versa. I try to 
find out whether there is any effect of CEO compensation on disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation. Finally, I want to examine whether audit quality has any significant effect on 
CEO compensation disclosure.  
This study finds that overall CEO compensation disclosure measured by the index is 
very poor but increased over the years as expected. The empirical result shows that firm 
performance (ROA), CEO compensation, director ownership, foreign investors and audit 
quality are the significant explanatory factors for CEO compensation disclosure index. CEO 
compensation disclosure is more transparent when firm performance is high. When firm 
performance is good, they also try to present themselves that they are more accountable to the 
shareholders and attract new investors by disclosing CEO compensation information in more 
details.  This research study shows that disclosure quality of CEO compensation is high when 
CEO receives more compensation. Directors monitoring role is effective in ensuring higher 
disclosure of CEO compensation. Foreign investors are more concerned about their 
investment and they are habituated about the comprehensive disclosure of CEO 
compensation like their home countries and expect same disclosure in listed banks of 
Bangladesh and monitor accordingly. Moreover, this study reveals that disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation is comparatively high when firm is audited by the affiliated audit firms of 
BIG 4. BIG 4 audit firm ensures higher disclosure and transparency to retain their reputation 
in the global market.  But this study also reports that firm size has no significant association 
with CEO compensation disclosure and board size, independent directors, female directors, 
and institutional investors have no monitoring role on disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation which means that corporate governance is very weak and inefficient. Creditors 
also don‟t have any bargaining power to increase the quality of disclosure of CEO 
compensation.  
 330  
 
This study provides some suggestions to develop the transparency of CEO 
compensation disclosure and thereby, reduce the agency cost and information asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers in the listed banks of Bangladesh. First, Clarkson et al. 
(2006) stated that compulsory disclosure requirements increases high quality disclosures and 
less chance of interpretative judgment. Thus, the regulatory authority should establish a 
comprehensive disclosure guideline including the minimum (mandatory) and voluntary 
disclosure requirement for all the companies. Second, there is no separate compensation 
committee for directors and management and employees in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
Thus, a separate compensation committee should be established to ensure the transparency 
and accountability of the compensation and disclosure issues. Third, it is also observed that 
there is no change or improvement of disclosure pattern of CEO compensation from 2006 to 
2013. This implies that the disclosure of CEO compensation in 2013 is same as like in 2006.  
Thus, the regulatory authority and internal compensation committee should more emphasize 
on disclosure in details about compensation policy and process, pay performance relation, 
separate disclosure, segregated compensation, variable and fixed elements, compensation of 
peer groups, criteria of setting up salaries, component of perquisites, bonus and other 
benefits, retirement benefits, share based payments etc. and monitor the disclosure practices 
regularly to ensure transparency and accountability to the stakeholders. Finally, the 
regulatory authority should more focus on corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
governance mechanisms should be modernized based on the global market demand and board 
size, female directors, independent directors and institutional investors monitoring role 
should be effective to raise the disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  
Thirdly, I examine measurement and determinants of corporate governance quality 
considering the listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. The specific 
research questions are: (1) what is the quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of 
Bangladesh? (2) What are the determinants of quality of corporate governance in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh?  To resolve the first research question, I develop an index of corporate 
governance quality considering ownership information, shareholder rights, financial 
transparency, board, management structure and process, external auditing information, risk 
management information, tax management information, and corporate responsibility, 
compliance and stakeholder information. The overall quality of corporate governance 
provides the information to what extent banks are applying or practicing corporate 
governance attributes. Moreover, corporate governance quality indicates that whether the 
firm is a better governed firm or poor governed firms.  The second research question deals 
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with the determinants of quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. 
Board characteristics such as board size and proportion of independent director, ownership 
structure such as institutional ownership, director ownership and foreign investor, external 
monitoring such as leverage and firm characteristics such as firm size and firm age are 
considered to find out the determinants of corporate governance quality. The determinants of 
corporate governance quality help to asses which factors are important in corporate 
governance quality and which factors are inactive or not playing the significant role in 
improving corporate governance quality.  
To measure the corporate governance quality, a self structured governance index is 
developed including total 285 attributes and divided into eight sub categories using the 
corporate governance guidelines, regulatory requirement of Bangladesh Bank, listing 
requirement, disclosure practices and previous empirical governance literature. The empirical 
study shows that overall corporate governance quality measured by the index is only 52.37% 
which indicates poor quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh 
although it said that banking sector is well organized, highly developed and regulated by 
various laws all over the world. The empirical result finds that quality is higher in shareholder 
rights and external auditing information but quality is lower in board, management structure 
and process, financial transparency, risk management information and tax management 
information among the sub categories of governance quality. The empirical analysis also 
presents that overall corporate governance quality is drastically increased in 2012 because of 
significant improvement in board, management structure and process and financial 
transparency and information in the annual report. Newly corporate governance guidelines 
2012 include some new issues which have ultimate effect on quality of board, management 
structure and process and financial transparency and information in the annual report. This 
study also observed that governance quality is very low in voluntary attributes and even some 
mandatory attributes are violated by the most of the banks.  This study also investigates the 
determinants of corporate governance quality in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Board 
characteristics (board size and board independence), ownership structure (institutional 
ownership, director ownership and foreign investors), external monitoring (firm leverage) and 
firm characteristics (firm size and firm age) are considered to measure the determinants of 
corporate governance quality. This study finds that firm size, small board, independent 
director, director shareholdings and newly firms are the significant explanatory variables in 
determining the corporate governance quality but institutional shareholders, foreign investors 
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and creditors have no significant monitoring role or power to improve the quality of corporate 
governance.   
This study provides some suggestions based on empirical results to improve the 
governance literature in the listed banks of Bangladesh. First, stakeholders may have more 
demand of voluntary governance information but most of the banks show a poor quality of 
corporate governance in voluntary attributes.  The regulatory authority and banks should 
more focus on voluntary attributes of corporate governance and can  impose as mandatory 
requirement, if necessary, in the corporate governance guidelines.  Second, it is common that 
firms follow the mandatory attributes of corporate governance. But it is evident that listed 
banks are violating even some mandatory attributes of corporate governance. Thus, banks and 
regulatory authority should be more cautious and follow the mandatory attributes and the 
regulatory authority may impose high penalty in violation of mandatory attributes. Third, the 
empirical evidence finds that corporate governance quality is low in terms of board, 
management structure and process, financial transparency, risk management and tax 
management information. Thus, the banks and regulatory authority should more emphasize 
on overall as well as individual attributes of subcategories of corporate governance and 
impose as mandatory requirement, if necessary, in the corporate governance guidelines.  
Fourth, bank follows the corporate governance guidelines and report “comply or explain” or 
“comply” basis according to corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 respectively. 
Most of the banks disclose the governance related issue in the compliance checklist table by 
giving yes or no type information. But most of the banks do not provide any discussion or 
explanation or notes in details about the governance issue in the governance report or 
director‟s report or any part of the annual report. Thus, banks should provide more details 
information voluntarily or the regulatory authority should impose mandatory restriction to 
disclose the governance information with details explanation or discussion.  Fifth, the 
empirical result finds that institutional investors, foreign investors and creditors have no 
bargaining power to improve the quality of corporate governance. They should develop and 
increase their monitoring capacity and bargaining power to increase the corporate governance 
quality by holding a significant ownership. Sixth, there is no information of tax management 
or compliance, risk management and reporting in the corporate governance guidelines. The 
regulatory authority should include tax management and compliance, risk management and 
reporting information in the governance guidelines to improve the quality of governance. 
Finally, this study finds that some of the mandatory attributes (such as having independent 
directors and minimum number of independent directors) are violated by most of the banks 
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but there is no information about the penalty or punishment in the annual report. Moreover, 
there is no information of penalty or punishment in the corporate governance guidelines. 
Thus, the regulatory authority should closely monitor the compliance of governance attributes 
and impose a huge penalty in case of violation of attributes and include a separate segment of 
punishment or penalty in the corporate governance guidelines. 
The overall research findings, recommendations or suggestions will help to 
understand the practical scenario and provide the guidelines for further improvement in the 
area of CEO compensation and corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
Moreover, the regulatory authority, policy makers, researchers, practitioners and others 
should more emphasize on the research findings and recommendations of CEO compensation 
and corporate governance and should take necessary action for further development or 
improvement and ensure proper transparency and accountability to the stakeholders.  
 
5.2 Implications of the Research 
This research study mainly deals with three research questions about CEO 
compensation and corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. First, what are the 
major determinants of CEO compensation? Second, what is the quality of CEO compensation 
disclosure?  What are the significant factors influence the quality of CEO compensation? 
Third, what is the quality of corporate governance? What are the major determinants 
contributing to the quality of corporate governance? The overall research findings have some 
implication in improving the area of CEO compensation and corporate governance in the 
listed banks of Bangladesh and the implications are described below:  
First, there is dearth of research studies relating to determinants of CEO compensation 
in the listed banks of Bangladesh and the empirical research on determinants of CEO 
compensation will provide a remedy for the paucity of compensation research and will add 
value to the CEO pay literature in Bangladesh. This study investigates the relationship of 
CEO compensation with firm performance, corporate governance parameters (such as board 
composition and ownership structure), external monitoring and firm characteristics and the 
findings of the research will help to understand which factors contribute significantly in 
determination of CEO pay. In addition, the findings of the study will help to understand the 
mechanisms of corporate governance systems in banks and how it works and to what extent it 
is effective in determination of CEO pay. Finally, the findings of this study will also help to 
the regulators, policy makers, practitioners, researchers and others to enrich the corporate 
governance mechanisms and pay performance relationship contribute to work as a better 
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alignment between management and shareholders by reducing agency problem in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh. 
Second, there is dearth of empirical research related to disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh. This study will also contribute to the paucity 
of CEO compensation disclosure research and will add value to the disclosure literature of 
Bangladesh. This study evaluates the self structured CEO compensation disclosure index and  
the relationship of CEO compensation disclosure index with firm performance, corporate 
governance variables including board composition and ownership pattern, firm 
characteristics, CEO compensation and audit quality. The critical analysis and findings will 
help to understand practical scenario of disclosure practices of CEO compensation in the 
absence of detailed accounting standard and major determinants of disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation in the listed banks of Bangladesh. The findings of the study will help to 
regulators, practitioners, researchers and others to understand the mechanisms of corporate 
governance and to what extent the corporate governance is effective in disclosing CEO 
compensation disclosure index and how firms should modernize the corporate governance 
mechanisms to enrich the comprehensive disclosure of CEO compensation similar to 
developed countries disclosure. Finally, the finding of the research will also help to 
materialize the transparency and accountability about CEO compensation disclosure to the 
stakeholders and reduce the information asymmetry and agency cost by resolving the burning 
question of public whether CEO receives excess amount or not.  
Third, the empirical research of corporate governance quality: measurement and 
determinants analysis also has some implications. There is dearth of research studies relating 
to corporate governance quality and its determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Thus, 
this study will provide a remedy for the paucity of governance research and will add value to 
the literature of quality of corporate governance in Bangladesh.  This study develops a unique 
self structured corporate governance index as a proxy of corporate governance quality for the 
banking sector of Bangladesh. This study investigates the quality of corporate governance 
through item wise, category wise, and overall analysis over the time period in the banking 
sector of Bangladesh.  The different types of analysis will show that to what extent banks are 
practicing corporate governance attributes and whether they are better governed or worst 
governed firm. This study investigates the determinants of corporate governance quality 
through board characteristics, ownership structure, external monitoring and firm 
characteristics and the findings will help to understand which factors are contributing 
significantly and which factors are inactive or not playing the significant role in improving 
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corporate governance quality.  Finally, the findings of this study will help to the regulator and 
policy maker to understand and identify the actual scenario and weakness of corporate 
governance practices and the regulator and policy maker may emphasize on weak point of 
corporate governance issues and include some new issues as a mandatory requirement in the 
corporate governance guidelines which will improve the quality of corporate governance in 
the banking sector of Bangladesh.  
The overall research findings will help to understand the practical scenario of CEO 
compensation and corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh. Moreover, the 
regulatory authority, policy makers, researchers, practitioners and others will more emphasize 
on CEO compensation and corporate governance and provide the guidelines, 
recommendation or suggestions for further improvement in the area of CEO compensation 
and corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh.  
 
5.3 Limitations of Research 
In this thesis, I faced some limitations during my research period. First, I consider the 
listed banks of Bangladesh during the period of 2006 to 2013. Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC) introduces corporate governance guidelines firstly in 2006 
and later revised the corporate governance guidelines in 2012. CEO compensation and 
corporate governance information are comparatively available after the introduction of 
corporate governance guidelines 2006. But sufficient CEO compensation and corporate 
governance information are not available before 2006. Thus, I have to consider the listed 
banks of Bangladesh after introduction of corporate governance guidelines 2006.  
Second, I examine the determinants of CEO compensation considering only the total 
CEO compensation.  Most of the banks do not disclose the performance incentives or bonus 
information in the annual report. Even few banks disclose the bonus information as festival 
bonus rather than incentive bonus. Thus, I couldn‟t analyze the performance incentives or 
bonus information due to absence of incentives data in the annual report.  
Third, I examine the determinants of compensation and disclosure quality of 
compensation and its determinants considering only the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). All 
the banks disclose CEO compensation information as separate line item in the profit and loss 
statement and details in the notes. But management (including the CFO, and other senior 
executives) compensation information with details other than the CEO is not separately 
available in the annual report during 2006 to 2013. Thus, I could not analyze the determinants 
 336  
 
of compensation and disclosure quality of management compensation information other than 
the CEO.   
Fourth, I develop a self structured index to assess the quality of CEO compensation 
disclosure considering compensation policy and process, perquisites, bonus, retirement 
benefit and so on. But there are no unique measurement process and weighting system 
available to measure the disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Similarly, I also develop a 
self structured corporate governance index and divided into eight sub categories considering 
corporate governance guidelines, regulatory requirement of Bangladesh Bank, listing 
requirement, disclosure practices and previous empirical governance literature. But there is 
no unique boundary of corporate governance, measurement process and weighting system to 
assess the quality of corporate governance. Thus, disclosure quality of CEO compensation 
and quality of corporate governance can be questioned due to lack of database and absence of 
unique the measurement process and weighting systems.   
Fifth, the indexes for quality of corporate governance includes total 285 attributes 
considering the corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012, Bangladesh Bank 
guidelines, listing requirement of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), and prior empirical 
literature. If the answer of the attributes is yes, then score would be one and otherwise score 
would be zero. The attributes of quality of corporate governance cover both compliance and 
disclosure issues because corporate governance guidelines 2006 and 2012 include some 
issues related to compliance and some issues related to disclosure. For example, according to 
corporate governance guidelines 20006 and 2012, they require disclosing the aggregate 
number of shares along with name wise details held by parent/ subsidiary/associated 
companies; directors, CEO and company secretary, CFO, head of internal audit and their 
spouses; executives; and shareholders holding 10% or more. Disclosure is also one kind of 
compliance according to the corporate governance guidelines and prior empirical research 
and thus this study considers both compliance and disclosure issue as part of quality of 
corporate governance. But banks may not disclose any particular attributes on the following 
basis: (1) the attribute is not available in the firm or (2) the attribute is available in the firm 
but it is immaterial to disclose it or (3) the attribute is available in the firm, it is material but 
the firm decided not to disclose the attribute.  In this study, any undisclosed attributes score 
are given zero to avoid judgment error in the coding process following the study of Morries et 
al. (2011) and Biswas (2012). But it is not possible to identify the particular reason or basis 
for undisclosed attributes. The indexes for quality of corporate governance cannot identify 
the quality of attributes for undisclosed compliances. Thus, the indexes for quality of 
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corporate governance have identification problem which can be said as the limitation of this 
study. 
Finally, I investigate the CEO compensation and corporate governance considering 
only listed banks of Bangladesh. I checked the CEO compensation information and corporate 
governance information in the manufacturing firms during the period of 2006 to 2013. But I 
didn‟t get sufficient information about CEO compensation and corporate governance in the 
manufacturing firms during the period of 2006 to 2013 to conduct the research. Thus, I 
restrict my research on CEO compensation and corporate governance only on the listed banks 
of Bangladesh.  
 
5.4 Area of Future Research  
The following are some issues for further research:  
First, I examine the determinants of CEO compensation and disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation and its determinants considering firm performance, corporate governance 
mechanisms including board composition, ownership structures and firm characteristics. 
Other determinants may have also effect on CEO compensation and disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation. Further research can be done considering other determinants like stock 
return, political effect, stakeholder pressure, and legal framework etc. on CEO compensation 
and disclosure quality of CEO compensation.  
Second, I used the quantitative method to find out the determinants of CEO 
compensation and disclosure quality of CEO compensation and its determinants in the thesis. 
But qualitative method may give a different finding about determinants of CEO 
compensation and disclosure quality of CEO compensation. Thus, future research can also be 
carried out considering qualitative method such as interview, or questionnaire survey to find 
out the major determinants of CEO compensation and disclosure quality of CEO 
compensation.  
Third, I examine the determinants of CEO compensation considering only total CEO 
compensation. I could not analyze the performance incentives due to absence of incentives 
data during the period of 2006 to 2013. Future research can be done considering the total 
compensation and performance incentives based on availability of data in the recent periods.  
Fourth, I investigate the determinants of CEO compensation and disclosure quality of 
CEO compensation and its determinants in the listed banks of Bangladesh. In the thesis, I 
mainly consider the determinants of compensation and disclosure quality of compensation on 
the basis of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) information. But management also includes 
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executive director, CEO, CFO, and other senior executives. In Banks, all the directors are non 
executive directors. Thus, future research on determinants of compensation and disclosure 
quality of compensation can be done considering management and executives other than the 
CEO.  
Fifth, I evaluate the quality of corporate governance in the listed banks of Bangladesh 
considering the availability of corporate governance attributes in the annual report and used 
the quantitative approach. Future research can be conducted to measure the quality of 
corporate governance using the qualitative approach such as interview and questionnaire 
survey.  
Sixth, CEO compensation and corporate governance might also be influenced by 
macroeconomic and financial market indicators in Bangladesh. Thus, the researcher can do 
further research considering the macroeconomic and financial market condition of 
Bangladesh and the effect of these indicators on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance.  
Finally, I examine the CEO compensation and corporate governance in the listed 
banks of Bangladesh. Future research can also be carried out on the same research issue CEO 
compensation and corporate governance considering manufacturing firms. In addition, the 
researcher can also make a comparative analysis of CEO compensation and corporate 
governance between the banking and financial institutions and manufacturing firms of 
Bangladesh. Moreover, future research can also be done on CEO compensation and corporate 
governance by making a comparative analysis between listed banks of Bangladesh and with 
other listed banks of South Asia.   
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
 
 CEO Compensation Disclosure Index 
 
No Score Element Disclosure Scoring 
Index 
Required Papers 
Reference 
1 1 Separate disclosure for CEO 
compensation 
0= No 
1= Yes 
Bangladesh Bank  Clarkson  
et al. 
(2006) 
2. 1 Remuneration Process of CEO 
compensation 
0= No discussion 
1= Discussion of the 
remuneration process 
 Clarkson  
et al. 
(2006) 
3. 1 Pay to performance relation/link 
of CEO compensation  
0= No discussion 
1= Discussion of the pay 
performance relation or 
link  
 Clarkson  
et al. 
(2006) 
4. 1 Comparative CEO remuneration 
Information 
0= No 
1= Yes 
 Clarkson  
et al. 
(2006) 
5. 1 Disaggregated /Segregated CEO 
remuneration/  
0= Aggregated 
information only 
1= 
Disaggregated/segregated  
information 
 Clarkson  
et al. 
(2006) 
6. 1 Relative importance of fixed and 
variable components of CEO 
compensation  
0= No 
1= Yes 
 Melis et al. 
(2015) 
7. 1 Peer groups considered for CEO 
compensation 
0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
Melis et al. 
(2015) 
8 1 Criteria of setting up the salaries  
for CEO compensation 
  Melis et al. 
(2015) 
9.  Perquisites includes for CEO 
compensation:  
   
 1 9.a. House rent 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.b. House maintenance  0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.c. Entertainment 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.d. Utility 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.e. Allowances 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.f. Special Allowances 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.g. Leave fare assistance 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.h. Dearness allowance 0= No BRPD circular  
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No Score Element Disclosure Scoring 
Index 
Required Papers 
Reference 
1= Yes letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 1 9.i. Medical allowance 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.j. Security allowance 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
 1 9.k. Others 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
10. 2 Bonuses and other benefits    
  10.a  Festival Bonus 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
  10.b. Incentive / Performance 
Bonus 
0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
11. 2 Retirement Benefits    
  11.a. Provident fund 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
  11. b. Other retirement benefit 0= No 
1= Yes 
BRPD circular 
letter no- 3, dated 
February 1, 2006 
 
12. 1 Disclosure of equity/share based 
payments 
0= No 
1= Yes 
 Clarkson  
et al. 
(2006) 
Total 24     
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Appendix-2 
Checklist of Quality of Corporate Governance  
 
Serial 
No 
Sub 
Indices Governance Items  Legal References 
I. Quality of Ownership Information 
1 I-1 Does the firm report ownership pattern (% of ownership held by 
sponsors, directors, government, institution, foreign and general 
public)? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 15(a) 
2 I-2 Does the firm report changes in shareholdings?   
3 I-3 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of shares held by 
parent/subsidiary/ associated companies and other related parties 
along with name wise details? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (k) (i); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xxi)(a) 
4 I-4 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of shares held by directors, 
chief executive officer (CEO), company secretary, chief financial 
officer (CFO), head of internal audit, and their spouses and minor 
children along with name wise details? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (k) (ii); CG 
Guideline (2012)-1.5 
(xxi)(b); DSE Listing 
Regulations 2006- 15(b) 
5 I-5 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of shares held by 
executives (top five salaried employees other than directors, CEO, 
company secretary, CFO, and head of internal audit) along with 
name wise details? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (k) (iii); CG 
Guideline (2012)-1.5 
(xxi)(c) 
6 I-6 Does the firm disclose aggregate number of shares held by 
shareholders holding 10% or more along with name wise details? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (k) (iv); CG 
Guideline (2012)-1.5 
(xxi)(d) 
7 I-7 Does the firm provide information about total number of 
promoters/sponsors? 
  
8 I-8 Does the firm report the list (name) of each promoters/sponsors 
other than directors? 
  
9 I-9 Does the firm report the number of shares held by individual 
promoters/ sponsors other than directors? 
  
10 I-10 Does the firm comply that all sponsors/promoters and directors 
jointly hold minimum 30% shares of the paid up capital? 
BSEC Notification, 
November 22, 2011 
11 I-11 Does the firm report the list of top 1, 3,5, 10 or 20  shareholders  
other than directors? 
  
12 I-12 Does the firm report the number of shares held by top 1, 3, 5, 10 or 
20 shareholders other than directors? 
  
13 I-13 Does the firm disclose the classification of shareholders including 
number of shareholders and percentage of shareholding such as up 
to 500 shares, 501 to 5000 shares………over 1,000,000 shares? 
  
II. Quality of Shareholders  Rights Information 
14 II-1 Does the firm hold their annual general meeting (AGM) in each 
year? 
Company Act  1994 Sec. 
81(1) 
15 II-2 Does the firm hold current annual general meeting (AGM) within 
fifteen months from the previous AGM? 
Company Act  1994 Sec. 
81 (1) 
16 II-3 Does the firm report the process for holding annual general meeting 
(AGM)? 
  
17 II-4 Does the firm disclose the notice of annual general meeting (AGM)? Company Act  1994 Sec. 
85(1)(a) 
18 II-5 Does the firm send the notice of annual general meeting (AGM) to 
the shareholders at least 14 days before the AGM? 
Company Act  1994 Sec. 
85(1)(a) 
19 II-6 Is the firm‟s annual general meeting (AGM) agenda available and 
accessible? 
Company Act  1994 Sec. 
85(1)(a) 
20 II-7 Does the firm provide the information of annual general meeting 
(AGM) date and location? 
Company Act  1994 
Schedule - I 
21 II-8 Does the firm report the availability and accessibility of proxy Company Act  1994 
 355  
 
Serial 
No 
Sub 
Indices Governance Items  Legal References 
voting? Schedule - I 
22 II-9 Does the firm attach the proxy form with the annual report? Company Act  1994 
Schedule - I 
23 II-10 Do the firm‟s board members attend at annual general meeting to 
answer shareholder questions? 
 
24 II-11 Does the firm disclose the policy for ensuring shareholders 
participation in the AGM? 
 
25 II-12 Does the firm disclose dividend policy?  
26 II-13 Does the firm disclose the strategy or policy for effective 
communication with the shareholders and other stakeholders? 
 
III.  Quality of Financial Transparency and Information in the Annual Report 
27 
III- 1 Does the firm report the fairness of financial statements (state of 
affairs, result of operations, cash flows and changes in equity) which 
is prepared by the management? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (a); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xi) 
28 
III- 2 Does the firm report that accounting estimates are based on 
reasonable and prudent judgment? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (c); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xiii); BAS- 
8 
29 
III- 3 Does the firm report the most significant areas where estimates and 
judgment have been made? 
BAS- 8 
30 
III- 4 Does the firm report that financial statements have been prepared 
following International Accounting  Standards (IAS) / Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BAS) / International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) / Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards 
(BFRS), as applicable in Bangladesh  and has any departure from 
there  been adequately disclosed? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (d); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xiv) 
31 
III- 5 Is the firm‟s internal control system sound in design and 
implemented and monitored effectively? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (e); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xv) 
32 
III- 6 Does the firm report the capability to continue as a going concern? CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (f); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xvi) 
33 
III- 7 Does the firm disclose the significant deviation from the last year‟s 
operating results?   
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (g); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xvii) 
34 
III- 8 Does the firm provide key operating and financial data in 
summarized from at least preceding three years/five years 
(Corporate Governance Guideline, 2006 and 2012 respectively)? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (h); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xviii) 
35 
III- 9 Does the firm provide dividend (cash or stock) information and 
explanation for nonpayment? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (i); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xix) 
36 
III- 10 Does the firm report industry outlook and possible future 
developments in the industry? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (i) 
37 
III- 11 
Does the firm report segment wise or product wise performance? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (ii); DSE Listing 
Regulations 2006- 
5(b)(1) 
38 
III- 12 Does the firm provide discussion on gross profit margin and net 
profit margin? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (iv) 
39 
III- 13 Does the firm provide discussion (rules and procedures) on extra 
ordinary transactions (extra ordinary gain or loss)? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (v) 
40 
III- 14 Does the firm report on related party transactions/contract and 
nature, type, element and amount of related party 
transactions/contract? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (vi); BAS -24; 
BRPD Circular 14, 
Dated 25 June, 2003 
41 
III- 15 Does the firm report on utilization of proceeds from public issues, 
right issues and/or through any other instruments? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (vii) 
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No 
Sub 
Indices Governance Items  Legal References 
42 
III- 16 Does the firm provide an explanation of deterioration of financial 
results after the firm goes for initial public offering (IPO), Repeat 
public offering (RPO), rights offer and direct listing? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (viii) 
43 
III- 17 Does the firm‟s management explain about the significant variance 
between quarterly financial performance and annual financial 
statement in the annual report? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 
1.5 (ix) 
44 
III- 18 Does the firm provide non cash benefits to the chairman of the board 
of directors? 
  
45 
III- 19 Does the firm provide non cash benefits to the key personnel of 
management?   
46 
III- 20 Does the firm provide performance related incentives (cash or non 
cash) to the key personnel of management?   
47 
III- 21 Does the firm disclose of overall business plan (budget/target) and 
achievement (performance)?   
48 
III- 22 Does the firm receive the unmodified audit opinion in the auditor‟s 
report? 
  
49 
III- 23 Are the firm‟s financial statements audited within 120 days from the 
end of financial year? 
BSEC  Notification  16 
Feb„2000 
50 
III- 24 Are the firm‟s annual accounts approved at an AGM within 9 
months from the end of financial year?  
51 
III- 25 Does the firm provide credit rating information? BRPD Circular- 06 (July 
05, 2006); DSE Listing 
Regulations 2006- 
3(ii)(b) 
52 III- 26 Does the firm achieve AA3 or AA+ for long term credit rating?   
53 III- 27 Does the firm report the events after the balance sheet date? BAS -10 
54 
III- 28 Does the firm report market share (position) information 
(remittance, deposit, import, export, investment and position in 
market etc.)? 
  
55 III- 29 Does the firm provide information about market capitalization?   
56 III- 30 Does the firm report value added statement of the current year?   
57 III- 31 Does the firm report Economic Value Added Statement (EVA)?   
58 
III- 32 Does the firm report Market Value Added (MVA) statement 
(MVA)?   
59 
III- 33 Does the firm provide information on the company‟s capital 
structure? 
  
60 III- 34 Does the firm report on DUPONT analysis (ROE Decomposition)?   
61 
III- 35 Does the firm provide separate report on corporate governance other 
than compliance checklist? 
  
62 
III- 36 Does the firm provide an explanation of non compliance of 
corporate governance? 
  
63 
III- 37 Has the firm obtained a certificate of compliance of conditions of 
corporate governance guideline from professional accountant/ 
secretary (Chartered Accountant/ Cost Management Accountant / 
Chartered Secretary? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 7 
(i) 
64 
III- 38 Does the firm send the copy of certificate of compliance of 
corporate governance guideline to the shareholders along with the 
annual report on a yearly basis? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 7 
(i) 
65 
III- 39  Does the director state that the firm has complied all the condition 
according to the annexure attached in the director‟s report? 
CG Guideline (2012)-7 
(ii) 
66 
III- 40 Does the firm provide a separate statement of compliance of 
Bangladesh Bank guidelines for corporate governance? 
BRPD Circular- 06, 
Dated February 04,2010 
(BRPD Circular 16, 
Dated - July 24, 2003)  
67 
III- 41 Does the firm receive best presented accounts and reports or annual 
report?   
68 III- 42 Does the firm receive awards or accolades for good corporate   
 357  
 
Serial 
No 
Sub 
Indices Governance Items  Legal References 
governance practices? 
69 III- 43 Does the firm receive best corporate award or financial institution?   
70 III- 44 Does the firm provide separate forward looking statement?   
71 III- 45 Does the firm disclose future prospect, plans and goals?   
72 III- 46 Does the firm report investment in the coming years?   
73 III- 47 Does the firm report in details investment in the coming years?   
74 
III- 48 Does the firm provide projected qualitative information (such as  
import, export, remittance, deposit, loans, earnings, cash flows, 
capital,  cost of fund, market share and so on)?   
75 
III- 49 Does the firm provide projected quantitative information (such as 
import, export, remittance, deposit, loans, earnings, cash flows, 
capital,  cost of fund, market share and so on)?    
IV. Quality of Board, Management Structure and Process 
76 
IV- 1 Does the firm provide the number and name of directors in the 
board? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(1) 
77 
IV- 2 Does the firm follow board size within 5 to 20? CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-1.1 
78 
IV- 3 Does the firm reorganize the board every year through new 
appointment/rotation/retirement /termination of directors? 
Company Act- 1994 
Sec. 91(2) 
79 
IV- 4 Does the firm provide the brief resume (profile) of directors to the 
shareholders in case of appointment/ reappointment of directors? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.5 (xxii)(a); DSE 
Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(6) 
80 
IV- 5 Does the firm‟s each director other than independent director(s) hold 
qualification shares (minimum 2% of the paid up capital)? 
Company Act- 1994 
Sec. 97; BSEC 
Notification, November 
22,2011 
81 IV- 6 Does the firm disclose educational qualifications of each director?   
82 
IV- 7 Does the firm disclose director‟s nature of expertise in specific 
functional areas to the shareholders in case of appointment/ 
reappointment of directors? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.5 (xxii)(b) 
83 
IV- 8 Does the firm disclose the age (date of birth) of the each director? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(1) 
84 
IV- 9 Does the firm provide information about each of the directors‟ 
joining date in the board? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(2) 
85 
IV- 10 Does the firm provide information about name of the companies in 
which the person holds the directorship and membership of 
committees of the board in case of appointment/ reappointment of 
directors? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.5 (xxii)(c); DSE 
Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(3) 
86 
IV- 11 Does the firm provide information in details about previous 
employment/positions of directors? 
  
87 
IV- 12 Does the firm have the independent directors in the board of 
directors? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-1.2 (i) 
88 
IV- 13 Are the independent directors identified in the board of directors or 
audit committee? 
  
89 
IV- 14 Does the firm comply the minimum requirement of independent 
directors i.e. at least 1/10 and 1/5 according to corporate governance 
guideline 2006 and 2012 respectively? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-1.2 (i) 
90 
IV- 15 
Does the firm report the direct shareholding position of independent 
directors? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.2 (i); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.2 (ii)(a) 
91 
IV- 16 Does the firm comply that an independent directors are not the 
sponsor/promoters or directors or shareholders of the company and 
can‟t hold  1% or more shares of the total paid up shares on the basis 
of family relationship and also the family members of the 
independent directors can‟t hold the above  mentioned shares of the 
company? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.2 (i); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.2 (ii)(b) 
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92 
IV- 17 Does the firm comply that an independent director does not have 
any other relationship such as pecuniary with the company or its 
subsidiary or associated companies? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.2 (i); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.2 (ii)(c) 
93 
IV- 18 Does the firm comply that independent directors are not the 
member, director or officer of any stock exchange? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.2 (i); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.2 (ii)(d) 
94 
IV- 19 Does the firm comply that independent directors are not the 
shareholder, director or officer of any member of stock exchange or 
an intermediary of the capital market? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.2 (i); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.2 (ii)(e) 
95 
IV- 20 Does the firm comply that an independent director are not the 
partner or executive or former partner or former executive in 
previous three years of the concerned company‟s statutory audit 
firm? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.2 (ii)(f) 
96 
IV- 21 Does the firm comply that independent directors can‟t be an 
independent director in more than three listed companies? 
CG Guideline ( 2012)-
1.2 (ii)(g) 
97 
IV- 22 Does the firm comply that independent directors have not been 
convicted by the court of competent jurisdiction as a defaulter in 
payment of loan to bank or non bank financial institution? 
CG Guideline ( 2012)-
1.2 (ii)(h) 
98 
IV- 23 Does the firm comply that independent directors have not been 
convicted for a criminal offense involving moral turpitude? 
CG Guideline ( 2012)-
1.2 (ii)(i) 
99 
IV- 24 Does the firm comply that independent directors are appointed by 
the BODs and approved by the shareholders in the annual general 
meeting (AGM)? 
 CG Guideline (2006)-
1.2 (ii); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.2 (iii) 
100 
IV- 25 Does the firm comply that posts of independent director(s) are not 
remaining vacant for more than 90 days? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.2 (iv) 
101 
IV- 26 Does the board place a code of conduct for all members of the board 
and compliance of the code is recorded annually? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.2 (v) 
102 
IV- 27 Does the firm comply that the tenure of office of an independent 
directors for a period of three years and can be extended for 1(one) 
term only? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.2 (vi) 
103 
IV- 28 Does the firm comply that independent directors are knowledgeable 
individual with integrity and have the ability to ensure compliance 
with financial, regulatory, and corporate laws and make meaningful 
contribution to the business? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.3 (i) 
104 
IV- 29 Does the firm comply that independent directors are the business 
leader /corporate leader/ bureaucrat/ university teacher with 
economics / business studies or law background / professionals like 
chartered accountants (CA), cost and management accountants 
(CMA) and chartered secretaries? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.3 (ii) 
105 
IV- 30 Does the firm comply that independent directors have 12 years of 
corporate management / professional experiences? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.3 (ii) 
106 
IV- 31 Does the firm disclose the relaxation of the qualification and 
experience of the independent directors with the prior approval of 
BSEC? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
1.3 (iii) 
107 
IV- 32 Does the firm disclose the role and responsibilities of the board? BRPD Circular 06, 
Dated February 04,2010 
(BRPD Circular 16, 
Dated - July 24,2003); 
BRPD Circular - 11, 
Dated - October 27, 
2013 
108 
IV- 33 Does the firm disclose the duties and responsibilities of independent 
directors? 
  
109 
IV- 34 Does the firm provide a separate report or statement of director‟s 
responsibility in respect of internal control and audited financial 
statement? 
BSEC Notification, 
Dated February 20,2006 
110 IV- 35 Does the firm disclose the roles and responsibilities of board and   
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management separately and clearly? 
111 
IV- 36 Does the firm disclose the factors and criteria (basis) in determining 
the size of the board or to be a member of the board? 
  
112 
IV- 37 Does the firm disclose the number of board meeting during the year? CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (j); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xx) 
113 
IV- 38 Does the board of directors meet at least four times in every year? Company Act  1994 Sec. 
96 
114 
IV- 39 Does the firm disclose the attendance of each director of the board 
meetings? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.4 (j); CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.5 (xx) 
115 IV- 40 Do the firm‟s all directors attend at least 75% of board meeting?   
116 
IV- 41 Do the firm‟s all (or each) independent directors attend at least 75% 
of board meeting?   
117 
IV- 42 Does the firm disclose the political connection of the board 
members? 
  
118 
IV- 43 Does the firm disclose the procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of 
interest among board members? 
  
119 
IV- 44 Does the firm disclose the performance evaluation process /criteria/ 
system of the board (directors)? 
  
120 IV- 45 Does the firm evaluate the performance of the board regularly?   
121 IV- 46 Does the firm arrange the orientation program for all new directors?   
122 
IV- 47 Does the firm arrange professional development and training 
activities for directors? 
  
123 
IV- 48 Does the firm disclose the appointment of chairman who is elected 
from the directors of the board? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.3; CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.4 
124 
IV- 49 Does the board define the role and responsibilities of the chairman 
clearly? 
CG Guideline (2006) -
1.3; CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.4; BRPD 
Circular 06, Dated 
February 04, 2010 ( 
BRPD Circular 16, 
Dated - July 24, 2003) 
125 
IV- 50 Does the firm have an executive committee as a sub-committee of 
the board of directors? 
BRPD Circular-06, 
Dated February 04, 
2010; (BRPD Circular 
16, Dated - July 
24,2003) 
126 IV- 51 Does the firm disclose the members of executive committee?   
127 
IV- 52 Does the firm disclose the number of meeting of executive 
committee? 
  
128 
IV- 53 Does the firm disclose the attendance of meeting of executive 
committee? 
  
129 
IV- 54 Do the firm‟s all executive members attend at least 75% of 
executive committee meeting?   
130 
IV- 55 Does the firm disclose the duties and responsibilities of the 
executive committee? 
  
131 IV- 56 Does the firm provide the report of executive committee?   
132 IV- 57 Does the firm provide the report of shariah supervisory committee?   
133 
IV- 58 Does the firm have an audit committee as a sub-committee of the 
board of directors? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-3(i); BRPD 
Circular - 12, Dated- 
December 23, 2002; 
BRPD Circular 16, 
Dated - July 24,2003 
134 IV- 59 Does the audit committee assist the board of directors in ensuring CG Guideline (2006) – 
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that financial statements reflect true and fair view of the state of 
affairs of the company and ensure good monitoring system within 
the business? 
3;  (ii); CG Guideline 
(2012)-3(ii) 
135 
IV- 60 Is the audit committee responsible to the board of directors and are 
the duties of audit committee clearly stated in writing / does the 
audit committee have a written charter? 
CG Guideline (2006) - 
3; CG Guideline (2012)-
3 (iii) 
136 
IV- 61 Does the firm disclose the basis of selection of audit committee 
members? 
  
137 
IV- 62 Does the firm disclose the members of audit committee? CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-3.1(i) 
138 
IV- 63 Does the audit committee have at least three members? CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-3.1 (i) 
139 
IV- 64 Does the audit committee have at least one independent director? CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-3.1 (ii) 
140 
IV- 65 Is the chairman of the audit committee an independent director?  CG Guideline (2012)-
3.2 (i) 
141 
IV- 66 Does the chairman of audit committee attend in the AGM? CG Guideline (2012)-
3.2 (ii) 
142 
IV- 67 Does the chairman of the audit committee have the professional 
qualification or knowledge, understanding and experience in 
accounting or finance? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.2 (ii) 
143 
IV- 68 Are all members of the audit committee financially literate and does 
at least one member have experience of accounting or financial 
management (professional qualification or graduation in 
accounting/finance with 12 years‟ experience)? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.1 (iii) 
144 
IV- 69 Does the board of directors appoint the new audit committee 
member(s) to fill up the vacancy immediately or not more than one 
month from the date of vacancy to ensure continuity of the 
performance of audit committee, if audit committee members are 
lower than prescribed number of three persons due to expiry of the 
term or any other circumstances? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.1 (iii); CG Guideline 
(2012)-3.1 (iv) 
145 
IV- 70 Does the company secretary act as secretary of audit committee? CG Guideline (2012)-
3.1 (v) 
146 
IV- 71 Does the quorum of the audit committee meeting constitute at least 
one independent director? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.1 (vi) 
147 
IV- 72 Does the audit committee oversee the financial reporting process? CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(i) 
148 
IV- 73 Does the audit committee monitor choice of accounting policies and 
principles? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(ii) 
149 
IV- 74 Does the audit committee monitor internal control risk management 
process? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(iii) 
150 
IV- 75 Does the audit committee oversee hiring and performance of 
external auditors? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(iv) 
151 
IV- 76 Does the audit committee review annual financial statements with 
the management before submission to the board for approval? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(v) 
152 
IV- 77 Does the audit committee review quarterly and half yearly financial 
statements with the management before submission to the board for 
approval? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(vi) 
153 
IV- 78 Does the audit committee review the adequacy of internal audit 
function? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(vii) 
154 
IV- 79 Does the audit committee review statement of significant related 
party transactions submitted by management? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(viii) 
155 
IV- 80 Does the audit committee review management letters/ letter of 
internal control weakness issued by statutory auditors? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(ix) 
156 
IV- 81 Does the firm report to the audit committee about the 
uses/application of funds on a quarterly basis when money is raised 
through initial public offering (IPO)/ repeat public offering (RPO) / 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(x) 
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right issue? 
157 
IV- 82 Does the firm prepare the statement of funds utilized for the purpose 
other than those stated in the offer document /prospectus on an 
annual basis? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
3.3(x) 
158 
IV- 83 Does the audit committee immediately report its activities to the 
BODs? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.3.1(i);   CG Guideline 
(2012)-3.4.1(i) 
159 
IV- 84 Does the audit committee immediately report on conflict of interest 
to the BODs? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.3.1(ii)(a);   CG 
Guideline (2012)-
3.4.1(ii)(a) 
160 
IV- 85 Does the audit committee immediately report on suspected or 
presumed fraud or irregularity or material defect of the internal 
control system to the BODs? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.3.1(ii)(b);   CG 
Guideline (2012)-
3.4.1(ii)(b) 
161 
IV- 86 Does the audit committee immediately report on suspected 
infringement of laws, including securities related laws, rules and 
regulations to the BODs? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.3.1(ii)(c);   CG 
Guideline (2012)-
3.4.1(ii)(c) 
162 
IV- 87 Does the audit committee immediately report any other relevant 
matters to the BOD?  
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.3.1(ii)(d);   CG 
Guideline (2012)-
3.4.1(ii)(d) 
163 
IV- 88 Does the audit committee identify any significant issue that is 
violated by the BODs and report it to BSEC? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.3.2 ;   CG Guideline 
(2012)-3.4.2 
164 
IV- 89 Does the audit committee report its activities to the shareholders and 
general investors? 
CG Guideline (2006)-
3.4;   CG Guideline 
(2012)-3.5 
165 IV- 90 Does the firm provide the report of audit committee?   
166 
IV- 91 Does the firm disclose the number of audit committee meetings 
during the year? 
 
167 IV- 92 Does the audit committee meet at least two times during the year?  
168 
IV- 93 Does the firm disclose the written minutes (activities) for audit 
committee meetings? 
 
169 IV- 94 Does the firm disclose the attendance of audit committee meetings?  
170 
IV- 95 Do the firm‟s all audit committee members attend at least 75% of 
audit committee meeting? 
 
171 
IV- 96 Do the firm‟s all (or each) independent directors attend at least 75% 
of audit committee meeting? 
 
172 
IV- 97 Does the firm provide educational qualification information of 
CEO? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
173 
IV- 98 Does the firm provide date of joining information of the CEO? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
174 
IV- 99 Does the firm disclose the experience of the CEO? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
175 
IV- 100 Does the firm disclose the role and responsibilities of the CEO? CG Guideline (2006) -
1.3; CG Guideline 
(2012)-1.4; BRPD 
Circular 06, Dated 
February 04,2010 
(BRPD Circular 16, 
Dated - July 24, 2003); 
BRPD Circular - 18, 
Dated - October 27, 
2013 
176 IV- 101 Does the firm disclose the appointment of Chief Financial Officer CG Guideline (2006, 
 362  
 
Serial 
No 
Sub 
Indices Governance Items  Legal References 
(CFO)? 2012)-2.1 
177 
IV- 102 Does the firm provide educational qualification information of 
CFO? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
178 
IV- 103 Does the firm provide date of joining information of the CFO? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
179 
IV- 104 Does the firm disclose the experience of the CFO? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
180 
IV- 105 Does the firm disclose the roles, responsibilities and duties of the 
CFO? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-2.1 
181 
IV- 106 Does the firm disclose the appointment of Head of Internal Audit? CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-2.1 
182 
IV- 107 Does the firm provide educational qualification information of the 
head of internal audit? 
  
183 IV- 108 Does the firm disclose the experience of the head of internal audit?   
184 
IV- 109 Does the firm define the roles, responsibilities and duties of the 
Head of Internal Audit? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-2.1 
185 
IV- 110 Does the firm disclose the appointment of secretary? CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-2.1 
186 
IV- 111 Does the firm provide educational qualification information of 
Company Secretary? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
187 
IV- 112 Does the firm provide date of joining information of secretary? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
188 
IV- 113 Does the firm disclose the experience of the secretary? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 8(8) 
189 
IV- 114 Does the firm disclose the roles, responsibilities and duties of the 
secretary? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-2.1 
190 
IV- 115 Does the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) attend in the board 
meeting? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-2.2 
191 
IV- 116 Does the secretary attend in the board meeting? CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-2.2 
192 
IV- 117 Do the CEO and CFO certify to the board that they have reviewed 
the financial statements for the year and these statements are free 
from material untrue statement, or omission of material fact or 
misleading statements? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
6(i)(a) 
193 
IV- 118 Do the CEO and CFO certify to the board that they have reviewed 
the financial statements for the year and these statements present the 
true and fair view of the company and comply with existing 
accounting standards and applicable laws? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
6(i)(b) 
194 
IV- 119 Do the CEO and CFO certify to the board that to their best of 
knowledge, company is not dealing any transactions that is 
fraudulent, illegal or violation of code of conduct? 
CG Guideline (2012)-
6(ii) 
195 
IV- 120 Does the firm provide separate report or statement on CEO/CFO's 
declaration to the board?   
196 
IV- 121 Does the firm provide separate report on management discussion 
and analysis?   
197 IV- 122 Does the firm provide existence of (CEO) plan of succession?   
198 
IV- 123 Does the CEO serve no more than two additional boards of other 
public companies? 
  
199 
IV- 124 Does the firm disclose the performance evaluation process or criteria 
of the management (CEO, CFO and others senior management)? 
  
200 IV- 125 Does the firm disclose the performance evaluation of CEO/MD?   
201 
IV- 126 Does the firm disclose performance evaluation of the management 
team other than CEO/MD? 
  
202 
IV- 127 Does the firm provide discussion or explanation about remuneration 
of directors in the corporate governance or directors report?   
203 
IV- 128 Does the firm provide discussion or explanation about compensation 
of CEO/MD in the corporate governance or director‟s report?   
 363  
 
Serial 
No 
Sub 
Indices Governance Items  Legal References 
204 
IV- 129 Does the firm provide the policies (basis) on compensation of 
CEO/MD? 
BRPD Circular- 9, 
Dated September 9,1996 
205 
IV- 130 Does the board of directors fix the remuneration and compensation 
of directors and CEO/MD? 
BRPD Circular- 6, 
Dated- February 4, 2010 
206 
IV- 131 Does the board of directors fix the compensation of management 
(excluding CEO/MD) and employees?   
207 
IV- 132 Does the separate compensation committee (other than directors) fix 
the compensation of management (excluding CEO/MD) and 
employees?   
208 
IV- 133 Does the firm disclose the roles and responsibilities of compensation 
committee for management (excluding CEO?MD) and employees?   
209 IV- 134 Does the firm disclose the appointment of legal advisor?   
V. Quality of External Auditing Information 
210 
V-1 Does the firm provide the discussion or process on appointment of 
external auditors? 
Company Act  1994 Sec. 
210 
211 V-2 Does the firm disclose the duration of current auditors?   
212 
V-3 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not performing the 
appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions of the company? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-4(i) 
213 
V-4 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not performing the 
financial information systems design and implementation of the 
company? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-4(ii) 
214 
V-5 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not performing the book –
keeping or other services related to the accounting records or 
financial statements of the company? 
CG Guideline (2006, 
2012)-4(iii) 
215 
V-6 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not performing the broker 
dealer services of the company? 
CG Guideline (2006) 4 
(iii); CG Guideline 
(2012)-4(iv) 
216 
V-7 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not performing the 
actuarial services of the company? 
CG Guideline (2006) 4 
(iv); CG Guideline 
(2012)-4(v) 
217 
V-8 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not performing the 
internal audit services of the company? 
CG Guideline (2006) 4 
(v);   CG Guideline 
(2012)-4(vi) 
218 
V-9 Are the firm‟s external /statutory auditors not performing any 
service that is determined by the audit committee? 
CG Guideline (2006) 4 
(vi); CG Guideline 
(2012)-4(vii) 
219 
V-10 Are the firm‟s partner or employee of the external audit firms not 
holding or posing any share of the company during the tenure of 
audit engagement? 
CG Guideline (2012)- 4 
(viii)  
220 
V-11 Does the firm report the amount of non audit fees paid to the 
auditors? 
  
221 V-12 Is the firm‟s amount of audit fee higher than non-audit fee?   
VI. Quality of Risk Management Information 
222 VI-1 Does the firm provide a separate report on risk management?   
223 
VI-2 Does the firm have  the risk management committee or division or 
unit? 
Banking Company 
Act(Amendment) -
2013(15)(kha)(3);  
BRPD Circular 11, 
Dated October 27,2013 
224 
VI-3 Does the firm provide the list of members of risk management 
committee or division or unit? 
  
225 
VI-4 Does the firm provide the report of the risk management committee 
or chief risk officer desk?   
226 
VI-5 Does the firm disclose the number of meetings of risk management 
committee or division or unit? 
  
227 
VI-6 Does the firm disclose the attendance of risk management 
committee or division or unit? 
  
 364  
 
Serial 
No 
Sub 
Indices Governance Items  Legal References 
228 
VI-7 Do the firm‟s all members of risk management committee or 
division or unit attend 75% of risk management committee meeting?   
229 
VI-8 Does the firm disclose the role and responsibilities of risk 
management committee or division or unit? 
BRPD Circular- 11 
230 VI-9 Does the firm disclose the risk management strategy and policy?   
231 VI-10 Does the firm disclose the risk management process?   
232 
VI-11 Does the firm disclose qualitative (descriptive) information of risk 
management?   
233 
VI-12 Does the firm disclose quantitative (or numerical) information of 
risk management?   
234 
VI-13 Does the firm provide discussion on credit (investment) risk 
management? 
  
235 
VI-14 Does the firm provide discussion on foreign exchange risk 
management? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(b);  
236 VI-15 Does the firm provide discussion on asset liability risk management?   
237 
VI-16 Does the firm provide discussion on internal control and compliance 
risk management? 
  
238 
VI-17 Does the firm provide discussion on money laundering prevention 
risk management? 
  
239 
VI-18 Does the firm provide discussion on information and 
communication technology risk management? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(d); BRPD 
circular- 14 
240 
VI-19 Does the firm provide discussion on market risk management? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(d) 
241 
VI-20 Does the firm provide discussion on operational risk management? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(h) 
242 VI-21 Does the firm provide discussion on liquidity risk management?   
243 
VI-22 Does the firm provide discussion on interest risk management? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(a) 
244 VI-23 Does the firm provide discussion on reputation risk management?   
245 VI-24 Does the firm provide discussion on equity risk management?   
246 VI-25 Does the firm provide discussion on settlement risk management?   
247 VI-26 Does the firm provide discussion on strategic risk management?   
248 VI-27 Does the firm provide discussion on legal risk management?   
249 
VI-28 Does the firm provide discussion on adequate capital risk 
management? 
BRPD Circular - 24 & 
35 
250 
VI-29 Does the firm provide discussion on business/industry risk? DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(c) 
251 
VI-30 Does the firm provide discussion on potential or existing 
government regulations? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(e) 
252 
VI-31 Does the firm provide discussion on potential changes in global or 
national policies? 
DSE Listing Regulations 
2006- 4(f) 
253 VI-32 Does the firm provide discussion on (credit) concentration risk?   
254 VI-33 Does the firm provide discussion on residual risk?   
255 VI-34 Does the firm provide discussion on fraud risk management?   
256 
VI-35 Does the firm provide discussion on stress testing to manage the 
future shocks and potential risk? BRPD Circular- 11 
VII. Quality of Tax Management Information 
257 
VII-1 Does the firm disclose the applicable tax rate? Income Tax Ordinance , 
1984 -Schedule –II 
258 VII-2 Does the firm disclose the effective tax rate?   
259 
VII-3 Does the firm disclose taxable profit and computation of taxable 
profit? 
  
260 
VII-4 Does the firm provide discussion on accounting policies for current 
tax and deferred tax? 
BAS 1 and BAS 12 
(disclosure part) 
261 VII-5 Does the firm report the provision for current tax during the year? BAS –12; BAS-37 
262 VII-6 Does the firm disclose the computation of provision for current tax BAS –12; BAS-37 
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during the year? 
263 VII-7 Does the firm report the provision for deferred tax during the year? BAS –12; BAS-37 
264 
VII-8 Does the firm disclose the computation of provision for deferred tax 
during the year? 
BAS –12; BAS-37 
265 VII-9 Does the firm provide the tax assessment information?   
266 VII-10 Does the firm provide a separate statement of tax status or position?   
267 
VII-11 Does the firm report on tax status showing accounting year, 
assessment year, tax provision, tax liability, excess or shortfall of 
provision, amount paid, required provision, assessment status  etc.? 
  
268 
VII-12 Does the firm provide discussion on tax in the chairman‟s report or 
director‟s report? 
  
269 
VII-13 Does the firm disclose the contribution to national exchequer and 
economy? 
  
270 
VII-14 Does the firm disclose that the tax services are performed by 
separate tax advisor or external/ statutory auditor?   
271 
VII-15 Does the firm report the tax compliance as per law (BAS 12, Income 
Tax Ordinance 1984 etc.)? 
  
VIII. Quality of Corporate Responsibility, Compliance and Stakeholder Information 
272 VIII-1 
Does the firm provide separate report on corporate social 
responsibility? 
 
273 VIII-2 
Does the firm provide qualitative information of corporate social 
responsibilities? 
 
274 VIII-3 
Does the firm provide quantitative information of corporate social 
responsibilities? 
 
275 VIII-4 Does the firm provide environment information?  
276 VIII-5 
Does the firm provide discussion on environmental policies and 
performance? 
 
277 VIII-6 Does the firm provide separate report on environmental issues?  
278 VIII-7 
Does the firm provide separate report or statement on human 
resources management? 
BRPD Circular 16, 
Dated - July 24, 2003 
279 VIII-8 
Does the firm provide discussion on appointment and promotion 
policy of employees? 
 
280 VIII-9 Does the firm provide separate report on sustainability?  
281 VIII-10 Does the firm provide discussion or separate statement of strategy?  
282 VIII-11 Does the firm disclose vision, mission, goals and objectives?  
283 VIII-12 Does the firm disclose code of conduct, core values or ethics?  
284 VIII-13 
Does the firm disclose the distribution of employees by gender and 
age? 
 
285 VIII-14 
Does the firm have the policy on “whistle blower” protection for all 
employees? 
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Appendix-3 
Corporate Governance Guidelines 2006 
                                                               NOTIFICATION 
 
Dated the 20th February, 2006 
 
No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08: Whereas, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (herein after referred to as the ‗Commission„) deems it fit that the consent 
already accorded by the Commission, or deemed to have been accorded by it, or to be 
accorded by it in future, to the issue of capital by the companies listed with any stock 
exchange in Bangladesh, should be subject to certain further conditions, on comply or 
explain„ basis, in order to enhance corporate governance in the interest of investors and the 
capital market; 
 
Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by section 2CC of the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (XVII of 1969), the Commission hereby supersedes its earlier 
Order No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-06 dated the 9th  January, 2006 and 
imposes the following further conditions to the consent already accorded by it, or deemed to 
have been accorded by it, or to be accorded by it in future, to the issue of capital by the 
companies listed with any stock exchange in Bangladesh: 
 
Provided, however, that these conditions are imposed on comply or explain„ basis. The 
companies listed with any stock exchange in Bangladesh should comply with these 
conditions or shall explain the reasons for non-compliance in accordance with the condition 
No.5. 
 
The Conditions: 
 
1.00 BOARD OF DIRECTORS: 
 
1.1. Board’s Size 
The number of the board members of the company should not be less than 5 (five) and 
more than 20 (twenty): 
 
Provided, however, that in the case of banks and non-bank financial institutions, insurance 
companies and statutory bodies for which separate primary regulators like Bangladesh 
Bank, Department of Insurance etc. exist, the Board of those companies should be 
constituted as may be prescribed by such primary regulators in so far as those 
prescriptions are not inconsistent with the aforesaid condition. 
 
1.2 Independent Directors 
All  companies  should  encourage  effective  representation  of  independent  directors  on  
their Board  of  Directors  so  that  the  Board,  as  a  group,  includes  core  competencies  
considered relevant in the context of each company. For this purpose, the companies 
should comply with the following: 
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(i)      At least one tenth (1/10) of the total number of the company„s board of directors, 
subject to a minimum of one, should be independent directors. 
 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause independent director means a director who does 
not hold any share in the company or who holds less than one percent (1%) shares of the total 
paid-up shares of the company, who is not connected with the company„s promoters or 
directors or shareholder who holds one percent (1%) or more than one percent (1%) shares of 
the total paid-up shares of the company on the basis of family relationship; who does not 
have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, with the company or its 
subsidiary/associated companies, who is not a member, director or officer of any stock 
exchange, and who is not a shareholder, director or officer of any member of stock exchange 
or an intermediary of the capital market. 
 
(ii) The independent director(s) should be appointed by the elected directors. 
 
1.3. Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
The positions of the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
companies should preferably be filled by different individuals. The Chairman of the 
company should be elected from among the directors of the company. The Board of 
Directors should clearly define respective roles and responsibilities of the Chairman and the 
Chief Executive Officer. 
 
1.4         The Directors’ Report to Shareholders 
The directors of the companies should include following additional statements in the 
Directors„ 
Report prepared under section 184 of the Companies Act, 1994: 
 
(a) The financial statements prepared by the management of the issuer company present 
fairly its state of affairs, the result of its operations, cash flows and changes in equity. 
 
(b) Proper books of account of the issuer company have been maintained. 
 
(c) Appropriate accounting policies have been consistently applied in preparation of the 
financial statements and that the accounting estimates are based on reasonable and 
prudent judgment. 
 
(d) International Accounting Standards, as applicable in Bangladesh, have been followed in 
preparation of the financial statements and any departure therefrom has been adequately 
disclosed. 
 
(e) The system of internal control is sound in design and has been effectively implemented 
and monitored. 
 
(f) There are no significant doubts upon the issuer company„s ability to continue as a going 
concern. If the issuer company is not considered to be a going concern, the fact along 
with reasons thereof should be disclosed. 
 
(g) Significant deviations from last year in operating results of the issuer company should be 
highlighted and reasons thereof should be explained. 
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(h) Key operating and financial data of at least preceding three years should be summarised. 
 (i) If the issuer company has not declared dividend (cash or stock) for the year, the reasons 
thereof should be given. 
(j) The number of Board meetings held during the year and attendance by each director 
should be disclosed. 
 
(k) The pattern of shareholding should be reported to disclose the aggregate number of shares 
(along with name wise details where stated below) held by: 
 
(i) Parent/Subsidiary/Associated companies and other related parties (name wise 
details); 
(ii)  Directors, Chief Executive Officer, Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer, 
 Head of Internal Audit and their spouses and minor children (name wise 
details);  
(iii) Executives; and 
(iv) Shareholders holding ten percent (10%) or more voting interest in the 
company 
(name wise details). 
 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause, the expression executive means top five 
salaried employees of the company, other than the Directors, Chief Executive Officer, 
Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer and Head of Internal Audit. 
 
2.00   CHIEF  FINANCIAL  OFFICER (CFO),  HEAD  OF  INTERNAL  AUDIT  
AND COMPANY SECRETARY: 
 
2.1. Appointment 
The company should appoint a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), a Head of Internal Audit and 
a Company Secretary. The Board of Directors should clearly define respective roles, 
responsibilities and duties of the CFO, the Head of Internal Audit and the Company 
Secretary. 
 
2.2.       Requirement to Attend Board Meetings 
The CFO and the Company Secretary of the companies should attend meetings of the Board 
of Directors, provided that the CFO and/or the Company Secretary should not attend such 
part of a meeting of the Board of Directors which involves consideration of an agenda 
item relating to the CFO and/or the Company Secretary. 
 
3.00      AUDIT COMMITTEE: 
The company should have an Audit Committee as a sub-committee of the Board of Directors.  
The Audit Committee should assist the Board of Directors in ensuring that the financial 
statements reflect true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and in 
ensuring a good monitoring system within the business.  
The Audit Committee shall be responsible to the Board of Directors. The duties of the 
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Audit Committee should be clearly set forth in writing. 
 
3.3.1.    Constitution of Audit Committee 
(i)         The Audit Committee should be composed of at least 3 (three) members. 
(ii)       The Board of Directors should appoint members of the Audit Committee who 
should be directors of the company and should include at least one independent 
director. 
(iii)      When  the  term  of  service  of  the  Committee  members  expires  or  
there  is  any circumstance  causing  any  Committee  member  to  be  unable  
to  hold  office  until expiration of the term of service, thus making the number 
of the Committee members to be lower than the prescribed number of 3 (three) 
persons, the Board of Directors shouldappoint the new Committee member(s) 
to fill up the vacancy(ies) immediately or not later than 1 (one) month from the 
date of vacancy(ies) in the Committee to ensure continuity of the performance 
of work of the Audit Committee. 
 
3.2. Chairman of the Audit Committee 
(i) The Board of Directors should select 1 (one) member of the Audit Committee to be 
Chairman of the Audit Committee. 
(ii) The Chairman of the audit committee should have a professional qualification or 
knowledge, understanding and experience in accounting or finance. 
 
3.3. Reporting of the Audit Committee  
3.3.1. Reporting to the Board of Directors  
(i) The Audit Committee should report on its activities to the Board of Directors. 
(ii) The Audit Committee should immediately report to the Board of 
Directors on the following findings, if any: 
(a)  Report on conflicts of interests; 
(b)  Suspected or presumed fraud or irregularity or material defect in the internal 
control system; 
(c)  Suspected infringement of laws, including securities related laws, rules and 
regulations; and 
(d)  Any other matter which should be disclosed to the Board of Directors 
immediately. 
 
3.3.2. Reporting to the Authorities 
If the Audit Committee has reported to the Board of Directors about anything which 
has material impact on the financial condition and results of operation and has discussed 
with the Board of Directors and the management that any rectification is necessary and if 
the Audit Committee finds that such rectification has been unreasonably ignored, the 
Audit Committee should report such finding to the Commission, upon reporting of such 
matters to the Board of Directors for three times or completion of a period of 9 (nine) 
months from the date of first reporting to the Board of Directors, whichever is earlier. 
 
3.4.     Reporting to the Shareholders and General Investors 
Report on activities carried out by the Audit Committee, including any report made to the 
Board of Directors under condition 3.3.1 (ii) above during the year, should be signed by the 
Chairman of the Audit Committee and disclosed in the annual report of the issuer company. 
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4.00.   EXTERNAL/STATUTORY AUDITORS 
The issuer company should not engage its external/statutory auditors to perform the 
following services of the company; namely:  
i) Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions; 
ii) Financial information systems design and implementation; 
iii) Book-keeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial 
statements; 
iv) Broker-dealer services; 
(v)        Actuarial services; 
(vi)       Internal audit services; 
(vii)       Any other services that the Audit Committee determines.  
5.00 REPORTING THE COMPLIANCE IN THE DIRECTOR’S REPORT 
The directors of the company shall state, in accordance with the annexure attached, in 
the directors„ report whether the company has complied with these conditions. 
 
Annexure 
Status of compliance with the conditions imposed by the Commission„s Notification No. 
SEC/CMRRCD/2006- 158/Admin/02-08 dated 20th  February, 2006 issued under section 
2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 
1969:  
 
Condition No. 
 
Titl
e 
Compliance Status 
(Put ? in the appropriate 
column) 
Explanation for non- 
compliance 
with the 
condition 
Complied Not Complied 
1.1     1.2 (i)     1.2 (ii)     1.3     1.4 (a)     1.4 (b)     1.4 (c)     1.4 (d)     1.4 (e)     1.4 (f)     1.4 (g)     1.4 (h)     1.4 (i)     1.4 (j)     1.4 (k)     2.1     2.2     3.00     3.1 (i)     3.1 (ii)     3.1 (iii)     3.2 (i)     3.2 (ii)     3.3.1 (i)     3.3.1 (ii) (a)     3.3.1 (ii) (b)     3.3.1 (ii) (c)     3.3.1 (ii) (d)     3.3.2     3.4     4.00 (i)     4.00 (ii)     4.00 (iii)     
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Condition No. 
 
Titl
e 
Compliance Status 
(Put ? in the appropriate 
column) 
Explanation for non- 
compliance 
with the 
condition 
Complied Not Complied 
4.00 (iv)     4.00 (v)     4.00 (vi)     4.00 (vii)     
 
By order of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Dr. Mirza Azizul Islam 
Chairman 
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Appendix-4 
Corporate Governance Guidelines 2012 
NOTIFICATION 
 
07 August 2012 
 
 
No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/134/Admin/44: Whereas, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (herein after referred to as the “Commission”) deems it fit that the consent 
already accorded by the Commission, or deemed to have been accorded by it, or to be 
accorded by it in future, to the issue of capital by the companies listed with any stock 
exchange in Bangladesh, shall be subject to certain further conditions, on 'comply' basis, in 
order to enhance corporate governance in the interest of investors and the capital market; 
 
Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by section 2CC of the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (XVII of 1969), the Commission hereby supersedes its earlier 
Notification No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08 dated 20th February, 2006 and 
imposes the following further conditions to the consent already accorded by it, or deemed to 
have been accorded by it, or to be accorded by it in future, to the issue of capital by the 
companies listed with any stock exchange in Bangladesh: 
 
Provided, however, that these conditions are imposed on 'comply' basis. The companies listed 
with any stock exchange in Bangladesh shall comply with these conditions in accordance 
with the condition No. 7. 
 
The Conditions: 
 
1. BOARD OF DIRECTORS:  
 
1.1 Board's Size  
The number of the board members of the company shall not be less than 5 (five) and more 
than 20 (twenty):  
 
Provided, however, that in case of banks and non-bank financial institutions, insurance 
companies and statutory bodies for which separate primary regulators like Bangladesh Bank, 
Insurance Development and Regulatory Authority, etc. exist, the Boards of those companies 
shall be constituted as may be prescribed by such primary regulators in so far as those 
prescriptions are not inconsistent with the aforesaid condition.  
 
1.2 Independent Directors  
All companies shall encourage effective representation of independent directors on their 
Board of Directors so that the Board, as a group, includes core competencies considered 
relevant in the context of each company. For this purpose, the companies shall comply with 
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the following:-  
 
(i) At least one fifth (1/5) of the total number of directors in the company‟s board 
shall be independent directors.  
(ii) For the purpose of this clause “independent director” means a director-  
 
a) who either does not hold any share in the company or holds less than one 
percent (1%) shares of the total paid-up shares of the company;  
b) who is not a sponsor of the company and is not connected with the 
company‟s any sponsor or director or shareholder who holds one percent 
(1%) or more shares of the total paid-up shares of the company on the basis 
of family relationship. His/her family members also should not hold above 
mentioned shares in the company:  
Provided that spouse, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister, son-in-
law and daughter-in-law shall be considered as family members;  
c) who does not have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, 
with the company or its subsidiary/associated companies;  
d) who is not a member, director or officer of any stock exchange;   
e) who is not a shareholder, director or officer of any member of stock 
exchange or an intermediary of the capital market;  
f) who is not a partner or an executive or was not a partner or an executive 
during the preceding 3 (three) years of the concerned company‟s statutory 
audit firm;   
g) who shall not be an independent director in more than 3 (three) listed 
companies;  
h) who has not been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction as a 
defaulter in payment of any loan to a bank or a Non-Bank Financial 
Institution (NBFI);  
i) who has not been convicted for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude.  
(iii) the independent director(s) shall be appointed by the board of directors and 
approved by the shareholders in the Annual General Meeting (AGM).  
(iv) the post of independent director(s) can not remain vacant for more than 90 (ninety) 
days.  
(v) the Board shall lay down a code of conduct of all Board members and annual 
compliance of the code to be recorded.  
(vi) the tenure of office of an independent director shall be for a period of 3 (three) 
years, which may be extended for 1 (one) term only.  
 
1.3 Qualification of Independent Director (ID)  
(i) Independent Director shall be a knowledgeable individual with integrity who is 
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able to ensure compliance with financial, regulatory and corporate laws and can 
make meaningful contribution to business.  
(ii) The person should be a Business Leader/Corporate 
Leader/Bureaucrat/University Teacher with Economics or Business Studies or 
Law background/Professionals like Chartered Accountants, Cost & 
Management Accountants, Chartered Secretaries. The independent director must 
have at least 12 (twelve) years of corporate management/professional 
experiences.  
(iii) In special cases the above qualifications may be relaxed subject to prior 
approval of the Commission.  
 
1.4 Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer  
The positions of the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of the companies 
shall be filled by different individuals. The Chairman of the company shall be elected from 
among the directors of the company. The Board of Directors shall clearly define respective 
roles and responsibilities of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer.  
 
1.5 The Directors’ Report to Shareholders  
The directors of the companies shall include the following additional statements in the 
Directors' Report prepared under section 184 of the Companies Act, 1994 (Act No. 
XVIII of 1994):-  
(i) Industry outlook and possible future developments in the industry.   
(ii) Segment-wise or product-wise performance.   
(iii) Risks and concerns.   
(iv) A discussion on Cost of Goods sold, Gross Profit Margin and Net Profit Margin.   
(v) Discussion on continuity of any Extra-Ordinary gain or loss.   
(vi) Basis for related party transactions- a statement of all related party transactions 
should be disclosed in the annual report.  
(vii) Utilization of proceeds from public issues, rights issues and/or through any 
others instruments.  
(viii) An explanation if the financial results deteriorate after the company goes for 
Initial Public Offering (IPO), Repeat Public Offering (RPO), Rights Offer, 
Direct Listing, etc.  
(ix) If significant variance occurs between Quarterly Financial performance and 
Annual Financial Statements the management shall explain about the variance 
on their Annual Report.  
(x) Remuneration to directors including independent directors.   
(xi) The financial statements prepared by the management of the issuer company 
present fairly its state of affairs, the result of its operations, cash flows and 
changes in equity.  
(xii) Proper books of account of the issuer company have been maintained.   
(xiii) Appropriate accounting policies have been consistently applied in preparation of 
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the financial statements and that the accounting estimates are based on 
reasonable and prudent judgment.   
(xiv) International Accounting Standards (IAS)/Bangladesh Accounting Standards 
(BAS)/International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)/Bangladesh Financial 
Reporting Standards (BFRS), as applicable in Bangladesh, have been followed 
in preparation of the financial statements and any departure there-from has been 
adequately disclosed.  
(xv) The system of internal control is sound in design and has been effectively 
implemented and monitored.  
(xvi) There are no significant doubts upon the issuer company's ability to continue as 
a going concern. If the issuer company is not considered to be a going concern, 
the fact along with reasons thereof should be disclosed.  
(xvii) Significant deviations from the last year‟s operating results of the issuer 
company shall be highlighted and the reasons thereof should be explained.  
(xviii) Key operating and financial data of at least preceding 5 (five) years shall be 
summarized.  
(xix) If the issuer company has not declared dividend (cash or stock) for the year, the 
reasons thereof shall be given.  
(xx) The number of Board meetings held during the year and attendance by each 
director shall be disclosed.  
(xxi) The pattern of shareholding shall be reported to disclose the aggregate number 
of shares (along with name wise details where stated below) held by:-  
a) Parent/Subsidiary/Associated Companies and other related parties 
(name wise details);  
b) Directors, Chief Executive Officer, Company Secretary, Chief 
Financial Officer, Head of Internal Audit and their spouses and minor 
children (name wise details);  
c) Executives;   
d) Shareholders holding ten percent (10%) or more voting interest in the 
company (name wise details).  
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause, the expression “executive” means top 5 
(five) salaried employees of the company, other than the Directors, Chief Executive 
Officer, Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer and Head of Internal Audit. 
 
(xxii) In case of the appointment/re-appointment of a director the company shall 
disclose the following information to the shareholders:- 
 
a) a brief resume of the director;   
b) nature of his/her expertise in specific functional areas;   
c) names of companies in which the person also holds the directorship 
and the membership of committees of the board.  
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2. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO), HEAD OF INTERNAL AUDIT AND 
COMPANY SECRETARY (CS):  
2.1 Appointment  
The company shall appoint a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), a Head of Internal Audit 
(Internal Control and Compliance) and a Company Secretary (CS). The Board of Directors 
should clearly define respective roles, responsibilities and duties of the CFO, the Head of 
Internal Audit and the CS.  
 
2.2 Requirement to attend the Board Meetings  
The CFO and the Company Secretary of the companies shall attend the meetings of the Board 
of Directors, provided that the CFO and/or the Company Secretary shall not attend such part 
of a meeting of the Board of Directors which involves consideration of an agenda item 
relating to their personal matters.  
 
3. AUDIT COMMITTEE:  
(i) The company shall have an Audit Committee as a sub-committee of the Board of 
Directors.  
(ii) The Audit Committee shall assist the Board of Directors in ensuring that the financial 
statements reflect true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and in 
ensuring a good monitoring system within the business.  
(iii) The Audit Committee shall be responsible to the Board of Directors. The duties of 
the Audit Committee shall be clearly set forth in writing.  
 
3.1 Constitution of the Audit Committee  
(i) The Audit Committee shall be composed of at least 3 (three) members.  
(ii) The Board of Directors shall appoint members of the Audit Committee who shall 
be directors of the company and shall include at least 1 (one) independent director. 
(iii) All members of the audit committee should be “financially literate” and at least 1 
(one) member shall have accounting or related financial management experience. 
 
Explanation: The term “financially literate” means the ability to read and understand the 
financial statements like Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement and a 
person will be considered to have accounting or related financial management expertise if 
(s)he possesses professional qualification or Accounting/ Finance graduate with at least 12 
(twelve) years of corporate management/professional experiences. 
 
(iv) When the term of service of the Committee members expires or there is any 
circumstance causing any Committee member to be unable to hold office until 
expiration of the term of service, thus making the number of the Committee 
members to be lower than the prescribed number of 3 (three) persons, the Board 
of Directors shall appoint the new Committee member(s) to fill up the 
vacancy(ies) immediately or not later than 1 (one) month from the date of 
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vacancy(ies) in the Committee to ensure continuity of the performance of work of 
the Audit Committee.  
(v) The company secretary shall act as the secretary of the Committee.  
(vi) The quorum of the Audit Committee meeting shall not constitute without at least 1 
(one) independent director. 
 
3.2 Chairman of the Audit Committee  
(i) The Board of Directors shall select 1 (one) member of the Audit Committee to be 
Chairman of the Audit Committee, who shall be an independent director.  
(ii) Chairman of the audit committee shall remain present in the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM).  
 
3.3 Role of Audit Committee  
Role of audit committee shall include the following:-  
(i) Oversee the financial reporting process.  
(ii) Monitor choice of accounting policies and principles.  
(iii) Monitor Internal Control Risk management process.  
(iv) Oversee hiring and performance of external auditors.  
(v) Review along with the management, the annual financial statements before 
submission to the board for approval.  
(vi) Review along with the management, the quarterly and half yearly financial 
statements before submission to the board for approval.  
(vii) Review the adequacy of internal audit function.  
(viii) Review statement of significant related party transactions submitted by the 
management.  
(ix) Review Management Letters/ Letter of Internal Control weakness issued by 
statutory auditors.  
(x) When money is raised through Initial Public Offering (IPO)/Repeat Public 
Offering (RPO)/Rights Issue the company shall disclose to the Audit Committee 
about the uses/applications of funds by major category (capital expenditure, 
sales and marketing expenses, working capital, etc), on a quarterly basis, as a 
part of their quarterly declaration of financial results. Further, on an annual 
basis, the company shall prepare a statement of funds utilized for the purposes 
other than those stated in the offer document/prospectus.  
 
3.4 Reporting of the Audit Committee  
 
3.4.1 Reporting to the Board of Directors  
i. The Audit Committee shall report on its activities to the Board of 
Directors.  
ii. The Audit Committee shall immediately report to the Board of Directors 
on the following findings, if any:-   
 a)  report on conflicts of interests;  
 b) suspected or presumed fraud or irregularity or material 
defect in the internal control system;  
 c) suspected infringement of laws, including securities related laws, rules 
and regulations; 
 d) any other matter which shall be disclosed to the Board of 
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Directors immediately.  
  
3.4.2 Reporting to the Authorities  
If the Audit Committee has reported to the Board of Directors about anything which has 
material impact on the financial condition and results of operation and has discussed with the 
Board of Directors and the management that any rectification is necessary and if the Audit 
Committee finds that such rectification has been unreasonably ignored, the Audit Committee 
shall report such finding to the Commission, upon reporting of such matters to the Board of 
Directors for three times or completion of a period of 6 (six) months from the date of first 
reporting to the Board of Directors, whichever is earlier. 
 
3.4.3 Reporting to the Shareholders and General Investors  
Report on activities carried out by the Audit Committee, including any report made to the 
Board of Directors under condition 3.4.1 (ii) above during the year, shall be signed by the 
Chairman of the Audit Committee and disclosed in the annual report of the issuer company.  
 
4. EXTERNAL/STATUTORY AUDITORS:  
The issuer company should not engage its external/statutory auditors to perform 
the following services of the company; namely:-  
 
(i) Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions.   
(ii) Financial information systems design and implementation.   
(iii) Book-keeping or other services related to the accounting records or 
financial statements.  
(iv) Broker-dealer services.   
(v) Actuarial services.   
(vi) Internal audit services.   
(vii) Any other service that the Audit Committee determines.  
(viii) No partner or employees of the external audit firms shall possess any share of 
the company they audit at least during the tenure of their audit assignment of 
that company.  
 
5. SUBSIDIARY COMPANY:  
(i) Provisions relating to the composition of the Board of Directors of the holding 
company shall be made applicable to the composition of the Board of Directors of 
the subsidiary company.  
(ii) At least 1 (one) independent director on the Board of Directors of the holding 
company shall be a director on the Board of Directors of the subsidiary company. 
(iii) The minutes of the Board meeting of the subsidiary company shall be placed for 
review at the following Board meeting of the holding company.  
(iv) The minutes of the respective Board meeting of the holding company shall state 
 379  
 
that they have reviewed the affairs of the subsidiary company also.  
(v) The Audit Committee of the holding company shall also review the financial 
statements, in particular the investments made by the subsidiary company.  
 
6. DUTIES OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL 
OFFICER (CFO):  
 
The CEO and CFO shall certify to the Board that:- 
(i) They have reviewed financial statements for the year and that to the best of their 
knowledge and belief:  
 
a) these statements do not contain any materially untrue statement or omit any 
material fact or contain statements that might be misleading;  
b) these statements together present a true and fair view of the company‟s affairs 
and are in compliance with existing accounting standards and applicable laws.  
(ii) There are, to the best of knowledge and belief, no transactions entered into by the 
company during the year which are fraudulent, illegal or violation of the 
company‟s code of conduct.  
 
7. REPORTING AND COMPLIANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  
 
(i) The company shall obtain a certificate from a practicing Professional 
Accountant/Secretary (Chartered Accountant/Cost and Management 
Accountant/Chartered Secretary) regarding compliance of conditions of Corporate 
Governance Guidelines of the Commission and shall send the same to the 
shareholders along with the Annual Report on a yearly basis.  
 
Explanation: Chartered Accountant means Chartered Accountant as defined in 
the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (Act No. XXXVIII of 1949); Cost and 
Management Accountant means Cost and Management Accountant as defined in 
the Cost and Management Accountants Ordinance, 1977 (Ordinance No. LIII of 
1977); Chartered Secretary means Chartered Secretary.  
 
(ii) The directors of the company shall state, in accordance with the Annexure 
attached, in the directors' report whether the company has complied with these 
conditions.  
 
Annexure 
Status of compliance with the conditions imposed by the Commission‟s Notification No. 
SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/134/Admin/44 dated 07 August 2012 issued under section 2CC of 
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969: 
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(Report under Condition No. 7.00) 
Condition No. Title  Compliance Status Remarks 
 
   (Put √in the appropriate column) 
(if any)            Complied  Not complied       
 
1.1      
 
1.2 (i)      
 
        
1.2 (ii) a)      
 
1.2 (ii) b)      
 
1.2 (ii) c)      
 
1.2 (ii) d)      
 
        
1.2 (ii) e)      
 
1.2 (ii) f)      
 
1.2 (ii) g)      
 
        
1.2 (ii) h)      
 
1.2 (ii) i)      
 
1.2 (iii)      
 
        
1.2 (iv)      
 
1.2 (v)      
 
1.2 (vi)      
 
1.3 (i)      
 
        
1.3 (ii)      
 
1.3 (iii)      
 
1.4      
 
        
1.5 (i)      
 
1.5 (ii)      
 
1.5 (iii)      
 
        
1.5 (iv)      
 
1.5 (v)      
 
        
        
1.5 (vi)      
 
1.5 (vii)      
 
1.5 (viii)      
 
        
1.5 (ix)      
 
1.5 (x)      
 
1.5 (xi)      
 
1.5 (xii)      
 
        
1.5 (xiii)      
 
1.5 (xiv)      
 
1.5 (xv)      
 
        
1.5 (xvi)      
 
1.5 (xvii)      
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1.5 (xviii)      
 
        
1.5 (xix)      
 
1.5 (xx)      
 
1.5 (xxi) a)      
 
1.5 (xxi) b)      
 
        
1.5 (xxi) c)      
 
1.5 (xxi) d)      
 
1.5 (xxii) a)      
 
        
1.5 (xxii) b)      
 
1.5 (xxii) c)      
 
2.1       
 
        
2.2       
 
3 (i)      
 
3 (ii)      
 
       
3 (iii)      
 
3.1 (i)      
 
3.1 (ii)      
 
3.1 (iii)      
 
        
3.1 (iv)      
 
3.1 (v)      
 
        
3.1 (vi)      
3.2 (i)      
3.2 (ii)      
       
3.3 (i)      
3.3 (ii)      
3.3 (iii)      
3.3 (iv)      
       
3.3 (v)      
3.3 (vi)      
3.3 (vii)      
       
3.3 (viii)      
3.3 (ix)      
3.3 (x)      
      
3.4.1 (i)      
3.4.1 (ii) a)      
3.4.1 (ii) b)      
3.4.1 (ii) c)      
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3.4.1 (ii) d)      
3.4.2      
3.5       
       
4 (i)      
4 (ii)      
4 (iii)      
       
4 (iv)      
4 (v)      
4 (vi)      
       
4 (vii)      
4 (viii)      
5 (i)      
5 (ii)      
       
5 (iii)      
5 (iv)      
5 (v)      
6 (i) a)      
6 (i) b)      
       
6 (ii)      
7 (i)      
7 (ii)      
 
This Notification shall be complied within 31 December 2012. 
 
By order of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Prof. Dr. M. Khairul Hossain 
Chairman. 
 
